IAN SANCHEZ ALARCON v. JUAN BALTAZAR (2026)

ORDER re ATTORNEY'S FEES

Petitioner moves for an award of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The motion is granted, and the Court awards fees totaling $7,572.48.

BACKGROUND

This in one of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of cases brought before district courts by undocumented immigrants who have been arrested by Department of Homeland Security personnel and placed in detention camps pending removal proceedings. Ian Sanchez Alarcon is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States in June 2021 when he was three years old. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 1. He initially received Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) status in 2014, and he continued to receive renewals, most recently on June 21, 2024. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. Despite receiving a Notice of Intent to Terminate his grant of DACA on October 22, 2025, his DACA has not yet been cancelled and remained in effect until June 20, 2026. Id.

In May 2025, Mr. Sanchez Alarcon was encountered by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after he was arrested on a driving under the influence charge in Florida. Id. at ¶ 24. He was issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging him as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Id. at ¶¶ 24-26. On October 24, 2025, an immigration judge ordered Mr. Sanchez Alarcon to be removed to Mexico. Id. at ¶ 29. He appealed that removal order to the BIA. Id. at ¶ 30. Meanwhile, he has been detained at the Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado and has not been given an opportunity to request a bond hearing or release because ICE claimed that his detention was mandatory under the current administration's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Mr. Sanchez Alarcon is fortunate in that he has a lawyer. On January 15, 2026, his lawyer filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking an order directing respondents to release him or, at a minimum, provide him with a bond hearing. ECF No. 1 at 21. In his petition he claimed that he had been unlawfully detained pursuant to a misapplication of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which mandates detention pending removal proceedings, whereas he should have been eligible for a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. His petition cited six previous cases in which judges in this district had ordered bond hearings or release after concluding that § 1226, not § 1225, applied to undocumented immigrants already present in the United States, as opposed to those who were stopped at the border before entering.

On February 2, 2026, this Court ordered respondents to show cause as to why the petition should not be granted. ECF No. 8. On February 17, 2026, respondents responded, agreeing that the central issue was whether Mr. Sanchez Alarcon was subject to mandatory detention by ICE under § 1225(b), but acknowledging that “[t]his issue is not materially different from an issue this Court has resolved in a prior ruling in another case.” ECF No. 11 at 1 (citing Cervantes Arredondo v. Baltazar, 25-cv-03040-RBJ (D. Colo., Oct. 31, 2025)). Nevertheless, respondents defended the government's present position on the §§ 1225/1226 issue, citing a recent Fifth Circuit decision and a district court in Oklahoma that supported that interpretation. They did acknowledge that “many” other cases do not support their position. Id at 2.

On February 17, 2026, having considered the government's response and petitioner's reply, I granted the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 12. In that order I cited four rulings from this district, that were issued before the respondents’ February 17 response that held that individuals in Mr. Sanchez Alarcon's position were subject to § 1226, not § 1225. I ordered the government to grant Mr. Sanchez Alarcon a bond hearing. Id. at 3. On February 25, 2026, he received that bond hearing and was granted bond by the immigration judge. ECF No. 17 at 1.

The matter is now before the Court on petitioner's motion for an award of attorney's fees. ECF No. 25. Respondents oppose the motion. ECF No. 26.

ANALYSIS and CONCLUSIONS

Courts may award attorney's fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). See Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152 (10th Cir. 2025). Under the EAJA a party can recover attorney's fees against the United States if (1) he was the prevailing party, (2) the government's position in the case was not substantially justified, (3) the party is eligible to receive an award; and (4) the amount sought is reasonable. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1) and 2412(d)(2)(B). Plaintiff seeks an award of $16,840.00. Respondents do not dispute that Mr. Sanchez Alarcon was the prevailing party or that he is eligible for an award. Respondents do, however, claim that their position was substantially justified; and if the Court finds otherwise, they argue that the amount of the attorney's fees requested is unreasonable.

A. Was Respondents’ Position on the Merits of the Petition Substantially Justified?

The government has the burden to establish that its position was substantially justified. See Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007). A position is substantially justified under the EAJA if it has “a reasonable basis both in law and fact” and is “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). I find that the government's position in this case was not substantially justified. In doing so, I emphasize that I do not attribute the government's position in this case to counsel. The lawyers in the United States Attorney's Office for Colorado have litigated this case with the same degree of candor that I have experienced during my years on this bench. They are advocates for the position of their client, the United States, and have done their job as expected.

