RICHARDS v. COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO 10 (2025)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW [331]

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff William Richards brought this Section 1983 action to recover damages resulting from the decades he spent in prison after being wrongfully convicted for his wife's murder. After years of litigation and a seven-day trial, a jury found in Mr. Richards’ favor against Defendant County of San Bernardino (“Defendant” or “the County”) on two Monell claims and awarded Mr. Richards over $25 million in damages. The County now seeks to undo the jury's verdict through a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (the “Motion”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). The County contends in the main that no reasonable jury could have found in Plaintiff's favor on either claim.

The Court is unpersuaded. Having carefully considered the parties’ submissions, the trial record, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict. Accordingly, and for the reasons explained below, the Motion is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In 1997, after four criminal trials, William Richards was convicted for the murder of his wife, Pamela Richards. After spending decades in prison and wading through years of appeals and post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Richards ultimately prevailed on his petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that he had been convicted on false evidence, and was freed. See In re Richards, 63 Cal. 4th 291, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 678, 371 P.3d 195 (2016). Mr. Richards was subsequently found factually innocent of the crime by a preponderance of the evidence under Cal. Penal Code § 1485.55(b). Ex. H.¹

On the night of Ms. Richards’ murder, Mr. Richards arrived home at approximately 11:50–55 p.m. and discovered his wife's body. Ex. AA at 92:18–23. He called 911 at 11:58 p.m. Ex. FF. The first responder, patrolman Deputy Mark Nourse, arrived to the scene at 12:38 a.m. Ex. LL Nourse inspected the body and initiated a homicide investigation. Ex. C at 98:21–99:13.

Deputy Coroner Randolph was first notified of Ms. Richards’ homicide at 12:40 a.m. Ex. KK at 1366:16–1368:18. He was told he did not need to report to the scene until needed because it was the County of San Bernardino's policy to prohibit coroners from entering a homicide scene until the scene was fully processed. Ex. FF at 2; Ex. C at 47:7–12, 60:22–61:2, 125:4–12; Ex. G at 12:20–25. Because it was dark, the responding officers chose to wait to access the scene until first light, around 6:00 a.m., purportedly to avoid destruction of the crime scene.² Ex. D at 88:5–8; Ex. F at 117:18–118:1, 152:1–153:20. Before officers arrived, Mr. Richards covered his wife's unclothed body with a sleeping bag. Ex. A at 129:2–7. Stray dogs were also running around the scene. Id. at 130:2–21.

Randolph did not arrive until he was requested around 10:30 a.m. Ex. KK at 1366:16–1368:18. By then, he was unable to estimate time of death. Ex. D at 54:12–15. However, he observed that the body was cool, in advanced stages of rigor mortis, and had been dead for a long time. Ex. R at 1367:13–1368:1; Ex. C at 55:8–15. In this litigation, Dr. Haddix, after reviewing the evidence in the criminal case, estimated that Ms. Richards died between twenty minutes to two hours before Mr. Richards arrived home. Ex. CC at 66:3–67:6.

Criminalist Craig Ogino conducted an autopsy of Ms. Richards and collected, among other things, fingernail scrapings from her hand, which he designated as “C-8.” Ex. M at 3–4. Ogino wrote bench notes, which described the C-8 scrapings as including soil, broken fingernails, possible blood and tissue, and one light blond hair. Id. The bench notes also stated that the light blond hair was 5/8” long, had a telogen root—showing the hair was blond to the root, indicating it was natural, not dyed, blond—and that “given the limited population of Pamela Richards and William Richards, it could have originated from Pamela Richards’ but not William Richards’ head hair.” Id. at 4; Ex. B at 200:14–204:12. Ms. Richards’ hair was dyed blond and 5–6” in length, and Mr. Richards hair was black. Ex. M at 2. Ogino testified in the instant litigation that he believed the light blond hair might not be “historical,” meaning that it could have been deposited around the time of her death, and not at some point prior. Ex. B at 200:6–11.

During Mr. Richards’ trials, reports that Ogino drafted, but not the bench notes, were included as evidence. See Exs. N–P. Ogino's reports related to the C-8 light blond hair stated that Ms. Richards’ fingernail scrapings contained, among other things, “soil, possible blood and tissue, ․ one light blond hair, [and] broken fingernails,” and that “[t]he blond hair could have originated from Pamela Richards but not William Richards.” Exs. O, P. The reports did not contain the additional detail found in the bench notes as described above. Compare Exs. O, P and Ex. M.

B. Procedural Background

In March 2017, Plaintiff William Richards brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant County of San Bernardino and other individual defendants violated his constitutional rights by suppressing exculpatory evidence during the criminal investigation and prosecution that led to his wrongful conviction for the homicide of his wife. [Dkt. 1]. After extensive litigation, the Court held a seven-day jury trial in June and July 2025. Following the presentation of evidence, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which the Court denied. [Dkts. 305, 307, 308]. The jury then deliberated and returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on two Monell claims: (1) the “Coroner Access Claim,” alleging that the County maintained a policy or custom restricting the coroner's access to homicide scenes that resulted in the suppression of exculpatory time-of-death evidence; and (2) the “Bench Notes Claim,” alleging that the County failed to maintain adequate policies or training to ensure disclosure of criminalist bench notes containing exculpatory forensic evidence. See Special Verdict Form at 3–5 [Dkts. 314, 315]. The jury awarded $25,241,000 in damages to Plaintiff. Id. The Court entered judgment on July 21, 2025. [Dkt. 330]. Defendant now renews its motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).³

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), a motion for judgment as a matter of law must be made before the case is submitted to the jury and must specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). If the Court does not grant the motion, “the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion.” E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)). A party may move to renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law within twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment, or, if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no later than twenty-eight days after the jury was discharged. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). It may also move in the alternative for a new trial under Rule 59. Id.

A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion that is contrary to the jury's verdict. E.E.O.C., 581 F.3d at 961. A jury's verdict “must be upheld” if it is supported by substantial evidence, even where it “is possible to draw a contrary conclusion.” Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). In ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court may: “(a) allow the judgment to stand, (b) order a new trial, or (c) direct entry of judgment as a matter of law.” White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002). Judgment is appropriate “if there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 859 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, when making its determination, the Court cannot “make credibility determinations” and “must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Tan Lam v. City of Los Banos, 976 F.3d 986, 995 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 159–51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Coroner Access Claim

To find in Plaintiff's favor on the Coroner Access Claim, the jury was required to find (and did find) that (1) Defendant's employees and/or agents deprived Plaintiff of constitutional rights; (2) Defendant's employees and/or agents acted pursuant to a widespread or longstanding practice or custom; (3) the widespread or longstanding practice or custom caused the suppression of evidence that was favorable to Plaintiff; and (4) the suppression harmed Plaintiff. See Special Verdict Form at 3–4 [Dkts. 314, 315]. Defendant argues that the jury's verdict should be set aside, and judgment should be granted in Defendant's favor on this claim for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff's Coroner Access Claim arose under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), not Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Plaintiff failed to prove Defendant adopted the coroner access policy in bad faith, a key element of a Youngblood claim; and (2) Plaintiff failed to prove that the coroner access policy caused the loss of exculpatory evidence. Neither theory is persuasive.

1. Brady, Youngblood, and Bad Faith

First, the Court finds that Defendant waived its “bad faith” argument by failing to raise it in its Rule 50(a) motion. See Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (F.R.C.P. 50(a)) (the “Rule 50(a) Motion”) [Dkt. 305]; Ex. EE [Dkt. 338-6]. The initial motion argued that Plaintiff failed to prove that the coroner access policy was unconstitutional. Rule 50(a) Motion at 4. The Rule 50(a) Motion acknowledged that Plaintiff's Coroner Access Claim was based on the theory that the coroner access policy suppressed exculpatory time of death evidence. Id. at 5, 11. But nowhere did the Rule 50(a) Motion argue that Plaintiff was required to prove bad faith under Youngblood. The closest it came to raising this argument was in the following passage:

[E]ven if the County's custom or practice resulted in a suppression of evidence in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Monell liability cannot attach here because there has been no showing that the County was deliberately indifferent to the fact that such a violation would or had occurred. Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the County was aware of the known or obvious risk that implementation of its custom or practice would lead to constitutional violations. The trial record is entirely devoid of any evidence that the County's custom or practice was unconstitutional or did violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Id. at 12. This was not enough to preserve the argument Defendant now advances.

It is improper to grant judgment as a matter of law on grounds that were not advanced in the pre-verdict motion. Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Advisory Comm. Notes to the 1991 Amendments, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50; Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1990)). Although “Rule 50(b) may be satisfied by an ambiguous or inartfully made motion under Rule 50(a),” E.E.O.C., 581 F.3d at 961 (citation omitted), Defendant's Rule 50(a) Motion did not assert the bad faith/Youngblood argument at all, instead focusing on Plaintiff's alleged failure to prove his claim under the Brady requirements. Allowing a vague statement that Plaintiff failed to prove a constitutional violation to open the door to arguments not raised in the pre-verdict motion would defeat the purpose of a Rule 50 motion: to (1) “preserve[ ] the sufficiency of the evidence as a question of law, allowing the district court to review its initial denial of judgment as a matter of law instead of forcing it to ‘engage in an impermissible reexamination of facts found by the jury,’ ” and (2) “call[ ] to the court's and the parties’ attention any alleged deficiencies in the evidence at a time when the opposing party still has an opportunity to correct them.” Id. (citing Lifshitz v. Walter Drake & Sons, 806 F.2d 1426, 1428–29 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Moreover, as agreed to by both parties, Court Instruction No. 19 explaining “Deliberate or Reckless Suppression of Evidence” for the Coroner Access Claim only required Plaintiff to prove that Defendant suppressed favorable evidence, Plaintiff was harmed by the suppression, and Defendant acted with “deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff's rights in suppressing the evidence. Court Instructions [Dkt. 310] at 23; see also Defendants’ Proposed Jury Instructions [Dkt. 258] at 13; Proposed Joint Final Pretrial Conference Order [Dkt. 252-1] at 5–7, 10. The instruction frames Plaintiff's Coroner Access Claim pursuant to Brady, not Youngblood, and no instruction required Plaintiff to prove Youngblood-related elements like bad faith. Nor did Defendant even propose an instruction based on Youngblood that would require Plaintiff to prove bad faith.

In short, Defendant's failure to dispute the instructions—indeed, Defendant requested the instructions—or raise the issue in the pretrial conference order constituted a waiver of the objection. See Skidmore as Tr. for Randy Craig Wolfe Tr. v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (holding that a district court's exclusion of a proposed jury instruction and a party's failure to object to the exclusion forfeited the objection); United States for Use and Benefit of Reed v. Callahan, 884 F.2d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding objections to instructions waived when “[t]he objections were made for the first time in a motion for new trial”); Patterson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 948, 950 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A pretrial order generally supersedes the pleadings, and the parties are bound by its contents.”); United States v. Joyce, 511 F.2d 1127, 1130 n.1 (9th Cir. 1974) (“The pretrial order controls the subsequent course of the action and the parties are bound by their agreement to limit the issues to be tried.”). Plaintiff did not need to prove bad faith because the jury instructions and the arguments from the parties reflect that Plaintiff brought the Coroner Access Claim under Brady. Defendant cannot now argue that Plaintiff failed to prove bad faith when there was no argument of this theory of the claim at trial. See Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1074 (holding that a party was not entitled to a jury instruction when it was not presented as a separate theory at trial).⁴

2. Causation

Causation under Monell requires “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016). The Court concludes that Plaintiff presented substantial evidence such that a reasonable jury could have found the coroner access policy caused the loss of exculpatory evidence. For example, the evidence presented at trial showed:

• Plaintiff arrived home at approximately 11:50–55 p.m. and first called 911 at 11:58 p.m. Ex. AA at 92:18–23; Ex. FF.

• A patrolman first arrived to the scene at 12:38 a.m. Ex. LL.

• Deputy Coroner Randolph was first notified of Ms. Richards’ homicide at 12:40 a.m., but he did not arrive at the scene until he was requested around 10:30 a.m. Ex. KK at 1366:16–1368:18; Ex. FF at 2 (Sgt. McCarville advising that he will call when a coroner is needed).

• Dr. Sheridan (Defendant's Chief Medical Examiner at the time) and Dr. Haddix (Plaintiff's expert) testified that Ms. Richards’ body could have been assessed immediately without destroying evidence. Ex. CC at 75:13–81:13; Ex. EE at 69:17–25.

• Dr. Haddix estimated that Ms. Richards died between twenty minutes to two hours before Mr. Richards arrived home. Ex. CC at 66:3–67:6.

This evidence more than supports the reasonable conclusion that Ms. Richards’ time of death was exculpatory to Plaintiff, and that this evidence could have been timely assessed and presented at trial if a coroner had been permitted to immediately access the body.

Further, although California law requires a coroner not to “disturb the body or any related evidence until the law enforcement agency has had reasonable opportunity to respond to the scene,” it also provides that “[t]he coroner or the coroner's appointed deputy, upon being informed of a death ․ requiring his or her inquiry, may immediately proceed to where the body lies, examine the body ․ and make inquiry into the circumstances, manner and means of death.” Cal. Gov't Code §§ 27491.3(c), 27491.2(a). Here, where time of death was relevant, California law did not require the coroner to refrain from immediately examining the body.

B. Bench Notes Claim

To find in Plaintiff's favor on the Bench Notes Claim, the jury was required to find (and did find) that (1) Defendant's employees and/or agents deprived Plaintiff of constitutional rights; (2) Defendant's policy was inadequate to prevent violations of law by its employees and/or agents in failing to turn over criminalist bench notes with potentially exculpatory evidence; (3) Defendant was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk that its policy was inadequate; (4) Defendant's conduct caused the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights; and (5) Plaintiff was harmed. See Special Verdict Form at 4–5. Defendant argues that the Court should set aside the jury's verdict and instead grant judgment in Defendant's favor because the bench notes were (purportedly) disclosed, were not material to Plaintiff's defense, and because Plaintiff (again, purportedly) failed to prove Defendant's deliberate indifference and causation of a Brady violation. Again, the Court disagrees.

1. Disclosure

Having reviewed all of the evidence presented at trial, the Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the bench notes were not disclosed. While Plaintiff was aware of the “C-8” blond hair found under Ms. Richard's broken fingernail through the disclosed reports, Plaintiff did not know of the additional details underlying the report that contained arguably exculpatory evidence.

In response, Defendant cites to the prosecutor's testimony that he provided Ogino's bench notes to defense counsel, Motion at 16 (citing Ex. F, at 30:8–31:12), but there was other evidence to contradict that statement. First, there was no copy of the bench notes in the file with the markings that the prosecutor typically made before providing them to a defendant's attorney. Ex. EE at 36:6–37:17. Second, the file did not contain a copy of a written request for the bench notes from the prosecutor to Ogino; if a prosecutor requested bench notes, it was the typical practice to put this written request in the file. Id. at 37:17–21; Ex. MM at 140:7–18, 142:18–20. Third, the practice was that criminalists would not provide their bench notes unless they received a request from the prosecutor. Ex. MM at 140:7–18. Finally, Plaintiff's habeas attorney testified that his team reviewed every document provided by the prosecution, and Ogino's bench notes were not included. Ex. CC at 153:7–158:19. The jury does not need to believe the prosecutor's self-serving testimony that the bench notes were disclosed, particularly when there is substantial evidence that could lead to a contrary conclusion.

2. Materiality

To establish a Brady violation, a plaintiff must show that the suppressed evidence was “materially favorable” to his defense. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869, 126 S.Ct. 2188, 165 L.Ed.2d 269 (2006) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). “Material” means there must be “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) and Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999).

Here, there was substantial evidence that the undisclosed bench notes were material because they contained exculpatory information beyond what the defense already possessed. The report provided to the defense stated that the C-8 blond hair recovered under Ms. Richards’ broken nail “could have originated from Pamela Richards.” Ex. P at 36–2. But the bench notes provide other information that indicates the hair could have been from a third person (not Ms. or Mr. Richards) because Ms. Richards’ hair was dyed blonde, Mr. Richards’ hair was black, and the recovered hair, evidenced by its telogen root, was naturally blonde. Ex. M; Ex. B at 200:14–201:10. The bench notes also revealed that the statement in the report that the hair could have come from Ms. Richards was based only on an assessment of the limited population of Ms. and Mr. Richards—it did not consider the possibility of a third source. Ex. M at 33–4; Ex. B at 201:11–202:23. In addition, Ogino testified in the instant litigation that he believed the hair might not be “historical,” which would mean that it could have been deposited around the time of her death, not at some point prior. Ex. B at 200:6–11. A hair likely deposited under Ms. Richards’ broken nail around the time of death—especially one belonging potentially to a third person—is undoubtedly material because it indicates someone else was potentially present when Ms. Richards was killed. The reports provided to the defense did not include this additional context contained in the withheld bench notes. See Exs. O, P. Defendant's attempts to minimize this evidence are unconvincing.

3. Deliberate Indifference

Next, the Court concludes on this record that the jury's finding that Defendant's failure to train regarding Brady violations amounted to deliberate indifference was supported by substantial evidence and applicable caselaw.

The parties stipulated that, at the time of Ms. Richards’ death, Defendant “had no written Brady policy requiring exculpatory evidence to be turned over.” Court Instructions at 13. Moreover, criminalists received no Brady training, and Defendant did not point to any evidence that Ogino understood the Brady obligation to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence. It was the practice of criminalists, including Ogino, to only produce bench notes if there was a specific request from a prosecutor, regardless of whether the notes contained Brady evidence. Ex. MM at 140:7–18. Plaintiff only presented evidence of this single Brady violation.

Defendant avers that Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) requires a pattern of Brady violations to prove deliberate indifference, not merely a complete lack of a written Brady policy and one violation. In Connick, the Court held that failure to train prosecutors on their Brady obligations was insufficient to prove deliberate indifference in an instance of single-incident liability because prosecutors, as licensed attorneys, “are not only equipped but are also ethically bound to know what Brady entails and to perform legal research when they are uncertain.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 66–67, 131 S.Ct. 1350. On this basis, the Court found that “recurring constitutional violations are not the ‘obvious consequence’ of failing to provide prosecutors with formal in-house training about how to obey the law” because they are already well-prepared by the “regime of legal training and professional responsibility.” Id.

Connick is obviously distinguishable. Here, it was the criminalist, not the prosecutor, who failed to turn over Brady evidence. Criminalists, unlike the attorneys in Connick, are not trained in the law or equipped with the tools to apply legal principles. A single instance of a violation can be sufficient to show deliberate indifference because constitutional violations resulting from failing to disclose Brady evidence are an “obvious consequence” of the lack of a policy and training for non-lawyers. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Canton does caution that Monell liability should not collapse into respondeat superior. 489 U.S. at 388–91, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (finding that the record did not show deliberate indifference and remanding for further proceedings). But Canton also contemplates that, while “there are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a failure to train can be the basis for liability under § 1983,” it may be the case that “in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights,” that deliberate indifference is shown such that the city is responsible under Section 1983. Id. at 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197. Failure to train non-attorney criminalists who frequently encounter Brady evidence, coupled with the complete lack of a written Brady policy, is exactly the circumstance contemplated in Canton to allow for Monell liability. Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit recognized, “[a] plaintiff also might succeed in proving a failure-to-train claim without showing a pattern of constitutional violations where a violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle recurring situations.” Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). What happened with the bench notes in this action is precisely the “highly predictable consequences” of failing to equip the criminalists with this required Brady training.

4. Causation

Finally, Defendant argues that there is no evidence to support the jury's finding that a Brady violation caused the injury in question. Motion at 21. Not so. A Monell claim requires “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1075. Court Instruction No. 20 explained that causation is found when Defendant's “failure to prevent violations of law by its employees and/or agents played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage to Plaintiff.” Court Instructions at 24. A reasonable jury could find, at a minimum, that the complete lack of a written Brady policy and Brady training for non-lawyers “played a substantial part” in Ogino's failure to disclose the potentially exculpatory bench notes. Indeed, there was no evidence at trial to suggest that, had Defendant maintained a Brady policy and trained its criminalists on such a policy, Ogino would have nonetheless still failed to turn over the (highly material) bench notes.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is denied.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All exhibits referenced herein were submitted with the Motion, Opposition, or Reply. Exhibits A through S are appended to the Declaration of Nadia Sarkis [Dkt. 331-1]; Exhibits AA through MM are appended to the Declaration of Ben Shaw [Dkt. 338-1]; and Exhibits T through V are appended to the Supplemental Declaration of Nadia Sarkis [Dkt. 340-1].

2.   As part of the present litigation, Dr. Sheridan (Defendant's Chief Medical Examiner at the time of the homicide investigation) and Dr. Haddix (Plaintiff's expert) testified that Ms. Richards’ body could have been assessed immediately without destroying evidence. Ex. CC at 75:13–81:13; Ex. EE at 69:17–25.

3.   Defendant also moves, in the alternative, for a new trial. [Dkt. 332]. The Court addresses that motion in a separate order.

4.   Even if Defendant did not waive the bad faith/Youngblood argument, Plaintiff's Coroner Access Claim was properly assessed by the jury under Brady. As discussed above, Plaintiff argued the Coroner Access Claim under Brady, not Youngblood, and the jury was able to evaluate it as such. A reasonable jury could find that—because Ms. Richards’ body was a piece of evidence which was collected—time of death evidence was indeed collected. It then follows that the jury could have reasonably found that Defendant suppressed, not merely failed to collect, the time of death which would have been evident through a timely examination of Ms. Richards’ body. It is not the only conclusion the jury could have reached, but it is nonetheless a reasonable one. This is unlike much of the caselaw to which Defendant cites in the Reply to the Motion because here the time of death evidence did exist, but the jury found it was suppressed by Defendant's policy of delaying coroner access.

Hernán D. Vera, United States District Judge