MEDRANO ROCHA v. SANTACRUZ (2026)

Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order GRANTING Petitioner's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [Dkt. 4]

I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 14, 2026, petitioner Enmanuel De Jesus Medrano-Rocha (“Petitioner”), who is currently detained in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) against respondent Ernesto Santacruz Jr. (“Respondent”). ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1, Petition (“Pet.”). On January 15, 2026, Petitioner filed the operative First Amended Petition (“FAP”). Dkt. 2, FAP. On January 21, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“Motion”). Dkt. 4, Motion (“Mot.”).

The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's Motion is GRANTED.

II.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a citizen of Nicaragua. Dkt. 4-1, Declaration of Nicole N. King (“King Decl.”) ¶ 6, Ex. A (“Form I-213”) at 1. On October 14, 2022, Petitioner crossed into the United States and was apprehended by the United States Border Patrol near El Paso, Texas. Mot. at 2. After determining Petitioner did not pose a danger to the community or flight risk, the Border Patrol released Petitioner on humanitarian or significant public benefit parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).¹ Id.; see Form I-213 at 2. Since then, Petitioner has been living in the United States. Mot. at 2.

On September 30, 2025, ICE re-detained Petitioner when he reported to the Los Angeles Field Office for a scheduled check-in. Id.; see also Form I-213. Upon re-detaining Petitioner, ICE served Petitioner a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) indicating he was charged as removable for entering the United States without inspection or admission in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and not being in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa or other entry document in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). See Dkt. 7-1, Ex. A, NTA at 4. However, ICE did not provide Petitioner a pre-detention hearing or a custody redetermination hearing before re-detaining him. Mot. at 2. Petitioner was subsequently transferred to the Adelanto ICE Processing Center, where he remains in custody today. Id.

On January 15, 2026, Petitioner filed the operative FAP, arguing he is entitled to relief because his re-detention in immigration custody without notice or a pre-detention hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (“Due Process Clause”). FAP at 6.

On January 21, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Motion, seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to release Petitioner from Respondent's custody, enjoin Respondent from re-detaining Petitioner without notice and a pre-detention hearing, and order Respondent to show cause as to why the Court should not issue a preliminary injunction. Mot. at 1. In support of the Motion, Petitioner submits a declaration from his counsel, King Decl., and accompanying exhibits.

On January 22, 2026, Respondent filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion. Dkt. 7, Opposition (“Opp.”). Respondent argues Petitioner is not entitled to relief because ICE has discretionary authority to re-detain individuals previously released on parole and, even if Petitioner's re-detention was unlawful, his release from custody is not warranted. Id. at 2-6. Respondent further contends Petitioner has not established irreparable harm and the balance of interests favors the government. Id. at 6-7.

This matter, thus, stands submitted.

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the Court may grant a temporary restraining order to prevent “immediate and irreparable injury.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). Like a preliminary injunction, a temporary restraining order is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008).

The party seeking such relief must establish: (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities weighs in its favor; and (4) the injunction is in the public interest (“Winter factors”). See id. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365. Courts in the Ninth Circuit also employ “an alternative ‘serious questions’ standard, also known as the ‘sliding scale’ variant of the Winter standard.” Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 16 F.4th 613, 635 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). Under the serious questions standard, the four Winter elements are “balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, a TRO may be warranted where there are “ ‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff,” and so long as the other Winter factors are also met. Id. at 1132.

IV.

THE WINTER FACTORS WEIGH IN FAVOR OF GRANTING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

A. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS

The likelihood of success on the merits is the most important Winter factor, which “is especially true for constitutional claims.” Junior Sports Mags. Inc. v. Bonta, 80 F.4th 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)). Here, the Court finds Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits or has at least raised “serious questions” regarding the merits of his claim that his re-detention violates the Due Process Clause.

1. Applicable Law

Under the Due Process Clause, no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from imprisonment ․ lies at the heart of the liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States,” including noncitizens, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Id. at 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, the Fifth Amendment “entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings.” A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94, 145 S.Ct. 1364, 221 L.Ed.2d 765 (2025) (citation modified) (quoting Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U. S. 670, 673, 145 S.Ct. 1003, 221 L.Ed.2d 529 (2025)).

“Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” United States v. Rivera-Valdes, 157 F.4th 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). In general, due process “requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Shinault v. Hawks, 782 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation modified) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990)). To determine “whether a pre-deprivation hearing is required and what specific procedures must be employed at that hearing given the particularities of the deprivation,” courts apply the three-part balancing test established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation modified) (quoting Shinault, 782 F.3d at 1057). Under the Mathews test, courts consider “(1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used, and the value of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the burdens of additional procedural requirements.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321, 96 S.Ct. 893.

2. Analysis

Petitioner claims Respondent violated his right to due process by revoking his parole and re-detaining him without a pre-deprivation hearing. Mot. at 3-8. The Court finds Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim.

First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining out of immigration custody. As a noncitizen residing within the United States, Petitioner is entitled to constitutional due process. See Sotomayor v. Bondi, No. EDCV 25-02939-CV-SSCx, 2025 WL 3691398, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (noting noncitizens released on discretionary parole are entitled to due process). Further, as noted, Petitioner was released on humanitarian or significant public benefit parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) shortly after he entered the United States and was apprehended by the United States Border Patrol. This release on parole gives rise to “the most elemental of liberty interests – the interest in being free from physical detention by one's own government.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004); see also Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801 F. Supp. 3d 919, 932 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“Being held in custody by the government at an earlier time does not eliminate one's liberty interest in remaining on release.” (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593)); Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (“Governmental actions may create a liberty interest entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause.”).

While the Government's initial decision to parole Petitioner was discretionary, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), that decision nonetheless contained an “implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593; see also Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“[E]ven when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.”). For nearly three years, Petitioner relied on this promise to become “gainfully employed,” live “with family and friends,” and “form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593. The length of Petitioner's release on parole further strengthens his private interest in his continued freedom from immigration detention. See Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1093 (finding the Government's actions in conditionally allowing the petitioner to live outside immigration custody for five years created a protected liberty interest); Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (finding the more than two years a petitioner lived outside of immigration custody “heightened” her liberty interest). Hence, Petitioner establishes a significant liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody.

Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is significant because Petitioner has not been afforded an opportunity to contest his detention. Civil immigration detention is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect” and is permissible only to reduce the risk of flight or danger to the community. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491; see also Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by a lesser bond or alternative conditions.”). In releasing Petitioner on humanitarian or significant public benefit parole in 2022, the United States Border Patrol necessarily found Petitioner did not pose a significant flight risk or danger to the community. Specifically, under the Department of Homeland Security's implementing regulations, a noncitizen may be paroled pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) only where the noncitizen “present[s] neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). Respondent offers no evidence or argument showing anything has changed since then demonstrating Petitioner no longer meets these criteria. Indeed, the record suggests otherwise, as ICE confirmed Petitioner has no prior criminal history when it re-detained him, see Form I-213 at 2-3, and Petitioner was apprehended when he voluntarily showed up at the Los Angeles Field Office for a scheduled check-in, see Mot. at 2. The uncontroverted evidence thus “raises an inference that the government will have difficulty proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner's detention is necessary to prevent danger to the community or his flight.” Meneses v. Santacruz, No. CV 25-11206-MCS-PVCx, 2025 WL 3481771, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025).

A pre-detention hearing would afford Petitioner the opportunity to demonstrate he does not pose a danger to the community or flight risk. In contrast, without the additional procedural safeguard of a pre-detention hearing, ICE could, as it appears to have done so here, unlawfully re-detain Petitioner at any time, regardless of whether his detention serves any valid governmental interest. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (finding the risk of erroneous deprivation was significant where neither party “had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for [the petitioner's] detention”); Juarez Fernandez v. Semaia, No. EDCV 25-03412-SPG-MBKx, 2026 WL 136229, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2026) (noting post-deprivation relief could result in the petitioner's indefinite detention “without any process”). Hence, the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner's liberty in this case is high.

