Jace Allbright v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group Inc. (2025)

Proceedings: Order (1) DENYING Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 42); (2) GRANTING Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 50); and (3) VACATING the August 4, 2025 Hearing (IN CHAMBERS)

Before the Court are Plaintiff Jace Allbright's (“Allbright” or “Plaintiff”) motion for summary judgment (“PMSJ,” Dkt. No. 42) and Defendant Southern California Permanente Medical Group Inc.'s (“SCPMG” or “Defendant”) motion for summary judgment (“DMSJ,” Dkt. No. 50) (collectively, “Motions”). The Court determines the Motions are appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motions, the Court DENIES the PMSJ and GRANTS the DMSJ. The August 4, 2025 hearing is VACATED.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 16, 2022, Plaintiff Allbright filed a complaint against SCPMG. (“Complaint,” Dkt. No. 1.) The Complaint asserts four causes of action: (1) retaliation on the basis of religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Claim One”); (2) failure to provide religious accommodation in violation of Title VII (“Claim Two”); (3) retaliation on the basis of religion in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (the “FEHA”), Cal. Gov't Code § 12900, et seq. (“Claim Three”); and (4) failure to provide religious accommodation in violation of the FEHA (“Claim Four”). (Id.) On March 9, 2023, Defendant filed an answer to the Complaint. (“Answer,” Dkt. No. 13.)

On April 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed the PMSJ. In support, Plaintiff filed the following:

• Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF,” Dkt. No. 42-3);

• Declaration of Ronald Hackenberg (“Hackenberg Decl.,” Dkt. No. 42-1) with attached exhibits; and

• Declaration of Jace Allbright (“Allbright Decl.,” Dkt. No. 42-2) with attached exhibits.

On April 21, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition to PMSJ. (“PMSJ Opp.,” Dkt. No. 45.) Defendant filed the following documents in support:

• Statement of Genuine Disputes of Material Facts (“DSGD,” Dkt. No. 45-2);

• Objections to Plaintiff's Evidence (“Defendant's Objections,” Dkt. No. 54-3);

• Declaration of Christian J. Rowley (“Rowley Opp. Decl.,” Dkt. No. 45-4) with attached exhibits (Dkt. Nos. 45-4, 45-5);

• Declaration of Derek Sumimoto (“Sumimoto Opp. Decl.,” Dkt. No. 45-6) with attached exhibits; and

• Declaration of Stephen J. Thomas, M.D. (“Thomas Opp. Decl.,” Dkt. No. 45-7) with attached exhibits.

On May 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply (“PMSJ Reply,” Dkt. No. 48), a supplemental declaration of Ronald Hackenberg (“Hackenberg Supp. Decl.,” Dkt. No. 48-1), and responses to Defendant's Objections (“Resp. to D Obj.,” Dkt. No. 48-2.) Plaintiff failed to file a response to Defendant's Statement of Genuine Disputes of Material Facts.¹

On May 12, 2025, Defendant filed the DMSJ. In support, Defendant filed the following:

• Statement of Undisputed Facts (“DSUF,” Dkt. No. 50-1);

• Declaration of Christian Rowley (“Rowley Decl.,” Dkt. No. 50-2) with attached exhibits;

• Declaration of Derek Sumimoto (“Sumimoto Decl.,” Dkt. No. 50-15) with attached exhibits; and

• Declaration of Stephen J. Thomas, M.D. (“Thomas Decl.,” Dkt. No. 50-21) with attached exhibits.

On June 9, 2025, Plaintiff opposed the DMSJ. (“DMSJ Opp,” Dkt. No. 54.) In support of his opposition, Plaintiff filed the following:

• Plaintiff's Statement of Genuine Disputes (“PSGD,” Dkt. No. 54-3); and

• Declaration of Ronald Hackenberg (“Hackenberg Opp. Decl.,” Dkt. No. 54-1 with attached exhibits; and

• Declaration of Jace Allbright (“Allbright Opp. Decl.,” Dkt. No. 54-3) with attached exhibits.

On June 16, 2025, Defendant filed a reply. (“DMSJ Reply,” Dkt. No. 55.) In support, Defendant filed a response to PSGD. (“PSGD Response,” Dkt. No. 55-1.)

II. FACTS

A. Objections

“A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). For summary judgment, courts consider evidence with content that would be admissible at trial, even if the form of the evidence would not be admissible at trial. See, e.g., Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court considers the parties' objections only where necessary.² All other objections are OVERRULED AS MOOT.

B. Undisputed Facts

The following material facts are sufficiently supported by admissible evidence and are uncontroverted, except as noted. These material facts are “admitted to exist without controversy” for purposes of the Motions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); L.R. 56-3.

SCPMG is a physician-operated entity that employs physicians and related healthcare professionals and is one of the entities that operate under the trademark Kaiser Permanente (“Kaiser”) that, together, provide healthcare to over twelve million members. (DSUF ¶ 1.)

Plaintiff worked for SCPMG as a physical therapist at the Ontario Medical Center for approximately 11 years. (Id. ¶ 2; PSUF ¶ 2.) Prior to his termination, Plaintiff was seeing a majority of his patients in person and providing direct patient care. (DSUF ¶ 3.) As a physical therapist for SCPMG, Plaintiff provided in-person physical therapy to patients. (Id. ¶ 4.) As a physical therapist for SCPMG, Plaintiff's practice involves “touching the patient” and “physical contact” with patients. (Id. ¶ 5.) It was “normal” for Plaintiff to care for older patients and others who had “compromised immune systems.” (Id. ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff has been a devout Christian throughout his adult life. (PSUF ¶ 5.) Plaintiff has a Doctorate of Physical Therapy from Western University of Health Sciences in Pomona, California; and a Bachelor of Arts in Christian Studies from California Baptist University. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff is scheduled to receive a Master of Divinity degree in May of 2025. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was in this program at the time of this termination from SCPMG. (Id.) Plaintiff currently serves as the Assimilation Pastor at Church in the Valley in Ontario Ranch, California. (Id. ¶ 8.)

In 2021, the United States faced a public health emergency as a result of a novel coronavirus, which causes the COVID-19 disease. (DSUF ¶ 7.) On August 2, 2021, in an effort to protect the health and safety of its workforce, members, patients, and communities, Kaiser announced it would require all employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they received an approved religious or medical exemption from the vaccination requirement (the “Policy”). (Id. ¶ 8.) The Policy provided that all employees be vaccinated by the specified deadline against COVID-19 unless they received a religious or medical exemption. (Id. ¶ 9.) The Policy specifically provided that “[f]ailure to provide proof of vaccination or receive a qualifying exemption during the 60-day leave of absence “will result in termination of employment.” (Id. ¶ 10.) Between late June 2021 and September 2021, daily cases of COVID-19 increased over 1200 percent; new hospital admissions, over 600 percent; and daily deaths, by nearly 800 percent and unvaccinated individuals accounted for over 85 percent of all hospitalizations in the period between June and July 2021. (Id. ¶ 11.) On August 5, 2021, the California Department of Public Health (“CDPH”), issued an order that generally required all healthcare workers to receive a COVID-19 vaccine (the “California Order”). (Id. ¶ 12.) As of late 2021, Kaiser had treated over 900,000 patients with COVID-19 and had administered over 6.8 million vaccine doses. (Id. ¶ 13.)

On November 5, 2021, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) issued regulations requiring “most Medicare-and Medicaid-certified providers and suppliers to ensure their staff are fully vaccinated for COVID-19.” (Id. ¶ 14.) The regulation CMS issued on November 5, 2021, explained that “[v]accination against COVID-19 is a critical protective action for all individuals, especially health care workers.” (Id. ¶ 15.) The regulation CMS issued on November 5, 2021, explained that the most salient threat posed by unvaccinated healthcare workers is their proclivity to transmit the virus to patients, many of whom are at a high risk for a severe illness. (Id. ¶ 16.) The regulation CMS issued on November 5, 2021, found patients were “refusing care from unvaccinated staff,” which resulted in “individuals avoiding or forgoing health care due to fears of contracting COVID-19 from health care workers.” (Id. ¶ 17.) The regulation CMS issued on November 5, 2021, determined that because “unvaccinated staff are at greater risk for infection, they also pre-sent [sic] a threat to health care operations – absenteeism due to COVID-related-exposures or illness.” (Id. ¶ 18.)

SCPMG established a process for employees to submit written religious or medical exemption requests from the Policy on Defendant's portal. (Id. ¶ 19.) To ensure all exemption requests were tracked and handled consistently, employees who sought an exemption from the Policy were directed to make a written request. (Id. ¶ 20.)

Plaintiff submitted two exemption requests, on August 18, 2021 and August 30, 2021, that were identical in substance. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff submitted the requests on forms supplied by Defendant. (PSUF ¶ 9.) In response to the exemption form question that asked “[t]he specific religious doctrine or teaching that prevents me from receiving a vaccine is,” Plaintiff responded as follows:

After careful thought and consultation with the Pastors and Elders of my Church, I am requesting an exemption to the mandate stating that I must take the SARS-CoV-2 vaccination because taking this vaccination would violate my religious belief and conscience. (1 Cor 3:16-17; 1 Cor 6:19-20; Heb 13:17; Rom 8:15; Matt 22:21; Rom 6:16; Gal 2:20; 2 Cor 5:10).

(“Exemption Request,” DSUF ¶ 21.)

Kaiser received more than 25,000 requests from over 16,000 employees (some employees submitted more than one request, including Plaintiff) for a religious exemption from the vaccination requirement of the Policy. (Id. ¶ 22.) After an initial review of the first approximately several hundred requests and gaining a sense of the content of the requests and how long each review took, Kaiser determined it would not be able to complete a detailed individual review of all requests before the September 30, 2021, deadline imposed by California Department of Public Health (“CDPH”) Orders. (Id. ¶ 23.) To allow sufficient time to address each request individually, Kaiser advised employees it was provisionally approving requests and that the provisional approval was subject to change based on changing circumstances. (Id. ¶ 24.)

During its initial review, Kaiser also learned there were Kaiser-specific internet chat groups, websites, and template language available and providing employees with information how to avoid the vaccines. (Id. ¶ 25; PSUF ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiff knew fraud was occurring regarding religious exemption requests from the Policy. (DSUF ¶ 26.) Plaintiff agrees it was important for Kaiser to weed out phony requests for religious exemption from the Policy. (Id. ¶ 27.)

On or about September 21, 2021, Plaintiff received notification that his request has been provisionally approved. (PSUF ¶ 10.) On October 19, 2021, Kaiser emailed Plaintiff an additional information request with five tailored questions and an open-ended prompt for any additional information he wanted to provide to gather additional relevant information in support of Plaintiff's religious Exemption Request. (DSUF ¶ 29; PSUF ¶ 11.) On October 21, 2021, Plaintiff responded to the additional information request. (DSUF ¶ 30.) Plaintiff began his responses by asking: “My specific question – please tell me what objective basis you have for questioning my sincerely held religious beliefs.” (PSUF ¶ 32.) Kaiser did not respond to Plaintiff's question. (Id.) Plaintiff responded to the additional information request as follows:

Question: Is your religious belief based on membership in an organized religion? If so, which one?

Answer: As I originally stated: I am a Christian. My religious beliefs are based on the Bible.

Question: Are you aware of the position of the head of your religion on receiving a COVID-19 vaccination? If so, what do you understand it to be? If you disagree with it, please explain why.

Answer: Yes, I am aware. Jesus is Lord and the Bible is the highest authority. His command is that I am to honor him with my body, with my conscience and in how I relate to others (1 Corinthians 6:19-20). In obedience to him I have chosen to exercise my legal right to a religious exemption which I have already received. No, I do not disagree with the Lord Jesus on anything.

Question: When did you become a member of this religion/start practicing the religious belief that forms the basis of your RFA?

Answer: I began following Jesus Christ in 1989. My faith in Him and commitment to obey Him forms the basis for all my conduct including the RFA.

Question: Have you previously requested any accommodations based on the religious belief that is preventing you from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine?

Answer: No -it has never been necessary before this. When I have declined medical treatments or vaccinations, I was not required to give any reasons.

Question: Is this belief part of a religious doctrine you believe? If yes, what religious doctrine? Does it specifically prevent vaccinations?

Answer: My beliefs and the doctrines I hold to are from what God says in the Bible (1 Cor 6:19-20). As stated previously in my original statement of belief, I am accountable to God for what I do with my body, commanded to honor God with my body and prohibited by God from violating my biblically bound conscience in relation to my body. In your third question you used the word “Prevent”. Doctrines do not “Prevent” something. Doctrines can sanction and forbid. If you mean, “Do these biblical doctrines forbid me from being vaccinated?” The answer is yes.

(“Additional Information Request,” Rowley Decl. Ex. 5.)

Plaintiff admits the Bible says nothing about vaccines. (DSUF ¶ 31.) Plaintiff admits he has taken other vaccines as an adult. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff admits the Bible does not prevent him from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine if it does not “violate” his conscience. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff testified 1 Corinthians 6 instructs him “to not put any unclean thing in our body.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff determines whether something is “unclean” based on “[i]f it complies with scripture and if it falls in line with the Holy Spirit and with counsel with my pastor, then I can make these decisions before God and am accountable for what I do.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff's pastors did not instruct him not to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. (Id. ¶ 36; “Allbright Depo.,” Rowley Decl. Ex. 1 at 53:12–20 (stating “it was my decision before God” and “[n]o one told me I should or should not take it”).)

Some members of Plaintiff's church received a COVID-19 vaccine and others did not. (DSUF ¶ 37.) At no point did Plaintiff assert to SCPMG that God told him directly or through the Holy Spirit not to take the vaccine or the like. (Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff cannot say whether Tylenol is unclean because “it depends” and it “could be for somebody.” (Id. ¶ 39.)

SCPMG reviewed Plaintiff's Exemption Request using the same process it used for all requests. (Id. ¶ 47.) On November 30, 2021, SCPMG sent Plaintiff an email notifying him his Exemption Request was denied and he had five days to become vaccinated or he would be placed on unpaid leave. (Id. ¶ 48.) On December 3, 2021, SCPMG placed Plaintiff on unpaid administrative leave, in accordance with the Policy, informed him that he had until January 7, 2022, to become vaccinated or his employment would be terminated. (Id. ¶ 49.) On December 3, 2021, Plaintiff sent an email to his managers stating, among other things: “While you may disagree with my decision to not get the injection, it should be my decision, not Kaisers. This was the basis of my argument when I complied with submitting a religious exemption ․” (Id. ¶ 50.) He further stated “I personally decided that getting the injection would not be the wisest thing for me based on my medical history.” (Id.) On January 10, 2022, Plaintiff's employment was terminated by operation of the Policy. (Id. ¶ 51.)

Except for declining to take the COVID vaccine, Plaintiff performed his duties in a satisfactory manner. (PSUF ¶ 3.) Plaintiff complied with biweekly testing, mask-wearing, and spacing precautions. (DSUF ¶ 70.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of identifying the portions of the pleadings and record that it believes demonstrate the absence of an issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party must show that “under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

“When the moving party also bears the burden of persuasion at trial, to prevail on summary judgment it must show that ‘the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.’ ” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 890 (9th Cir. 2008). This is “ordinarily a heavy burden.” Barnes v. Sea Haw. Rafting, LLC, 889 F.3d 517, 537 (9th Cir. 2018). By contrast, where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need not produce evidence negating or disproving every essential element of the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Instead, the moving party “must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

“If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Id. However, if the moving party has sustained its burden, the non-moving party must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact that must be resolved at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-moving party must make an affirmative showing on all matters placed at issue by the motion as to which it has the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “The non-moving party must show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991). Summary judgment for the moving party is proper when a “rational trier of fact” would not be able to find for the non-moving party based on the record taken as a whole. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

Cross-motions for summary judgment “must be considered on [their] own merits.” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cnty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001); Acosta v. City Nat'l Corp., 922 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2019). Courts must review the evidence submitted in support of each cross-motion, and “give the nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 2006); Tulalip Tribes of Wash. v. Washington, 783 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2015).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff purports to move for summary judgment as to all of his claims. (See PMSJ at 1.) However, the PMSJ discusses only Plaintiff's accommodation claims and fails to address his retaliation claims. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(a) requires a party moving for summary judgment to “identify each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Accordingly, the Court construes the PMSJ as a partial motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's accommodation claims.

Defendant moves for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff's claims. (See DMSJ.)

A. Failure to Provide Accommodation

Plaintiff asserts claims for failure to provide religious accommodation under Title VII (Claim Two) and the FEHA (Claim Four) (“accommodation claims”). Cf. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A claim for religious discrimination under Title VII can be asserted under several different theories, including disparate treatment and failure to accommodate.”). Both statutes require an employer to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs unless doing so would impose an undue hardship. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(l)(1). Courts analyze Title VII and FEHA failure-to-accommodate claims under a burden-shifting framework. See Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2023). First, the employee must establish a prima facie case that an employer failed to accommodate his religious beliefs. Id. Second, “if the employee is successful, the employer can show that it was nonetheless justified in not accommodating the employee's religious beliefs or practices.” Id.

To establish a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) he had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty and (2) the employer subjected him to an adverse employment action because of his inability to fulfill the job requirement. See Peterson, 358 F.3d at 606; Dykzeul v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 2019 WL 8198218, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2019). If the plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case of failure to accommodate, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that it “initiated good faith efforts to accommodate reasonably the employee's religious practices or that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.” Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th at 1224; Peterson, 358 F.3d at 606.

Here, Plaintiff argues that (1) he has established a prima facie failure to accommodate claim and (2) there is no reasonable dispute regarding undue hardship because Defendant refused to accommodate Plaintiff. (PMSJ at 9-21.) Defendant argues that (1) Plaintiff's objection to the vaccination Policy was not religious in nature, as a matter of law, (2) Plaintiff cannot show he informed SCPMG of a religious belief that actually conflicted with the Policy, and (3) accommodating Plaintiff's objection to the vaccination requirement of the Policy would have caused SCPMG undue hardship. (DMSJ at 1.)

1. Plaintiff's Religious Beliefs

A plaintiff's “religious belief need not be consistent or rational to be protected under Title VII, and an assertion of a sincere religious belief is generally accepted.” Trinh v. Shriners Hospitals for Children, 2023 WL 7525228 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2023) (citing Keene v. City & County of S.F., 2023 WL 3451687, at *1 (9th Cir. 2023); Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981); Doe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th 1173, 1176 n.3 (9th Cir. 2021), and EEOC Guidance, § 12-I(A)(2)). But that “does not mean that courts must take plaintiffs' conclusory assertions of violations of their religious beliefs at face value.” Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th, at 1223. Nor does that mean that employers need to accommodate personal preferences couched as a bona fide religious belief, as Title VII does not protect secular preferences. See Tiano v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681-83 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII because she failed adequately to show that the timing of her religious pilgrimage was part of her bona fide, pilgrimage-related religious belief, as opposed to a personal preference, and explaining that employers need not “accommodate the personal preferences of the employee” because “Title VII does not protect secular preferences”). The burden to allege a conflict with religious beliefs is fairly minimal—this inquiry is not an inquiry into the reasonableness of a plaintiff's beliefs. Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th, at 1223. When an individual asserts that a requirement burdens their religious beliefs, a court's narrow function is only to evaluate whether a plaintiff “has alleged an actual conflict.” Id.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Exemption Request—specifically, Plaintiff's statements that he is accountable to God for what he does with his body, and that receiving a COVID-19 vaccine “would violate [his] religious belief and conscience” (see Exemption Request)—“is akin to the ‘body temple’ objections routinely rejected by district courts as not ‘religious’ for Title VII purposes and is ‘fungible enough to cover anything [Plaintiff] trains it on.’ ” (PMSJ Opp. at 10 (citing Medrano v. Kaiser Permanente, 2024 WL 3383704, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2024)).) Plaintiff argues that (1) “his faith is the basis for all his conduct,” (2) “he was prohibited by God from violating his biblically bound conscience in relation to his body,” and (3) “[a]t most, a jury could find ․ that secular beliefs played a secondary role in his conflict.” (PMSJ at 14.) The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue as to whether the Exemption Request was based on Plaintiff's bona fide religious belief. See Bordeaux v. Lions Gate Entertainment, Inc., 2023 WL 8108655, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2023) (assuming that plaintiff has established a bona fide religious belief “despite the fact that there are some facts in the record that undermine plaintiff's claim that her religious beliefs on the subject of vaccines are bona fide,” rather than the product of a “non-religious incident”). Accordingly, the burden shifts to Defendant to show that it could not accommodate Plaintiff's beliefs without undue hardship.

2. Undue hardship

Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff could establish prima facie failure to accommodate claims, the accommodation claims still fail because SCPMG could not reasonably accommodate Plaintiff without undue hardship. (DMSJ at 17.) Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's exemption from the Vaccination Policy would have (1) posed unacceptable safety risks, and (2) resulted in significant financial and operational burdens. (Id. at 17-21.)

Both Title VII and the FEHA require an employer to make a good faith effort to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the business. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(l)(1). The Supreme Court clarified the standard for what constitutes an undue hardship. “In common parlance, a ‘hardship’ is, at a minimum, something hard to bear ․ [U]nder any definition, a hardship is more severe than a mere burden ․ [A]dding the modifier ‘undue’ means that the requisite burden, privation, or adversity must rise to an excessive or unjustifiable level.” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023). An “ ‘undue hardship’ is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer's business.” Id. In formulating the standard as such, the Supreme Court definitively rejected the idea that an undue hardship was shown if an accommodation required anything “ ‘more than a de minimis cost.’ ” Id. “[C]ourts must apply the [undue hardship] test in a manner that takes into account all the relevant factors in the case at hand, including the particular accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature, size and operating cost of an employer.” Id. at 470. Non-economic impacts on coworkers can be considered, so long as those impacts are not the result of employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion in general, or the notion of accommodating religious practice. Id. at 472.

Defendant argues that the hardship of vaccine exemption is substantial in healthcare settings like SCPMG, where employees can transmit deadly diseases to their patients. (DMSJ at 18.) Defendant relies on the expert opinion of Stephen J. Thomas, M.D.³ , Chair of Microbiology and Immunology at SUNY Upstate Medical University, who opines that:

• Hospital and other in-person, patientcare settings present enhanced risks of transmission of COVID-19 due to the increased concentration of infected individuals in such settings. (DSUF ¶ 53.)

• The risk of transmission of COVID-19 increases significantly with interactions between patients and clinical staff, who come into close contact with patients and spend prolonged periods of time within their airspace, because the risk of infection from respiratory diseases is a function of proximity to, and duration of contact with, an infected person. (Id. ¶ 54.)

• Infected health care workers can transmit their virus to patients and their healthcare worker colleagues causing COVID-19 outbreaks in hospitals and other types of care facilities. (Id. ¶ 55.)

• Healthcare workers present a unique risk of transmission to patients and their colleagues not only because of their increased risk of being infected in the conduct of their work duties, but also because healthcare workers move between the community and health care facilities, and can act a transporters and importers of virus between the community into health care facilities. (Id. ¶ 56.)

• The specific nature of care rendered by physical therapists (like Plaintiff) raises particular concerns for SARS-CoV-2 transmission to patients and co-workers. (Id. ¶ 58.)

• Physical therapists traditionally require a hands-on approach to treat their patients, including extended physical touch, thereby placing them in direct contact with potentially infected patients. (Id. ¶ 59.)

• One survey of over 400 physical therapists (May to June 2020) revealed that, on average, physical therapists had treated between 10 and 30 patients with COVID-19 during that timeframe and 18% had treated more than 50 infected patients. (Id. ¶ 60.) Acute care therapists were seeing COVID-19 patients an average of 3-5 times per week and spending between 20 and 40 minutes with their patients each session. (Id.) Patient deconditioning, difficulty with walking, and problems with breathing were the most common symptoms being treated. (Id.)

• A study of physical therapists in Italy during the first wave of infection (five months) noted 13% of physical therapists who were tested experienced COVID-19. (Id. ¶ 61.) The overall rate of infection was 3.6% which was 10 times higher than the general population. (Id.) Of these, nearly 9% of therapists with a positive COVID-19 test did not recall having symptoms of COVID-19. (Id.) Infected people without symptoms drive transmission. (Id.) At the peak of infections, one in three physical therapists was infected. (Id.) More than 40% of those infected said their exposure occurred while wearing personal protective equipment. (Id.)

• Infected healthcare workers not only experience a personal health risk and pose a risk to patients, but they also place a significant operational and financial burden on hospitals and health care systems. (Id. ¶ 62.) Healthcare workers with COVID-19 are unable to work at a minimum, from 5 to 10 days as they isolate themselves. (Id. ¶ 63.) If a healthcare worker becomes very ill or experiences post-acute sequelae of COVID-19 (long COVID), their absenteeism could be even longer than 5 to 10 days. (Id. ¶ 64.) As a result, their employer (hospitals and health care systems) may need to seek replacement coverage for absent healthcare workers, close beds to new admissions, reduce the number of elective or non-emergency surgeries (which can still be very important to patient health and the absence of which can increase illness and death), increase the workload for remaining employees, or require hospitals to hire replacement healthcare workers or increase the workload on already overburdened healthcare workers. (Id. ¶ 65.) All these actions have ramifications on patient access to care and patient safety. (Id.)

• Personal protective equipment such as masks, gowns, respirators and eye protection can reduce but not eliminate the risk of [health care worker [“HCW”]) infection. (Id. ¶ 66.) Outbreaks occurring despite the presence of PPE use policies reflect both the limitations of the technology and the imperfections with the application and implementation of use. (Id.) They may not be used consistently, constantly, or correctly, while the effect of vaccination is “around the clock.” (Id.) Practices such as routine hand washing and routine COVID-19 testing can also reduce but not eliminate the risk of infection. (Id.) Regular testing is particularly inferior because a period exists between when an infected person becomes infectious to others and when a test becomes positive, which can vary depending on the person, the virus strain involved, and the test used—meaning someone could be infected and able to infect others but still register a negative test. (Id. ¶ 67.) Wearing PPE and following infection control processes mitigated some risk of hospital acquired infections but the impact was variable and not complete. (Id. ¶ 68.) Vaccination of healthcare workers was a more powerful and effective intervention, and made a demonstrable impact by lowering the risk of virus transmission and the risk of infection for vaccinated individuals. (Id.)

Plaintiff presents no evidence in rebuttal. Instead, he argues that Defendant cannot claim undue hardship when it has granted religious exemptions to other employees. (DMSJ Opp at 16.) But without any information regarding the duties and tasks of other employees granted accommodations, and whether such duties and tasks were similar to Plaintiff's, the Court cannot conclude that SCPMG accommodated similarly situated staff. “There is no record evidence to show whether any type of employee accommodated by SCPMG, like Plaintiff, (1) regularly “touched” patients or had extensive “physical contact” with them (DSUF ¶ 5), (2) routinely cared for older patients or patients with compromised immune systems (id.), (3) routinely spent 20 to 40 minutes in close proximity with patients (id. ¶ 60), or (4) had an infection rate ten times higher than the general population (id. ¶ 61).” (DMSJ Reply at 8-9 (citation modified).)

The Court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant has not met its burden to show that accommodating Plaintiff's beliefs would have caused undue hardship. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the DMSJ as to Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claims (Claim Two and Claim Four) and DENIES the PMSJ in its entirety.

B. Retaliation

Plaintiff asserts claims for retaliation under Title VII (Claim One) and FEHA (Claim Three) (“retaliation claims”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “terminated him, for engaging in protected activity, specifically requesting a religious accommodation” under Title VII and FEHA. (Complaint ¶¶ 32, 51.) Title VII and FEHA prohibit an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of a protected trait, including religion.⁴ See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a). Both statutes also prohibit an employer from retaliating against an employee because he has made a charge of discrimination or has opposed a discriminatory practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(h).

In the Ninth Circuit, courts analyze Title VII and FEHA retaliation claims under a burden-shifting framework. See Weil v. Citizens Telecom Servs. Co., 922 F.3d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case. Id. To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000); see Day v. Sears Holdings Corp., 930 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2013).

If established, the prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination. Weil, 922 F.3d at 1002. The burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the defendant to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its action. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802); see Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000). Whether a defendant has met its burden involves “no credibility assessment” at this stage. Hittle v. City of Stockton, 2022 WL 616722, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2022) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)); see Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 742 (9th Cir. 2004).

If the defendant meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507; Guz, 8 P.3d at 1114. The plaintiff must then produce “sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.” Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep't, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005). In employment discrimination cases, the plaintiff “need produce very little evidence to overcome an employer's motion for summary judgment ․ because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a searching inquiry—one that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a full record.” Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1124 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's retaliation claim fails because he “cannot establish his exemption request was the but-for cause of his termination.” (DMSJ at 11.) Defendant points to its vaccine Policy—which informed employees that if they were not vaccinated by the deadline and did not have an approved exemption, their employment would be terminated—and argues that Plaintiff was terminated for failure to comply with the Policy and not because he submitted a religious exemption request. (Id. 11-12.) Several courts have found that a plaintiff cannot establish causation where a vaccine mandate is neutrally imposed and clearly states that termination is a consequence of failing to comply with the mandate. See Leake v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., 2024 WL 1854287 at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2024), cert. denied, 2024 WL 4529879 (U.S. Oct. 21, 2024) (“the complaint's allegations confirm that the but-for cause of [p]laintiffs' termination' was not their religious objections to the vaccine, but rather [p]laintiffs' refusal to comply with the conditions that [the employer] neutrally imposed on all non-vaccinated employees.”); Medrano v. Kaiser Permanente, 2024 WL 3383704, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2024) (dismissing the plaintiff's retaliation claim because the complaint's allegations demonstrated the plaintiff was terminated for failure “to comply with a universal policy imposed on all non-vaccinated employees[,]” not for submission of an exemption request);Weiss v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 2023 WL 8420974, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2023) (finding the plaintiff “fails to provide sufficient facts establishing that she was terminated as a result of her exemption request and not because she failed to comply with the [p]olicy, which clearly mandated all employees be vaccinated unless an exemption is granted, otherwise they would be terminated from employment.”).

Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to make any argument regarding causation or present any evidence suggesting that Defendant's stated reason for terminating his employment was a pretext for retaliation. (See DMSJ Opp.) Plaintiff merely argues that his “religious views were rejected, when so many of his colleagues were accepted, raising the inference that he was specifically targeted.” (Id. at 14.) As discussed above, Plaintiff fails to present any evidence that employees whose exemptions were granted were similarly situated to Plaintiff. “Where abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence suggests that no discrimination occurred, [P]laintiff's creation of only a weak issue of fact as to whether [Defendant's] reason was untrue will not suffice.” Opara v. Yellen, 57 F.4th 709, 724 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). As such, the Court GRANTS the DMSJ as to Plaintiff's retaliation claims (Claims One and Three).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the DMSJ and DENIES the PMSJ. Summary judgment is granted in Defendant's favor on all claims. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint. The Court VACATES the August 4, 2025 hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to this Court's Local Rules, “[a]ny moving party who files a reply to an opposition to a motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment must file a ‘Response to Statement of Genuine Disputes,’ which must include ․ the moving party's response (with pinpoint citations including page and line numbers, if available, to evidence in the record) to rebut the existence of a genuine dispute.” L.R. 56-2. Accordingly, for Plaintiff's failure to respond to the DSGD, the Court may take any dispute alleged by Defendant and supported by competent evidence in the DSGD to be genuine.

2.   “[O]bjections to evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant, speculative, and/or argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal conclusion are all duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself” and are thus “redundant” and unnecessary to consider here. Burch v. Regents of Univ. of California, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”).

3.   Plaintiff objects to the Declaration of Dr. Thomas, arguing it “lacks foundation,” does not “address[ ] the specifics of this case,” and offers “only general information.” (PSGD ¶¶ 52-69.) Plaintiff also takes issue with the fact that Dr. Thomas “played no role” in the decision to deny Plaintiff's Exemption Request or terminate him. (DMSJ Opp. at 15.) Plaintiff fails to cite to any authority for his evidentiary arguments. (See id.) The Federal Rules of Evidence specifically permit an expert witness with “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” to offer opinions reflecting application of “reliable principles and methods” to “the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. The Federal Rules of Evidence also provide that experts may rely on “facts or data” that “would otherwise be inadmissible” if “experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 703. Dr. Thomas's expert opinions regarding the transmission of COVID-19 in patientcare settings and specifically between physical therapists and their patients are directly relevant to the determination of whether accommodating Plaintiff's exemption request posed an undue hardship for Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED.

4.   “California courts have observed that although the wording of Title VII differs in some particulars from the wording of FEHA, the antidiscriminatory objectives and overriding public policy purposes of the two acts are identical.” Madsen v. Associated Chino Teachers, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). Thus, the analysis of a religious discrimination claim is the same under Title VII and FEHA. Id.; see Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 896 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We may look to federal authority regarding Title VII and similar civil rights statutes when interpreting analogous statutory provisions of FEHA.”); Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113 (Cal. 2000) (“Because of the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our own statutes.”).

The Honorable JESUS G. BERNAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE