UNITED STATES v. GERMANO (2026)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT [ECF No. 15] AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT [ECF No. 17]

In April 2025, the Laguna Beach Police Department (the “LBPD”) received and investigated an online tip that a user of the Kik messaging platform was distributing child pornography. The LBPD used the information that they received from that tip to obtain a warrant to search the apartment of Defendant Alex Coleman Germano. During the execution of that search warrant, LBPD Detective Elizabeth Gutierrez questioned Germano both before and after providing him with a Miranda warning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The LBPD used Germano's statements to obtain an additional search warrant. Thereafter, the Government indicted Germano on three counts of distributing videos of child pornography.¹

Before the Court are Germano's motions to suppress certain evidence that the LBPD obtained, allegedly in violation of Germano's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.² The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motions in March 2026.³ After considering the papers filed in support and in opposition,⁴ as well as the argument of counsel at the hearing on the Motions, the Court GRANTS Germano's 5th Amendment Motion and DENIES Germano's 4th Amendment Motion, for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. 5th Amendment-Related Facts

On April 16, 2025, at around 10:15 a.m., more than 10 officers from the LBPD, armed with rifles and wearing tactical gear,⁵ arrived at Germano's apartment to execute a search warrant.⁶ When Germano answered the door, LBPD officers took his phone from his pocket, handcuffed him and his wife, and led them outside the apartment.⁷

At around 11:20 a.m., Detective Gutierrez approached Germano, who was seated on the curb and surrounded by officers and police vehicles.⁸ Detective Gutierrez showed Germano a car key and asked if it was his, which Germano confirmed.⁹ She then asked to what car it belonged, and Germano pointed to his Toyota RAV4 vehicle and said, “That Rav 4.”¹⁰

About an hour later, Detective Gutierrez again approached Germano while he was still seated on the curb in the parking area with at least one officer present and began to question him.¹¹ Detective Gutierrez asked Germano about his phone number, his email addresses, his social media accounts,¹² the last time that he used those accounts,¹³ who had access to his devices in his apartment,¹⁴ and his Wi-Fi set-up, including who might have access to his internet network.¹⁵ Detective Gutierrez also asked Germano if he had ever chatted with people online about child pornography or if he had sent or received such content.¹⁶ Eventually, Detective Gutierrez told Germano that he was flagged for “doing something you shouldn't be doing,” at which time Germano acknowledged that he had conducted searches for children online.¹⁷

At approximately 12:43 p.m., after Germano had been sitting on the curb for approximately two hours, Germano asked Detective Gutierrez if he could stand up.¹⁸ Detective Gutierrez denied Germano permission to stand up, but she told him that he could stretch his legs if he wanted.¹⁹ Germano informed Detective Gutierrez that he had a knee injury. Detective Gutierrez directed Germano to remain seated but told him that he could “shake them out” if necessary.²⁰

About 10 minutes later, Detective Gutierrez asked Germano if he would allow her to look through his phone, and Germano consented.²¹ Germano also provided the passcode.²²

Detective Gutierrez inquired about how Germano contacted people through the online game FIFA.²³ Germano replied that he and a guy from FIFA (the “FIFA-guy”) talked about how to keep kids safe and how to prevent posting pictures of kids on the internet.²⁴ Germano stated that he began searching for pictures of the FIFA-guy's kids, “trying to help him.”²⁵ Near the end of that conversation, Germano was presented with a form to sign to confirm that he consented to a search of his phone, and Germano asked if he could stand up to sign it.²⁶ That entire conversation lasted about 45 minutes, during which Germano admitted that he had viewed naked pictures and videos of children who were 6 to 10 years old and that he may have downloaded some pictures or videos.²⁷

Throughout that time, Germano repeatedly asked to stand up, and eventually—after Germano promised not to run—Detective Gutierrez allowed him to stand.²⁸ But shortly thereafter, Detective Gutierrez told Germano to sit back down.²⁹

After a short break, Detective Gutierrez returned and told Germano that she wanted to talk to him a bit more about the same matters.³⁰ During that second round of questioning, Germano again admitted that he had searched online for kids between the ages of 6 and 10.³¹ Germano also stated that he did not know that the children featured in the images and videos at issue were younger; he thought that they were older.³² Detective Gutierrez asked Germano about Germano's own trauma and mental health issues, such as traumatic sexual experiences from his childhood, as well as Germano's history with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.³³ Germano asserted his belief that he had been desensitized to certain events because of his own experiences, and he expressed regret for what he had done.³⁴ Toward the end of that second round of questioning, Detective Gutierrez informed Germano that she would seek an additional warrant to search the devices that the LBPD seized that day, and she asked Germano if there “[i]s any specific location that I should be mindful of to look for, in order to remove some of those images or videos that you probably shouldn't have?”³⁵ Germano responded, “I think I got rid of them when I had, like, a moment of clarity.”³⁶

At 2:13 p.m., Detective Gutierrez stepped away from Germano to speak with another officer, who informed Detective Gutierrez that the LBPD officers had conducted a preliminary search of Germano's phone but that they did not find anything.³⁷ Detective Gutierrez responded that they should still seize the phone.³⁸

At 2:17 p.m., Germano asked if he could go back in his apartment, but he was denied access because LBPD officers were still inside.³⁹

Detective Gutierrez ultimately arrested Germano.⁴⁰ At approximately 4:05 p.m., Germano was driven to the police station, placed in an interrogation room, and read his Miranda rights. Detective Gutierrez then interrogated Germano.⁴¹ During that interrogation, Germano admitted that he knew that it was a crime to distribute child pornography and that he understood that his actions constituted the distribution of child pornography.⁴²

B. 4th Amendment-Related Facts

The following three warrants are at issue in this case, all of which Detective Gutierrez obtained from the Orange County Superior Court:⁴³

• the February 13, 2025, Search Warrant,44 which was directed to the technology and communication companies Cox Communications, Google LLC, and Kik;

• the April 15, 2025, Search Warrant,45 which allowed the seizure of devices and other items from Germano's apartment, car, and person (which the LBPD executed on April 16, 2025); and

• the April 21, 2025, Search Warrant,46 which allowed a search of the digital devices that were seized on April 16, 2025.

