RICHARD v. UNITED VAN LINES LLC LLC (2025)

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 80. The matter is fully briefed and ripe for review.¹ This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves the transporting and storing of a military servicemember's household goods and personal property in a military-procured move from Virginia to Colorado.² Between June 22 and June 25, 2022, a moving trailer containing Plaintiffs’ household goods (“HHGs”) and personal property was burglarized at Defendant Arrow Moving and Storage of Colorado, Inc.’s (“Arrow”) facility in Colorado. Plaintiffs claim liability under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 and 49 U.S.C. § 13907 against Defendants Meramec Valley Transport, LLC (“Meramec”), United Van Lines, LLC (“United”), and Arrow (collectively “Defendants”). Defendants argue that their liability is contractually limited, and Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees.

The U.S. Government, through the United States Transportation Command (“USTRANSCOM”), contracts with private transportation companies, called Transportation Service Providers (“TSP”), to transport and store military servicemembers’ HHGs. ECF Nos. 80 at 7, 81 at 5-6. USTRANSCOM is responsible for negotiating the rates for shipment of servicemembers’ HHGs and developed the 400NG Tariff to govern the same. ECF No. 81-1 at 72. The 400NG Tariff incorporates the Defense Personal Property Program Claims and Liability Business Rules (“PPP Business Rules”). Id. at 77. TSPs agree to the PPP Business Rules by contracting with the U.S. Government to transport a servicemember's HHGs. Id.

On June 6, 2022, Government Bill of Lading (“GBL”) No. BGAC0588276 was issued for Meramec to transport Plaintiffs’ HHGs from Virginia to Colorado. ECF No. 80-1 at 151.³ Box 7 of GBL No. BGAC0588276 states the requested pickup date was June 8, 2022. Box 27 of GBL No. BGAC0588276 states “Shipment is released at full replacement protections as defined by the Defense Personal Property Program Claims and Liability Business Rules.” The PPP Business Rules state:

1.1 Liability

․

1.1.3 If the claim is filed directly with the TSP within nine months of delivery, then the TSP is liable for FRV [Full Replacement Value]. For shipments scheduled for pickup on or after 15 May 2022, the TSP's liability will be:

1.1.3.1. $6.00 times either the net weight of the HHGs shipment ․, and

1.1.3.2. Will be no less than $10,000 per shipment, and

1.1.3.3. Will not exceed $75,000.

․

1.2. FRV Liability

1.2.1. When the customer files a claim against the TSP, within nine months of delivery, the TSP is liable for the repair or FRV cost of a damaged item, whichever is less, and for the FRV cost of lost, or destroyed items ․

ECF No. 81-1 at 12.⁴ A section in the PPP Business Rules also deals specifically with high-value items (“HVI”), which include “very high-end, highly pilferable, and/or expensive collectible items,” such as jewelry. Id. at 21. The PPP Business rules state:

1.8 High Value Items and High Risk Inventories

1.8.2 The TSP's liability for high value items shall be limited to $100 per pound of the article if the customer fails to inform TSP that such items ․ are included in the shipment after the TSP asks the customers, in writing to list items in the above categories that will be included in the shipment. For purposes of determining TSP's liability, all such numbered inventory items shall be deemed to weigh at least one pound․

1.8.3 ․ Note that just because an item is worth more than $100 per pound, does not mean it must be listed on a HVI sheet for the customer to be paid more than $100 per pound, should it be lost or damaged․

ECF No. 81-1 at 21–22 (emphasis in the original). Box 16 of the GBL states “this Bill of Lading is governed by the regulations relating thereto as published in Title 41, Part 102-118 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Terms and Conditions are also contained in the Tender of Service.” ECF No. 80-1 at 151.

Meramec arranged for Defendant United to perform the transportation. ECF No. 75 at 4. On June 8, 2022, at 7:13 am, the trailer used to transport Plaintiffs’ HHGs weighed 45,740 pounds. ECF No. 80-1 at 158. Plaintiffs’ HHGs were then loaded in the trailer for transit. At 4:58 pm that same day, the trailer was reweighed and weighed 55,920 pounds, indicating the net weight of Plaintiffs’ HHGs was 10,180 pounds. Id. A High Value Inventory Form signed on June 8, 2022, has “N/A” written in the location where high-value items would be listed. ECF No. 81-1 at 154.