The question, however, is whether the government's position on the §§ 1225/1226 dispute, as applied to undocumented immigrants in a position like Mr. Sanchez Alarcon, was substantially justified. These are individuals who either entered the United States illegally or remained after their legal entitlement ended. In most cases, they have remained in the country for many years. They are individuals who do not have significant criminal records, if any; who have never been described as a danger to the community or as a flight risk; and who often have families (including U.S. citizens), jobs, and pay taxes.¹ To be sure, they are subject to removal. Whether and when they will be deported will be determined by the Executive Branch, not the courts. The question in front of the courts is whether they are legally entitled to a bond hearing and/or conditional release while they await the Executive's decision.

My first reason for concluding that the government's present position was not substantially justified is historical. For nearly 30 years the United States government interpreted § 1225(b)(2) as being applicable to individuals who are stopped at the border. They remained in detention until their case concluded. The government applied § 1226 to undocumented individuals who were already in the United States, and they were entitled to a bond hearing. This all changed in July 2025 when the present administration reinterpreted the statutes so that it could detain without bond every undocumented immigrant arrested, including people like Mr. Sanchez Alarcon, regardless of whether they were a danger to the community or a flight risk. That historical context is well described in a recent decision of the Tenth Circuit. Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 1876709, at **2-3 (10th Cir. June 30, 2026).² This change of position has caused probably thousands of people to be detained, frequently in appalling conditions. It has caused financial and emotional distress to family members and employers. And it has imposed huge burdens on prosecutors and judges in the civil justice system.

Second, the government's present position is inconsistent with a decision of the United States Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit noted this in Santillan Quiroz:

What's more, the Supreme Court has endorsed this (until recently) unbroken interpretation and practice. In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court explained that, for purposes of our immigration laws, § 1225 governs the processing of noncitizens at “the Nation's borders and ports of entry.” Once noncitizens are “inside the United States,” § 1226 “generally governs the process of arresting and detaining that group of aliens pending their removal.” In short, Jennings explained that § 1225 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country” while § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country.” (emphasis added). We therefore approach the Government's novel, contrary position with a healthy dose of skepticism.

2026 WL 1876709 at *5 (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287, 288 and 289 (2018)).

In determining whether respondents’ position in this case was substantially justified, it is fair to look at what they knew when they took that position. When the government detained Mr. Sanchez Alarcon without a bond hearing, it was aware of its own previous 30-year history of interpreting §§ 1225 and 1226. It was aware of the Jennings case.³ By February 17, 2026, when respondents filed their response to this Court's show-cause order, the government knew much more. I noted earlier that Mr. Sanchez Alarcon's petition for a writ of habeas corpus itself listed six previous decisions of judges in this district that rejected the government's position on the application of § 1225 to individuals in his position. I am sure there were more. To my knowledge every district and magistrate judge in this district has drawn multiples of these cases, and as of the time respondent filed their response to the show-cause order, every judge and magistrate judge in this district had rejected the government's position.

In support of their position on substantial justification, respondents note that two circuit courts, Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026) and Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026), and several district courts, had gone the other way. However, both appellate decisions were decided on 2-1 votes. Respondents knew when they filed their response to the petition that I had already expressed my agreement with the dissent in Buenrostro. See Geronimo Hernandez v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-00057-RBJ, ECF No. 7 at 2-3 (D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2026). At that time, they also knew that another judge in this district who had considered the same issue likewise agreed with the Buenrostro dissent.⁴ See Singh v. Baltazar, 819 F. Supp. 3d 1247 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026); Murzi v. Noem, No. 26-cv-00359-CNS, 2026 WL 395111 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 2026). And by the time respondents filed their response to petitioner's motion for attorney's fees, this Court had, on multiple occasions, expressly disagreed with the reasoning articulated by the Buenrostro and Avila majorities.⁵

But whether respondents’ position in the present case was substantially justified does not turn solely, or ever primarily, on a counting of cases. Rather, the basic problem is that the government's reinterpretation of § 1225 to support the administration's immigration policies and practices was ill-motivated, ill-conceived, and wrong. Respondents have not met their burden to show that their position in this case was substantially justified.⁶

B. What is a Reasonable Hourly Rate for an Attorney's Fee Award?

The Court does, however, agree with the respondents that the amount of attorney's fees requested by the petitioner is excessive for this case. There is no dispute about the number of hours recorded by petitioner's lawyer and paralegal. The dispute concerns the appropriate hourly rate.

Petitioner's lawyer, Sarah L. Vuong, requests a fee award using an hourly rate of $600 per hour for her time. She believes this to be a reasonable rate for an immigration lawyer of her experience and skill. ECF No. 25-4. She submits declarations from two other experienced immigration lawyers who attest to Ms. Vuong's ability, experience, and the reasonableness of her rates. ECF No. 25-2 and 25-3.