1. February 13 Search Warrant

In August 2024, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children received a Cyber Tipline Report from Kik, an online messaging application,⁴⁷ indicating that someone with the username “meowyoudo” uploaded videos of suspected child pornography on the Kik platform between August 15 and 22, 2024.⁴⁸ The report also stated that the username “meowyoudo” was associated with the email address snarthellama@gmail.com and that the suspect had utilized two specific IP addresses belonging to Cox Communications to upload the content.⁴⁹ The report was forwarded to the LBPD in September 2024.⁵⁰

In February 2025, Detective Gutierrez obtained a search warrant directed to Cox Communications, Google LLC, and Kik.⁵¹ The warrant allowed the LBPD to search various digital property, including the following:⁵²

• from Cox Communications: billing records, service information, subscriber information, device information, email content, IP address logs, and location information;

• from Google LLC: Google files, linked accounts, subscriber information, gmail records, device information, IP address logs, and web and app activity; and

• from Kik c/o MediaLab.ai Inc.: group records, subscriber information, email records, transactional chat logs, IP address logs, abuse reports, and media content.

2. April 15 Search Warrant

The Orange County Superior Court granted the April 15 Search Warrant based upon the information that the LBPD obtained through its execution of the February 13 Search Warrant, as well as its officers' additional investigation.⁵³ That search warrant permitted the search of an apartment located in Laguna Niguel, California, where Germano lived; a Toyota RAV4 vehicle belonging to Germano; and Germano's person.⁵⁴ It also authorized the seizure of computers, digital cameras, wearable fitness devices, and children's items such as toys, clothing, games, and books.⁵⁵

3. April 21 Search Warrant

The April 21 Search Warrant authorized the search of an iPhone, a Lenovo Think Pad, a MacBook Pro, and a MacBook Air seized from Germano's apartment on April 16, 2025, during the execution of the April 15 Search Warrant.⁵⁶ That search warrant allowed for the collection of computer documents, computer images and videos, computer internet history, computer location data, computer system information and configuration, computer user attribution records, app activity, Apple iOS biome and knowledge records, mobile device communication information, mobile device images and videos, mobile device internet history, mobile device location data, and mobile device user attribution records.⁵⁷

The probable cause supporting that search warrant was nearly identical to that for the previous search warrant, with additional paragraphs containing the new information that Detective Gutierrez obtained from the statements that Germano made during his post-Miranda interrogation, during which Germano admitted to “spamming” and distributing child pornography to random users on Kik.⁵⁸ However, no child pornography was found on those devices.⁵⁹

C. Procedural History

In October 2025, the Government obtained the Indictment against Germano, which charges three counts of knowingly distributing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) & (b)(1).⁶⁰ In February 2026, Germano filed the instant Motions.⁶¹

D. Evidentiary Hearing

On March 31, 2026, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing during which Germano's counsel and the Government examined Detective Gutierrez under oath.⁶² Detective Gutierrez testified that during the execution of the April 16 Search Warrant at Germano's apartment, Germano was detained; he was not free to leave police contact; and he was prohibited from entering his apartment. Detective Gutierrez further testified that after she arrested Germano, Germano was transported to the police station and was given a Miranda warning, after which Detective Gutierrez re-asked some of the same questions that she had posed to him pre-Miranda.

Detective Gutierrez testified that she did not plan to arrest Germano prior to the execution of the April 15 Search Warrant, but she decided to arrest Germano after (1) talking with his wife; (2) determining that Germano's wife's information was not attached to Germano's Cox account; and (3) ruling out the possibility that other adults lived at Germano's apartment who could have had anything to do with uploading or streaming information on Germano's Cox network.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the exclusionary rule, a court must suppress evidence obtained in violation of a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment rights. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004); United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h). The exclusionary rule covers not merely evidence obtained as a direct result of a constitutional violation, but also evidence derived from that illegality—the so-called “fruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Ngumezi, 980 F.3d 1285, 1291 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016)). When deciding a motion to suppress, the court first determines whether a constitutional violation occurred, and then, if so, whether suppression is appropriate. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-39, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011); see also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (“The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred ․ does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.”).

A. Fifth Amendment

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person ․ shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda, the Supreme Court extended the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to an individual subjected to custodial interrogation by the police. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460–61 & 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602. A Miranda warning is required prior to custodial interrogation. See id. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by a law enforcement officer after a person has been taken into custody or has otherwise been deprived of his or her freedom of action in any significant way. See United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008). In determining whether someone is in custody, the “the ultimate inquiry” is “whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983). Interrogation, for the purpose of Miranda, is defined as any activity by a law enforcement officer “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).

The Government bears the burden of demonstrating that a valid Miranda warning was given to the person in custody and that the person waived his or her right to remain silent knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, before any custodial interrogation occurs. See generally Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 439-41, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000); United States v. Harrison, 34 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1994); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3501. Otherwise, any statement that the person in custody makes must be suppressed. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

B. Fourth Amendment

“The Fourth Amendment protects individuals ‘against unreasonable searches and seizures' and requires a warrant supported by probable cause before law enforcement may search or seize an individual or his belongings.” United States v. Pearson, 2017 WL 1628397, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV); see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999).

“A warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set out with particularity.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit in support of the warrant, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). “To determine whether a warrant lacks sufficient specificity, [the court] must examine both the warrant's particularity and its breadth.” United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1995).

“The specificity required in a warrant varies depending on the circumstances of the case and the type of items involved.” United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986). A warrant describing “generic categories of items” is “not necessarily invalid if a more precise description of the items subject to seizure is not possible.” Id.

“Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based.” United States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982, 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation modified). In analyzing whether a warrant is overbroad, a court considers: (1) if probable cause existed to seize all items from a category described in the warrant; (2) if the warrant provided objective standards to differentiate items subject to seizure and not subject to seizure; and (3) if the applicant for the warrant was able to describe the items more particularly given the information available. See United States v. Flores, 802 F.3d 1028, 1044 (9th Cir. 2015). Even if a warrant is overbroad, the Ninth Circuit has “embraced the doctrine of severance, which allows [the court] to strike from a warrant those portions that are invalid and preserve those portions that satisfy the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1045–46.

The Ninth Circuit has upheld search warrants, including search warrants for digital devices allegedly involved in the possession or distribution of child pornography, that contained broad provisions lacking temporal limitations. See, e.g., United States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases) (concluding that a search warrant was not overbroad because the Government was “faced with the challenge of searching for digital data that was not limited to a specific, known file or set of files” and therefore “had no way of knowing which or how many illicit files there might be or where they might be stored, or of describing the items to be seized in a more precise manner”).

III. ANALYSIS

A. 5th Amendment Violations

Germano argues that all of the statements that he made to Detective Gutierrez on April 16, 2025, were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The Court agrees in substantial part.