On June 22, 2022, the trailer carrying Plaintiffs’ HHGs arrived at Arrow's facility in Colorado Springs, CO. ECF No. 81-1 at 83. Between June 24 and June 27, 2022, the trailer was broken into. Id. Boxes in the trailer were cut open and rummaged through. Id. On July 11, 2022, the remaining HHGs were delivered to Plaintiffs’ residence. An Inventory Control Form dated July 11, 2022, indicates that approximately 45 boxes out of approximately 175 were either missing or damaged. ECF No. 81-1 at 117, 152. On July 11, 2022, a trailer carrying Plaintiffs’ HHGs was reweighed. Id. at 159. This time the weigh ticket indicates Plaintiffs’ HHGs weighed 10,220 pounds. Id. On July 15, 2022, Meramec submitted a voucher for $15,981.42 to the U.S. Government for Plaintiffs’ move, which was paid. ECF No. 80-1 at 152.

On July 16, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a claim with Meramec, seeking damages exceeding $75,000. ECF No. 75 at 7. The parties did not provide the Court with the claim. Nor does the complaint specify the damages Plaintiffs are seeking. Plaintiffs provided a document titled “Insurance Inspection Report” conducted by Furniture Medic for Defendant United.⁵ ECF No. 81-1 at 143–150. It is dated April 4, 2022, which predates Plaintiffs’ HHGs shipment, but it does include the address Plaintiffs’ HHGs were delivered to on July 11, 2022, and a Claim Number that matches the GBA number. Id. at 143. The document refers to the “shipper” stating that the listed items were missing from the move. Id. 143–147. The document lists 36 items, including several pieces of jewelry. Id. There is a “Claim $” column for each item. Id. The claim amount for the jewelry alone exceeds $100,000. Id. Plaintiffs also provided a letter dated September 19, 2022, from Defendant United with an offer to settle the claim. Id. at 59. Defendant United offers to pay Plaintiffs $4,500 for several items of jewelry because “[t]hese items were not listed on the High Value Inventory prior to the move. We understand these items were packed by the carrier, but items of higher value are required to be listed on the HVI. Our maximum liability is $100 per lb for any items not listed.” Id.

On March 17, 2023, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in El Paso County District Court. ECF No. 1-1. On April 24, 2023, Defendants removed the action to this Court. ECF No. 1. On August 17, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint raising claims under the Carmack Amendment against Meramec, United, and Arrow for loss and/or damages to their HHGs. See ECF No. 44. Plaintiffs also seek attorneys’ fees under 49 U.S.C. § 14708. Defendants seek partial summary judgment to restrict the amount of damages in this case to $6.00 times the net weight of the Plaintiffs’ shipment, not to exceed $75,000, and an order stating that Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys’ fees.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that (1) there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When analyzing a motion for summary judgment, the court must “look at the factual record and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006). However, the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon its pleadings at this stage; rather, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998).

Ultimately, the Court's inquiry on summary judgment is whether the facts and evidence identified by the parties present “a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable ․ or is not significantly probative ․ summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants contend that under the GBL their liability is limited to $61,080.00. See ECF No. 80 at 21. The Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act permits carriers to limit their liability. 49 U.S.C. § 14706. Specifically, “[a] carrier or group of carriers ․ may ․ establish rates for the transportation of household goods under which the liability of the carrier for that property is limited to a value established by written declaration of the shipper or by a written agreement.” Id. § 14706(f). Plaintiffs do not contest that the Carmack Amendment allows TSPs to limit their liability for property loss or damage. ECF No. 81 at 10. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that under certain circumstances, liability limitations are unenforceable, such as when there is “deceit practice upon a shipper.” Id. For the reasons stated below the Court finds no factual basis for either a finding of fraud or for setting aside the liability limitation.

