LAWLESS v. UNITED STATES (2025)

ORDER REGARDING: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF No. 11]; PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO STAY PROCEEDINGS [ECF Nos. 12 & 16], TO DISQUALIFY [ECF No. 13], AND TO AMEND [ECF No. 18]; AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DECLARE PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT [ECF No. 21]

Before the Court are six matters:

• the motions of Plaintiff Richard Lawless to stay this case pending the resolution of a judicial misconduct proceeding;1

• the motion of Defendant United States of America (the “Government”) to dismiss this action;2

• Lawless's motion to disqualify the undersigned judicial officer;3

• Lawless's motion for leave to amend his Complaint;4 and

• the Government's motion to declare Lawless a vexatious litigant.5

The Court concludes that these matters are appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After considering the papers filed in support and in opposition,⁶ as well as the filings contained in various related actions, the Court GRANTS the Government's Motion to Dismiss, DENIES Lawless's Motions as moot, and GRANTS the Government's Vexatiousness Motion, for the reasons set forth herein.

I. BACKGROUND

Before he commenced the present action, Lawless filed eight other actions before this Court:

• Lawless v. Security and Exchange Commission, 5:21-cv-01637-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Sep. 28, 2021) (the “First Action”);

• Lawless v. Central Intelligence Agency, 5:21-cv-01857-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2021) (the “Second Action”);

• Lawless v. Puig Lugo, 5:21-cv-02072-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2021) (the “Third Action”);

• Lawless v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 5:21-cv-02174-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2021) (the “Fourth Action”);

• Lawless v. United States of America, 5:22-cv-00148-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2022) (the “Fifth Action”);

• Lawless v. United States of America, 5:22-cv-01700-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2022) (the “Sixth Action”);

• Lawless v. United States of America, 5:24-cv-00804-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2024) (the “Seventh Action”); and

• Lawless v. United States of America et al, 5:25-cv-00773-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2025) (the “Eighth Action”).

Lawless has also pursued lawsuits in various other courts, including Riverside County Superior Court, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the Washington, D.C., Superior Court, and the United States Supreme Court.⁷

Each of those actions relates to Lawless's firmly held beliefs regarding an extensive criminal conspiracy behind the Puerto Rico debt crisis. As detailed in prior Orders, Lawless has accused a litany of public officials—ranging from senators to SEC chairmen—of perjury, retaliation, collusion, and corruption.⁸ Lawless has also repeatedly included the undersigned judge in his ever-growing list of conspirators and has filed several unsuccessful motions for recusal.⁹

In December 2024, Lawless filed a Motion for Ruling in the First Action, through which Lawless asked the Court to “deny” certain exemptions that the SEC has claimed when responding to Lawless's Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests.¹⁰ Lawless did not identify the exemptions to which he objected nor the document productions to which those exemptions related; accordingly, the Court denied Lawless's Motion for Ruling without prejudice and ordered the SEC to provide another status report regarding the progress of its document productions.¹¹

In response to that Order, Lawless moved for the judges assigned to his case to recuse.¹² In that Motion, Lawless accused the Court of conspiring with the SEC and the Government to “deprive the Plaintiff of his civil rights and a fair trial,” and Lawless asserted that he sought damages for those civil rights violations.¹³ Those accusations and claims were duplicative of accusations and claims that have been rejected previously, including by independent judicial officers.¹⁴

On the same day that Lawless filed the Motion to Recuse in the First Action, he also filed another Complaint, thereby commencing the Eighth Action.¹⁵ Although the Eighth Action was ostensibly a civil rights lawsuit against various governmental entities, in that Complaint, Lawless merely repeated the accusations that he raised in his Motion to Recuse, including accusations of judicial bias.¹⁶ Lawless also filed a request to proceed in Forma Pauperis.¹⁷ The Court denied Lawless's IFP Request and dismissed the Complaint as frivolous and duplicative.¹⁸

After the Court denied Lawless's IFP Request and dismissed the Eighth Action, Lawless filed identical ex parte applications for temporary restraining orders in the First Action and the Eighth Action.¹⁹ In those Emergency Applications, Lawless accused the Court of “acting in concert with the Defendant to protect ․ on-going criminal activity.”²⁰ Based upon those accusations, Lawless asked the Court to “stay the proceedings ․ until further action is taken” and for “the recusal of the presiding judge.”²¹

Before the Court ruled on Lawless's Emergency Applications, Lawless moved to dismiss the First Action voluntarily.²² The Government informed the Court that it did not oppose the dismissal,²³ so the Court dismissed that action.

In April 2025, Lawless commenced the instant action in Riverside County Superior Court.²⁴ The Government removed the case to this Court in June 2025,²⁵ and throughout June and July 2025, the parties filed the instant Motions.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(6)—Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Am. Family Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002). Although a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “does not need detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

To state a plausible claim for relief, the complaint “must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts” to support its legal conclusions. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) ․” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations and footnote omitted). Accordingly, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” which means that a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual content to “allow[ ] the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint must contain “well-pleaded facts” from which the court can “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

B. Rule 15(a)—Leave to Amend

A district court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The purpose underlying the liberal amendment policy is to “facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Therefore, leave to amend should be granted unless the Court determines “that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)).

C. Vexatious Litigation

“Federal courts can ‘regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under ․ appropriate circumstances.’ ” Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted)). In this Judicial District, a court may, “[o]n its own motion,” initiate a vexatious litigant order at “any time,” which eventually may result in “a directive to the Clerk not to accept further filing from the litigant ․ without written authorization from a judge of the Court or a Magistrate Judge.” L.R. 83-8.2.

“When district courts seek to impose pre-filing restrictions, they must: (1) give litigants notice and ‘an opportunity to oppose the order before it [is] entered’; (2) compile an adequate record for appellate review, including ‘a listing of all the cases and motions that led the district court to conclude that a vexatious litigant order was needed’; (3) make substantive findings of frivolousness or harassment; and (4) tailor the order narrowly so as ‘to closely fit the specific vice encountered.’ ” Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1062 (quoting De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147-48).

“The first and second of these requirements are procedural, while the ‘latter two factors ․ are substantive considerations ․ [that] help the district court define who is, in fact, a “vexatious litigant” and construct a remedy that will stop the litigant's abusive behavior while not unduly infringing the litigant's right to access the courts.’ ” Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Government's Motion to Dismiss and Lawless's Various Motions

The Court begins with the Government's Motion to Dismiss. The Government argues that this action should be dismissed for a variety of reasons, including that the case constitutes a collateral attack on prior proceedings and that it is barred by claim preclusion.²⁶ The Court agrees.

It is well settled that a litigant who is unhappy with the result in one proceeding may not attack that proceeding by filing another action that either involves similar claims or that contains allegations regarding the unfairness of the prior proceeding. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1987). Additionally, to the extent that claims in one lawsuit are related to claims in a prior lawsuit, the doctrine of res judicata, which “precludes the relitigation of a cause of action that previously was adjudicated in another proceeding between the same parties or parties in privity with them,” may bar the second litigation. Federation of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1180, 1202, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 (2004). For res judicata to apply, three elements must be present: “(1) an identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the same parties or their privies.” Gallardo v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2013). Because the purpose of the res judicata doctrine is to “promote[ ] judicial economy,” the doctrine requires “all claims based on the same cause of action [to] be decided in a single suit,” such that if claims were not “brought initially,” they “may not be raised at a later date.” Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 897, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 51 P.3d 297 (2002).

Lawless's claims fail under both standards. First, to the extent that Lawless alleges that the Court's decisions in prior actions demonstrate that the Court is engaged in a conspiracy to defraud Lawless, those claims constitute impermissible collateral attacks on prior proceedings. See Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1392. Second, to the extent that Lawless reasserts claims against the Government regarding the Government's role in the Puerto Rican debt crisis, those claims have been repeatedly adjudicated and dismissed, and, as such, they are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Mycogen, 28 Cal. 4th at 897, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 51 P.3d 297.

Accordingly, the Government's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. In view of that ruling, Lawless's Motions to Stay, Motion to Disqualify, and Motion for Leave to Amend are DENIED as moot.

B. The Government's Vexatious Litigant Motion

The Government also moves to declare Lawless a vexatious litigant. Lawless opposes that Motion, which he views as “a retaliatory act designed to suppress protected speech, silence a federal whistleblower, and prevent the disclosure of government corruption in connection with the Puerto Rico bond fraud.”²⁷ For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that, contrary to Lawless's contentions, the Government's Vexatious Litigant Motion is not motivated by bad faith. Rather, in view of Lawless's litigation history, a vexatious litigant order is both appropriate and necessary.

1. Notice and Opportunity to Respond

Before a district court may impose pre-filing restrictions on a litigant, the litigant must be afforded notice and an opportunity to respond to the possibility that he or she will be declared a vexatious litigant. See Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1063. Lawless received notice of the Government's Vexatious Litigant Motion, and he opposes the Motion.²⁸ Accordingly, the notice requirement has been satisfied.

2. Compilation of an Adequate Record

As the Government notes, in addition to the instant action, Lawless has filed a slew of lawsuits against the Government, including the following eight federal lawsuits:

• Lawless v. Security and Exchange Commission, 5:21-cv-01637-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Sep. 28, 2021);

• Lawless v. Central Intelligence Agency, 5:21-cv-01857-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2021);

• Lawless v. Puig Lugo, 5:21-cv-02072-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2021);

• Lawless v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 5:21-cv-02174-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2021);

• Lawless v. United States of America, 5:22-cv-00148-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2022);

• Lawless v. United States of America, 5:22-cv-01700-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2022);

• Lawless v. United States of America, 5:24-cv-00804-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2024); and

• Lawless v. United States of America, 5:25-cv-00773-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2025).

But Lawless's litigiousness is not confined to the federal courts. In just one year, Lawless filed over 200 individual lawsuits in Riverside County Superior Court.²⁹ Lawless has also filed numerous lawsuits in the District of Columbia.³⁰ The volume of those filings leads the Court to conclude that a vexatious litigant order is both appropriate and necessary.

3. Substantive Findings of Frivolousness or Harassment

“[I]t is incumbent on the court to make ‘substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant's actions.’ ” Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1064 (quoting De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148). To qualify as frivolous, “ ‘[t]he plaintiff's claims must not only be numerous, but also be patently without merit.’ ” Molski, 500 F.3d at 1059 (quoting Moy v. United States, 906 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1990)). In the alternative, to qualify as harassment, “the filing of several similar types of actions [must] constitute[ ] an intent to harass the defendant or the court.’ ” De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148 n.3 (quoting In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Here, the Court finds that Lawless's cases fit within both categories.

4. Frivolousness

Lawless's actions are numerous and patently without merit. In one of his recent actions, which was duplicative of several prior actions, Lawless alleged that he is a whistleblower who worked with the SEC for approximately one year before the SEC “ceased communications with him without explanation and did not provide updates on his whistleblower status.”³¹ According to Lawless, he then discovered that the SEC had “subpoenaed his private email records from Google, citing an ‘investigation’ into him.”³² Lawless believes that the SEC also “made false statements, withheld evidence, and concealed material facts,” which constitutes “fraud on the court.”³³ And Lawless alleges that the Court acted with the SEC to “suppress evidence and retaliate against the Plaintiff”³⁴ by “knowingly ignor[ing] critical evidence that would have changed the outcome.”³⁵

Those allegations repeat Lawless's assertions from several prior actions in which he has made fanciful and baseless allegations of a broad conspiracy—whose participants included officials at the highest levels of government—to retaliate against Lawless and to violate his rights based upon his attempt to expose the Government's role in the Puerto Rico debt crisis.

For example, Lawless has repeatedly accused the SEC and other high-ranking officials of withholding information from him and the Court and of committing perjury. See Lawless v. Security and Exchange Commission, Case No. 5:21-cv-01637-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Sep. 28, 2021); Lawless v. United States of America, Case No. 5:22-cv-01700-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2022); Lawless v. United States of America, Case No. 5:24-cv-00804-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2024). Lawless has not substantiated any of those allegations, and he continues to pursue them despite his receipt of repeated notices that his claims cannot proceed.³⁶

Lawless has also accused the SEC and other high-ranking officials—including the undersigned judge—of conspiring against him, based upon mere suspicions and speculation. See Lawless v. Security and Exchange Commission, Case No. 5:21-cv-01637-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Sep. 28, 2021); Lawless v. United States of America, Case No. 5:22-cv-01700-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2022); Lawless v. United States of America, Case No. 5:24-cv-00804-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2024). Lawless continues to pursue those accusations despite various courts' rulings that such claims will not succeed.³⁷

Finally, Lawless has repeatedly asserted that the SEC illegally requested his Google records, despite this Court's finding that the SEC served no such requests.³⁸ See Lawless v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 5:21-cv-02174-JWH-SP (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2021). Indeed, Lawless previously raised this issue to the Ninth Circuit, which concluded that his arguments were “so insubstantial as to not require further argument” and summarily affirmed this Court's Order.³⁹ Despite that Ninth Circuit affirmance, Lawless persists in his attempts to assert those claims and accusations against the Court and the SEC.

The filings in those cases show that Lawless's claims are sufficiently numerous and meritless to qualify for a substantive finding of frivolousness. See Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1523, 1526 (9th Cir. 1983).

5. Harassment

Although it is unnecessary to make an alternative ruling, the Court nonetheless finds that Lawless has filed several similar types of actions and has filed several similar papers that permit a reasonable inference of an intent to harass the Court and the SEC. Specifically, although Lawless insists that his many lawsuits “were not filed to harass,” the evidence shows otherwise.⁴⁰

To start, in the cases described above, Lawless has continued to press his allegations, even after repeated warnings that they were frivolous. Lawless's insistence on continuing to file lawsuits raising the same allegations, while knowing that those allegations were previously dismissed and that those dismissals have been affirmed, evinces an intent to harass the Court and the SEC. Contrary to Lawless's arguments, those filings are harassing, insubstantial, and vexatious—not protected by the First Amendment. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 743, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983) (“[S]uits based on insubstantial claims ․ are not within the scope of First Amendment protection.”).

Next, to provide a more specific example, in the Fourth Action, Lawless moved for emergency relief based upon his belief that the SEC requested his email records from Google.⁴¹ The Court denied that request because Lawless had not established a need for emergency relief, and the Court also noted that the SEC had not made any such requests for Lawless's email records.⁴² The Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed that decision and denied Lawless's request for en banc review.⁴³ Despite those orders, Lawless commenced another lawsuit asserting those claims,⁴⁴ he filed at least one Motion to Recuse,⁴⁵ and he made multiple Applications.⁴⁶ Each of those papers regurgitates the same claims of surveillance and conspiracy that Lawless has asserted—and that this Court has rejected—in prior cases.

As another example, Lawless has filed numerous requests for recusal or disqualification, through which he has accused the judges assigned to his cases of conspiring with the Government to violate his rights.⁴⁷ Several of those requests have been evaluated by independent judicial officers, and none of Lawless's accusations has been substantiated.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, Lawless has continued to assert those same allegations, including through the Motion to Recuse that he recently filed in the Eighth Action and the Motion to Disqualify that he filed in the instant action.⁴⁹

Finally, the Government provided to the Court evidence that demonstrates that Lawless's motivations are far less benign than he suggests in his Vexatious Litigant Opposition. In merely one year, Lawless sent the Government's counsel over 400 emails.⁵⁰ Those emails are revealing. In one such email, Lawless informed the Government's counsel that he would “stay the course even if it takes years,” he explained that he would “file another” lawsuit anytime Lawless “los[t] a case,” and he warned that “even the Judges in the Federal District Court in Central California will be held accountable.”⁵¹ Those remarks are consistent with Lawless's litigation conduct, wherein he responds to adverse rulings by dismissing lawsuits in favor of filing misconduct complaints and new lawsuits against the judges and opposing counsel from the prior actions. Indeed, that is precisely the approach that Lawless has begun to take in the instant action.⁵²

In short, the various cases and filings show that Lawless has a litigation history of filing several similar types of actions with the knowledge that the Court will summarily reject them, or that they have previously been rejected by this Court and other judicial officers, thereby raising a reasonable inference of an intent to harass the Court. See De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148 n.3. That history qualifies Lawless's litigation behavior for a substantive finding of harassment.

C. Narrow Tailoring of the Order

“Finally, pre-filing orders ‘must be narrowly tailored to the vexatious litigant's wrongful behavior.’ ” Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Molski, 500 F.3d at 1061). It should “cover[ ] only the type of claims [the litigant] had been filing vexatiously.” Molski, 500 F.3d at 1061.

Accordingly, the Court will not accept any filings from Lawless that are duplicative or frivolous, as his litigation history reflects. See Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1066 (noting that an order that would prevent filings that are “not duplicative, and not frivolous” would be sufficiently narrowly tailored). Filings that do not qualify as duplicative or frivolous will be accepted for filing. Thus, the pre-filing order does not “deny [Lawless] access to courts on any ․ claim that is not frivolous.” Molski, 500 F.3d at 1061.

IV. DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:

1. The Government's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 11] is GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. Lawless's Motions to Stay [ECF Nos. 12 & 16], Motion to Disqualify [ECF No. 13], and Motion to Amend [ECF No. 18] are DENIED as moot.

3. The Government's Vexatious Litigant Motion [ECF No. 21] is GRANTED.

4. Lawless is DESIGNATED a vexatious litigant in view of his litigation history.

5. Lawless is DIRECTED to obtain leave of the Court before filing a Complaint, a request to proceed in Forma Pauperis, or a document in a case that is closed. Lawless is DIRECTED to lodge a copy of this Order and a copy of the proposed filing with every motion for leave. If the Court determines that the proposed filing is frivolous or duplicative, then that document will not be accepted for filing.

6. Judgment will issue accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Pl.'s Mots. to Stay (the “Motions to Stay”) [ECF Nos. 12 & 16].

2.   See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (the “Motion to Dismiss”) [ECF No. 11].

3.   See Pl.'s Mot. to Disqualify (the “Motion to Disqualify”) [ECF No. 13].

4.   See Pl.'s Mot. for Leave to Amend (the “Motion for Leave to Amend”) [ECF No. 18].

5.   See Def.'s Mot. to Declare Pl. a Vexatious Litig. (the “Vexatious Litigant Motion”) [ECF No. 21].

6.   The Court considered the documents of record in this action, including the following papers: (1) Complaint [ECF No. 1-1]; (2) Motions to Stay; (3) Motion to Dismiss; (4) Motion to Disqualify; (5) Pl.'s Counterarguments to the Motion to Dismiss [ECF Nos. 14 & 19]; (5) Vexatious Litigant Motion; (6) Pl.'s Opp'n to the Vexatious Litigant Motion (the “Vexatious Litigant Opposition”) [ECF No. 24]; (6) Def.'s Reply in Support of the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 22]; (7) Def.'s Opp'ns to the Motions to Stay [ECF Nos. 23 & 26]; (8) Def.'s Reply in Support of the Vexatious Litigant Motion [ECF No. 25]; and (9) Pl.'s Sur-Reply in Opp'n to the Vexatious Litigant Motion (the “Vexatious Litigant Sur-Reply”) [ECF No. 27].

7.   See Notice of Related Case [ECF No. 70 in the First Action]; see also Decl. of Paul B. Green (the “Green Declaration”) [ECF No. 21-1], Exs. 2 & 3.

8.   See Order re Pl.'s Mots. for Sanctions (the “Sanctions Order”) [ECF No. 167 in the First Action].

9.   See, e.g., Mot. to Have Judge Holcomb Recuse Himself From this Case [ECF No. 93 in the First Action]; Mot. to Have Judge Holcomb Recuse Himself From this Case [ECF No. 29 in the Fourth Action] (jointly, the “Prior Recusal Motions”). Those motions were denied after independent judicial review. See Min. Order Den. Pl.'s Mot. to Disqualify Judge John W. Holcomb [ECF No. 95 in the First Action]; Min. Order Den. Pl.'s Mot. to Disqualify Judge John W. Holcomb [ECF No. 32 in the Fourth Action] (jointly, the “Prior Recusal Orders”).

10.   See Pl.'s Mot. Requesting Court Rulings on the FOIA Redactions (the “Motion for Ruling”) [ECF No. 193 in the First Action].

11.   See generally Order Den. Pl.'s Mot. for Court Ruling (the “Order Denying Motion for Ruling”) [ECF No. 198 in the First Action].

12.   See Mot. Requesting Judges Holcomb and Pym Recuse Themselves (the “Motion to Recuse”) [ECF No. 200 in the First Action].

13.   Id. at 6:29-31.

14.   See, e.g., Prior Recusal Motions; Prior Recusal Orders; see also Order of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals [ECF Nos. 62 in the Fourth Action]; Order from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals [ECF No. 90 in the Sixth Action] (jointly, the “Ninth Circuit Orders”).

15.   See generally Compl. (the “Eighth Action Complaint”) [ECF No. 1 in the Eighth Action].

16.   See generally id.

17.   See Req. to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (the “IFP Request”) [ECF No. 2 in the Eighth Action].

18.   See Order Den. IFP Request (the “IFP Order”) [ECF No. 9 in the Eighth Action].

19.   See Emergency Mots. for Temporary Restraining Order (the “Emergency Applications”) [ECF No. 203 in the First Action & ECF No. 10 in the Eighth Action].

20.   See id. at 15:11-13.

21.   See id. at 20:14-17.

22.   See Notices of Voluntary Dismissal [ECF Nos. 208 & 211 in the First Action].

23.   See Notice of Non-Opp'n [ECF No. 213 in the First Action].

24.   See Eighth Action Complaint.

25.   See Notice of Removal [ECF No. 1].

26.   See generally Motion to Dismiss.

27.   Vexatious Litigant Opposition 1:26-28.

28.   See generally id.

29.   See Green Declaration, Ex. 3 (listing 231 lawsuits that Lawless filed in Riverside County Superior Court in 2019).

30.   See id., Ex. 2.

31.   Eighth Action Complaint 13:5-6.

32.   Id. at 13:8-9.

33.   Id. at 14:25-26.

34.   Id. at 15:4-6.

35.   Id. at 15:16-17.

36.   See, e.g., Order re Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No. 90 in the Fifth Action] (explaining that the SEC is immune from liability for Lawless's allegations).

37.   See Prior Recusal Orders; see also Ninth Circuit Orders (rejecting Lawless's accusations of malfeasance by the Court and the Government).

38.   See Min. Order Den. Mot. for Stay (the “Fourth Action Emergency Order”) [ECF No. 56 in the Fourth Action].

39.   See Ninth Circuit Orders.

40.   Vexatious Litigant Opposition 2:2-4.

41.   See Pl.'s Emergency Mot. Requesting Stay of SEC's Efforts to Secure Plaintiffs Google Records [ECF No. 50 in the Fourth Action].

42.   See Fourth Action Emergency Order.

43.   See Ninth Circuit Orders; Order from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals [ECF No. 63 in the Fourth Action].

44.   See Eighth Action Complaint.

45.   See Motion to Recuse.

46.   See Emergency Applications.

47.   See Recusal Motions.

48.   See Recusal Orders.

49.   See Motion to Recuse; Motion to Disqualify.

50.   See Green Declaration ¶ 2.

51.   Id., Ex. 1.

52.   See Vexatious Litigant Sur-Reply 2:25-27 (noting that Lawless has filed misconduct complaints against the Government's counsel); see also Decl. of Richard Lawless in Supp. of Filing Cal. State Bar Compl., Ex. A [ECF No. 28] (record of a complaint that Lawless filed against the Government's counsel with the California Bar).

John W. Holcomb, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE