Marianne Apodaca, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. MILE HI FOODS CO LLC QSR LLC LLC (2025)

ORDER ON MOTIONS

Plaintiff alleges Defendants engaged in unlawful employment practices by discriminating against females, African Americans, and Afghans in its hiring. It brings five claims under Title VII, including failure to hire based on sex, race, and national origin, and well as retaliation and insufficient recordkeeping. See Doc. 1 at 13–17. Defendant Bimbo QSR Colorado, LLC moves to dismiss all claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. 38. Defendant Mile Hi moves to partially dismiss Plaintiff's complaint—the first, second, and third claims (failure to hire based on sex, race/color, and national origin). Doc. 54. And Plaintiff moves to strike several of Defendant Mile Hi's affirmative defenses. Doc. 66. For the reasons below, Defendant QSR's motion is granted, Defendant Mile Hi's motion to partially dismiss is denied, and Plaintiff's motion to strike Mile Hi's affirmative defenses is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

On October 22, 2019, Plaintiff-Intervenor Marianne Apodaca filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission asserting violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by Defendants Mile Hi Foods, Co., Mile Hi Employee Group, Inc., Mile Hi Bakery, Inc., Mile Hi Corporate Services, LLC, Mile Hi Warehousing & Logistics, Co., and all d/b/a Mile Hi Companies. Doc. 1 at ¶ 10; Doc. 20-2 at ¶ 8. Mile Hi produces baked goods for national chain restaurants, distributes supplies to fast food restaurants, and performs warehousing and delivery services for food suppliers and distributors. Doc. 1 at ¶ 22. According to its website, Mile Hi has the largest footprint of food and paper product distribution, including to hundreds of McDonald's locations across Colorado and neighboring states. Doc. 20-2 at ¶ 18. Ms. Apodaca, the Human Resources Manager for Mile Hi from September 21, 2015 to April 24, 2019, was responsible for staffing over 300 positions for Mile Hi in management, warehouse, food services, transportation, administration, and other employment positions. Doc. 20-2 at ¶¶ 19–20.

In her EEOC Charge, Ms. Apodaca claimed Mile Hi engaged in discriminatory hiring practices beginning in 2015, retaliation against her in 2019, and recordkeeping violations in 2021. Id. Specifically, Ms. Apodaca alleged that she was instructed to follow racially and sexually discriminatory hiring quotas to limit the number of African American, female, and Afghan employees. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 36, 38–84; Doc. 20-2 at ¶¶ 59–66, 76–79, 101–151, 155–158, 176–189, 198–207. Ms. Apodaca alleges that she refused to follow these directives and, as a result, was subjected to a hostile work environment, retaliation, and termination. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 85–103; Doc. 20-2, ¶¶ 157–170, 190–191, 203–204, 208–214, 218–221.

Following Ms. Apodaca's filing, the EEOC undertook an investigation of her charges against Mile Hi, and on April 23, 2024, issued a Letter of Determination stating it found reasonable cause to believe Mile Hi had violated Title VII. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 10–11; Doc. 20-2 at ¶¶ 8–10. Following the parties’ participation in a formal conciliation process, on August 14, 2024, the EEOC issued a Notice of Failure of Conciliation to Mile Hi. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 12-14; Doc. 20-2 at ¶ 10. On September 30, 2024, the EEOC filed the current lawsuit.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court's role in addressing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is to “determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed.” Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007). In doing so, the court “must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Alvarado v. KOB-TV, LLC, 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (quoting in part Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “Mere ‘labels and conclusions’ and ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’ will not suffice.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). So, a court can “disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

DISCUSSION

I. QSR's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 38)

QSR contends EEOC's claims against it should be dismissed because the complaint fails to plead any facts that QSR is the same entity as Mile Hi or that it was engaged in any of the alleged discriminatory conduct. Doc. 38 at 4–5; 12–14. EEOC argues QSR is the same entity as Mile Hi under Colorado law and therefore is responsible for any discrimination Mile Hi committed. Doc. 60 at 6–8. I agree with QSR.