A. Limited Liability Under the Carmack Amendment is Enforceable

This case is difficult in the sense that Plaintiffs, who have volunteered to serve their country and have had to endure several moves as part of that service, had their HHGs burglarized and damaged due to no fault of their own. However, the Court agrees with Defendants that their liability is limited as a matter of law. “The Carmack Amendment ․ expressly recognizes the right of a shipper and carrier to establish an agreed value of the goods to be shipped which limits the carrier's liability and permits a shipper thereby to benefit from a lower rate.” Rocky Ford Moving Vans, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 1369, 1372 (8th Cir. 1974) (citing Strickland Transportation Co. v. United States, 334 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1964)). In this case, the U.S. Government is the “shipper” authorized to contract with Defendants. Marohn v. Burnham Van Servs., Inc., 478 F. Supp. 49, 51 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (concluding “that plaintiffs, by giving the United States government authority to ship their goods, also conferred on the government the incidental authority to enter into a valid contract for carriage with defendants”). The GBL prepared by the U.S. Government memorializes the contract the U.S. Government and Defendants entered into. The GBL states that the “[s]hipment is released at full replacement protection as defined by the [PPP Business Rules].” The PPP Business Rules cap the Defendants’ liability at $6.00 times the net weight of the HHGs shipment, not to exceed $75,000.

Limiting liability makes sense from a policy standpoint. TSPs may not be willing to contract with the U.S. Government to transport servicemembers’ HHGs if there is not “a measure of predictability for carriers in the exposure to damages they face.” York v. Day Transfer Co., 525 F. Supp. 2d 289, 297 (D.R.I. 2007) (citations and quotation omitted). TSPs would not agree to be paid a fraction of the value of the shipment, in this case just over $15,000, if it would subject them to hundreds of thousands of dollars of liability for the replacement costs of the value of the shipment. There are other options for service members to protect their HHGs. For example, renters’ insurance or homeowners’ insurance often covers belongings against loss or damage during relocation. Many cases cited by Defendants for the proposition that other courts have found that the U.S. Government's contracts with TSPs are binding on servicemembers were brought by casualty insurers that insured the servicemembers. See, e.g., Howe v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 622 F.2d 1147, 1149 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he appeal is pressed by the casualty insurer which insured the military plaintiff against such damage.”); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Paul Arpin Van Lines, Inc., 652 F.2d 198, 199 (1st Cir. 1981) (“[The servicemember] in fact decided to augment this statutory protection by purchasing from the appellant insurance company a $30,000 policy covering the transport of his belongings.”). Another option is for the servicemember to transport small high-value items, such as jewelry, with them. It is unknown if the Plaintiffs pursued any of these options.

The Court disagrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs’ maximum recovery is capped at $61,080.00 because there appears to be a genuine issue of material fact regarding the net weight of the Plaintiffs’ HHGs. The net weight identified on the GBL is 10,180 pounds, which is also reflected in the weigh ticket dated June 8, 2022, but the re-weigh ticket dated July 11, 2022, reflects a net weight of 10,220 pounds. This reflects an increase of 40 pounds after the burglary. Defendants attempt to explain this discrepancy by stating, “[a]fter the burglary, the shipment required delivery using a different tractor unit, and repacking of the remaining household goods to facilitate delivery to Plaintiffs’ residence.” ECF No. 80 at 17 n. 8. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that this explanation defies logic. If approximately 45 boxes of the approximately 175 boxes are either missing or damaged and items have been removed from the shipment, it is hard to understand why the shipment would weigh more. The Court's understanding of the PPP Business rules is that because Plaintiffs filed their claim within nine months of delivery of their HHGs they are entitled to either the repair or full replacement value cost of a damaged item and the full replacement value cost of a lost or destroyed item; however, the recovery is capped at $6.00 times the net weight of the shipment, not to exceed $75,000. The weight of the shipment, and thus the cap on liability, and the value of the missing and destroyed items are still in dispute.

B. Alleged Deceit Practiced on the Shipper

Plaintiffs agree with the general rule that TSPs may limit their liability under the Carmack Amendment. Plaintiffs argue that one exception to the enforceability of a liability limitation under the Carmack Amendment is if the TSP was deceptive in its contracting with the shipper, hence voiding the contract. ECF No. 81 at 10. Plaintiffs list six genuine issues of material fact that a jury should decide regarding deception by Defendants. The Court briefly addresses each below but ultimately finds the liability limitation applies.