Because Germano was questioned by Detective Gutierrez prior to his arrest, then arrested, given a Miranda warning, and questioned again, the Court must analyze whether suppression is appropriate for both Germano's pre- and post-Miranda statements.

With respect to Germano's pre-Miranda statements, the Court must undertake the following analysis:

• Is Germano's custody status governed by the Ninth Circuit's Craighead or Kim factors? See United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2002).

• Was Germano in custody when he made his pre-Miranda statements to Detective Gutierrez?

• Was Germano being interrogated?

• Does the Terry-stop exception apply to Detective Gutierrez's questioning? See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

• Were Germano's statements spontaneous?

With respect to Germano's post-Miranda statements, the Court must determine whether they should be suppressed under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. In the alternative, the Court must decide whether Germano's post-Miranda statements should be suppressed because Germano was given an illegal two-step Miranda warning.

1. Pre-Miranda Warning Statements

Germano argues that the statements that he made to Detective Gutierrez before he received a Miranda warning should be suppressed because he was in custody, and, therefore, he was entitled to be advised of his Miranda rights.⁶³ The Government responds that Germano was not in custody.⁶⁴ The Government also presents two alternative arguments with respect to Germano's pre-Miranda warning statements: (1) that Detective Gutierrez's questions were within the scope of a Terry-stop;⁶⁵ and (2) that some of Germano's statements were spontaneous.⁶⁶ The Court agrees with Germano.

a. Does Craighead or Kim Apply in Determining Germano's Custody Status?

To determine whether a suspect is in custody during an in-home interrogation, the Ninth Circuit directs a district court to consider: “(1) the number of law enforcement personnel and whether they were armed; (2) whether the suspect was at any point restrained, either by physical force or by threats; (3) whether the suspect was isolated from others; and (4) whether the suspect was informed that he was free to leave or terminate the interview, and the context in which any such statements were made.” Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1084. Even so, “courts have generally been much less likely to find that an interrogation in the suspect's home was custodial in nature The element of compulsion that concerned the Court in Miranda is less likely to be present where the suspect is in familiar surroundings.” Id. at 1083.

In contrast, to determine whether a suspect is in custody during an interrogation not in his or her home, the district court considers: “(1) the language used to summon the individual; (2) the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt; (3) the physical surroundings of the interrogation; (4) the duration of the detention; and (5) the degree of pressure applied to detain the individual.” Kim, 292 F.3d at 974.

Germano argues that the Court should apply the Craighead factors because he was detained in a parking lot adjacent to his apartment, even though he was not actually in his apartment.⁶⁷ See United States v. Holder, 2015 WL 5092878, at *8 (D. Ariz. Aug. 31, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 8711484 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2016) (applying Craighead when the defendant was taken downstairs to a parking lot outside of his apartment for questioning). The Government focuses its argument on whether Germano was physically restrained, which is only one factor in the Craighead analysis.⁶⁸ Furthermore, at the hearing, the Government agreed that Germano's questioning qualified as in-home questioning and that the Craighead factors are more applicable here. Therefore, the Court will apply the Craighead factors in determining Germano's custody status.

b. Was Germano in Custody?

The Craighead factors support a finding that Germano was in custody when Detective Gutierrez questioned him.

i. Number of Law Enforcement Personnel and Whether They Were Armed

In Craighead, the Ninth Circuit provided ample guidance in determining how to analyze this factor:

When a large number of law enforcement personnel enter a suspect's home, they may fill the home such that there are no police-free rooms or spaces to which the suspect may retreat should he wish to terminate the interrogation. Similarly, when the number of law enforcement personnel far outnumber the suspect, the suspect may reasonably believe that, should he attempt to leave, he will be stopped by one of the many officers he will encounter on the way out. The suspect may also believe that the large number of officers was brought for the purpose of preventing his departure. In addition, if the suspect sees the officers unholstering their weapons within his home, the suspect may reasonably believe that his home is no longer safe from the threat of police force. In short, the presence of a large number of visibly armed law enforcement officers goes a long way towards making the suspect's home a police-dominated atmosphere.

Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1084–85.

More than 10 armed officers executed the search warrant at Germano's apartment,⁶⁹ greatly outnumbering Germano such that he could have reasonably believed that he was not free to depart. See id. As shown in the photograph below, the officers possessed unholstered weapons, making it reasonable for Germano to believe that his apartment was no longer safe from the threat of police force.⁷⁰ See id.

During the officers' execution of the search warrant, they moved Germano from his apartment into the parking area.⁷¹ While he was in the parking area, Germano was surrounded by police vehicles, he was always monitored by an officer, and he was not free to leave.⁷²

The circumstances that Germano faced in the parking area also support the Court's finding that he reasonably perceived that he was unable to depart. See id. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of a finding that Germano was in custody.

ii. Whether the Suspect Was at Any Point Restrained, Either by Physical Force or by Threats

“When law enforcement agents restrain the ability of the suspect to move—particularly through physical restraints, but also through threats or intimidation—a suspect may reasonably feel he is subject to police domination within his own home and thus not free to leave or terminate the interrogation.” Id. at 1085. In Craighead, the court found that the defendant was in custody, in part, because a detective blocked the defendant's only route out of the room by standing with his back to a closed door. See id. at 1086.

In contrast, in United States v. Young, 622 F. App'x 694 (9th Cir. 2015), this factor weighed in favor of a finding that the defendant was not in custody because a door connecting the garage to the main portion of the house remained open and unblocked during the defendant's entire interview. See id. at 695.

Here, Germano was restrained because he was immediately placed in handcuffs when law enforcement arrived at his apartment.⁷³ See Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1085. Then, in the parking lot, Germano was restrained because he was told to sit on the curb for more than two hours and was denied permission to stand up.⁷⁴ See id. Furthermore, Germano was restrained because, during the hearing, Detective Gutierrez repeatedly testified that Germano was not free to leave and that he was detained.⁷⁵ See id.

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of a finding that Germano was in custody.

iii. Whether the Suspect Was Isolated from Others

“The Supreme Court highlighted isolation from the outside world as perhaps the crucial factor that would tend to lead a suspect to feel compelled to provide self-incriminating statements.” Id. at 1086–87.

