UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RUBEN RODRIGUEZ (2024)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT RODRIGUEZ'S MOTION FOR EARLY TERMINATION OF SUPERVISED RELEASE

Before this Court is Defendant Ruben Rodriguez's motion for early termination of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). (Def. Mot., ECF No. 241.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

After pleading guilty on November 9, 2018 to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), Rodriguez was sentenced to 72 months of incarceration. (ECF No. 162.) The Court (Arterton, J.) also sentenced Rodriguez to 36 months of supervised release. (Id.) Rodriguez began his supervised release on November 7, 2022, and has served 20 months of the 36-month term. (Def. Mot. at 1.)

Rodriguez moves for early termination of his supervised release on the grounds that he maintains full-time employment and “has accomplished the ‘rehabilitative purpose’ of supervision.” (Id.) Rodriguez, who is in his forties, states that incarceration was a “real wakeup call,” and emphasizes that he has “continued to demonstrate his upstanding character, excellent work ethic, and commitment to family.” (Id. at 2, 4.) Rodriguez contends that his supervised release should be terminated so that he can move back to Puerto Rico to take care of his ailing father. (Id. at 4.) Both the Government and the Probation Office oppose the motion. (Id. at 1; Probation Mem., ECF No. 247 at 2.) Victoria Aguilar, Supervisory U.S. Probation Officer, states that “[d]ue to the nature and circumstances regarding [Rodriguez's] criminal history and his rationale for requesting early termination from supervised release, our office does not support this motion.” (Probation Mem. at 2.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), a court may “terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release ․ if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). In determining whether early termination of supervised release is warranted, the Court is to consider several factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. § 3583(e). These factors include: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, deterrence, protecting the public from further crimes, providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment, the applicable sentencing range for the defendant's conduct, any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, and the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).

“Early discharge from supervised release is appropriate to ‘account for new or unforeseen circumstances’ not contemplated at the initial imposition of the sentence.” United States v. Monteperto, No. 01-CR-56 (CBA), 2007 WL 914545, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2007) (quoting United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1997)). “Only ‘occasionally’ is it warranted due to the changed circumstances of the defendant, such as exceptionally good behavior, which renders the previously imposed term ‘either too harsh or inappropriately tailored to serve’ general punishment goals.” Id. (quoting Lussier, 104 F.3d at 36). Motions for early termination of supervised release should not be granted as a matter of course because “model prison conduct and full compliance with the terms of supervised release is what is expected of” a defendant. United States v. Weintraub, 371 F. Supp. 2d 164, 166–67 (D. Conn. 2005); see also United States v. Sheckley, 129 F.3d 114, 1997 WL 701370, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 10, 1997).

III. DISCUSSION

Having considered Rodriguez's submission, the Probation Office's memorandum, the circumstances of Rodriguez's conviction and his prior conviction for sexual assault of a minor in the second degree, and all other relevant § 3553(a) factors, the Court concludes that he is not the exceptional case warranting early termination of his supervised release. While the Court is pleased with Rodriguez's post-incarceration conduct and commends him for his continued compliance with the conditions of his supervised release and maintenance of fulltime employment, “in the end that is what is required of all criminal defendants[.]” Weintraub, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 167; see also United States v. Berrios, No. 95-CR-84 (PKL), 2010 WL 1010022, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2010) (holding that defendant's “good behavior, though praiseworthy, does not rise to the level of being ‘exceptional’ or ‘new or unforeseen’ ”); Monteperto, 2007 WL 914545, at *1 (denying defendant's motion for early termination of supervised release on the grounds that “laudable” and “commendable” behavior is neither “exceptional” nor “new or unforeseen”).

Like the defendants cited above, Rodriguez's praiseworthy behavior is not “exceptional” or “new or unforeseen.” Moreover, because Rodriguez has only completed a little over one-half of his term of supervised release (Def. Mot. at 1), the § 3553(a) factors would be disserved by terminating supervised release this early. See Sheckley, 1997 WL 701370, at *1 (affirming denial of termination of supervised release where appellant served half of his term). Finally, to the extent Rodriguez seeks early termination of his supervised release in order to move to Puerto Rico, the Probation Office has given him information on how to transfer the case to that jurisdiction. (Probation Mem. at 2.) A reduction in Rodriguez's term of supervised release on grounds of good behavior or change of jurisdiction, therefore, is not warranted.

Accordingly, while the Court is encouraged by Rodriguez's efforts toward rehabilitating himself, his motion for early termination of his supervised release is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Rodriguez's motion for early termination of supervised release (ECF No. 241) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

VERNON D. OLIVER United States District Judge