The complaint is devoid of any allegations whatsoever regarding QSR. See Doc. 1. Aside from being listed in the caption, QSR is never mentioned in the complaint, not even in the party descriptions. Id. at 3–9. The complaint never asserts QSR was involved in or responsible for Mile Hi's employment decisions, was a successor or parent company to Mile Hi or its operations, or that the alleged discriminatory practices continued after QSR acquired Mile Hi. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that [a] defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A “group pleading is insufficient to state a plausible claim implicating a particular defendant.” Cayo, Inc. v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., No. 23-cv-00105, 2023 WL 4744196, at *9 (D. Colo. May 2, 2023). EEOC provides no allegations about QSR—not even conclusory ones—that would suggest it is liable for the Title VII violations its complaint describes. And it cannot simply lump QSR into the alleged conduct of Mile Hi using a group pleading, especially where the grouping is done only in the case caption.¹ See L5L See Indus., Inc. v. Kiss Indus., LLC, No. 20-cv-03742, 2022 WL 704705, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 21, 2022) (dismissing claims and holding that a “[g]roup pleading violates Rule 8 when a plaintiff fails to distinguish among multiple defendants, including on claims that could not apply to certain defendants”). QSR's motion to dismiss is therefore granted and EEOC's claims against QSR are dismissed without prejudice.

II. Mile Hi's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 54)

Mile Hi contends EEOC's first claim (failure to hire based on sex) should be dismissed because it is time-barred under Section 706 of Title VI, see Doc. 54 at 4–7, and that EEOC's second and third claims (failure to hire based on race/color and national origin) are also time-barred because EEOC has not named specific aggrieved individuals related to those claims. Id. at 7–8. EEOC argues Section 706's time bar does not apply to claims that allege a pattern and practice constituting a continuing violation, as its first claim does, see Doc. 65 at 4–8, and its second and third claims do not require naming aggrieved individuals in its complaint to overcome a motion to dismiss. Id. at 8–12. I agree with EEOC.

A. First Claim (Failure to Hire Based on Sex)

Under Title VII Section 706, “an employee must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice giving rise to the charge unless the employee has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency, in which case the employee has 300 days to file her EEOC charge.”² Juarez v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 23-CV-00409-PAB-NRN, 2024 WL 1156610, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 15, 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1)). But the continuing violation doctrine acts as an exception to the 300-day time bar. In Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, the Supreme Court addressed the continuing violation doctrine and held where multiple acts make up one claim, a plaintiff can recover for acts outside the 300-day time limit when at least one act occurred within that period. 536 U.S. 101, 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). The “Morgan Court expressly left open whether the continuing violations doctrine applied to the pattern or practice method of proof,” see Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 F. App'x 707, 715 (10th Cir. 2008), something the Tenth Circuit has still declined to address. Id. at 715; see also Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1186 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003). Prior to Morgan, however, the Tenth Circuit recognized in Bruno v. Western Electric Co. that when alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination, under “a plaintiff who shows a continuing policy and practice that operated within the statutory period has satisfied the filing requirements.” 829 F.2d 957, 960 (10th Cir. 1987). Still, refusals to hire (like terminations, failures to promote, and denials of transfer) are generally considered discrete acts and not a pattern or practice that would constitute a continuing violation. See Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1185 (“Under Morgan, it is clear that the 1997 and 1998 refusals to hire are discrete acts. See 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061.”). Citing Davidson and other cases, Mile Hi argues that EEOC's allegations that Mile Hi failed to hire women constitute discrete acts and therefore are not one unlawful employment action subject to the continuing violation doctrine. I disagree.

EEOC's complaint alleges Mile Hi “engaged in a pattern or practice of failing or refusing to hire female applicants for warehouse and driving positions because of their sex.” Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 17, 81–82, 123. The continuing violation doctrine is an equitable exception to Section 706's timely filing requirement for claims “based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061. The Tenth Circuit uses three factors to determine if a violation is continuing:

(i) subject matter—whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination; (ii) frequency; and (iii) permanence—whether the nature of the violations should trigger an employee's awareness of the need to assert her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate.

Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1310–11 & n.4 (10th Cir. 1999). EEOC alleges Mile Hi instructed Ms. Apodaca “not to hire women for warehouse jobs because [it] believed that women were not effective at manual labor and would distract other male workers,” and that it “preferred hiring women to clerical or administrative jobs.” Doc. 1 at 1, ¶ 53. EEOC also alleges that Mile Hi's executive told Ms. Apodaca that “female workers cannot do the warehouse job and are not effective,” id. at ¶ 52, and “that Mile Hi should not hire ‘pretty girls’ in the warehouse because then the warehouse workers do not get any work done.” Id. at ¶ 77. Viewing the allegations in favor of EEOC, as I must on a motion to dismiss, they satisfy the first and second factors above. As to third factor—permanence—there is no indication that Mile Hi's failure to hire females during the applicable time period “should [have] trigger[ed] an [applicant]’s awareness of the need to assert her rights” or that “the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate.” Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1310. From the applicant's perspective, Mile Hi could have declined to hire her for any number of non-discriminatory reasons, like a competitive applicant pool or lack of experience. Therefore, EEOC's claim of failure to hire based on sex meets the characteristics for a continuing violation. See EEOC v. Waste Indus. U.S.A., LLC, No. 1:23-CV-04293-JPB-JEM, 2024 WL 4344954, at *8 (N.D. Ga. May 28, 2024) (holding “the Court is ultimately persuaded that, like the individual acts which over time create a hostile work environment, the individual failures to hire which occur over time accumulate to become a company's pattern or practice”); see also EEOC v. Horizontal Well Drillers, LLC, No. CIV-17-879-R, 2018 WL 3029108, at *9 (W.D. Okla. June 18, 2018) (finding failure to hire constituted a continuing violation negating Section 706's 300-day time bar). Accordingly, EEOC can use the continuing violation exception to Section 706's timely filing rule to recover on behalf of females aggrieved by Mile Hi's alleged pattern or practice of failure to hire “[s]ince at least 2015.”³ Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 17–18, 81–82, 123. Mile Hi's motion to dismiss EEOC's first claim is therefore denied. If at a later stage EEOC cannot meet its burden to prove a continuing violation, Mile Hi may raise this issue again.

B. Second & Third Claims (Failure to Hire Based on Race/Color and National Origin)

Mile Hi contends that because EEOC did not name specific Black or Afghan aggrieved individuals who were denied employment 300 days before the charge of discrimination, that its second and third claims are time-barred under Title VII's Section 706. Mile Hi states “courts have required the name of at least ‘one presently identified victim’ in order to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8” and cites to cases appearing to support that proposition. Doc. 54 at 8. Mile Hi is wrong and misstates the caselaw.

As EEOC points out, when it brings a lawsuit in its own name on behalf of the public interest, it is not acting as a proxy for private individuals. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (noting “the agency is guided by ‘the overriding public interest in equal employment opportunity ․ asserted through direct Federal enforcement.’ 118 Cong. Rec. 4941 (1972).”). As a result, to survive a motion to dismiss, Rule 8 only requires the EEOC provide a defendant with notice of the claims against it, not the specific name of any aggrieved individuals. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also, e.g., EEOC v. Tesla, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 3d 875, 891 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (holding defendant's “argument for dismissal based on the Commission's failure to identify any member of the alleged group of victims fails because the Commission brings this enforcement action in its own name ․ so the Commission is not required to identify an aggrieved individual to survive Tesla's motion to dismiss.”). Indeed, requiring the EEOC to identify a specific individual at the time the agency files suit ignores the independent standing it has to sue in its own name. Its authority to seek victim-specific remedies for private individuals, then, is not derivative of the rights of those individuals. See, e.g., Gen. Tel., 446 U.S. at 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698 (holding “the EEOC is not merely a proxy for the victims of discrimination”).

The cases Mile Hi cites do not actually stand for the proposition that the EEOC must name individual aggrieved parties in its pleadings. See Doc. 54 at 8. EEOC v. JBS USA, LLC states only that naming one aggrieved individual helps to satisfy Rule 8 standards, but not that it is required. See 481 F.Supp.3d 1204, 1216 (D. Colo. 2020). And in EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., regarding a class action complaint, the court held that the “EEOC must merely ‘plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference’ that [a defendant] violated provisions of the ADA as to the unidentified individuals.” No. 09-cv-5291, 2013 WL 140604, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2013). To further drive home the point, consider the language of the court's conclusion in EEOC v. Rosebud Rests. Inc.: “the Court concludes that the EEOC may bring its current claims against defendant under the authorization provided by § 706 and that its allegations of intentional discrimination are sufficient to state a claim for Title VII relief ․ even in the absence of the identification of an individual job applicant who was rejected because of his race.” 85 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 2015). Because Mile Hi misstates the law and is out of step with the EEOC's requirements under Rule 8, its motion to dismiss EEOC's claims two and three are denied.

III. EEOC's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses (Doc. 66)

EEOC moves to strike nine of Mile Hi's twenty-four affirmative defenses. Doc. 66 at 2. It contends Mile Hi's first, tenth, and nineteenth defenses should be struck because they rebut EEOC's claims and do not qualify as affirmative defenses, id. at 4–6, its third, fourth, eleventh, seventeenth, and twentieth defenses should be struck because they are immaterial or contrary to law, id. at 6–10, and its fourteenth defense should be struck because it lacks specificity and fails to give Mile Hi notice of a defense. Id. at 10. Mile Hi disagrees and contends its defenses are properly pleaded. Doc. 79.

Rule 12(f) provides that a party may move to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant [or] immaterial ․ matter.” Purzel Video GmbH v. St. Pierre, 10 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1168 (D. Colo. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)). Courts strike affirmative defenses when doing so will save time and money, prevent confusion, or prevent complication of the issues in the case. See Millennium Funding, Inc. v. Priv. Internet Access, Inc., No. 21-CV-01261-NYW-SKC, 2022 WL 7560395, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 13, 2022). Courts generally view motions to strike as a drastic remedy and infrequently grant such requests. See Purzel Video GmbH, 10 F.Supp.3d at 1168. “The plain language of Rule 12(f) does not demand the movant make a showing of prejudice,” Jenkins v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.R.D. 544, 548 (D.N.M. 2019), and the decision to strike a defense falls squarely within the discretion of the court. See Purzel Video GmbH, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 1168.

Mile Hi's first, tenth, and nineteenth affirmative defenses are stricken because they seek to negate elements of the claim and are not properly considered affirmative defenses. See A1 Garage Door Serv., LLC v. West, No. 21-cv-01821-PAB-NRN, 2022 WL 952874, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2022). Mile Hi's first affirmative defense is that “[t]he Complaint, in whole or in part, may fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Doc. 79 at 3. Its tenth affirmative defense states “[t]he same decisions would have been made with respect to any and all intervenors, plaintiffs and/or allegedly aggrieved individuals regardless of any unlawful motive.” Id. at 4. And its nineteenth affirmative defense states “[o]ne or more of The Mile Hi Defendants was an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII, and therefore is not covered under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id.

“By its nature, an affirmative defense does not negate the elements of a plaintiff's claim but instead precludes liability even if all of the elements of a plaintiff's claim are proven.” Purzel Video GmbH, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 1170. Because Mile Hi's first affirmative defense—failure to state a claim—“seek[s] to negate the elements of the plaintiff's claim,” it cannot serve as an affirmative defense. A1 Garage Door Serv., 2022 WL 952874, at *3. Mile Hi's defenses ten and nineteen suffer the same defect. The tenth provides a nondiscriminatory reason not to hire aggrieved individuals (rebutting EEOC's prima facie case), and the nineteenth argues one or more Defendants are not covered employers under Title VII. These statements merely rebut elements of EEOC's claims against it. But since a rebuttal of a claim cannot serve as an affirmative defense, these defenses must also be stricken.

EEOC also moves to strike Mile Hi's third, fourth, eleventh, fourteenth, seventeenth, and twentieth affirmative defenses. The language of these defenses are as follows:

Third Defense: “EEOC failed to conciliate in good faith, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.”

Fourth Defense: “One or more of the asserted claims may be barred, in whole or in part, by the after-acquired evidence doctrine, including wrongdoing that would have been grounds for termination had any of The Mile Hi Defendants been aware of the behavior.”

Eleventh Defense: “The individual actions of the alleged aggrieved individual(s) identified in the Complaint may have been the cause of any damages that resulted.”

Fourteenth Defense: “At all times, The Mile Hi Defendants’ actions were legitimate and based on appropriate and/or mandatory federal and/or state requirements, laws, or guidance.”

Seventeenth Defense: “Any unlawful acts or omissions allegedly committed, if at all, may have been outside the scope of the actors’ employment, and may be barred as they were not authorized, ratified, or sanctioned by The Mile Hi Defendants.”

Twentieth Defense: “Employment with one or more of the Defendants was at-will and could be terminated by either party for any reason and at any time, with or without notice.”

Regarding Mile Hi's third defense, “it is well settled in the Tenth Circuit that the EEOC's failure to conciliate in good faith is not a defense to liability.” EEOC v. Beverage Distributors Co., LLC, No. 11-CV-02557-CMA-CBS, 2012 WL 6547782, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2012). Accordingly, this defense is stricken. Mile Hi's eleventh affirmative defense must also be stricken because “the defense of contributory negligence does not apply to intentional acts of discrimination.” Lofton v. FTS Int'l Mfg. LLC, No. CIV-17-242, 2017 WL 3741982, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 30, 2017).

As to the fourth defense, it is not clear from the caselaw that an after-acquired evidence defense is per se inapplicable in a refusal-to-hire case. See Roalson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 10 F.Supp.2d 1234 (D. Kan. 1998) (finding that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning after-acquired evidence of alleged misrepresentations on a job application by Plaintiff who brought a failure-to-hire claim). Accordingly, this defense remains. Mile Hi's seventeenth defense remains for the same reason. EEOC argues but provides no authority to support its claim that the Faragher-Ellerth defense does not apply in failure-to-hire cases. Mile Hi states it is not asserting that specific defense, but merely that “an employer may be liable for both negligent and intentional torts committed by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). This is enough to maintain Mile Hi's defense at this time so it will remain. Mile Hi's fourteenth defense is a closer call. EEOC contends it is too vague to put it on notice of what defense Mile Hi is raising. See Doc. 66 at 10. But because Rule 8 does not require a party to explain how a defense applies, see Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 594 (D.N.M. 2011), I find that Mile Hi's appeal to state and federal law is sufficient notice of a defense to EEOC. Regarding Mile Hi's twentieth defense, it has agreed to withdraw it, see Doc. 79 at 9, so EEOC's motion as to this defense is moot.

CONCLUSION

It is ordered that:

Defendant QSR's Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 38, is granted without prejudice;

Defendant Mile Hi's Partial Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 54, is denied;

Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses, Doc. 66, is granted in part and denied in part as follows:

Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Strike Mile Hi's first, third, tenth, eleventh, and nineteenth affirmatives defenses is granted;

Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Strike Mile Hi's fourth, fourteenth, and seventeenth affirmative defenses is denied;

Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Strike Mile Hi's twentieth affirmative defense is moot; and

Plaintiff EEOC may file an amended complaint.

FOOTNOTES

1.   QSR suggests there may be jurisdictional grounds to dismiss this case based on the EEOC's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Doc. 38 at 6 n. 4. But as Plaintiff notes, the Supreme Court in Fort Bend Cnty., Tex. v. Davis foreclosed this jurisdictional argument. 587 U.S. 541, 542, 139 S.Ct. 1843, 204 L.Ed.2d 116 (2019) (“A claim-processing rule requiring parties to take certain procedural steps in, or prior to, litigation [like failure to exhaust administrative remedies] may be mandatory in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if timely raised,” but it is “nonjurisdictional.”).

2.   The parties agree that the 300-day filing period applies, see Doc. 54 at 4; Doc. 65 at 4, so the Court will apply this limitation instead of the 180-day period, though it's not clear Ms. Apodaca previously “instituted proceedings with a State or local agency.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1).

3.   It's worth noting that expansive use of the continuing violation doctrine does create the potential for undoing the purpose behind the otherwise strict time limitations in the statute. Statutes of limitations are generally meant to ensure that claims are brought quickly once they are or should be known so that the harm does not continue to accumulate and evidence remains fresh. Permitting the EEOC's claims here to reach back to 2015 highlights that those purposes are undermined. But that is the state of the law that applies here.

Daniel D. Domenico, United States District Judge