When Germano answered his door at the beginning of the LBPD's execution of the search warrant, Germano was isolated because officers immediately confiscated his phone and led him outside of his apartment.⁷⁶ See id. Although the record is unclear regarding Germano's wife's precise location during the execution of the search warrant, she was not sitting on the curb beside Germano.⁷⁷

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of a finding that Germano was in custody.

iv. Whether the Suspect Was Informed That He Was Free to Leave or to Terminate the Interview, and the Context in Which Any Statements Were Made

Germano was never told that he was free to leave or that he could terminate the interview. Indeed, as previously discussed, Germano was told to remain seated, and he would not have been free to leave even if he had asked. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of a finding that Germano was in custody.

Thus, all Craighead factors compel the Court's finding that Germano was in custody when he made his pre-Miranda statements.

c. Was Germano Being Interrogated?

The Government does not dispute that Detective Gutierrez interrogated Germano.⁷⁸ Accordingly, the Court finds that Detective Gutierrez was interrogating Germano during the execution of the search warrant while he was in the parking lot outside of his apartment. See United States v. Castillo-Marin, 684 F.3d 914, 923 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The government, again, did not contest this argument and, thus, apparently concedes it.”).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Germano was entitled to receive a Miranda warning prior to Detective Gutierrez's questioning.

d. Was Detective Gutierrez's Questioning Within the Bounds of a Terry-Stop?

The Government argues that even if Germano was in custody and was interrogated, Detective Gutierrez's conduct was within the bounds of questioning permitted by a Terry-stop.⁷⁹ Germano contends that Detective Gutierrez's questioning exceeded what is allowed in a Terry-stop.⁸⁰ The Court agrees with Germano.

“Where an individual has been detained incident to a search warrant, and officers' questioning stays within the bounds of questioning permitted during a Terry-stop, Miranda rights are not required.” United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008). “If, however, the individual is asked questions going ‘beyond a brief Terry-type inquiry,’ the individual is entitled to Miranda warnings.” Id. (quoting Kim, 292 F.3d at 976).

During a Terry-stop, an officer may ask a detainee “a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

Here, Germano was detained incident to a search warrant, so the Terry standard applies, see Davis, 530 F.3d at 1081, but the questions that Detective Gutierrez posed to Germano exceeded a “moderate” number to determine Germano's identity or to confirm or dispel Detective Gutierrez's suspicions. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138. The First and Second Body-Worn Camera Transcript timestamps show that Germano was questioned for approximately 45 minutes and 28 minutes, respectively.⁸¹ Detective Gutierrez directly asked, among other things, for the location of evidence and for admissions of guilt—far beyond simply confirming or denying her suspicions. For example, Detective Gutierrez's questions included the following:

• “[W]ho has access to any of your electronic devices in your home?”82

• “Have you had any house guests ․ that would have lived here for an extended period of time?”83

• “I think you're smart enough to know when to close your eyes, when to not keep searching, right?”84

• “How many times did you say you searched for the description of children?”85

• “[A]t any point did you download any of those images or videos that you found online?”86

• “Would you allow me to look through your phone in your presence?”87

• “When you hear the term child pornography, what does that mean to you?”88

• “[W]hat do you know to be child pornography?”89

• “What is child pornography in your own words?”90

• “What do you know about IP addresses?”91

• “Do you remember doing that?”92

• “Is it a picture or is it a video?”93

• “Of those videos that you can recall you've possibly saved, at some point in time, have you ever uploaded those anywhere?”94

• “Is it safe to say that those could be other people's daughters, nieces?”95

• “Is there any specific location that I should be mindful of to look for, in order to remove some of those images that you probably shouldn't have?”96

The length of questioning and substantive nature of the questions are sufficient for the Court to find that Detective Gutierrez's interrogation falls outside of the bounds of the Terry-stop exception. Accordingly, the Terry-stop exception does not apply.

e. Were Germano's Statements Spontaneous?

The Government argues that, even if the Terry-stop exception does not apply, Germano made the statements at issue spontaneously.⁹⁷ The Government offers only a single example: Germano's statement about purposely searching for pornographic images of children.⁹⁸ The Court disagrees with the Government's argument.

A spontaneous or voluntary statement from a suspect in custody is admissible even in the absence of a Miranda warning. See Burgos v. Spearman, 2014 WL 1800406, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2014) (citing Cox v. Del Papa, 542 F.3d 669, 675–76 (9th Cir.2008)); see also Irons v. Vasquez, 62 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Miranda does not bar the admission of spontaneous statements.”).

Germano did not make his statements about searching online for pornographic images of children spontaneously. Detective Gutierrez told Germano that he had been “flagged for doing something [he] shouldn't be doing,”⁹⁹ to which Germano later responded that he “was doing something to try to look up something to help someone else.”¹⁰⁰ That statement was not spontaneous. When Detective Gutierrez told Germano that he was flagged, she also stated that she was going to give him a “nugget of info,” then she asserted that Germano was flagged for his activity on Cox internet,¹⁰¹ which provided Germano with the context for Detective Gutierrez's interest in Germano's online conduct.

That was not the only exchange between Germano and Detective Gutierrez, however; indeed, Germano's allegedly spontaneous statement occurred approximately 20 minutes after Detective Gutierrez began to interrogate him.¹⁰² Prior to Germano's utterance of his allegedly spontaneous statement, Detective Gutierrez informed Germano that the search warrant was not drug related,¹⁰³ and she asked Germano, inter alia:

• to give her a “rundown as to who has access” to any of his electronic devices;104

• to provide his current email address as well as any other email addresses that he used;105

• if he was on any social media platforms;106

• if he was on any online chatting platforms;107

• if he had any cell phone lines;108

• if he had ever been a part of Kik;109

• to explain what he used Kik for;110

• how he contacts people through Kik;111

• how to establish a Kik account;112

• when was the last time that he used Kik;113

• which email account Germano used to establish his Kik account;114

• to confirm that his service provider was Cox Communications;115 and

• whether the username “Meow You Do” sounded familiar 116—the same username that the LBPD obtained from the Cyber Tip Line.117

Additionally, four minutes before Germano made the allegedly spontaneous statement,¹¹⁸ Detective Gutierrez directly asked Germano about child pornography: “did you ever engage in chat rooms or conversations, direct message with anybody who you may have sent or received what one would be considered child pornography? When you hear the term child pornography, what does that mean to you?”¹¹⁹ The entire 20 minutes of preceding context make it clear that Detective Gutierrez was interrogating Germano about his online presence and whether it was related to child pornography. Therefore, the Court finds that Germano's statements were not spontaneous.

In sum, Germano was subjected to custodial interrogation when he was questioned outside his apartment during the LBPD's execution of the April 15 Search Warrant. Germano was not provided with a Miranda warning before the questioning began. The questions that Detective Gutierrez asked were not within the bounds of a Terry-stop, nor were Germano's statements spontaneous.

Therefore, Germano's pre-Miranda statements must be suppressed in view of the LBPD's violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.

2. Post-Miranda Warning Statements

Germano argues that the statements that he provided at the police station after he received a Miranda warning should also be suppressed. The Court agrees.

Germano asserts two theories for suppressing his post-Miranda statements: fruit of the poisonous tree and illegal two-step Miranda.

a. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

Germano contends that his post-Miranda statements should be suppressed pursuant to the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine because Detective Gutierrez was not planning to arrest him, and she did so only after Germano made incriminating statements.¹²⁰ The Court agrees.

The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine operates in the Fifth Amendment context as follows: if the defendant's pre-Miranda statement was coerced in violation of the Fifth Amendment, then the court must suppress the defendant's post-Miranda statement unless the post-Miranda statement was sufficiently attenuated from the coercion to remove any “taint.” See United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1440 (9th Cir. 1985).

The Court declines to address the Government's argument because it provides no record citations nor legal authority to support its position.¹²¹ See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716, 723 n.8 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the Court declines to address the undeveloped argument, ‘which is not supported by citations to the record, argument, or any legal authority’ ”). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Germano's post-Miranda statements should be suppressed.

b. Illegal Two-Step Miranda

In the alternative, Germano argues that his post-Miranda statements should be suppressed due to the LBPD's employment of an illegal two-step Miranda process.¹²² The Government opposes.¹²³ The Court agrees with Germano.

A post-Miranda confession preceded by earlier, pre-Miranda inculpatory statements should be excluded when (1) the post-warning confession is obtained during a “deliberate” two-step interrogation; and (2) “the midstream Miranda warning was objectively ineffective.” United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 2006).

i. Deliberateness

In considering whether a Miranda warning was deliberately withheld, a district court considers subjective evidence of the officers' intent, as well as objective factors such as (1) the timing, setting, and completeness of the pre-Miranda interrogation; (2) the continuity of police personnel; and (3) the overlapping content of pre- and post-Miranda statements. See Williams, 435 F.3d at 1158-59.

(I) Timing, Setting, and Completeness of the Pre-Miranda Interrogation

As previously discussed, Germano's pre-Miranda interrogation took place in the parking lot outside of his apartment, and it was lengthy and thorough. This factor favors a finding that Germano's Miranda warning was deliberately withheld.

(II) Continuity of Police Personnel

“The continuous presence of the lead interrogator is perhaps the ‘most important’ issue regarding continuity of personnel.” United States v. Islava, 2020 WL 3446233, at *8 (D. Ariz. June 24, 2020) (quoting Reyes v. Lewis, 833 F.3d 1001, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016)).

Detective Gutierrez conducted both the pre- and post-Miranda interrogation, and she was the only interrogator at the police station. This factor favors a finding that Germano's Miranda warning was deliberately withheld.

(III) Overlapping Content of Pre- and Post-Miranda Statements

“[P]articularly troubling [was] the overlapping content of the officers' pre- and postwarning questions: reference to the prewarning statements ․ [are] an implicit suggestion that the mere repetition of the earlier statement was not independently incriminating. [However,] [t]he implicit suggestion [is] false.” Williams, 435 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).

Germano's post-Miranda interrogation overlapped with his pre-Miranda interrogation. On at least 10 occasions, Detective Gutierrez referred to the pre-Miranda interrogation,¹²⁴ including Germano's independently incriminating statements.¹²⁵ See id. This factor favors a finding that Germano's Miranda warning was deliberately withheld.

Because all three deliberateness factors favor Germano, the Court finds that Germano's Miranda warning was deliberately withheld.

ii. Midstream Miranda Ineffectiveness

To determine whether a midstream Miranda warning was ineffective, the court must consider: (1) the completeness and detail of the prewarning interrogation; (2) the overlapping content of the two rounds of interrogation; (3) the timing and circumstances of both interrogations; (4) the continuity of police personnel; (5) the extent to which the interrogator's questions treated the second round of interrogation as continuous with the first; and (6) whether any curative measures were taken. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615, 124 S.Ct. 2601.

The first four factors are substantially similar to the deliberateness factors, which the Court already determined weigh in favor of Germano.

(I) Continuity

When determining continuity, a court may consider whether there was a break between interrogations, whether the interrogation occurred in the same room, and whether the interrogator referred back to admissions made during the pre-Miranda interrogation. See Islava, 2020 WL 3446233, at *8.

Detective Gutierrez mitigated continuity because more than 90 minutes elapsed between the pre- and post-Miranda interrogations and the setting changed from the parking lot to the interview room—factors that probably would have caused Germano to distinguish between the two contexts. See id. However, Detective Gutierrez perpetuated continuity because she constantly referred to the prior interrogation during the subsequent interrogation. See id.

Accordingly, this factor is neutral.

(II) Curative Measures

“[C]urative measures should be designed to ensure that a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would understand the import and effect of the Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation modified).

The evidence of record includes no curative measures, such as informing Germano that his pre-Miranda statements were likely inadmissible. Accordingly, this factor favors a finding that Germano's midstream Miranda warning was ineffective.

Because factors one, two, three, four, and six favor Germano, the Court concludes that Germano's midstream Miranda warning was ineffective.

In sum, having found that Detective Gutierrez deliberately withheld a Miranda warning from Germano and that Germano's midstream Miranda warning was ineffective, the Court concludes that Germano was provided with an illegal two-step Miranda warning. Therefore, Germano's post-Miranda statements must be suppressed because they were acquired during an illegal two-step Miranda process in violation of his Fifth Amendments rights.

For those reasons, Germano's pre- and post-Miranda statements must be suppressed.

B. 4th Amendment Violations

Germano argues that the evidence that the LBPD obtained through their execution of the three search warrants should be suppressed because the search warrants were overbroad, were insufficiently particular, were based upon stale evidence, or contained material omissions.¹²⁶ The Court disagrees.

1. February 13 Search Warrant

Germano argues that the February 13 Search Warrant is insufficiently particular because it does not set a time range for the collection of digital data, it allowed the LBPD to obtain broad categories of data, and it did not specify the “Target Account” that it referenced.¹²⁷ Specifically, Germano avers that that warrant is insufficiently particular because it requested over a year of data from Cox Communications and Kik and it requested data associated with the Gmail account from the date that the account was created.¹²⁸ The Court disagrees.

In the absence of a citation to case law or other authorities from either party, the Court finds that the February 13 Search Warrant was sufficiently particular and was not overboard. The lack of a time range and the request for broad categories of data are not fatal because the LBPD was “faced with the challenge of searching for digital data that was not limited to a specific, known file or set of files.” Schesso, 730 F.3d at 1046–47. Even if the LBPD knew when the child pornography was uploaded to Kik, it did not know when, how, or where the child pornography had been obtained, whether it had been distributed further, or who created the Gmail account.¹²⁹

Furthermore, the term “Target Account” is properly understood in the context of the February 13 Search Warrant. For example, the February 13 Search Warrant references the “Target Account” directly after providing an IP address or email address of the account that it seeks.¹³⁰

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the scope of the February 13 Search Warrant is set out with sufficient particularity. See Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963; Hill, 459 F.3d at 974.

2. April 15 Search Warrant

a. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

Germano argues that evidence that the LBPD obtained through their execution of the April 15 Search Warrant should be excluded pursuant to the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine from the February 13 Search Warrant.¹³¹ But, as previously discussed, the February 13 Search Warrant is valid, so that argument is unavailing.

b. Stale Evidence

Next, Germano argues that the April 15 Search Warrant is invalid because it was based upon stale evidence.¹³² The Court disagrees.

An affidavit must be based upon facts “so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time.” Durham v. United States, 403 F.2d 190, 193 (9th Cir. 1968) (quoting Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210, 53 S.Ct. 138, 77 L.Ed. 260 (1932)). “[T]he mere lapse of substantial amounts of time is not controlling in a question of staleness.” United States v. Dozier, 844 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 1988). A court evaluates staleness “in light of the particular facts of the case and the nature of the criminal activity and property sought.” United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation omitted). “The information offered in support of the application for a search warrant is not stale if there is sufficient basis to believe, based on a continuing pattern or other good reasons, that the items to be seized are still on the premises.” United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 745–46 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation modified).

The Court finds that the April 15 Search Warrant was not based upon stale evidence. Detective Gutierrez explained in her affidavit in support of the April 15 Search Warrant that, based upon her training and experience, collectors of child pornography typically retain pictures, films, and photographs for many years.¹³³ Detective Gutirrez further testified that because child pornography is a scarce resource, collectors are often reluctant to delete or destroy their collection, but, instead, they maintain their collection in digital format.¹³⁴ Therefore, a sufficient basis existed to believe that Germano would save his purported collection of child pornography and that his purported collection would still be on the premises eight months after the Cyber Tip Line report. See id. at 745–46.

c. Overbroad and Not Particularized

Germano also contends that the April 15 Search Warrant is overbroad and not particularized because it allowed for the seizure of wearable electronics such as Fitbits or Garmin devices, as well as “trophies and souvenirs” of child sexual abuse and assault.¹³⁵ The Government responds that each category is related to the LBPD's investigation of the charges at issue.¹³⁶ Specifically, the Government argues that children's items not belonging to a child in Germano's household could provide evidence of child molestation,¹³⁷ and fitness equipment—such as Fitbits or Garmin devices—could provide evidence of where the user was or what the user was doing at a given time, such as when the child pornography was uploaded.¹³⁸ The Court agrees with the Government.

Germano asserts that United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1990), is instructive.¹³⁹ In Weber, the police attempted to establish probable cause with expert testimony through an affidavit that consisted of “boilerplate recitations” rather than tailored “with the facts of this case or this particular defendant in mind.” Id. at 1345. The Weber court ruled that the agent could not search the defendant's house “merely by alleging he was a collector” of child pornography.¹⁴⁰ Indeed, there was no evidence that the defendant possessed pornography in his home. See id. Rather, the court instructed that the agent should have “taken the time and conscientiously drafted an affidavit tailored to what he knew about [the defendant] rather than submitting an affidavit describing generally information about different types of perverts who commit sex crimes against children ․” Id.

Here, in contrast, Detective Gutierrez obtained email addresses, a phone number, and a date of birth—all linked to Germano—during the execution of the February 13 Search Warrant.¹⁴¹ Based upon that information, Detective Gutierrez concluded that Germano operated under the username “meowyoudo” on the Kik platform, and she identified Germano as the suspect responsible for uploading over 50 files of child pornography onto Kik.¹⁴² Detective Gutierrez had probable cause that Germano actually possessed child pornography in his apartment and on his devices. See id. Accordingly, the April 15 Search Warrant is valid.

3. April 21 Search Warrant

As an initial matter, in determining the constitutionality of the April 21 Search Warrant, the Court will not consider the following paragraph in Detective Gutierrez's application for that warrant because, as previously discussed, it is based upon evidence that Detective Gutierrez obtained in violation of Germano's Fifth Amendment rights:

During a post-Miranda interview, Germano admitted to searching for CSAM via Google, and somehow found various files stored in the camera roll of his cell phone. Germano denied downloading and/or storing these files; however, he admitted to “spamming” and distributing “child pornography” to random users on Kik. Given the new information obtained, I am requesting the search of Germano's electronic devices for evidence of the video files already previewed, and determined to be CSAM.143

See Flores, 802 F.3d at 1045–46. Even in the absence of that paragraph, the standard of whether probable cause exists is an “objective one,” United States v. Magallon-Lopez, 817 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2016), and the remaining evidence in the application for the April 21 Search Warrant establishes a fair probability of finding child pornography on Germano's devices. See United States v. McCutchin, 2019 WL 1075544, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2019) (“Probable cause is satisfied if there was a probability that evidence or contraband would be found in a particular place; in this matter, there was a probability that child pornography would be found on an electronic device in Defendant's home as the unique IP address for Defendant's home was connected with the possession of child pornography.”); see also Schesso, 730 F.3d at 1046 (finding probable cause when the IP address associated with the defendant's home was connected with a child pornography video on a peer-to-peer file-sharing network 20 months earlier).

Germano challenges the April 21 Search Warrant as invalid for containing a material omission, as overbroad and insufficiently particular, and as based upon stale evidence.¹⁴⁴ The Court disagrees with Germano's arguments.

a. Material Omission

Germano contends that the April 21 Search Warrant contains a material omission, rendering it invalid.¹⁴⁵ Specifically, Germano avers that Detective Gutierrez made a misleading omission by failing to include in her application for the April 21 Search Warrant that a preliminary search of Germano's phone had revealed no evidence of child pornography.¹⁴⁶ The Court disagrees.