Third, Respondent has no countervailing interest in re-detaining Petitioner, and the burden of a pre-detention hearing is low. As discussed, Respondent has not shown Petitioner poses a flight risk or danger to the community, especially considering Petitioner's lack of criminal history and other countervailing evidence in the record before the Court. Respondent provides no other reason for ICE's revocation of Petitioner's parole and Petitioner's ongoing re-detention. Thus, Respondent lacks any governmental interest in continuing to detain Petitioner. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (finding no valid governmental interest where the government identified no changed circumstances regarding the petitioner's dangerousness or flight risk). Further, Respondent does not show a pre-detention hearing imposes a significant financial or administrative burden. To the contrary, custody hearings in immigration court are “routine” and impose only a “minimal” cost. Singh v. Bowen, No. EDCV 25-03034-CAS-PDx, 2025 WL 3251437, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025) (citation modified) (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 F.Supp.3d 1035, 1047–49 (E.D. Cal. 2025)). Hence, ICE's interest in Petitioner's continued detention is minimal.

Respondent's Opposition does not meaningfully address Petitioner's due process claim. Rather, Respondent merely contends ICE's authority to terminate Petitioner's parole is “discretionary” and ICE complied with the Department of Homeland Security's implementing regulations governing termination of humanitarian or significant public benefit parole. Opp. at 2-3. Specifically, Respondent cites 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e), which provides, in relevant part, “upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the officials listed ․, neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence of the [noncitizen] in the United States, parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the [noncitizen] and he or she shall be restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole. When a charging document is served on the alien, the charging document will constitute written notice of termination of parole, unless otherwise specified.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). Respondent thus appears to suggest ICE's mere compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e) is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.

Respondent's argument is unpersuasive. As an initial matter, Respondent fails to establish ICE, in fact, complied with 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e), as Respondent provides no evidence showing the purpose of Petitioner's parole has been accomplished or one of the authorized officials determined neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warranted Petitioner's continued presence in the United States. See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1146 (D. Or. 2025) (finding a notice that is “silent as to any finding that Petitioner's parole had served its purpose, that humanitarian reasons do not warrant Petitioner's presence in the country, or that he is a danger to the public or a flight risk” was insufficient to satisfy the statutory and regulatory requirements for terminating parole). Regardless, even assuming ICE complied with 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e) in terminating Petitioner's parole, neither that provision nor 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) affirmatively authorizes Petitioner's re-detention in immigration custody. See Daza v. Albarran, (“[M]ere termination of Petitioner's parole does not result in her mandatory detention.”). While 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) provides a noncitizen shall be returned to “custody” upon termination of parole, “[t]he law and the statute draw a distinction between ‘detention’ and ‘custody.’ ” Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-cv-10029-LJL, 2025 WL 3654098, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (“ ‘Custody’ does not necessarily mean physical custody. It concerns any status under which a person or thing is under ‘the care and control of [another] for inspection, preservation or security.’ ” (citation omitted)).

In any event, ICE's compliance with the Department of Homeland Security's implementing regulations does not excuse ICE from providing Petitioner with due process or otherwise establish ICE afforded Petitioner adequate due process before his re-detention in immigration custody. See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 981 (“[T]he government's discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.”); Mody v. Warden, No. EDCV 25-3400-FMO-RAOx, 2026 WL 51976, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (“[D]etermining whether respondents provided petitioner with notice required by regulation of a pending parole termination would not resolve the question before the court, i.e., whether respondents provided petitioner with sufficient due process prior to his re-detention.”); Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1137 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“That the express terms of the parole notice allowed for discretionary termination or expiration does not somehow obviate the need for the Government to provide a[n] individualized hearing prior to re-detaining the parolee.”). Hence, Respondent fails to show ICE provided Petitioner with due process prior to re-detaining him.

Accordingly, because Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that his re-detention violates the Due Process Clause, the first and most important Winter factor weighs in favor of him.

B. LIKELIHOOD OF IRREPARABLE HARM

“It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’ ” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994 (citation modified) (quoting Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002). “Deprivation of physical liberty by detention constitutes irreparable harm.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994). Among other harms, immigration detention results in “subpar medical and psychiatric care” for detainees and imposes “economic burdens” and “collateral harms” on the families of detainees. Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. “In the absence of an injunction, harms such as these will continue to occur needlessly on a daily basis.” Id.

Here, as stated above, Petitioner's release has been improperly revoked, and Petitioner has been unlawfully detained in violation of his constitutional right to due process. Since being re-detained, Petitioner has been unable to work or see his family. Mot. at 9. Thus, Petitioner and his family have suffered a “grievous loss” from his re-detention. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Under these circumstances, Petitioner and his family are – and will continue to be – irreparably harmed absent relief from this Court.