First, Plaintiffs argue that there are issues of material fact with regard to whether Defendant Meramec was authorized to broker this transaction. As evidence, Plaintiffs point to a printout from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's (“FMCSA”) website listing Meramec's authority type as an “active” “common” and “contract” carrier but says “none” next to the “broker” authority type. ECF No. 81-1 at 3. Plaintiffs also point to the 400NG Tariff, which the parties agree governs the transportation of servicemembers HHGs. The 400NG Tariff requires that the “TSP also acknowledge[ ] possession of the required operating authority to transport HHGs from, to, or in between the places set forth in the TSPs individual rate records/tenders.” ECF No. 81-1 at 120. Plaintiffs do not point to a source, nor can the Court find a source, stating Meramec must have a “broker” authority type for the U.S. Government to issue a GBL for Meramec to transport servicemembers’ HHGs. As stated above, the shipper in this transaction was the U.S. Government. Any violation of the 400NG tariff needs to be addressed by USTRANSCOM, the U.S. Government organization responsible for negotiating the terms for the shipment of servicemembers’ HHGs. Plaintiffs represent that their First Notice of Supplemental Authority is relevant to this argument. Plaintiffs provided a Complaint and Final Judgement filed in Buttigieg v. USA Logistics, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-2573 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2024.).⁶ In that case, the Secretary of Transportation sought civil monetary penalties under 49 U.S.C. § 14702 for the carrier's violations of the FMCSA's statutes and regulations. There, the household goods motor carrier operated without authority because its liability insurance lapsed. This case furthers the Court's finding that it is the U.S. Government's responsibility to seek remedies from the TSP for violations of rules and regulations governing the GBL.

Second, Plaintiffs argue that there exists a general issue of material fact regarding which version of the PPP Business Rules was in place at the time of the contract and shipment of Plaintiffs’ HHGs. The Court addresses this discrepancy supra n. 3. The Court agrees the applicable version is Version 1.2 dated March 8, 2022. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants prefer Version 1.3 because it “contains favorable language that excuses their conduct.” ECF No. 81 at 12. Plaintiffs do not specify the favorable language in Version 1.3 that Defendants rely on. The PPP Business Rules identify changes made from version to version. ECF No. 80-1 at 13, 15. The only change listed for Version 1.3 is the addition of language to paragraph 1.2.2.4. Id. at 7. This change did not impact the Court's analysis.

Third, Plaintiffs argue that there are conflicting copies of the GBL. Plaintiffs claim there is one version in “DPS”⁷ and another version with handwriting provided by Defendant Arrow via email on July 15, 2022. ECF Nos. 81 at 13, 81-1 at 121–22. Plaintiffs identify the differences between the version in DPS and the copy with handwriting. None of the differences identified affect the liability limitation or the weight of the Plaintiffs’ HHGs shipment. There does not appear to be any evidence that Defendants attempted to modify the terms of the GBL.

Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that there are discrepancies with the weight of the Plaintiffs’ HHGs shipment. As discussed above, the Court agrees; however, the Court disagrees that these discrepancies indicate deceit on the part of Defendants. The net weight of the shipment determines the liability cap as discussed above.

Fifth, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants had an obligation to report the robbery to USTRANSCOM and failed to do so. Plaintiffs describe the procedures in the PPP Business Rules regarding “catastrophic losses.” The PPP Business Rules describe a catastrophic loss as “when an estimated 60% of the inventory line items in a given shipment are lost, damaged, or destroyed” ECF No. 81-1 at 32. Plaintiffs have not alleged that 60% of their HHGs were lost or destroyed. It is estimated that 40 to 45 boxes out of approximately 175 boxes were either missing or damaged, which is approximately 25% of the shipment. Plaintiffs also allege that “Defendants intentionally misstated the status of Plaintiffs’ shipment in the DPS system.” The Court does not have access to DPS and neither party has provided evidence of what is reflected in the DPS system.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants failed to follow the procedures in the documents the parties agree govern the GBL: the 400NG Tariff, the PPP Business Rules, and the Tender of Service. Plaintiffs argue Defendants failed to ensure the inventory accurately reflected the true condition of the items in their HHGs shipment or identify and designate any high-risk inventory items. Plaintiffs argue that there are different versions of the High Value Inventory Form. ECF No. 81 at 18; see also ECF No. 81-1 at 140–42. However, none of the High Value Inventory Forms indicate that either party identified any high-value items that needed to be declared when the HHGs were packed in Virginia before signing the forms. As the PPP Business Rules state, items do not necessarily need to be listed on the High Value Form for the servicemember to recover full replacement value or $100 per pound for any loss of a high-value item, up to the liability cap. What high-value items were lost, and their value is still a factual dispute.

Plaintiffs do not provide any case law to support their theory that if a carrier fails to follow the procedures outlined in the 400NG Tariff, the PPP Business Rules, or the Tender of Service, the liability cap is unenforceable. Instead, the evidence supports the proposition that as a party of the GBL, USTRANSCOM has the authority to take disciplinary actions against the TSP to address any violations of the standards of performance required by the GBL. On September 16, 2022, USTRANSCOM suspended Defendant Meramec for failing to adhere to the Tender of Service requiring Meramec to identify a Claims Manager and a Trusted Agent in this matter. ECF No. 81-1 at 164. The case provided by Plaintiffs in their Notice of Supplemental Authority further supports that it is the U.S. Government's responsibility to seek remedies from a TSP that fails to adhere to rules and regulations. See, e.g., ECF No. 80-1 at 178–79. Those remedies can include civil monetary penalties, suspension or debarment from the program, or the deduction of outstanding claims from an amount due to a TSP. See e.g., ECF No. 81-1 at 17, 164.

Plaintiffs failed to identify any case law where the court found that the recovery cap for a servicemember was eliminated if deceit was practiced on the U.S. Government as the shipper. In Marohn v. Burnham Van Servs., Inc., the District Court recognized that “under certain circumstances courts have set aside the value limitation and allowed full recovery” such as when “the carrier induced the shipper to enter into a contract to carry goods which were ill-suited for the carrier's facilities” or the carrier “purposely converted the entrusted property for its own use or gain, in which case public policy would not permit the carrier to limit its liability and thus profit from its own misconduct.” 478 F. Supp. 49, 52 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (internal citations omitted). The Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Defendants deceiving the U.S. Government in its contracting or that the Defendants profited from the loss or damage to Plaintiffs’ property.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees under 49 U.S.C. § 14708. Shippers can recover attorneys’ fees in a Carmack Amendment claim involving HHGs; however, the recovery of attorneys’ fees “apply only in the case of collect-on-delivery transportation of household goods.” 49 U.S.C.A. § 14708(f). Defendants argue that the transaction was not a collect-on-delivery (“COD”) transaction; and thus, attorneys’ fees are not recoverable under the statute. Plaintiffs argue that there is a factual dispute as to whether the shipment should be considered a COD transaction and that a ruling on the issue of attorneys’ fees is premature at the summary judgment stage. The evidence demonstrates that the transport of Plaintiffs’ HHGs was not a COD transaction.

The statute does not define what a COD transaction is; however, Courts interpreting the definition have found that a COD requires that the carrier be paid “at the time of delivery—not before or after delivery.” Arnold v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 3d 467, 472 (W.D. Tex. 2024). Similar to the plaintiff in Hoover v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., Plaintiff Darrius Richard's employer, the U.S. Government, paid for his shipping charges. 111 P.3d 1076 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005). In Hoover, the Court of Appeals of Kansas affirmed the state district court's conclusion that 49 U.S.C. § 14708(d) was not available to support the award of attorneys’ fees and costs because, in part, the invoice was dated nearly a week after the move was completed. Here, the evidence is clear that the voucher the U.S. Government used to pay Meramec for its services is dated July 15, 2022, several days after Plaintiffs’ HHGs were delivered to their residence on July 11, 2022.

Plaintiffs argue that the Bill of Lading from United creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the shipment of their HHGs was a COD shipment. ECF No. 81 at 19–20. The standard language on the form states “[u]less other payment arrangements are made with the carrier in writing signed by the carrier, this shipment is a collect shipment.” ECF No. 81-1 at 161.⁸ Defendants state that “United inadvertently issued the United bill of lading” and argue that the United Bill of Lading has no bearing on the GBL. ECF No. 80 at 24. The Court notes that another page of the United Bill of Lading provides that United's services are to be billed to the “Military” and refers to the GBL number, which demonstrates “other payment arrangements made with the carrier in writing.” The GBL and the rules and regulations incorporated within, govern Plaintiffs’ transaction with Defendants. Reference to form language and an inapplicable Bill of Lading is insufficient. See Arnold, 737 F. Supp. 3d at 472. (finding that the transaction was not a COD despite testimony that the shipper believed it to be a COD and the Bill of Lading indicated the shipment was a COD because the shipment was paid in advance of the delivery).

In the case cited by Plaintiffs, Danko v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., the plaintiff sought attorneys’ fees under 49 U.S.C. § 14708(d) or an Arizona state statute. 617 F. Supp. 2d 864, 868 (D. Ariz. 2008). Both statutes require the plaintiff to prevail before an award of attorneys’ fees. There, the District Court held that it was premature at the summary judgment stage to make a ruling before a party was qualified to recover attorneys’ fees. The District Court did not discuss the factual dispute as to whether the shipment was a COD. The Court is not convinced that it is always premature at the summary judgment stage to rule on whether a party is entitled to attorneys’ fees under 49 U.S.C. § 14708. See Nichols v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109 (D. Nev. 2003) (deciding at the motion to dismiss stage that the plaintiff did not have a claim for attorneys’ fees because the plaintiffs missed the 120-day deadline requirement in 49 U.S.C. § 14708(d)(1)). Here, Plaintiffs have failed to “set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find” that the transaction was a COD. Adler, 144 F.3d at 671. Accordingly, since the U.S. Government was responsible for paying Meramec, and paid Meramec after delivery of the HHGs, the shipment was not a COD transaction as required for the recovery of attorneys’ fees. Therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys’ fees under 49 U.S.C. § 14708(d).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that the limitation of liability set forth in the GBL and the PPP Business Rules is valid and binding. Defendant's recovery is capped at $6.00 times the yet-to-be-determined net weight of Plaintiffs’ HHGs shipment, not to exceed $75,000. Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Carmack Amendment. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 80, is GRANTED IN PART.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On December 31, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority Regarding Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“First Notice of Supplemental Authority”). ECF No. 82. On February 28, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Second Notice of Supplemental Authority Regarding Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Second Notice of Supplemental Authority”). ECF Nos. 83-84.

2.   The background is taken from the parties’ chart of undisputed material facts filed before the Intent to File Motion for Summary Judgment hearing, ECF Nos. 75-76, and the parties’ briefings and appendixes on Summary Judgment, ECF Nos. 80-81.

3.   Plaintiffs correctly point out that Defendants’ Motion refers to the wrong Government Bill of Lading (“GBL”) number; however, Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that the correct GBL is included in the Appendix in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Defendant's Appendix”). See ECF Nos. 81 at 6; 80 at 7–8 (referring to GBL BGAC05882796), 80-1 at 151 (attaching GBL No. BGAC0588276) (emphasis added).

4.   Plaintiffs correctly point out the version of the PPP Business Rules in Defendants’ Appendix, ECF No. 80-1 at 8–59 is the incorrect version because it is dated “25 July 2022” and postdates Plaintiffs’ move; however, Plaintiffs did attach the correct version, ECF No. 81-1 at 6-57, dated “8 March 2022.” See ECF No. 81 at 6.

5.   Plaintiffs claim they were not provided the Insurance Inspection Report until July 3, 2023, when Defendants made their initial disclosures as part of this litigation. ECF No. 81 at 19.

6.   Plaintiffs also represent that their Second Notice of Supplement Authority is relevant to this argument. Plaintiffs provided a Memorandum of Opinion and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge in Notash et al. v. Total Mil. Mgmt., Inc. et al., No. 1:23cv980, 2025 WL 605607 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2025). In it, Magistrate Judge L. Patrick Auld recommends that the plaintiffs’ state claims be dismissed because they are preempted by the Carmack Amendment or the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 14501, depending on whether the defendant qualifies as a broker or a carrier. It provides a helpful analysis on the difference between a broker and carrier under the Carmack Amendment and the FAAAA; otherwise, the Court does not find the case germane to the issues as to whether there is a cap on liability or entitlement to attorneys’ fees.

7.   DPS is defined in the 400NG Tarriff as the Defense Personal Property System. ECF No. 80-1 at 69.

8.   The Court notes that the United Bill of Lading is signed by one of the Plaintiffs acknowledging that “the shipment will be transported based on a value of $6.00 per pound multiplied by the actual weight of the shipment with a $0 deductible. A maximum value of $75,000 applies to your shipment. Your estimated amount is $65,900.” ECF No. 81-1 at 163.

REGINA M. RODRIGUEZ, United States District Judge