“Under Franks, a criminal defendant has the right to challenge the veracity of statements made in support of an application for a search warrant.” United States v. Perkins, 850 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978)). “To prevail on a Franks challenge, the defendant must establish two things by a preponderance of the evidence: first, that the affiant officer intentionally or recklessly made false or misleading statements or omissions in support of the warrant, and second, that the false or misleading statement or omission was material, i.e., necessary to finding probable cause.” Perkins, 850 F.3d at 1116 (citation modified). “If both requirements are met, ‘the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded.’ ” Id. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674).

“Materiality is lacking if probable cause remains once any misrepresentations are corrected and any omissions are supplemented.” United States v. Gross, 2025 WL 2887181, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025). Here, the fact that the LBPD's preliminary search of Germano's phone did not reveal evidence of child pornography is not a material omission because probable cause remained even with the inclusion of those unsuccessful preliminary search results. See id. As previously discussed, the April 21 Search Warrant contained information linking to Germano IP addresses, an email address, a phone number, a physical address, and a date of birth, pertaining to an account suspected of uploading over 50 videos of child pornography.¹⁴⁷ See United States v. Nguyen, 743 F. App'x 764, 766 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that child pornography shared from a computer using a certain IP address was sufficient to establish probable cause that evidence of a crime would be found in the defendant's home, which was associated with that IP address).

b. Overbroad and Not Particularized

Germano challenges the April 21 Search Warrant for not providing a search protocol and for allowing for a search for broad categories of data from the digital devices.¹⁴⁸

The Ninth Circuit has held that the absence of a search protocol is “not fatal.” United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e look favorably upon the inclusion of a search protocol; but its absence is not fatal.”). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has permitted “generic classification authorizing seizure of an entire computer system and virtually every document in the defendant's possession without referencing child pornography or any particular offense conduct because, although officers knew that a party had sent 19 images of child pornography directly to the defendant's computer, they had no way of knowing where the images were stored.” Id. at 975 (citation modified). “As always under the Fourth Amendment, the standard is reasonableness.” Id. at 974. Detective Gutierrez's failure to include a search protocol is not fatal. See id. at 978.

Next, the April 21 Search Warrant requests reasonably particular data from the digital devices. The April 21 Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of: computer document records, computer images and videos records, computer internet history records, computer location data records, computer user attribution records, Apple iOS biome knowledge records, mobile device communication information records, mobile device images and videos records, mobile device internet history records, mobile device location data records, and mobile device user attribution records.¹⁴⁹ That authorization is reasonable given that Detective Gutierrez did not know from which device Germano uploaded child pornography or on which device he might be storing it. For each piece of digital data requested, Detective Gutierrez also explained how that information was related to the investigation.¹⁵⁰

Therefore, the April 21 Search Warrant is not overbroad or insufficiently particular.

c. Stale Evidence

Germano also avers that the April 21 Search Warrant is invalid as based upon stale evidence, for the same reasons as the April 15 Search Warrant.¹⁵¹ For the same reasons as previously discussed, the Court finds that the April 21 Search Warrant was not based upon stale evidence.

IV. DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:

1. Germano's Motion to Suppress Under the Fifth Amendment [ECF No. 15] is GRANTED. The pre- and post-Miranda statements that Germano made to the LBPD are SUPPRESSED.

2. Germano's Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained in Violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights [ECF No. 17] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Indictment (the “Indictment”) [ECF No. 1]

2.   Def.'s Mot. to Suppress Under the Fifth Amendment (the “5th Amendment Motion”) [ECF No. 15]; Def.'s Mot. to Suppress Evid. Obtained in Violation of the Fourth Amendment (the “4th Amendment Motion”) [ECF No. 17].

3.   See Min. Order re Evidentiary Hr'g on the Motions (the “Minute Order”) [ECF No. 28].

4.   The Court considered the documents of record in this action, including the following papers: (1) Indictment; (2) 5th Amendment Motion; (3) 4th Amendment Motion; (4) Govt.'s Opp'n to the 5th Amendment Motion (the “5th Amendment Opposition”) [ECF No. 21]; (5) Govt.'s Opp'n to the 4th Amendment Motion (the “4th Amendment Opposition”) [ECF No. 22]; (6) Def.'s Reply to the 5th Amendment Opposition (the “5th Amendment Reply”) [ECF No. 23]; (7) Def.'s Reply to the 4th Amendment Opposition (the “4th Amendment Reply”) [ECF No. 24]; (8) Decl. of Alex Germano in Supp. of the 5th Amendment Motion (the “5th Amendment Germano Declaration”) [ECF No. 15-1]; (9) Decl. of Terra Castillo Laughton in Supp. of the 5th Amendment Motion (the “Castillo Laughton Declaration”) [ECF No. 15]; and (10) Decl. of Alex Germano in Supp. of the 4th Amendment Motion (the “4th Amendment Germano Declaration”) [ECF No. 17-1].

5.   5th Amendment Motion 2:4-22 n.3; see also 5th Amendment Germano Declaration ¶ 3.

6.   5th Amendment Germano Declaration ¶ 2.

7.   Id. at ¶¶ 4 & 5.

8.   5th Amendment Motion 3:9-14 n.4.

9.   Id.

10.   Id.

11.   Castillo Laughton Declaration ¶ 3; id., Ex. 2 (the “First Body-Worn Camera Transcript”) [ECF No. 15-2] 9:25.

12.   Id. at 16:12–15, 16:32-33, 19:13–16, & 19:30–31.

13.   Id. at 18:15 & 20:1-20.

14.   Id. at 11:27-28.

15.   Id. at 20:26–21:2.

16.   Id. at 22:4–7.

17.   Id. at 25:14–16, 25:32, & 26:3–9.

18.   Id. at 28:4–6.

19.   Id.

20.   Id. at 28:7–11.

21.   Id. at 37:18–21.

22.   Id. at 38:1–2.

23.   Id. at 28:31–30:7.

24.   Id.

25.   Id. at 30:26–31:18.

26.   Id. at 45:7–31.

27.   Id. at 32:7–10, 32:27–30, & 34:4–21.

28.   Id. at 38:26–39:11.

29.   Id. at 40:14.

30.   Castillo Laughton Declaration ¶ 4; id., Ex. 3 (the “Second Body-Worn Camera Transcript”) [ECF No. 15-3] 6:10–12.

31.   Id. at 9:19–21.

32.   Id. at 10:34–35 & 11:18–21.

33.   Id. at 17:28–18:5.

34.   Id. at 16:14–15, 17:3–5, 20:30–31, & 21:28–24:5.

35.   Id. at 21:8–11.

36.   Id.

37.   Id. at 20:4–6.

38.   Id. at 20:10–11.

39.   Id. at 22:8 & 22:12–13.

40.   5th Amendment Motion 6:15–16.