I do not question Ms. Vuong's expertise in immigration matters. If this were a complex immigration case, with discovery, extensive motion practice, hearings, possibly a trial, I likely would have used the adjusted lodestar method and found her rate to be reasonable. See Robinson v. City of Edmund, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998) (describing the lodestar calculation as a product of the number of attorney hours reasonably expended and a reasonable hourly rate); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (listing factors often used to make appropriate adjustments to the lodestar).

Respondents, however, note that the EAJA limits attorney's fees to $125 per hour, adjusted for inflation, unless “the court justifies a higher rate for a special factor.” ECF No. 26 at 9 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)). The Consumer Price Index is used to calculate the inflation adjustment. See T.E. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-cv-02274-CNS, 2023 WL 7089901, at *4 (D. Colo. Oct. 26, 2023). Respondents use a formula that I have seen in other cases to calculate the adjusted EAJA rate: $125 (the rate when the statute was passed) multiplied by the unadjusted Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) when the services were rendered, divided by the CPI-U for March 1996 when the statute was passed. In this case, the formula generates a rate of $261.12 per hour:

~p$125 × 325.252/155.7~p = $261.12

ECF No. 26 at 5.

I do not find that there is a special factor present in this case that justifies a higher rate. It is not a complex case. There was no discovery, no dispute about the facts, and the limited motion practice focused on one legal issue. There has been a deluge of similar cases filed in this district (and around the country resulting from the government's reinterpretation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. The judges in this district have, with one exception, granted the petitions. There is a cookie cutter aspect to these cases that enables lawyers to borrow from other lawyers and from their own previous work. It is important litigation work, but it is not unusually challenging.

I find that $261.12 is a reasonable hourly rate for this case. Using the undisputed number of hours claimed by the petition, the calculation is as follows:

• 24.6 attorney hours × $261.12 = $6,423.55

• 1.4 paralegal hours × $261.12 = 365.57 7

• $6,789.12

Petitioner requests compensation for an additional three hours of work on the reply brief. I find that to be a reasonable request. This adds $783.36, bringing the total award to $7,572.48.

ORDER

Petitioner's motion for an award of attorney's fees, ECF No. 25, is GRANTED. The Court awards fees in the amount of $7,572.48.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As noted above, in May 2025, Mr. Sanchez Alarcon was charged with a DUI. On December 23, 2025, Mr. Sanchez entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of reckless driving and was sentenced to probation. ECF No. 1 at 6. The Court does not minimize a charge of DUI, which does raise community safety issues. However, that was not provided by respondents as a reason for his detention. ECF No. 11 at 2-3.

2.   Because Santillan Quiroz came down after respondents’ response to the show-cause order, I only cite the case for its historical discussion and its analysis of the Jennings case.

3.   In its response to the show cause order, respondents suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) supported the government's position. That was a misinterpretation of Jennings. The Tenth Circuit agrees, as noted above.

4.   After the response to the show-cause order was filed in this case, four circuit courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have disagreed with Buenrostro and Avila. Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026); Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr Mia., 175 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2026); and Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, supra.

5.   See e.g., Mundo Zarate v. Valdez, No. 1:26-cv-01280-RBJ, ECF No. 13 at 3 (D. Colo. Apr. 8, 2026); Singh v. Baltazar, No. 1:26-cv-00612-RBJ, ECF No. 11, at 3 (D. Colo. March 26, 2026); Tijerino v. Baltazar, No. 1:26-cv-00907-RBJ, ECF No. 9 at 5 (D. Colo. March 24, 2026); Mejia Arias v. Baltazar, No. 1:26-cv-00770, ECF No. 13 at 4-5 (D. Colo. March 19, 2026); Naranjo Dominguez v Baltazar, No. 1:26-cv-00482-RBJ, ECF No. 11 at 3 (March 12, 2026); Gonzalez Rosas v. Baltazar, No. 1:26-cv-00457-RBJ, ECF No. 13 at 3 (D. Colo. Feb. 25, 2026); Kaba v. Bondi, No. 1:26-cv-00875-RBJ, ECF No. 15 at 3 (D. Colo. March 20, 2026); Cabral v. Baltazar, No. 1:26-cv-00416-RBJ, ECF No. 14 at 3 (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2026).

6.   Judge Martinez of this district has reached similar conclusions in two recent cases. See Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-4029-WJM-STV, 2026 WL 1758226, at **2-4 (D. Colo. June 18, 2026); Morales Lopez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-3078, at **5-6 (D. Colo. May 29, 2026).

7.   The parties have not expressly addressed whether paralegal time should be billed at the same statutory rate which is slightly higher than the law firm's regular rate. It makes little difference in this case, and I have given the petitioner the benefit of the doubt.

R. Brooke Jackson Senior United States District Court Judge