Accordingly, the second Winter factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.

C. BALANCE OF EQUITIES AND PUBLIC INTEREST

The final two Winter factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009). The Ninth Circuit has recognized “neither equity nor the public's interest are furthered by allowing violations of federal law to continue.” Galvez v. Jaddou, 52 F.4th 821, 832 (9th Cir. 2022) (affirming the balance of hardships weighed in favor of plaintiffs alleging the government violated the INA). Specifically, in cases involving removal, “there is a public interest in preventing [noncitizens] from being wrongfully removed.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 436, 129 S.Ct. 1749.

Here, because Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on his constitutional claim, the balance of equities and public interest “tip[ ] sharply” in his favor. All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. Moreover, Respondent's interest in enforcing immigration laws is not compelling because “our system does not permit agencies to act unlawfully even in pursuit of desirable ends.” Ala. Ass'n of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 594 U.S. 758, 766, 141 S.Ct. 2485, 210 L.Ed.2d 856 (2021) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582, 585-86, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952)); see also Cmty. Legal Servs. in E. Palo Alto v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 777 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1045-46 (N.D. Cal. 2025), appeal dismissed, No. 25-2358, 2025 WL 1189827 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2025) (“[C]ourts regularly find that ‘[t]here is generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action.’ ” (quoting League of Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016))). Faced with “a conflict between [administrative] concerns and preventable human suffering, [the Court has] little difficulty concluding that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in [Petitioner's] favor.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996.

Accordingly, the third and fourth Winter factors weigh in favor of Petitioner.

* * * * *

Thus, because all four Winter factors weigh in favor of Petitioner, Petitioner is entitled to injunctive relief. While Respondent argues the proper relief is remedying the specific procedural defects rather than releasing Petitioner from custody, see Opp. at 4-6, the Court rejects this argument. As discussed above, Petitioner continues to suffer irreparable harm so long as he remains unlawfully re-detained. Providing Petitioner with a post-detention hearing or other procedural remedy will not redress the constitutional violation Petitioner has suffered in being re-detained without a pre-deprivation hearing required by due process. Cf. Esmail v. Noem, No. CV 25-08325-WLH-RAOx, 2025 WL 3030590, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2025) (“Providing Petitioner an interview ex post facto, while keeping him detained in ICE's custody, would not remedy the apparent constitutional violation that Petitioner has suffered in being re-detained without any measure of due process.”). Further, Petitioner's release is necessary to return him to the status quo, which is “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force v. Montana, 98 F.4th 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation modified) (quoting GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000)). Here, the last uncontested status is Petitioner's release on parole before his current re-detention. See Sotomayor, 2025 WL 3691398, at *6 (finding the petitioner's immediate release from custody was the appropriate relief where the petitioner was re-detained without due process). Accordingly, Petitioner's release from custody is the appropriate remedy. Accord Mody, 2026 WL 51976, at *7; Aviles-Mena v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06783-RFL, 2025 WL 2578215, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2025).

V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Petitioner's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is GRANTED;2

2. Respondent is ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from its custody;

3. Respondent is ENJOINED from relocating Petitioner outside the Central District of California pending final resolution of this case;

4. Respondent is ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner without providing him a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where Respondent bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger such that his physical custody is required;

5. Respondent is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing no later than seven (7) days from the date of this Order why the Court should not issue a preliminary injunction. Petitioner may file a Reply no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order; and

6. Respondent is ORDERED to file a status report no later than January 26, 2026 demonstrating compliance with this Order.

Failure to comply with this Order will result in sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides, in relevant part, that the Secretary of Homeland Security “may ․ in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any [noncitizen] applying for admission to the United States.”

2.   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) permits a court to grant injunctive relief “only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). “Despite the seemingly mandatory language, ‘Rule 65(c) invests the district court ‘with discretion as to the amount of security required, if any.’ ” Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis removed) (quoting Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003)). Here, it is unlikely Respondent will incur any significant costs, and requiring a bond “would have a negative impact on plaintiff's constitutional rights, as well as the constitutional rights of other members of the public.” Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 936 F. Supp. 719, 738 (C.D. Cal. 1996). Accordingly, the Court waives the bond requirement.

KENLY KIYA KATO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE