CRESCENCIO v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY (2025)

Proceedings (In Chambers): ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS [24]; REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE [28]

Before the Court is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the “Motion”) filed by Defendant Ford Motor Company on September 3, 2025. (Docket No. 24). Plaintiffs Armando Moreno Crescencio and Jacob Levy filed an Opposition on September 29, 2025. (Docket No. 25). Ford filed a Reply on October 6, 2025. (Docket No. 27).

The Court has considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion and held a hearing on November 17, 2025.

Ford's Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.

The Motion is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiffs purchased a Certified Pre-Owned vehicle, which does not qualify as a “new motor vehicle” under the Song–Beverly Act. Although Plaintiffs allege that they received a new CPO warranty at the time of purchase, such a warranty does not constitute a “manufacturer's new car warranty” within the meaning of the statute. Moreover, there are no current allegations that would make Ford liable under the used-goods provisions of the SBA, but Plaintiffs may develop such allegations, if proper, on leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 23, 2022, Plaintiffs purchased a Certified Pre-Owned (“CPO”) 2019 Ford F-150 (the “Vehicle”). (Complaint (Docket No. 1-1) ¶ 8). Plaintiffs allege that the Vehicle was “pre-owned,” but that Ford provided Plaintiffs with a “new and full CPO warranty” at the time of purchase. (Id.). Plaintiffs signed a Retail Installment Sales Contract (“RISC”) which identifies Galpin Motors, Inc., as the retail seller, not Ford. (See RISC (Docket No. 24-3) at 1).

Following the purchase, Plaintiffs allege that serious defects manifested in the Vehicle, including transmission system defects. (Complaint ¶ 10). Plaintiffs first presented the Vehicle for repairs in June 2023 and reported harsh gear shifting and jerking when accelerating. (Id. ¶ 11). In March 2024, Plaintiffs presented the Vehicle again for repeated concerns of jerking when accelerating and harsh gear shifts. (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiffs presented the Vehicle for repair a third time in May 2024. (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiffs subsequently revoked acceptance of the Vehicle. (Id. ¶ 14).

Based on the above allegations, Plaintiffs allege violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790–1795.8, including breach of express and implied warranties and failure to repair. (Id. ¶¶ 19–60).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“After the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The analysis for Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings is “substantially identical to [the] analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A motion for judgment on the pleadings should only be granted if “the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989).

In reviewing a Rule 12(c) motion, “all factual allegations in the complaint [must be accepted] as true and construe[d] ․ in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). Judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is warranted “only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Deveraturda v. Globe Aviation Sec. Servs., 454 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Ford asks that the Court consider the Retail Installment Sales Contract (“RISC”), signed by Plaintiffs when they purchased the Vehicle. (Motion at 1 n.1). The purchase agreement is referenced in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Complaint ¶ 8), and attached to Ford's Motion. (See Docket No. 24-3).

Ford also filed a Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) with its Reply on October 6, 2025. (Docket No. 28). In its RJN, Ford asks that the Court consider the following documents:

1. (Tentative) Order Granting Defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, dated December 9, 2024, in Sean M. Hutchinson v. Ford Motor Company, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC666024 / JCCP 4856 (the “Hutchinson Action”) (Jessner, J.), Exhibit A;

2. Order Sustaining Ford Motor Company's Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, dated May 14, 2025, in the Hutchinson Action, Exhibit B;

3. Order Overruling Defendant's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, dated October 3, 2025, in the Hutchinson Action, Exhibit C.

Plaintiffs do not appear to oppose the RJN or the request to consider the RISC. The Court agrees it may properly consider these documents. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (A court may incorporate by reference “documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff's] pleading.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Cherewick v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 578 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1158 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (“It is well-established that courts may take judicial notice of the pleadings, filings, and court records of any court.”).

Accordingly, Ford's RJN and separate request are GRANTED.

IV. DISCUSSION

Under the SBA, “[a]ny buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation ․ under an implied or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(a).

Here, Ford moves for judgment on the pleadings as to all of Plaintiffs’ SBA claims. (Motion at 1). Ford argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the SBA because Plaintiffs’ Vehicle is not a “new motor vehicle” under the SBA, and the used-goods provision of the SBA does not apply to manufacturers, such as Ford. (Id. at 3–5).

A. Express Warranty Claim

Under the SBA, “only purchasers of ‘new motor vehicles’ may bring a breach of express warranty claim against manufacturers.” Kargar v. BMW of North America, LLC, No. CV 22-03047-SPG (KSx), 2025 WL 3050151, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2025). That provision “requires a manufacturer to replace a defective ‘new motor vehicle’ or make restitution if, after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer (or its representative) is unable to repair the vehicle to conform to the applicable express warranty.” Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC, 77 Cal. App. 5th 209, 214, 292 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382 (2022) (“Rodriguez I”). Section 1793.22(e)(2) of the SBA defines “new motor vehicle” to include “a dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.22(e)(2) (emphasis added).

The California Supreme Court recently provided guidance on the meaning of the term “new motor vehicle” and the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty.” See Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC, 17 Cal. 5th 189, 326 Cal. Rptr. 3d 440 (2024) (“Rodriguez II”). In Rodriguez II, the supreme court held that “a [used] motor vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer's new car warranty does not qualify as a ․ ‘new motor vehicle’ unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale.” Id. at 196. A pre-owned car therefore does not become a “new motor vehicle” even if the original new car warranty is still in effect at the time the car is repurchased. Id.

The supreme court acknowledged that “certain used cars” may be “sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty” and therefore “qualify as ‘new motor vehicles’ for purposes of the statute.” Id. at 198. The court pointed to dealer-owned vehicles or “demonstrator” vehicles as such examples. Id. at 198–99. Demonstrators are vehicles “assigned by a dealer for the purpose of demonstrating qualities and characteristics common to vehicles of the same or similar model and type.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.22(e)(2). Such a vehicle is essentially sold “as if it were new — that is, with a full new car warranty.” Rodriguez I, 77 Cal. App. 5th at 221 (emphasis in the original).

Here, Plaintiffs acknowledge they purchased a used vehicle. (Complaint ¶ 8). Plaintiffs argue that Rodriguez II is distinguishable, however, because Ford issued a new CPO warranty with Plaintiffs’ purchase. (Opp. at 4–5; see also Complaint ¶ 8). The parties’ dispute thus narrows to a single legal question: Does a manufacturer's “Certified Pre-Owned” warranty, issued at the time of the sale of a used car, qualify as a manufacturer's “new car warranty” under Civil Code section 1793.22(e)(2) as interpreted in Rodriguez II?

The Court concludes that it does not.

Plaintiffs identify no authority indicating that a CPO warranty constitutes a “new car warranty” under Civil Code section 1793.22(e)(2). See Rodriguez II, 17 Cal. 5th at 196. At the hearing, Plaintiffs argued that Rodriguez II itself supplies the needed support because the supreme court acknowledged that an actionable “new car warranty” may be issued with a car that is not literally new. See 17 Cal. 5th at 198–200. Stated generally, that point is true. But as discussed more fully below, the Court understands both the statutory provision and Rodriguez II’s analysis as cabined to a narrow set of vehicles — i.e., the statutory examples of dealer-owned vehicles and demonstrators, rather than used vehicles previously owned by ordinary consumers. See id.

Indeed, the only post-Rodriguez II persuasive authorities that address CPO warranties have rejected Plaintiffs’ interpretation. See, e.g., Dubrosky v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. CV 24-09153-HDV (ASx), 2025 WL 2451031, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2025) (dismissing SBA claim because “Plaintiffs fail to adduce any authority indicating that a certified pre-owned warranty constitutes “a new car warranty” (emphasis in the original)); In re Coordination Proceeding Special Title Rule 3.550 Ford Motor Warranty Cases, 2025 Cal. Super. LEXIS 9146, at *7 (May 14, 2025) (sustaining demurrer as to CPO warranty theory because “[t]o qualify as a “new motor vehicle,” the manufacturer must have issued, as part of the sale, the manufacturer's new-car warranty, not a “new” warranty on a used car.”); see also Alves v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 23-3049-MWF (RAOx), 2023 WL 5207492, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2023) (concluding, before Rodriguez II, that a plaintiff must allege that the vehicle that was ‘not previously sold’ to a consumer and was sold with ‘full express warranties’ in order to plead the purchase of a ‘new motor vehicle’ ”).

Beyond the admittedly limited body of case law reckoning with CPO warranties, the Court's conclusion is further supported by three independent considerations:

First, Rodriguez II teaches that the statutory phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty” should be interpreted narrowly and in light of the enumerated examples that precede it. 17 Cal. 5th at 198–99.

In the grammatical context of the statute, the phrase is used as a modifier of the preceding examples: dealer-owned vehicles and demonstrators. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.22(e)(2). Those “types of vehicles, by definition, are driven for certain limited purposes prior to sale, and the ‘other motor vehicles ․’ phrase is used as a catch-all to cover similar narrow situations.” Alves, 2023 WL 5207492, at *6. The California Supreme Court noted that phrase's purpose therefore seems limited “to ensure that manufacturers cannot evade liability ․ by claiming a vehicle doesn't qualify as new because the dealer hadn't actually used it as a demonstrator” — e.g., if the dealership had instead used the vehicle only for marketing purposes. Rodriguez II, 17 Cal. 5th at 199–200 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In light of this context, Plaintiffs’ alternative reading of the phrase seems unlikely. “[I]f the Legislature had intended to define ‘new motor vehicle’ to include a potentially vast category of used cars ․ it would have been done so more clearly and explicitly than tucking it into a reference to demonstrators and dealer-owned vehicles.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Expanding this provision to cover all used vehicles with a CPO warranty would therefore “be contrary to the logical and grammatical structure of the clause and would seem to greatly expand manufacturers’ liability.” See Alves, 2023 WL 5207492, at *6.

Second, treating a CPO warranty as a “new car warranty” is inconsistent with the statutory structure and legislative history emphasized by the California Supreme Court in Rodriguez II. The supreme court explained that the SBA clearly “distinguishes between new and used products and calibrates manufacturers’ and sellers’ obligations accordingly.” Rodriguez II, 17 Cal. 5th at 200. Namely, the SBA “includes a distinct section addressing used products.” Id.; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1795.5. And the Act's legislative history likewise reflects that the California Legislature “has maintained distinction between ‘new’ and ‘used’ products” even while amending the SBA. Rodriguez II, 17 Cal. 5th at 201–02.

Simply put, the California Legislature “has shown that it knows how to legislate on ‘used’ products ․ and it has employed clear language when it wants to make a ‘used’ product subject to the warranty protections that apply to the product when new.” Id. at 202. It is thus unlikely that the legislature meant to achieve such a result in the ambiguous provision Plaintiffs invoke here.

Third, the Court acknowledges that this precise question — whether a CPO warranty constitutes a new car warranty — is unsettled under California law, with no clear answer from the California Supreme Court, California Courts of Appeal, or the Ninth Circuit. Any such uncertainty counsels in favor of Ford's narrower interpretation of the SBA.

Courts sitting in diversity are tasked with applying state law and “are bound by the pronouncements of the state's highest court on applicable state law.” Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2001). “Where the state's highest court has not decided an issue, the task of the federal courts is to predict how the state high court would resolve it.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In so predicting, “uncertainty arising from [state law] should be resolved so as to limit rather than expand liability.” In re Ford Motor Co. DPS6 Powershift Transmission Prods. Liab. Litig., 689 F. Supp. 3d 760, 780 (C.D. Cal. 2023); see also Davidson v. Apple, Inc., No. CV 16-4942-LHK, 2017 WL 3149305, at *18 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017); Del Webb Communities Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Federal courts should hesitate prematurely to extend the law in the absence of an indication from the state courts or the state legislature that such an extension would be desirable.” (cleaned up)).

Until there is further guidance from either the California Supreme Court, the California Courts of Appeal, or the Ninth Circuit, the Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs’ CPO Vehicle does not qualify as a “new motor vehicle” within the meaning of the SBA.

Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of express warranty under the SBA.

B. Implied Warranty Claim

The SBA also provides for manufacturers’ implied warranties of merchantability and fitness when “consumer goods” are sold at retail. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1792, 1791.1. The SBA defines “consumer goods” as “any new product or part thereof that is used, bought, or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, except for clothing and consumables.” Id. § 1791(a) (emphasis added).

The SBA “provides similar remedies in the context of the sale of used goods, except that the manufacturer is generally off the hook.” Rodriguez II, 17 Cal. 5th at 201 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is because, generally, in the context of used consumer goods, “liability for breach of implied warranty lies with distributors and retailers, not the manufacturer[.]” Rodriguez I, 77 Cal. App. 5th at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ruiz Nunez v. FCA US, LLC, 61 Cal. App. 5th 385, 399, 275 Cal. Rptr. 3d 618 (2021) (“It is evident from these [SBA] provisions that only distributors or sellers of used goods — not manufacturers of new goods — have implied warranty obligations in the sale of used goods.” (emphasis in the original)); Grismore v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2024 WL 5001469, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2024) (The SBA “does not create implied warranties against manufacturers for the sale of used consumer goods.”).

“The only exception to this rule is ‘[w]here the manufacturer sells directly to the public’ such that it ‘takes on the role of a retailer.’ ” Grismore, 2024 WL 5001469, at *2 (quoting Nunez, 61 Cal. App. 5th at 399); see also Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 43 Cal. App. 5th 334, 337, 256 Cal. Rptr. 3d 484 (2019). This scenario could arise where there are allegations that a manufacturer “played a substantial role in the sale of a used good.” Rodriguez II, 17 Cal. 5th at 202.

Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not even attempt to plead a violation of the relevant section of the SBA. See Dubrosky, 2025 WL 2451031, at *9 n.12 (dismissing similar argument where plaintiff did not allege violation of section 1795.5). In any case, there are no such allegations that Ford played a substantial role in the sale and thus acted as “a distributor or retailer seller of used consumer goods.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1795.5.

At the hearing, Plaintiffs argued that this action should be analogized to Kiluk, 43 Cal. App. 5th 334. In Kiluk, the manufacturer “partnered with a dealership to sell used vehicles directly to the public by offering an express warranty as part of the sales package,” which the court described as “a crucial incentive for buyers.” 43 Cal. App. 5th at 340. The court held that “[b]y partnering with the dealership, Mercedes Benz stepped into the role of a retailer and was subject to the obligations of a retailer under section 1795.5.” Id.

But Plaintiffs allege only that they purchased the Vehicle and that a CPO warranty by Ford accompanied the sale. (Complaint ¶ 8). The RISC is between Plaintiffs and Galpin Motors, Inc., not Ford (RISC at 1), and the Complaint alleges no facts about the nature of the sale or the CPO warranty that would support a finding that Ford was acting as a retailer in connection with the sale of the Vehicle or otherwise partnered with Galpin Motors. See Nunez, 61 Cal. App. 5th at 399 (distinguishing Kiluk where “plaintiff presented no evidence that defendant was ‘a distributor or retail seller of used consumer goods’ ․ or in any way acted as such”). Absent additional allegations of a retail partnership with Galpin Motors, the bare fact of the CPO warranty alone does not make Ford a retailer within the meaning of the SBA. In re Coordination Proceeding Special Title Rule 3.550 Ford Motor Warranty Cases, 2025 Cal. Super. LEXIS 9146, at *9–10 (“The Court does not read Kiluk as holding that a manufacturer ‘takes on the role of a retailer’ whenever a car is sold with a CPO warranty.”); see also Martinez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 22-CV-1082-MMA (BGS), 2022 WL 14118926, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2022) (concluding that manufacturer was not “retailer” under section 1791(1) even where used vehicle was sold with CPO warranty).

Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claim.

C. Section 1793.2(b) Claim

Plaintiffs’ third claim for relief alleges that Ford failed to commence and complete repairs to the Vehicle within 30 days as required by California Civil Code section 1793.2(b). (Complaint ¶¶ 47–60). Section 1793.2(b) provides that service and repair for nonconforming goods “shall be commenced within a reasonable time” and “the goods shall be serviced or repaired so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(b).

Section 1793.2(b) applies to “consumer goods sold in this state.” Id. § 1793.2(a). Again, the SBA defines “consumer goods” as “any new product or part thereof that is used, bought, or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, except for clothing and consumables.” Id. § 1791(a). Given Plaintiffs’ Vehicle was purchased used, for the reasons discussed above, Ford cannot be found liable under section 1793.2(b).

Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ third claim for relief under California Civil Code section 1793.2(b).

V. LEAVE TO AMEND

“Although Rule 12(c) does not mention leave to amend, courts have discretion to grant motions for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend.” Toma v. Univ. of Hawaii, No. CV 16-00499-RLP, 2017 WL 4782629, at *5 (D. Haw. Oct. 23, 2017) (collecting cases). The Ninth Circuit in unpublished decisions has applied the standard requirement for futility when reviewing a district court's denial of leave to amend when granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Hip Hop Beverage Corp. v. Michaux, 729 F. App'x 599, 600 (9th Cir. 2018); Pac. W. Grp., Inc. v. Real Time Sols., Inc., 321 F. App'x 566, 569 (9th Cir. 2008).

Moreover, Rule 15 requires that leave to amend “be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “This policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court identified five factors a court should consider when deciding whether to grant leave to amend: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment, and (5) whether the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Of these, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight.” Sonoma Cty. Ass'n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Eminence Cap., LLC, 316 F.3d at 1052); see also Sharkey v. O'Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 2015) (indicating a court should explain reasons for denying leave to amend).

Ford requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice, arguing that any amendment would be futile. (Motion at 6–7). The Court disagrees. Leave to amend would not be futile because “even if the vehicle was not a ‘new motor vehicle’ ” under the SBA, with additional allegations, Ford could “still [be] liable under the used goods provisions of section 1795.5.” Kiluk, 443 Cal. App. 5th at 340. Ford's arguments to the contrary turn on evidentiary questions not applicable to determining the futility of amendment. The Court also notes that Plaintiffs have not previously amended their pleading, and this Motion was the first opportunity for the Court to assess the sufficiency of their allegations.

Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Motion is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiffs may file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) by no later than December 19, 2025. Ford shall respond to the FAC, if filed, by no later than January 19, 2026.

Failure to file an FAC by December 19, 2025, will be construed as an intention to stand on the existing allegations and, accordingly, will result in entry of judgment dismissing this action with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, United States District Judge