41.   Castillo Laughton Declaration ¶ 5; id., Ex. 4 (the “Interview Room Transcript”) [ECF No. 15-4] 1:8–22.

42.   Id. at 29:24–25, 34:24–35:3, & 38:14–19.

43.   4th Amendment Motion 1:5–11.

44.   See 4th Amendment Motion, Ex. 2 (the “February 13 Search Warrant”) [ECF No. 17-2].

45.   See 4th Amendment Motion, Ex. 3 (the “April 15 Search Warrant”) [ECF No. 17-3].

46.   See 4th Amendment Motion, Ex. 4 (the “April 21 Search Warrant”) [ECF No. 17-4].

47.   February 13 Search Warrant 9-10 9 (all page citations to this document refer to the ECF pagination).

48.   Id at 10.

49.   Id.

50.   Id.

51.   Id. at 2.

52.   Id. at 4-5.

53.   April 15 Search Warrant 11-12 (all page citations to this document refer to the ECF pagination).

54.   Id. at 2-4.

55.   Id. at 5-6.

56.   April 21 Search Warrant 2-3 (all page citations to this document refer to the ECF pagination).

57.   Id. at 4.

58.   Id. at 11-12.

59.   See generally 4th Amendment Motion, Ex. 5 (the “June 25, 2025, LBPD Suppl. Report”) [ECF No. 17-5].

60.   See generally Indictment.

61.   See generally 4th Amendment Motion; 5th Amendment Motion.

62.   See generally Minute Order.

63.   5th Amendment Motion 8:1–12:26 (Craighead) & 13:1–16:22 (Kim).

64.   5th Amendment Opposition 9:6–25.

65.   Id. at 11:10-11.

66.   Id. at 13:12.

67.   5th Amendment Motion 8:18–23.

68.   5th Amendment Opposition 5:26-6:1.

69.   5th Amendment Germano Declaration ¶ 2.

70.   5th Amendment Motion 2:4-22 n.3.

71.   5th Amendment Germano Declaration ¶¶ 4 & 5.

72.   See generally Minute Order; 5th Amendment Motion 3:9-14 n.4.

73.   5th Amendment Germano Declaration ¶¶ 4 & 5.

74.   First Body-Worn Camera Transcript 28:3–6.

75.   See generally Minute Order.

76.   5th Amendment Germano Declaration ¶¶ 4–5.

77.   5th Amendment Motion 3:9-14 n.4.

78.   See generally 5th Amendment Opposition.

79.   Id. at 11:23–27.

80.   5th Amendment Reply 5:8–9.

81.   See First Body-Worn Camera Transcript 9:24-47:3 (questioning of Germano began at approximately the 28-minute mark and concluded at approximately the 1-hour, 13-minute mark); Second Body-Worn Camera Transcript 5:28-22:25 (questioning of Germano began at approximately the 8-minute mark and concluded at approximately the 36-minute mark).

82.   First Body-Worn Camera Transcript 11:27–28.

83.   Id. at 20:32–33.

84.   Id. at 31:30–31.

85.   Id. at 33:18–19.

86.   Id. at 33:30–31.

87.   Id. at 37:18.

88.   Id. at 22:6–7.

89.   Id. at 22:18.

90.   Id. at 22:21.

91.   Id. at 25:4.

92.   Second Body-Worn Camera Transcript 9:30–31 (referring to downloading images or videos of kids).

93.   Id. at 11:25.

94.   Id. at 13:16–17.

95.   Id. at 19:13–14.

96.   Id. at 21:8–9.

97.   5th Amendment Opposition 13:12.

98.   Id. at 13:21–14:9.

99.   First Body-Worn Camera Transcript 25:14–17.

100.   Id. at 26:3–6.

101.   Id. at 25:14–17.

102.   See id. at 9:26 (Detective Gutierrez began questioning Germano at approximately the 28-minute mark) & 25:23 (the allegedly spontaneous statement occurs at approximately the 48-minute mark).

103.   Id. at 11:7–11.

104.   Id. at 11:27–28.

105.   Id. at 12:13–13:8.

106.   Id. at 14:9.

107.   Id. at 14:21.

108.   Id. at 16:27.

109.   Id. at 16:32–33.

110.   Id. at 16:32–17:18.

111.   Id. at 17:19.

112.   Id. at 17:30.

113.   Id. at 18:15–16.

114.   Id. at 19:10–11.

115.   Id. at 20:26–29.

116.   Id. at 21:13.

117.   February 13 Search Warrant 10-13.

118.   See First Body-Worn Camera Transcript 22:9.

119.   Id. at 22:4–7.

120.   5th Amendment Motion 17:4–7.

121.   See generally 5th Amendment Opposition 14:12–25.

122.   5th Amendment Motion 19:23–24.

123.   5th Amendment Opposition 15:1–2.

124.   See Interview Room Transcript 5:1, 7:22-25, 9:1–2, 9:5–6, 11:21–23, 15:3, 21:22–25, 23:17–18, 25:21–22, 38:16–17, & 49:3–5.

125.   See id. at 38:16–17 (“[Y]ou've already told me that you searched for, downloaded, and distributed child porn.”).

126.   See generally 4th Amendment Motion.

127.   Id. at 5:20–8:24.

128.   Id. at 5:22–6:17.

129.   4th Amendment Opposition 3:18–4:2.

130.   See, e.g., February 13 Search Warrant 4.

131.   4th Amendment Motion 9:3–4.

132.   Id. at 9:11.

133.   April 15 Search Warrant 13.

134.   Id.

135.   4th Amendment Motion 10:11–19.

136.   4th Amendment Opposition 4:23–24.

137.   Id. at 5:21–24.

138.   Id. at 5:25–6:3.

139.   4th Amendment Motion 12:3–6.

140.   Id.

141.   February 13 Search Warrant 11-12.

142.   Id. at 12.

143.   April 21 Search Warrant 11-12.

144.   4th Amendment Motion 13:10–19:9.

145.   Id. at 13:19–21.

146.   Id. at 14:17–25.

147.   April 21 Search Warrant 10-11.

148.   4th Amendment Motion 17:7–19:5.

149.   April 21 Search Warrant 12-13.

150.   See id.

151.   4th Amendment Motion 19:5–9.

John W. Holcomb, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE