ALVAREZ v. CITY OF SANTA ANA (2025)

Proceedings: [IN CHAMBERS] ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS' AND CITY'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS [81, 82] AND GRANTING COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS [86]

Plaintiff Ramon Alvarez brings suit against the City of Santa Ana, the County of Orange, various departments of those municipalities, and certain officers of the Santa Ana Police Department (“SAPD”), who he alleges were involved in his false conviction in 2012 for the killing of Ruben Leal. Alvarez asserts his conviction, for which he served more than 11 years in prison, was obtained by testimony from a jailhouse informant, Craig Gonzales, that Defendants procured and knew to be false.

The Officer Defendants, the City, and the County each move to dismiss the claims against them. See Officer MTD [Doc. # 81]; City MTD [Doc. # 82]; County MTD [Doc. # 86]. For the reasons discussed in this Order, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Officer and City MTDs and GRANTS the County MTD.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Overview of the SAC 1

Alvarez brought three general categories of claims in his initial complaint, filed March 11, 2024: denial of due process and his right to a fair trial, supervisory liability, and a Monell ² claim. [See generally Doc. # 1.] The Court approved stipulations allowing him to file his first amended complaint on September 7, 2024, and his second amended complaint (“SAC”) on October 11, 2024. [Doc. ## 53, 71.]

The SAC brings a variety of civil rights claims against the following Defendants: the City, the SAPD (together, the “City Defendants”); the County, the County District Attorney's Office (“OCDA”), the County Sheriff's Department (“OCSD”) (collectively, the “County Defendants”); and David Rondou, John Franks, Terry Zlateff, Lorenzo Carrillo, Tony Harrelson, Carlos Rojas, and Sergeant Beaumarchais (collectively, the “Officer Defendants”). Defendants Rondou, Franks, and Zlateff were SAPD detectives; Defendants Carrillo and Beaumarchais were SAPD sergeants; and Defendants Harrelson and Rojas were, respectively, the Deputy Chief and Chief of the SAPD. SAC ¶¶ 13–15. The SAC does not specifically name any individuals who worked for the County as Defendants.

B. Allegations Regarding the Informant System

The SAC alleges the County Defendants are liable for their roles administering certain databases that contained information about jailhouse informants: the “TRED” system, the “Special Handling Log” system, and the “Orange County Informant Index” (“OCII”). Id. ¶¶ 43–49. These databases were allegedly kept secret until the illegal informant programs came to light through two high profile murder cases in the County. Id. ¶ 51.

The TRED and Special Handling Log systems are allegedly creations of the OCSD. Id. ¶ 44. TRED is an “inmate classification system,” which tracks prisoners and informants, including information such as officers' notes about informant activities, details about efforts to incentivize their performance, and descriptions of informants' reliability. Id. ¶¶ 44–45. The Logs purportedly show “coordinated movement and placement of informants at the behest of, or in cooperation with, local law enforcement.” Id. ¶ 46. The OCII is allegedly a product of the OCDA and contains information about informants such as the cases in which they gave testimony and any payment or favors given to them. Id. ¶ 43.

According to Alvarez, OCSD used these systems to cultivate confidential informants to gather information from criminal suspects represented by counsel, strategically placed informants with suspects and encouraged them to interrogate the suspects (in violation of their right to counsel), created detailed logs about such movements and interactions, created false documents to bolster their informants' credentials as necessary, and rewarded informants who provided information helpful to the prosecution. Id. ¶ 53. OCSD deputies were trained to keep the systems secret and even lied under oath to do so. Id. ¶ 54. Relevant to the proceedings against Alvarez that form the basis for this action, OCSD also allowed other agencies, such as SAPD, to access and misuse these databases. Id. ¶ 56.

C. Allegations Regarding the Initial Investigation into the Leal Murder

On June 28, 1998, SAPD officers found Leal's body on ice in a shed, with a gunshot wound to the head. Id. ¶ 41. SAPD arrested Alvarez and eight other suspects. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. Defendant Detectives Franks and Zlateff investigated the murder, supervised by Defendant Sergeant Beaumarchais. Id. ¶ 60.

Franks and Zlateff allegedly used “the TRED and [Special Handling Log] databases and/or the OCDA's OCII system” to find Gonzales—“a known snitch”—who had been housed at the SAPD jail and in Chino State Prison around the same time, although never in the same cell, as Alvarez. Id. ¶¶ 61–62. Franks and Zlateff shared details of the investigation with Gonzales and enticed him with promises of leniency if he cooperated, all with Beaumarchais' knowledge and approval. Id. ¶ 64. Franks and Zlateff also ignored eyewitnesses who stated Alvarez had not been at the scene and lied in official reports about Alvarez sharing a cell with Gonzales, which they knew to be untrue. Id. ¶¶ 68, 72. According to Alvarez, jailhouse records showed that the two had never been housed together or been cell mates. Id. ¶ 71.

Gonzales concocted a story about Alvarez confessing while they were housed together, which Franks and Zlateff knew to be false yet recited in their official police reports. Id. ¶ 70. Franks and Zlateff allegedly also entered false information from Gonzales into the TRED system. Id. ¶ 177. Gonzales later refused to testify, however, and the investigation went cold. Id. ¶¶ 69, 75.

D. Allegations Regarding the Subsequent Investigation

Around 2010, Defendant Detective Rondou (whose supervisors were Defendants Carrillo, Harrelson, and Rojas), at Defendant Franks' request, picked up the investigation into the Leal murder. Id. ¶ 77. Rondou found Gonzales' prior false statements, which Franks and Zlateff had recorded in “official police reports and systems.” Id. ¶ 81. With the approval of Rondou's supervisors (whom Alvarez alleges knew that the deal was for “false” testimony), Rondou offered Gonzales a new deal, including benefits and monetary compensation to be paid from the SAPD Homicide Reward Fund. Id. ¶¶ 82–84, 86. Gonzales agreed, and Rondou arrested Alvarez on July 21, 2010. Id. ¶ 84.

Throughout the criminal proceedings against Alvarez, Rondou continued to meet with Gonzales, provide assurance about the deal (including assuaging Gonzales' concerns about testifying falsely), and direct Gonzales not to say anything about the deal. Id. ¶¶ 90, 103. Rondou also allegedly learned Gonzales had been an informant in cases outside of California yet withheld this information from the defense and directed Gonzales not to divulge it. Id. ¶ 92. Indeed, in response to inquiries from defense counsel, the OCDA's office falsely stated they “checked law enforcement resources to determine if Craig Gonzales had a background as an informant in California and other states there was none[.] [sic]” Id. ¶ 97. The OCDA and the prosecutor, Mark Geller, failed to disclose information relevant to Gonzales notwithstanding the defense's requests and their obligations to disclose material favorable evidence. See id. ¶¶ 87, 94–97.

Rondou, Carrillo, and “SAPD, OCSD, and their employees and agents” also allegedly attempted to orchestrate a second false jailhouse confession, in violation of Alvarez's right to counsel. To this end, they used the TRED and Special Handling Logs to locate Brian Ruorock, another known informant. Id. ¶¶ 105–06. Notwithstanding multiple attempts, however, Ruorock was unable to extract any inculpating evidence from Alvarez and (unlike Gonzales) was not willing to fabricate the confession. Id. ¶ 111. Alvarez alleges that Defendants failed to turn over Ruorock's extensive notes about his attempts to elicit such a confession to the defense team. Id. ¶¶ 114–17.

E. Alvarez's Trial and Later Proceedings

Following a trial that ended with a hung jury, Alvarez was convicted on retrial and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Id. ¶¶ 123, 130. Alvarez alleges that Gonzales' testimony was “the glue that held the prosecution's case together”: there was no physical or forensic evidence against him, no murder weapon was recovered, and in closing argument, Geller (the prosecutor) relied extensively on Gonzales' false testimony that Alvarez had confessed to him. Id. ¶¶ 124–25. Without the benefit of information about Gonzales' history as an informant and motivation to provide testimony useful to the prosecution, the defense team was unable to fully impeach him. See id. ¶ 127. Defendants Carrillo, Harrelson, Rojas, and Rondou subsequently discussed and agreed to pay Gonzales off using the Homicide Reward Fund. Id. ¶¶ 132–33.

In 2015, Alvarez, proceeding pro se, sought habeas corpus relief in this Court on the basis of the fabricated testimony. Id. ¶ 141. Gonzales filed declarations admitting that he falsely testified against Alvarez in return for payment, moving to another prison, and receiving a reduced sentence. Id. ¶ 143. The Court granted the petition, and Defendant OCDA agreed not to retry the case. Id. ¶ 144.

F. Claims Alleged in the SAC

The SAC brings the following “claims” and “counts”³ within certain claims:

• Claim one, violation of the right to counsel, against Rondou and Carrillo;

• Claim two—

• Count one, suppression of evidence, against the Officer Defendants;

• Count two, unlawful suppression/Brady violations, against Rondou, Carrillo, Harrelson, and Rojas;

• Count three, fabrication of evidence and procurement of known false testimony, against Rondou, Carrillo, Franks, Zlateff, and Beaumarchais;

• Count four, failure to correct known false testimony and Napue 4 error, against Rondou, Carrillo, Harrelson, and Rojas;

• Claim three, “supervisory liability,” against Beaumarchais, Carrillo, Harrelson, and Rojas;

• Claim four, malicious prosecution, against Rondou, Franks, Zlateff, Beaumarchais, and Carrillo;

• Claim five, false arrest and false imprisonment, against Rondou, Franks, Zlateff, Beaumarchais, and Carrillo;

• Claim six, Monell claims—

• Count one, “deception in the procurement and presentation of evidence in criminal proceedings/systematic Brady 5 and Napue violations,” against the City Defendants, the County, and the OCSD

• Count two, “systematic Brady violations; systematic deprivation of constitutional rights,” against the OCDA and the County; and

• Count three, violation of the right to counsel, against the County, the OCSD, and the City Defendants.

See generally SAC.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may seek to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although a pleading need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must accept all factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the moving party. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996).

Should a court dismiss certain claims, “[l]eave to amend should be granted unless the district court ‘determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’ ” Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

B. Officer MTD

1. Statute of Limitations

As set forth above, the SAC brings a variety of civil rights claims under Section 1983 against the Officer Defendants. The parties agree the applicable statute of limitations relevant to these claims is two years (see Officer MTD at 11; Opp. to Officer MTD at 14) but disagree as to whether certain claims not included in the initial complaint filed on March 11, 2024 are time-barred.

Specifically, the Officer Defendants argue that the right-to-counsel (claim one), fabrication (claim two, count three), and malicious prosecution (claim four) claims must be dismissed because they were first alleged in the FAC, after the expiration of the two-year limitations period. Reply ISO Officer MTD at 9–10. They also seek dismissal of all claims against Defendant Beaumarchais on this basis. Id. at 15. Alvarez argues the claims relate back to his initial complaint, rendering them timely. Opp. to Officer MTD at 14–15, 17.

Alvarez is correct except with regard to the claims against Defendant Beaumarchais, who is dismissed from this action with prejudice for the reasons discussed below.

a. Legal Standard—Relation Back

When a limitations period derives from state law, the court should consider both federal and state law and employ the more permissive relation back standard. See Butler v. Nat'l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1200-02 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying California's relation back doctrine); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).

Under federal law, relation back applies to newly added causes of action if “the amendment asserts a claim ․ that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). The claims must “share a common core of operative facts such that the plaintiff will rely on the same evidence to prove each claim.” Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1133 n.9 (relation back standard “is meant to ensure that the original pleading provided adequate notice of the claims raised in the amended pleading”). Thus, an amendment will not relate back where the amended complaint “had to include additional facts to support the [new] claim.” Id. at 1133.

California has a “well-established policy of liberally allowing amendments to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations where the recovery sought in both pleadings is based on the same general set of facts.” Rowland v. Super. Ct., 171 Cal. App. 3d 1214, 1216, 217 Cal.Rptr. 786 (1985). Under California law, “[t]he relation-back doctrine requires that the amended complaint must (1) rest on the same general set of facts, (2) involve the same injury, and (3) refer to the same instrumentality, as the original one.” Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal. 4th 383, 408–09, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453, 981 P.2d 79 (1999); see also Barrington v. A.H. Robins Co., 39 Cal. 3d 146, 154, 216 Cal.Rptr. 405, 702 P.2d 563 (1985) (requiring the same “operative” facts). “[T]he critical inquiry is whether the defendant had adequate notice of the claim based on the original pleading.” Pointe San Diego Residential Cmty., L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP, 195 Cal. App. 4th 265, 277–78, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 540 (2011) (affirming application of the relation-back doctrine to claims that were “refined and augmented” from the prior iteration of the complaint).

b. Right to Counsel (Claim One)

The right to counsel claim is against Defendant Officers Rondou and Carrillo for their involvement in the attempt to elicit a confession from Brian Ruorock, the second informant. See SAC ¶ 149. The initial complaint had allegations about these events, including that Rondou and the OCSD used the TRED system to coordinate interactions between Alvarez and Ruorock, their attempts were unsuccessful, and Defendants failed to release relevant evidence to the defense. Compl. ¶¶ 58–66.

These factual allegations were the basis for a claim for “systematic Brady violations and unlawful use of informants” in the original complaint. See id. ¶ 156; see also id. ¶ 174(b) (alleging that informants were improperly used to elicit statements from defendants without their counsel present). The right to counsel claim thus arises out of the same conduct set out in the original complaint and relates back under even the less permissive federal standard set forth above. Contrary to the Officer Defendants' arguments (see Reply ISO Officer MTD at 12), the original complaint did not merely focus on Geller but clearly alleged wrongdoing by Rondou and that Carrillo was Rondou's supervisor, and was aware of Rondou's misconduct alleged in the Complaint. See Compl. ¶ 149.

c. Fabrication of Evidence/Procurement of Known False Testimony (Claim Two, Count Three)

The fabrication of evidence claim is brought against Defendant Officers Rondou, Carrillo, Franks, Zlateff, and Beaumarchais. SAC ¶ 176. It relies on allegations that Zlateff, Franks, and Beaumarchais colluded with Gonzales during the initial investigation and, subsequently, Rondou and Carrillo made a deal with Gonzales to testify against Alvarez, even knowing Gonzales' account was false, and with their superiors' full knowledge and approval.

As the Officer Defendants point out, the initial complaint contained a scanter version of events, including a lack of allegations that Rondou knew Gonzales' confession was false immediately after restarting the investigation and fewer details about Zlateff's and Franks' role in the initial investigation. See Reply at 13–14; but see Compl. ¶¶ 30–34 (details about Franks' and Zlateff's initial involvement in the investigation).

Nevertheless, applying the relation back doctrine to the fabrication claims is well within California law. Although not explicitly stated in the initial complaint, that pleading clearly implies that Rondou knew Gonzales' account was a lie based on the allegations that Rondou actively concealed the deal with Gonzales and coached his testimony for trial. See Compl. ¶ 57. Franks and Zlateff were also named as defendants in the initial complaint, which alleged that they acted in concert with Gonzales to testify against Alvarez in exchange for leniency. Id. ¶ 113. The operative facts are the same (eliciting and encouraging false testimony), the injury is the same (the right to be free from a wrongful conviction and incarceration), and the instrumentality is the same (the false testimony at the trial used to secure the conviction).

d. Malicious Prosecution (Claim Four)

The malicious prosecution claim is also brought against Rondou, Franks, Zlateff, Beaumarchais, and Carrillo. SAC ¶ 209. As alleged in the SAC, this claim is similar to the fabrication claim: Alvarez alleges these Officer Defendants caused criminal proceedings to be brought against him without any reasonable belief in his guilt and solely based on the fabricated evidence they procured. Id. ¶ 210. The Officer Defendants argue that Franks and Zlateff were not on notice that they were liable for actions with respect to the prosecution of Alvarez years after the initial investigation went cold, but the original complaint clearly sought to hold them liable on a theory that their actions with respect to the original investigation suborned Gonzales' perjury and ultimately led to Alvarez's conviction.

For similar reasons as discussed above, the relation back doctrine applies to this claim.

e. Defendant Beaumarchais

As for Defendant Beaumarchais, Alvarez argues that he merely substituted Beaumarchais for a previously named “Doe” Defendant. See Opp. to Officer MTD at 18. Alvarez relies on California law regarding adding new defendants and does not invoke the federal standard for doing so.⁶ Id.

California courts have held that “[a]s a general rule, ‘an amended complaint that adds a new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed.’ ” Hawkins v. Pac. Coast Bldg. Prod., Inc., 124 Cal. App. 4th 1497, 1503, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 (2004) (quoting Woo v. Superior Ct., 75 Cal. App. 4th 169, 176, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 20 (1999)). “Under California Civil Procedure Code § 474, however, California courts have recognized that ‘where an amendment does not add a “new” defendant, but simply corrects a misnomer by which an “old” defendant was sued, case law recognizes an exception to the general rule of no relation back.’ ” Butler, 766 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Hawkins, 124 Cal. App. 4th at 1503, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 453). “When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint ․, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 474.

Alvarez argues that section 474 applies. Beaumarchais is allegedly Franks and Zlateff's supervisor, but the initial complaint included no allegations that an unnamed or unknown supervisor acted comparably to the allegations against Beaumarchais. Compare SAC ¶ 65, with Compl. ¶¶ 30–33. The cases Alvarez cites do not support a contrary conclusion, as none discuss relation back where, as here, the initial complaint did not comply with the procedure in section 474. See Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 18 Cal. 3d 932, 935, 136 Cal.Rptr. 269, 559 P.2d 624 (1977) (amendment at issue substituted a defendant's name for “Doe I” as the manufacturer of a machine).

The claims against Defendant Beaumarchais are accordingly DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as time-barred. The Court does not separately address arguments as to Defendant Beaumarchais in the remainder of this Order.

2. Right To Counsel Claim (Claim One)

Citing Massiah v. United States, the SAC alleges the unsuccessful attempt to obtain Alvarez's confession using the second jailhouse informant, Ruorock, violated his right to counsel. See SAC ¶¶ 149–57 (citing 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964)). The Officer Defendants are correct that this claim must be dismissed for failure to allege prejudice to Alvarez. See Officer MTD at 17.

In Massiah, the Supreme Court held that the use of covert means to elicit incriminating evidence from a counseled defendant after that defendant is charged violates the Sixth Amendment. 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). The Court phrased the violation both as occurring at the time of the interrogation and when the evidence is used at trial. See id. at 205–07, 84 S.Ct. 1199. Thus, Massiah left open the question of whether the unsuccessful use of covert means would violate the Sixth Amendment, if no evidence was used against the defendant from the questioning.

Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court issued Weatherford v. Bursey (an opinion in a civil rights case), which the Ninth Circuit has interpreted “to mean that there is no Sixth Amendment violation unless there is prejudice.” United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing Weatherford, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)). Post-Weatherford, the Ninth Circuit has consistently required a claim for violation of the right to counsel, in both criminal and civil rights actions, to assert some form of prejudice to be viable. See, e.g., Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Hohn, 123 F.4th 1084, 1112–13 (10th Cir. 2024) (noting that this is the majority rule and cataloguing cases). In a civil case, unlike a criminal case, there need not be a showing that the constitutional violation contributed toward a conviction in some manner. See Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 911. But there must be some allegation of harm beyond the mere fact of the intrusion into the attorney-client privilege. See id. (noting the plaintiff alleged his right to privately confer with his counsel was chilled). No such allegations are contained in the SAC.

The Court is aware of the language from Kansas v. Ventris cited by Alvarez: “the Massiah right is a right to be free of uncounseled interrogation, and is infringed at the time of the interrogation.” 556 U.S. 586, 592, 129 S.Ct. 1841, 173 L.Ed.2d 801 (2009). The holding of Ventris is not about pleading right to counsel claims in civil cases but about the use of evidence obtained in violation of the right to counsel for impeachment in a criminal trial. Moreover, the parties in Ventris conceded there had been a Sixth Amendment violation, so that the Court did not need to decide the issue. See 556 U.S. at 590, 129 S.Ct. 1841.

The Court is aware of no Ninth Circuit case holding that this language from Ventris compels a different interpretation of Weatherford. To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit has continued to require some form of prejudice to sustain a right-to-counsel claim after the Ventris decision. See Salerno v. Munoz, 507 F. App'x 677, 678 (9th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Rodvelt, No. 23-4182, 2025 WL 485521, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2025). It continues to be the law in this Circuit that to bring a viable claim for a right-to-counsel violation under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating prejudice from the infringement on his right to counsel.

The Court accordingly DISMISSES the “right to counsel” claim alleged against Rondou and Carrillo under “Claim 1” WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, as it is not certain that amendment would be futile. The Court further dismisses the Monell claims regarding violation of Alvarez's right to counsel (claim six, count three) with leave to amend, as those claims are not viable without an underlying constitutional violation.

3. Suppression Claim (Claim Two, Counts One and Two)

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Alvarez voluntarily dismisses Defendants Franks and Zlateff from the suppression claim. Opp. to Officer MTD at 21 n.11. He also concedes that the separately listed suppression “counts” should be considered as one. The Court accepts these concessions and considers claim two, counts one and two, as one claim brought against Rondou, Carrillo, Harrelson, and Rojas.

The Officer Defendants argue that Alvarez is collaterally estopped from bringing a suppression claim inasmuch as he relies on the argument that Gonzales' informant history was suppressed because this issue was decided against Alvarez in the habeas proceedings. Officer MTD at 18. According to the SAC, Rondou knew Gonzales had been an informant in Nevada but withheld this evidence during discovery in the criminal proceedings and instructed Gonzales not to say anything about it. SAC ¶¶ 91–93.

Prior habeas corpus proceedings can have a preclusive effect on civil rights actions. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). The Court looks to the law of California for the elements of collateral estoppel here. Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019) (“State law also governs the application of collateral estoppel to a state court judgment in a federal civil rights action.”).

Under California law, the requirements for collateral estoppel to apply are—

(1) the issue to be precluded must be identical to that decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated at that time; (3) the issue must have been necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding must be final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom preclusion is sought must be in privity with the party to the former proceeding.

People v. Garcia, 39 Cal. 4th 1070, 1077, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 75, 141 P.3d 197 (2006).

Here, the Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing in the habeas proceeding, at which Alvarez was represented by counsel, and Gonzales, Rojas, Rondou, and Geller each testified. Following the hearing, the Court found as follows:

No evidence was presented at the evidentiary hearing to support Gonzales's declarations and testimony that State officers knew of Gonzales's informant history in Nevada. On this question, Gonzales's statements stood alone and, therefore, are not sufficient for the Court to find that the Nevada informant evidence was available to the State.

Alvarez v. Montgomery, No. SA CV 15-0987-DMG (KS), 2022 WL 868889, at *28 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 860804 (Mar. 23, 2022).⁷

The issue in the habeas proceedings, as relevant here, was whether the State violated Brady by failing to disclose the evidence of Gonzales' prior informant work in Nevada. Alvarez, 2022 WL 868889, at *27. In the Brady context, the “State” means the prosecutor as well as the investigating police agency, if those persons are aware of favorable information. See id. (discussing authority). Thus, the issue litigated in the habeas proceedings was the same: did Rondou or another investigating officer know of Gonzales' Nevada informant history? The issue was actually litigated and ultimately resolved by a final order adopting the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation. Alvarez is, of course, the same party. Accordingly, collateral estoppel applies to this issue.

The suppression-of-evidence claims against Franks and Zlateff are DISMISSED without leave to amend. Moreover, collateral estoppel bars the claim to the extent Alvarez brings claims based on the alleged failure to disclose Gonzales' prior informant history in Nevada as a Brady violation.⁸

4. Fabrication Claim (Claim Two, Count Three)

a. Witness Immunity

The Officer Defendants cite a variety of cases as support that testifying witnesses are entitled to immunity, even if they commit perjury. Officer MTD at 22–23.

The Court also briefly addresses the City's argument that the Brady claims should be dismissed. City MTD at 13. The City argues that it is inherently contradictory and implausible for the SAC to allege both that the officers misled Geller and that Geller misled the court. But the SAC clearly alleges that whether Geller knew Gonzales's testimony was false is unknown to Alvarez at this time. SAC ¶ 33. Review of the SAC does not reveal any inconsistencies in the allegations as to Geller that render the Brady claims implausible. For instance, while the City seizes on paragraph 168 of the SAC as “contradicting” allegations that the Officer Defendants did not disclose Brady information to Geller, the relevant part of that paragraph simply supports that Geller knew (as any prosecutor would) that disclosure of impeachment evidence regarding the informant would be favorable to Alvarez.

Gonzales (who testified) is not named as a defendant. Neither are any of the individual officers named as defendants based on testimony they gave at trial. The SAC does not allege that any individual officer testified at Alvarez's trial. The Officer Defendants are sued for allegedly masterminding and facilitating the plan for Gonzales to provide the key evidence framing Alvarez, not for any testimony they gave.

The Officer Defendants do not cite binding authority that involves non-testifying officer defendants to whom immunity was extended. See, e.g., Paine v. City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Absent such authority, the Officer Defendants' testimonial immunity-based arguments are not persuasive.

b. Personal Participation (Zlateff, Franks, and Carrillo)

The Officer Defendants alternatively argue that the SAC lacks allegations that Officers Zlateff, Franks, or Carrillo were personally involved in the fabrication of evidence. Officer MTD at 24.

To the contrary, the SAC plausibly alleges that individual officers are liable because they personally participated in the fabrication of evidence against Alvarez or they “set[ ] in motion a series of acts by others which [they knew] or reasonably should [have known] would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743–44 (9th Cir. 1978).

Zlateff and Franks allegedly “found” Gonzales using a database that identified him as an informant, lied about Gonzales and Alvarez being housed together (knowing such information would likely be used later), and shared information with Gonzales with promises of leniency. SAC ¶¶ 61–64. Even after Gonzales changed his mind about testifying, these Defendants allegedly left their false statements about Alvarez's alleged confession to Gonzales in the files, knowing their statements “would likely be used at a later date.” Id. ¶ 70; see also id. ¶ 177 (alleging Franks and Zlateff entered false information into the TRED system). Indeed, Defendant Franks allegedly asked Rondou to “look at” the Leal case, which caused the investigation to resume and ultimately led to Alvarez's arrest. Id. ¶ 77. The SAC alleges Defendant Carrillo was Rondou's supervisor, Rondou knew Gonzales' account was false, Rondou fully conveyed the “nature, extent, and terms of the deal” to testify falsely against Alvarez to Carrillo, and Carrillo approved of and ratified the deal. Id. ¶ 85. The allegations against Carrillo go well beyond mere respondeat superior liability. Cf. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

c. Use of Testimony at Trial

The Officer Defendants argue that allegations of falsified evidence are not actionable unless the evidence was used at trial. The relevance of this argument is somewhat unclear, as the fabrication claim expressly relies on the use of Gonzales' false account as the primary evidence against Alvarez at trial. See SAC ¶ 182.

5. Napue and False Arrest Claims (Claim Two, Count Four and Claim Five)

In response to the Officer MTD, Alvarez voluntarily dismisses his Napue claim for failure to correct false testimony and his claim for false arrest. Opp. to Officer MTD at 8. Accordingly, these claims are DISMISSED without leave to amend. The Court also DISMISSES any corresponding Monell claims premised on alleged Napue violations or false arrest without leave to amend. See Opp. to City MTD at 14 n.2.

6. Malicious Prosecution Claim (Claim Four)

The Officer Defendants argue that there can be no viable malicious prosecution claim against them when there was a grand jury indictment and certain Defendants did not participate in initiating the criminal proceedings. Officer MTD at 31.

“In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff ‘must show that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional right.’ ” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). “Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors but may be brought ․ against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed.” Id. (citing Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Defendants' grand jury indictment argument is contrary to the SAC's allegations.⁹ No grand jury is alleged to have indicted Alvarez. And while the Defendant Officers argue that the appropriate Defendant is the prosecutor, this ignores longstanding case law that in an appropriate case, a police officer who caused charges to be filed can also be sued for malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067. Here, the SAC plausibly alleges that but for the Officers' actions, Alvarez would never have been prosecuted criminally.

The Defendant Officers alternatively argue Defendants Franks and Zlateff should be dismissed when they were involved more than a decade before Alvarez was charged. Officer MTD at 32. This is an argument as to causation. As noted above, causation in a section 1983 is broad enough to include those who set into motion a series of acts by others that they know or reasonably should know will cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. The SAC alleges that Zlateff and Franks knew or should have known that their efforts to not only obtain Gonzales' false account of a confession but to create a false record in support of that narrative would be used to prosecute Alvarez. See SAC ¶¶ 63, 70, 74. Indeed, according to the SAC, Franks actively interceded in the investigation after it went cold, asking Defendant Rondou to look at the Leal murder in 2010 and both Franks and Zlateff entered false information into the TRED system. Id. ¶¶ 77, 177. This is adequate to survive the Officer MTD.

Similarly, Defendant Officers argue that Carrillo is not plausibly alleged to have participated in the malicious prosecution. Reply ISO Office MTD at 29. This argument fails for the reasons set forth above regarding Defendant Carrillo's alleged knowledge and approval of Rondou's misconduct.

7. Claims as to Supervisory Officers (Claim Three)

The SAC lists a claim for “supervisory liability” against Defendants Carrillo, Rojas, and Harrelson. SAC ¶ 200. The Officers move for dismissal of this claim on the basis that it alleges merely respondeat superior liability. Officer MTD at 28–31.

Although it is well-established that there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983 (see Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045), the allegations of the SAC go well beyond purely passive supervision. “[S]upervisors can be held liable for: 1) their own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of subordinates; 2) their acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation of which a complaint is made; or 3) for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23 F.4th 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

As discussed earlier in this Order, the SAC alleges that Carrillo, Rojas, and Harrelson were Rondou's supervisors and that he met with them and fully disclosed the details of his deal with Gonzales to testify falsely. See SAC ¶¶ 85–86, 93, 131–38. Claim Three therefore properly predicates liability for Rondou's actions on more than mere respondeat superior liability but acquiescence in Rondou's misconduct with full knowledge of the relevant details. The Court declines to dismiss this claim.

8. Conclusion: Officer MTD

The Officer MTD is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The following claims are dismissed without leave to amend: claim two, count four (failure to correct known false testimony and Napue error); claim five (false arrest); any claims against Defendant Beaumarchais; claims against Franks and Zlateff for suppression of evidence (claim two, counts one and two); and claims against any Defendants for suppression of evidence inasmuch as they are based on suppression of Gonzales' Nevada informant history. The Court also dismisses any Napue-based claims against the municipal defendants without leave to amend. The following claims are dismissed with leave to amend: all claims of violation of Alvarez's right to counsel (claim one and claim six, count three).

C. City MTD 10

As noted above, the SAC brings “claim six,” counts one and three, against the City Defendants. Because “count three” pertains to the violation of Alvarez's right to counsel, it is dismissed with leave to amend (as explained in Section II(B)(1)(b) of this Order, supra).

The Court focuses on the viability of the allegations against the City Defendants under “count one” of claim six. “Count One” of the Monell claims in the SAC is against the County, the OCSD, the City, and the SAPD for “deception in the procurement and presentation of evidence in criminal proceedings/systematic Brady ¹¹ and Napue violations.” SAC ¶ 229 (formatting omitted); but see supra Section II(B)(5) (dismissing the Napue claims without leave to amend).

1. Legal Principles: Monell Claims

Under Monell, a municipality cannot be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by its employees on a theory of respondeat superior. 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. “Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018.

The SAC does not plausibly allege any express municipal policy. A plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability under section 1983 may do so in one of three other ways, relevant to this Order: (1) the plaintiff may demonstrate that a municipal employee committed the alleged constitutional violation “pursuant to a formal governmental policy or longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity”; (2) the plaintiff may demonstrate that “an official with final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992). And (3), a plaintiff may rely on a theory of a “failure to train” that amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those who deal with municipal employees. See Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021).

As for option (1), a longstanding custom or practice that constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity may suffice, if the custom is so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled city policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Id.

Regarding option (2), ratification, “[a] municipality may be held liable for a constitutional violation if a final policymaker ratifies a subordinate's actions.” Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2004). “To show ratification, a plaintiff must show that the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “The policymaker must have knowledge of the constitutional violation and actually approve of it. A mere failure to overrule a subordinate's actions, without more, is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.” Id.

Finally, for option (3), to allege a theory of failure to train, “a plaintiff must include sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference ([a]) of a constitutional violation; ([b]) of a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; and ([c]) that the constitutional injury would not have resulted if the municipality properly trained their employees.” Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1153–54. “A municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2. Overview of the Monell Allegations against the City

As against the City, the SAC alleges a longstanding and well-established practice of similar misconduct. According to Alcarez, since the early 1990s, the SAPD has fabricated confessions, unlawfully used jailhouse informants, concealed informant-related information and other evidence that had to be disclosed to the defense, and systematically failed to discipline and supervise employees. SAC ¶ 236.

The SAC does not merely allege these issues in a conclusory fashion. Alvarez provides a list of cases in which SAPD officers allegedly engaged in similar misconduct. In People v. Scott Dekraai, he alleges “SAPD officers denied any knowledge of the jailhouse databases, meanwhile with full knowledge that the records exist and were used in SAPD criminal investigations.” Id. ¶ 240. The SAC also alleges four other cases in which SAPD officers failed to disclose exculpatory evidence about informants or from informants, unlawfully used jailhouse informants to attempt to elicit confessions, and/or failed to provide the defense with exculpatory evidence pertaining to false confessions. Id. ¶ 278; see also id. ¶ 279 (“[T]he discovery of cases affected by the unlawful informant program carried out by OCSD and SAPD, in conjunction with the OCDA ․ is ongoing to this day. Indeed, an October 2023 tally estimated that nearly fifty-seven (57) criminal cases have been tainted by official misconduct uncovered after the unlawful jailhouse informant program was revealed in Dekraai.”). In addition, the SAC alleges SAPD and the City were aware of these issues, yet routinely failed to train their employees, discipline them, or otherwise take action to halt these known problems.

3. Custom and Practice

Alvarez asserts that he brings five custom and practice theories against the City: (1) the pervasive misuse and concealment of information in the OCII, Special Handling Logs, and TRED information databases; (2) the concealment of known exculpatory information; (3) collaboration with County employees to cover up the use of the jailhouse informant program and TRED file system; (4) securing false and perjured testimony from informants; and (5) collaborating with OCSD to place jailhouse informants to elicit incriminating statements.¹² See SAC ¶¶ 235–42, 251–53, 261, 266–67, 279.

The City argues that Alvarez has failed to allege other instances of similar behavior sufficient to support such claims. City MTD at 19–20. To the contrary, as noted above, Alvarez has pointed to multiple cases in which SAPD officers allegedly engaged in similar misconduct and alleges that these issues persisted for years, over multiple cases other than his own. The City argues that Alvarez fails to point to other cases involving SAPD officers misusing the County's jailhouse information systems, but this ignores that the allegations about the Dekraai case include allegations about SAPD officers withholding information about the use of the County systems. The SAC clearly alleges that the other cited cases involved SAPD employee misconduct.¹³ See SAC ¶ 278.

4. Failure To Train

The SAC brings failure to train claims against the City, as well, founded on a lack of written policy, procedure, and/or recurrent training regarding the Constitutional protections afforded to criminal suspects, to identify and disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence, and to be honest and accurate in reports and documents provided to the prosecution. See SAC ¶ 287. The City argues that the failure to train claims must also be dismissed because they are overly vague and because they improperly rely on inferences from a single incident. See City MTD at 21–23.

The allegations as to the failure to train are specific enough to put the City on notice and to plausibly allege a failure to train that was the moving force behind Alvarez's constitutional harm. In addition to the use of a falsified confession to convict him, Alvarez also alleges that his defense was crippled by the lack of disclosure of various pieces of inculpatory and impeaching evidence. As noted above, he alleges multiple specific other examples of such misconduct by SAPD officers (not merely County officers). And he repeatedly asserts that the City was aware of these issues yet failed to impose training requirements. This is adequate to plead a failure to train theory against the City.

5. Ratification by a Final Policymaker

The SAC alleges that Defendants Carrillo, Harrelson, and Rojas were Rondou's supervisors and ratified his conduct alleged in the SAC. See SAC ¶ 79. The City argues that these claims are implausible. See City MTD at 24–25.

The opposition brief to the City MTD clarifies that Alvarez brings this claim for the use of Gonzales' allegedly fabricated testimony as ratified by Rojas, the SAPD chief. See Opp. to City MTD at 24–25. Contrary to the City's arguments, the SAC sufficiently alleges that Rojas knew of the misconduct at issue and ratified it anyway and alleges that Rojas, the police chief, was a final policymaker.¹⁴ See SAC ¶¶ 85, 131–38, 303. The allegations are sufficient that Rojas actually knew that a false confession was being used to convict Gonzales and approved of Rondou's actions, anyway.

6. Causation

The City argues Alvarez fails to plausibly allege any particular City policy, practice, or failure to train was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation and that it is the prosecutor, Geller, not the City, who is the cause of any such violation. City MTD at 25–26.

Specifically, the City asserts that it is contradictory for Alvarez to argue both that his conviction was the result of the County Defendants' jailhouse database-related policies and the City's unconstitutional policies. Id. at 25. The City cites to no case, however, holding that a complaint cannot allege multiple policies caused a constitutional deprivation. To establish causation under Monell, a municipal policy must be both the “but-for” and “proximate” cause of the harm. See Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 837 (9th Cir. 1996). Of course, an event may have multiple proximate and but-for causes. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 656, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 207 L.Ed.2d 218 (2020) (“[O]ften events have multiple but-for causes.”); Mendez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 897 F.3d 1067, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is common for injuries to have multiple proximate causes.”). There is nothing so inconsistent about Alvarez's allegations that multiple policies exist and led to his wrongful conviction such that the Court must dismiss his Monell claims at this early stage. See, e.g., Tahoe Sierra Pdes. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 34 F.3d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting in the context of a § 1983 claim that “a question of causation is preeminently a question of fact, to be decided after trial”).

As for the City's argument that the prosecutor's involvement severs the causal link between the officers and the conviction, this reasoning appears to derive from cases holding “[a] prosecutor's independent judgment may break the chain of causation between the unconstitutional actions of other officials and the harm suffered by a constitutional tort plaintiff.” See, e.g., Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2008). But that reasoning does not apply where the prosecutor's independent judgment has been compromised and where there is a lack of probable cause to support the arrest—just the type of allegations in the SAC. See id. at 864.

7. SAPD as Defendant

In its MTD, the City argues that the SAPD is not an appropriate defendant because the SAPD is not an entity independent of the City. City MTD at 27. Alvarez argues that he can sue both entities but acknowledges that this is a “question of taxonomy”: “If [the] City's request for dismissal of SAPD is predicated on an admission that the SAPD is a subdivision of City, Plaintiff would concede that the SAPD may be dismissed without prejudice, so long as the case proceeds against the City.” Opp. to City MTD at 26. Accordingly, because the SAPD is duplicative of the City, the Court DISMISSES the SAPD without prejudice as a Defendant in this action.

8. Conclusion

The City MTD is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The SAPD is dismissed from this action as a defendant, without prejudice.

D. County Defendants' MTD

The County Defendants are named in all three Monell-based claims in the SAC. The Court addresses the arguments relevant to each claim against the County Defendants, in turn, below.

1. “Count One”

Count One is brought against the County and the OCSD. The OCSD is named for its role with respect to creating and maintaining the jailhouse information systems used to cultivate Gonzales and Ruorock as informants against Alvarez—no County employee is named as a defendant and the SAC lacks allegations of wrongdoing by any OCSD officer with respect to the proceedings against Alvarez.

The SAC alleges OCSD and its chief policymaker Sheriff Sandra Hutchens were responsible for administering the TRED and Special Handling Log systems, including regulating access to and use of those systems. SAC ¶ 18. The SAC alleges that the accuracy of information in the TRED database is critical and that it is commonly known in the OCSD that information in that database will be relied upon by other law enforcement officers. Id. ¶ 44. The OCSD's use of these systems is alleged in some detail in the SAC, including that the OCSD used the systems to cultivate confidential informants and place them in proximity to suspects and regularly lied under oath and otherwise concealed the systems' existence. See id. ¶¶ 49, 54.

As relevant to Alvarez's conviction, Franks and Zlateff allegedly used the TRED and special handling log systems (“and/or” the OCII system) to locate Gonzales, ignoring information in those systems that Gonzales never shared a cell with Alvarez. See SAC ¶¶ 61–63. They also entered false information into the TRED system related to Gonzales' account of Alvarez's “confession.” Id. ¶ 177. Later, Rondou used the TRED and Special Handling Logs to monitor and coordinate interactions between Ruorock and Alvarez to attempt to elicit a confession from Alvarez (although as noted above, this effort was unsuccessful). Id. ¶ 106; see also id. ¶ 272. The SAC asserts that OCSD staff knew outside law enforcement (such as the SAPD) used the TRED and special handling log systems in this manner and failed to engage in any oversight of the systems. Id. ¶ 119. Moreover, the SAC alleges that OCSD affirmatively held a policy of keeping the systems and the information therein secret.

The Court has carefully reviewed the prolix allegations of the SAC as pertinent to the Monell claims against the County and the OCSD under the first Monell “count.” There are no plausible allegations that an individual City Defendant was acting pursuant to OCSD custom or policy. Indeed, that would be patently implausible when considered in context with the allegations the City Defendants acted pursuant to City policy and practice, such as the City's own policy of keeping its use of the databases confidential. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 235–38. The SAC further includes no plausible allegations to compel the conclusion that OCSD had authority to train, discipline, or otherwise supervise SAPD officers with respect to their actions alleged in this case.¹⁵ See Opp. to County MTD at 22 (“to be clear, Plaintiff is not asking this Court to hold the County responsible for Defendant Rondou's acts”).

The only actionable claim that the SAC could plausibly be construed as bringing against the OCSD and the County under “count one” is thus a “policy of inaction in light of notice that the misuse of its database is likely to cause constitutional violations.” See Opp. to County MTD at 23. With respect to this claim, however, the SAC fails to plausibly allege proximate causation. The constitutional violations at issue were by SAPD officers who misused databases that were meant to document information about confidential informants. It was not the databases that caused Alvarez's conviction, but the alleged conspiracy of these actors to frame him for the murder by misusing the County's databases. There are no plausible facts alleged that the County knew or should have known about the alleged misconduct of these particular SAPD officers.

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES “count one” as against the Defendant County and OCSD with leave to amend.¹⁶

2. “Count Two”

“Count Two” of the Monell claims (claim six) in the SAC is against only the County and the OCDA. The OCDA is named in the SAC for its role in administering and overseeing the OCII database. See Opp. to County MTD at 20 (“Plaintiff's allegations deal with the County's creation, use and oversight of their databases which [is] an administrative function and not prosecutorial. Specifically, the OCII was designed to document informant credibility and reliability by tracking the name of the case, case number, the date and synopsis of any testimony, and any consideration or benefits given.”).

For similar reasons as those noted above with respect to the TRED and Special Handling Log claims against the OCSD and the County, the OCII-related claims against the OCDA must fail. The allegations with respect to the OCII system in the SAC are sparse, confined solely to Zlateff and Franks' use of this (or the other two databases) to locate Gonzales.¹⁷ SAC ¶ 61. The SAC does not allege that the OCII was used with respect to the misconduct involving Ruorock. See SAC ¶¶ 105–20. The Court is not aware of any authority that the use of a database to locate a confidential informant is, standing alone, a constitutional violation. The SAC is bereft of specific allegations that Zlateff and Franks otherwise misused the OCII database in a manner that was a moving force behind Alvarez's conviction or that was the product of OCDA's custom and policy.

The Court notes the SAC's allegations focus on wrongdoing by the OCDA through the DA who prosecuted Alvarez, Mark Geller. See, e.g., SAC ¶ 87 (Geller did not turn over information about inducements to informants or impeachment evidence for prosecution witnesses, on the defense's request), 95 (similar), 97 (OCDA lied about Gonzales' informant history when requested), 125 (Geller told the jury that Gonzales was getting “nothing” for his testimony during closing argument). As the County Defendants point out, however, local prosecutors (and the DA's office) are generally entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from actions based on the prosecutor's allegedly unconstitutional actions while litigating the case. See Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000).

Alvarez attempts to recharacterize his lawsuit as “target[ing] the County's maintenance, administration, and use of its secret databases,” but this is simply not a plausible reading of the SAC with respect to “count two.” See, e.g., SAC ¶ 335 (“In its data entry and administration of the OCII, it was OCD's custom and practice to hide benefits given to witnesses from other sources by ignoring their own informant database, OCII, and have their assistant district attorneys misrepresent to the jury that the witness had no reason to lie or the witness was getting nothing in exchange.”). Characterizing these allegations as “OCII-related” does not change that they are inherently allegations about the prosecution of criminal cases, not the administration of the OCII system.

Alvarez relies on Goldstein v. City of Long Beach in his opposition to the County's MTD on this point. See Opp. to County MTD at 15 (citing 715 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2013)). There, a plaintiff brought suit against a DA's office for failure to create any system for prosecutors to access information pertinent to jailhouse informants and failed to train them to disseminate this information. Goldstein, 715 F.3d at 752. The Ninth Circuit held that “California district attorneys act as local policymakers when adopting and implementing internal policies and procedures related to the use of jailhouse informants” and that the DA “represent[ed] the county when establishing administrative policies and training related to the general operation of the district attorney's office, including the establishment of an index containing information regarding the use of jailhouse informants.” Id. at 759–60.

Here, however, there are no actionable allegations of a failure of the “administrative oversight of systems used to help prosecutors comply with their constitutional duties [to wit, the OCII]” that were the moving force behind Alvarez's conviction. See id. at 762. The SAC fails to plausibly connect the dots between the lack of supervision over the OCII and Alvarez's claimed constitutional violations. Accord Puckett v. Cnty. of Sacramento, No. 2:22-CV-00350-KJM-DB, 2023 WL 2432919, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2023) (“Plaintiff's allegations that the Office encouraged or tolerated Brady violations is a ‘polic[y] or training relating to prosecutorial functions’ and is not properly characterized as an administrative action removed from the prosecutorial fray.”).

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Count Two as against the County and OCDA with leave to amend.

3. “Count Three”

Count Three of Claim Six brings claims against the County and the OCSD (as well as the City and SAPD) for violation of Alvarez's right to counsel with respect to the misconduct involving Ruorock. For the reasons noted above, the claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

4. Conclusion as to County MTD

The County MTD is GRANTED. The Monell claims against the County Defendants are DISMISSED with leave to amend, except as otherwise stated in this Order.

III.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the City and Officer MTDs are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; the County MTD is GRANTED.

The following claims are dismissed with leave to amend: (1) claims for violation of the right to counsel (claim one and claim six, count three); and (2) Monell claims against the County Defendants (claim six), except as dismissed without leave to amend, below.

The following claims are dismissed without leave to amend: (1) all claims against Defendant Beaumarchais and against SAPD; (2) claims against Defendants Franks and Zlateff for suppression of evidence as brought in claim two, counts one and two; (3) claims to the extent they are brought for suppression of Gonzales's Nevada informant history; (4) Napue and false arrest claims (claim two, count four, and claim five); (5) claims against the City to the extent they are for customs and practices other than those identified supra part II(C)(3); and (6) claims against the City for ratification to the extent they are based on ratification by persons other than Defendant Rojas.

Defendants Beaumarchais and SAPD are dismissed from this action. Alvarez shall file his third amended complaint (TAC), or a statement that he does not wish to amend his SAC, by October 23, 2025. Defendants shall file their response within 21 days after the filing of a TAC or a statement of intent not to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

3.   If Alvarez chooses to file an amended complaint, he should not use “claims” and “counts” but should list all of his “causes of action” sequentially, as is typically the practice in federal pleadings. The Court was able to state the operative factual allegations in far fewer paragraphs than Alvarez's lengthy recitation of the facts in the SAC; Alvarez should endeavor to state his factual allegations with similar succinctness.

4.   Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959).

5.   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

6.   Because Alvarez does not contend that he can meet the requirements for relation-back as to Beaumarchais under Rule 15(c), the Court does not address it. The Court notes that the federal standard is even more difficult to meet, as the federal standard requires that there was notice to the new defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C).

7.   The Court takes judicial notice of the filings in the prior proceedings, which are matters of public record. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (A “court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. But a court cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.” (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

8.   The Court is not persuaded by Alvarez's arguments that it is improper to use Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss portions of claims. See Opp. to Officer MTD at 23. If collateral estoppel applies to a certain theory raised in the SAC as a basis for liability, it should be dismissed, regardless of whether other theories remain viable. See Fed. R. Civ P. 1.

9.   Although the word “indict” appears in the SAC, it does so as boilerplate language. See SAC ¶¶ 70, 233, 253(b).

11.   With respect to the Brady violations, the City advances an argument that it cannot be true both that the Officers acted pursuant to City policy, custom, or practice not to disclose favorable evidence and with “deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for” Alvarez's rights or the truth, as required to establish a section 1983 claim for a Brady violation. See Tennison v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2009); City MTD at 15.This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of section 1983 case law. Monell claims against a municipality who employed an officer who allegedly violated a person's constitutional rights are often brought simultaneously with a claim against the officer. That individuals must act with deliberate indifference does not bar such claims as a matter of course. See, e.g., Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444–45 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, for instance, there is nothing fundamentally inconsistent about the allegations against individual officers for failing to disclose Brady materials and a theory that the City is liable because it, for instance, knew of and tolerated a widespread practice of withholding Brady materials among its officers.

12.   Alvarez lists these five customs and practices in response to the City MTD. Accordingly, to the extent he brings a custom or practice claim against the City based on any other conclusory allegations (see SAC ¶¶ 235–315), they are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

13.   The City asks the Court to take judicial notice of the DOJ's report of investigation of the County, which report was attached to a prior iteration of the Complaint. See Reply ISO City MTD at 16. It is well-established, however, that the Court cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts, such as whether the report is accurate that only County employees were involved in the misconduct at issue in Dekraai. See Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999.

14.   Alvarez does not argue in response to the City MTD that any allegations other than those that Rojas ratified the payment to Gonzales support his final policymaker ratification theory as against the City. Accordingly, to the extent he brings a ratification claim against the City based on any other allegations (see SAC ¶¶ 235–315), they are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

15.   Indeed many of the allegations are not specific to the County whatsoever and lump together the City and the County with legal conclusions. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 280–315.

16.   Although the Court need not address this argument, it notes that the statute of limitations argument advanced by the County fails because California Government Code section 911.2 does not apply to federal civil rights claims.

17.   The SAC does not allege that the OCII was used with respect to the misconduct involving Ruorock. See SAC ¶¶ 105–20.

DOLLY M. GEE, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE