ENTROPIC COMMUNICATIONS LLC v. DISH NETWORK CORPORATION DISH LLC DISH LLC DISH (2025)

ORDER GRANTING COX'S RULE 12(c) MOTION FOR INVALIDITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101 [ECF No. 64]

I. SUMMARY OF DECISION

The claims of U.S. Patent No. 9,838,213 (the “ ’213 Patent”)¹ are directed to the abstract idea of sending a request for data, receiving responses to the request, and either (1) allocating resources based upon the responses; or (2) determining and transmitting data concerning bandwidth based upon the responses under Alice Step One. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 189 L.Ed.2d 296 (2014). Under Alice Step Two, the claims of the ’213 Patent do not include sufficient inventive features to transform those claims into something more than that abstract idea. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ’213 Patent is patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The claims of U.S. Patent No. 10,432,422 (the “ ’422 Patent”)² are directed to the abstract idea of communicating and receiving several messages with information concerning the quality-of-service flows, forming a list of flows based upon the messages, and sending the list back to a requesting node. Like those of the ’213 Patent, the ’422 Patent claims fail to include sufficient inventive features to transform those claims into something more than that abstract idea. Accordingly, the ’422 Patent is also patent-ineligible.

II. BACKGROUND

In February 2023, Plaintiff Entropic Communications, LLC filed its Complaint, thereby commencing this action against Defendants Cox Communications, Inc.; CoxCom, LLC; and Cox Communications California, LLC (collectively, “Cox”).³ Entropic asserts 12 patents against Cox.⁴ Entropic alleges that the asserted patents teach solutions related to repurposing existing coaxial cables in buildings to support high-speed data networks.⁵ Entropic further alleges that those solutions led to the formation of a new industry standard called Multimedia over Coax Alliance (“MoCA”).⁶

Relevant to Cox's instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,⁷ Entropic asserts that Cox's use of MoCA-compliant instrumentalities infringes at least Claim 1 of the ’213 Patent and at least Claim 1 of the ’422 Patent.⁸ Cox moves for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to Counts VIII (infringement of the ’213 Patent) and IX (infringement of the ’422 Patent) of the Complaint on the basis that the ’213 and ’422 Patents are directed to ineligible subject matter and are thus invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.⁹

The ’213 and ’422 Patents, both entitled “Parameterized Quality of Service Architecture in a Network,” share a specification. The ’422 Patent is a continuation of the application that ultimately issued as the ’213 Patent. Both patents claim priority to several provisional patent applications, the earliest of which was filed on February 6, 2007.

At a high level, the ’213 and ’422 Patents are directed to quality-of-service solutions that coordinate network nodes to provide accessible and reliable service to home users while keeping power costs in check.¹⁰ The inventions claimed in the Patents propose using a specific messaging framework—a Layer 2 Management Entity (“L2ME”)—to support communication among nodes so that the nodes can indicate their availability to receive and transmit data.¹¹ The patents describe the L2ME as “an extension to either the Media Access Control (MAC) sub-layer or the physical (PHY) network layer.”¹²

The L2ME is “a coordinated mesh network architecture” having multiple network nodes, one of which serves as a Network Coordinator (“NC”).¹³ The L2ME is connected to a Quality of Service (“QoS”) manager. The QoS manager allows data traffic depending upon the nodes’ indicated availability.¹⁴

Claim 1 of the ’213 Patent discloses a communication method as follows:

1. A communication method implemented in a Network Coordinator (NC) node of a communication network of a premises, the method comprising:

broadcasting to a plurality of nodes of the network, a request for a guaranteed quality of service flow in the network from a source node to at least one egress node, the plurality of nodes of the network to which the NC node broadcasts the request including at least the source node and the at least one egress node;

receiving a first response to the request from the source node, wherein the source node is the point of origin for the purposes of the guaranteed quality of service flow for data to be communicated within the guaranteed quality of service flow, the first response indicating whether the source node has available resources to support the guaranteed quality of service flow;

receiving a second response to the request from the at least one egress node indicating whether the at least one egress node has available resources to support the guaranteed quality of service flow; and

if the source node and the at least one egress node have available resources to support the guaranteed quality of service flow, then allocating resources for the guaranteed quality of service flow;

if the source node and the at least one egress node do not have available resources to support the guaranteed quality of service flow, then:

denying the guaranteed quality of service flow; and

if the guaranteed quality of service flow is denied based on bandwidth-related reasons, the determining a maximum data rate that would have resulted in a successful request for a guaranteed quality of service flow, and transmitting a message comprising information describing the maximum data rate that would have resulted in a successful request for a guaranteed quality of service flow.15

Claim 1 of the ’422 Patent discloses a communication network as follows:

1. A communication network comprising:

a requesting node;

a Network Coordinator (NC) node; and

a plurality of requested nodes,

wherein:

the requesting node is operable to, at least, communication a first message to the NC node requesting a list comprising parameterized quality of service (PQoS) flows of the communication network; and

the NC node is operable to, at least:

receive the first message from the requesting node; and

in response to the received first message:

communicate a second message to each requested mode of the plurality of requested nodes, the second message requesting from said each requested node a list identifying PQoS flows for which said each requested node is an ingress node;

receive, from said each requested node a respective third message comprising a list identifying PQoS flows for which said each requested node is an ingress node;

form an aggregated list of PQoS flows comprising each respective list identifying PQoS flows from each received third message; and

communicate a fourth message to at least the requesting node comprising the aggregated list,

wherein the second message specifies a range of PQoS flows being queried.16

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed, but before trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion under Rule 12(c) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc. 637 F.3d 1047, 1063 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). The analysis is “substantially identical” to that of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): a court must determine whether, crediting the factual allegations as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). The principal difference between the two motions is the timing of the filing. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). Under both standards, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quotations omitted). In other words, the complaint must contain “well-pleaded facts” from which the Court can “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Section 101 of Title 35 defines patent eligible subject matter with reference to four independent categories of eligible inventions: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010); 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court recognizes three exceptions to the application of § 101: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09, 100 S.Ct. 2204, 65 L.Ed.2d 144 (1980). Claims directed to those exceptions are not eligible because of pre-emption concerns. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 216, 134 S.Ct. 2347; see also Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 68 S.Ct. 440, 92 L.Ed. 588 (1948).

Alice is the most recent statement by the Supreme Court on the application of those principles. That case expanded the two-step approach for resolving § 101 issues adopted in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012). In the first step, a court must “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77, 132 S.Ct. 1289). If that standard is satisfied, then in the second step the court must ask “[w]hat else is there in the claims.” Id. That analysis requires a consideration of “the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–79, 132 S.Ct. 1289). In performing that second step of the analysis, the court must “search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’ ” Id. at 217-18, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73, 132 S.Ct. 1289).

The Federal Circuit has “repeatedly recognized that in many cases it is possible and proper to determine patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The ’213 Patent

Cox contends that the claims of the ’213 Patent are directed to the abstract idea of “requesting and receiving information from nodes in a network to verify their availability to provide resources for transmission of data within the network, and, if available, allocating resources for the data transmission, but if unavailable, calculating and transmitting the maximum data rate.”¹⁷ Entropic responds that the claims are not abstract because they require the use of “a highly specific messaging protocol” involving a network coordinator node and specific actions depending upon the availability of requested data flows.¹⁸

1. Representativeness

The Court finds Claim 1 representative, and it performs the § 101 analysis on that claim. See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The district court, however, correctly determined that addressing each claim of the asserted patents was unnecessary” where Claim 1 was “representative” because “all the claims are substantially similar and linked to the same abstract idea.”) (quotations omitted). Here, the claims of the ’213 Patent all relate to allocating resources for transmissions based upon sent and received data.¹⁹ In view of the common focus of the claims, applying the Alice framework to Claim 1 provides a representative analysis applicable to all of the asserted claims.²⁰ Entropic does not raise any meaningful distinction to the contrary. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Courts may treat a claim as representative ․ if the patentee does not present any meaningful argument for the distinctive significance of any claim limitations not found in the representative claim ․”).

2. Claim Construction

Entropic proposes that the Court construe “Network Coordinator (NC)” to mean “a node that manages and coordinates QoS service flows by layer 2 messages among peer nodes of the flows.”²¹ Cox argues that claim construction is unnecessary, and it also contests the propriety of Entropic's proposed construction.²² At the pleading stage, courts typically adopt a patentee's proposed construction to resolve eligibility issues. See Nat. Alternatives Int'l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2019). However, a court may alternatively resolve any claim construction disputes “to whatever extent is needed to conduct the § 101 analysis, which may well be less than a full, formal claim construction.” Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Here, the Court finds it most efficient to evaluate Entropic's proposed construction because Entropic's patent-eligibility arguments depend on the layer 2 messaging architecture.

First, “[t]he claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Despite the extensive prosecution history that Entropic cites, the claims themselves do not include any direct reference to a layer 2 messaging architecture. If the applicant intended to limit the claim scope in that way, then the applicant could have included such language. Thus, the claims themselves do not provide any support for Entropic's proposed construction.

Second, although the layer 2 messaging architecture embodiment occupies a significant portion of the disclosure, it is still merely an embodiment. It is improper to limit claim scope to a single embodiment. See id. at 1323; see also Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The specification introduces two distinct embodiments in summarizing the invention, only one of which involves layer 2 messaging.²³

Finally, the ’213 Patent introduces the term “Network Coordinator (NC)” in the background portion of the patent when describing prior art systems and the MoCA standard.²⁴ Based upon that disclosure and the applicant's capitalization of that term, it appears that NC is a term of art within the context of the MoCA standard, as opposed to a term expressly defined by either the ’213 or ’422 Patent. In fact, the MoCA standards define NC as “[a] MoCA node that performs the following salient functions in a MoCA Network: Beacon generation, MAP generation, admission of new MoCA nodes to the network, privacy key generation and distribution, and LMO scheduling.”²⁵ Although Entropic contends that compliance with the MoCA standard necessarily involves layer 2 messaging, that definition does not expressly require layer 2 messaging, and it does not support Entropic's proposed construction.

Accordingly, Claim 1 is not drafted in such a way as to limit the scope of NC to a node that performs its coordination functions only by layer 2 messages. The Court declines to adopt the portion of Entropic's proposed construction requiring layer 2 messages.

3. Alice Step One

a. What Does Claim 1 Teach?

“The first stage of the Alice inquiry looks at the focus of the claims [and] their character as a whole[.]” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). The Court must determine whether Claim 1 is “directed to an improvement” in the relevant technical field or “directed to an abstract idea.” In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). A claimed process that can be “performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” is directed to an abstract idea. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

At a high level, Claim 1 is directed to sending and receiving data and allocating resources based upon that data.²⁶ Specifically, Claim 1 teaches requesting a guaranteed quality of service flow, receiving responses from nodes indicating their availability, and either allocating resources or determining and transmitting information regarding bandwidth based upon the nodes’ responses.²⁷

The Federal Circuit has found claims invalid when those claims were directed to transmitting, receiving, routing, controlling, gathering, processing, collecting, analyzing, and displaying information or data:

Though lengthy and numerous, the claims do not go beyond requiring the collection, analysis, and display of available information in a particular field, stating those functions in general terms, without limiting them to technical means for performing the functions that are arguably an advance over conventional computer and network technology. The claims, defining a desirable information-based result and not limited to inventive means of achieving the result, fail under § 101.

Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also iLife Techs., Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 839 F. App'x 534, 536 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“We have routinely held that claims directed to gathering and processing data are directed to an abstract idea.”); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding claims invalid that were directed to “routing” and “controlling” records); Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims invalid that were directed to “the conveyance and manipulation of information”).

Thus, Claim 1 is directed to the abstract ideas of sending a request for data, receiving responses to the request, and either (1) allocating resources based upon the responses; or (2) determining and transmitting data concerning bandwidth based upon the responses.²⁸ In addition to those abstract steps, however, Claim 1 also teaches that the method is “implemented in a Network Coordinator (NC) node.”²⁹ The NC is a specific feature; thus, that element does not alter the character of the claim as a whole. Rather, the Court instead considers whether the NC is sufficiently inventive to transform the character of the claim under Step Two.

b. What Problem Does Claim 1 Purport to Solve and How Does Claim 1 Purport to Solve That Problem?

Entropic argues that Claim 1 is not abstract because it is directed to a specific and novel messaging architecture.³⁰ However, Claim 1 omits any description of the components of that specific messaging protocol or how one may use it to achieve the desired results. Rather, Claim 1 discloses a network communication method at a high level, with reference to generic components.

In support of its position, Entropic cites extensively to the specification as well as the prosecution history. However, the intrinsic record cannot ward off an ineligibility finding unless it is tied to the language of the claims themselves. See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The § 101 inquiry must focus on the language of the Asserted Claims themselves.”).

Moreover, to survive a patent-eligibility challenge, a claim directed to an improvement must disclose specific components, specific operations, or a specific arrangement of components or operations capturing the improvement. See IOENGINE, LLC v. PayPal Holdings, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 3d 464, 485 (D. Del. 2022) (finding claims patent-eligible that were “directed to particular hardware components that have particular features and are arranged in a particular manner”). That specificity “prevents patenting a result where it matters not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished.” Id. at 484 (quotation omitted); see also Maxell, Ltd. v. Fandango Media, LLC, 2018 WL 5085141, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2018) (finding claims non-abstract that disclosed “specific requirements” for performing the claimed function); compare Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims abstract when “[t]hey do not claim a particular way of programming or designing the software to create menus”).

Here, Claim 1 neither mentions the layer 2 messaging architecture, which Entropic contends is the primary improvement, nor explains how to facilitate communication within the context of such an architecture. Entropic nevertheless contends that the “massive prosecution history” of the patents demonstrates their eligibility under § 101.³¹ There are at least two problems with Entropic's position. First, the prosecution history overwhelmingly concerns 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, not the modern § 101 standard. That history demonstrates only that the Examiner believed that the claims disclosed a combination of elements not present in the prior art. The § 101 inquiry concerns subject matter eligibility, not novelty or obviousness.

Second, even if the prosecution history supported Entropic's argument that specific claim elements are unconventional, the applicant did not actually amend Claim 1 to include the layer 2 messaging architecture.³² In that way, Entropic's argument is contradictory and unpersuasive. The layer 2 messaging architecture—the purported improvement—was not even the feature that distinguished Claim 1 from the prior art during prosecution.

For those reasons, Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of sending a request for data, receiving responses to the request, and either (1) allocating resources based upon the responses; or (2) determining and transmitting data concerning bandwidth based upon the responses.

4. Alice Step Two

The Step Two inquiry considers whether the claim includes “an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Yu v. Apple Inc., 1 F.4th 1040, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2021), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 1113, 212 L.Ed.2d 10 (2022). “Where a claim is directed to an abstract idea, the claim must include additional features to ensure that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].” ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). In evaluating Step Two, the court considers whether the claim limitations, either individually or as an ordered combination, teach implementing the abstract idea using something more than well understood, routine, or conventional techniques. See Coop. Ent., Inc. v. Kollective Tech., Inc., 50 F.4th 127, 130 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

Cox argues that the claims refer only to generic computer components (various nodes including a Network Coordinator (NC) node, source node, and egress node, as well as a communications controller) and that they do not include any inventive concepts.³³ Cox also asserts that the NC is merely a type of node, and, thus, it is still a generic component.³⁴ Entropic seeks to avoid an invalidity finding by arguing that a dispute of fact exists regarding whether the NC is an unconventional element.³⁵ Entropic offers a proposed construction for NC.³⁶ However, as discussed above, the Court declines to adopt Entropic's construction.³⁷

First, the NC itself is not unconventional. Entropic acknowledges that the NC is just like any of the other peer nodes in the network, except that it is the coordinator.³⁸ A node is a generic network component. Accordingly, the NC cannot transform this claim into something more than an abstract idea.

Entropic also argues, in connection with its proposed construction, that the layer 2 messaging architecture renders the claim unconventional.³⁹ However, as discussed above, the claim does not teach a layer 2 messaging architecture nor explain how to implement one. “Without an explanation of the ‘mechanism’ for how the result is accomplished, this purported feature of the invention cannot supply an inventive concept.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F. 3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted)); see also BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (the ineligible concept “cannot supply the inventive concept”).

For those reasons, the Court concludes that Claim 1 fails to include any inventive concept sufficient to transform the abstract idea into something more. Accordingly, the ’213 Patent claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

B. The ’422 Patent

Cox contends that the ’422 Patent claims are directed to the abstract idea of “forming an aggregated data traffic list by requesting and receiving information from nodes within a network about scheduled data transmissions.”⁴⁰ Entropic responds that the claims are not abstract because they include “particular messages with particular contents” in a non-generic layer 2 messaging framework.⁴¹

1. Representativeness

With the exception of Claim 16, the Court finds Claim 1 representative and performs the § 101 analysis on Claim 1. See Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348. Here, the remaining claims of the ’422 Patent all relate to communicating, sending, and aggregating data between nodes in a network.⁴² In view of the common focus of the claims, applying the Alice framework to Claim 1 provides a representative analysis applicable to all asserted claims.⁴³ Entropic does not raise any meaningful distinction to the contrary. See Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1365.

With respect to Claim 16, Entropic failed to raise any meaningful distinction in its briefing. Still, Claim 16 includes the additional limitation “wherein the first message, second messages, third messages, and fourth message are Layer 2 Management Entity (L2ME) messages.” As discussed below, the other claims do not require layer 2 messages. Thus, while the Court finds Claim 16 generally directed to communicating, sending, and aggregating data between nodes in a network, the Court also separately considers whether the L2ME message limitation constitutes an inventive feature.

2. Claim Construction

Entropic's proposed construction for “Network Coordinator (NC)” also applies to Claim 1 of the ’422 Patent.⁴⁴ Again, Cox argues that claim construction is unnecessary.⁴⁵ The Court declines to adopt Entropic's proposed construction, for the reasons stated above.⁴⁶ Additionally, as discussed above, the applicant expressly disclosed “Layer 2 Management Entity (L2ME) messages” in Claim 16 of the ’422 Patent. That drafting choice further suggests that the scope of Claim 1 is not so limited, and it supports the Court's decision to reject Entropic's proposed construction.

3. Alice Step One

a. What Does Claim 1 Teach?

As discussed above, Step One considers the character of the claims as a whole.⁴⁷ Here, Claim 1 is directed to sending, receiving, and aggregating data at a high level.⁴⁸ Specifically, Claim 1 teaches receiving and sending messages and responses regarding scheduled data transmissions, forming an aggregated list regarding the scheduled data transmissions, and sending that list back to a requesting node.⁴⁹ The Federal Circuit has found claims with similar limitations ineligible, as summarized above.⁵⁰ Cox further argues that unlike the claims at issue in Electric Power Group, the claims of the ’422 Patent do not even teach analysis, but, rather, they disclose only the acts of collecting and aggregating information.⁵¹

Thus, the character of Claim 1 is directed to generic network components—i.e., nodes—and the abstract ideas of communicating and receiving several messages with information concerning the quality of service flows, forming a list of flows based upon the messages, and sending the list back to a requesting node.⁵² Claim 1 also teaches that one of the nodes is a “Network Coordinator (NC) node.”⁵³ Again, the Court considers whether the NC is sufficiently inventive to transform the character of the claim under Step Two.

b. What Problem Does Claim 1 Purport to Solve and How Does It Purport to Solve That Problem?

Entropic raises the same arguments with respect to both the ’213 and ’422 Patents. But, again, Entropic fails to tie its discussion of the intrinsic record to the claim language. Cox argues that the claim does not include any limitations detailing how the nodes communicate or receive messages.⁵⁴ Cox suggests that the specification provides that information in disclosing the L2ME and the QoS manager, but it contends that the claims are ineligible because they do not recite those functionalities.⁵⁵ The Court agrees with Cox. The claims do not explain how to achieve the improvement with reference to any specific components, operations, or combination of components and operations. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above,⁵⁶ the Court concludes that Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of communicating and receiving several messages with information concerning quality of service flows, forming a list of flows based upon the messages, and sending the list back to a requesting node under Alice Step One.

4. Alice Step Two

Entropic raises the same arguments with respect to both the ’213 and ’422 Patents. Cox argues that Claim 1 does not disclose any inventive features but, rather, merely nodes of various names.⁵⁷ Cox further contends that the specification teaches that the claimed systems and methods may be performed on a general-purpose computer using generic computer code.⁵⁸ As discussed above,⁵⁹ the NC is not an unconventional or inventive feature sufficient to transform the nature of the claim. Rather, it is a generic node. Accordingly, the Court likewise finds the ’422 Patent invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Claim 16 expressly discloses layer 2 messaging. Although Entropic does not specifically mention Claim 16, Entropic argues generally that use of a layer 2 messaging framework, consistent with the teachings of the ’422 Patent, is unconventional.⁶⁰ Specifically, by implementing the claimed functions at the layer 2 level, Entropic argues the ’422 Patent teaches solutions that save power and make the technology more accessible to lay consumers.⁶¹ In response, Cox asserts that the layer 2 messaging still does not supply the necessary “how” to render the claims non-abstract.⁶² Cox does not directly rebut Entropic's assertion that implementing the claimed functions at layer 2 is unconventional.

However, Entropic's Complaint does not include specific factual allegations related to the unconventionality of the layer 2 messaging framework. The ’422 Patent specification likewise does not include any disclosure regarding the unconventionality of the layer 2 messaging framework. At most, the ’422 Patent attributes certain general improvements—such as “low-cost and high-speed management” of network resources—to the framework, but it does not include any additional detail.⁶³ Accordingly, Entropic's pleading in its current state does not raise a fact issue regarding the unconventionality of the layer 2 messaging framework.

C. Fact Issues and Entropic's Amended Complaint as to DirecTV

“Whether the claim elements or the claimed combination are well-understood, routine, [or] conventional is a question of fact.” Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368. However, even if a disputed fact issue exists regarding the conventionality of layer 2 messaging architecture, that issue does not bear on the instant motion, with the exception of Claim 16 of the ’422 Patent, because the claims at issue do not disclose a layer 2 messaging architecture with any specificity. Accordingly, no fact issue precludes the resolution of Cox's instant Motion with respect to those claims. As discussed above, Claim 16 does expressly disclose layer 2 messaging. The operative Complaint against Cox at the time of Cox's Motion did not raise a fact issue regarding the unconventionality of the layer 2 messaging framework. Thus, with respect to the operative Complaint against Cox at the time of the Motion, the Court does not identify any fact issues precluding resolution. Moreover, Entropic's Amended Complaint as to DirecTV, discussed below, does not include factual allegations regarding the supposed unconventionality of the layer 2 messaging framework. Entropic does not propose any other factual allegations that could cure that defect. Accordingly, no fact issues preclude the resolution of Cox's Motion with respect to any claims of either the ’213 or ’422 Patents.

After the briefing and hearing on Cox's Motion, DirecTV, LLC; AT&T, Inc.; AT&T Services, Inc.; and AT&T Communications, LLC (collectively, “DirecTV”) filed their own motion in the 1043 Case challenging several asserted patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101.⁶⁴ As part of its motion, DirecTV also sought to join Cox's Motion.⁶⁵ Entropic then filed a First Amended Complaint against DirecTV with additional factual allegations that Entropic contends affect the analysis with respect to both Cox and DirecTV.⁶⁶ The parties filed supplemental briefing addressing the impact of the Amended Complaint.⁶⁷ Entropic argues that DirecTV should not be allowed to join Cox's Motion in view of the additional allegations and also because the allegations change the outcome of Cox's Motion.⁶⁸ Cox argues that the allegations in the Amended Complaint are not operative with respect to Cox.⁶⁹ DirecTV maintains that the allegations do not affect the eligibility analysis.⁷⁰

The Court evaluates and rules upon Cox's Motion based upon the state of the pleadings with respect to Cox at the time of the Motion. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Cox's Motion is GRANTED. The Court separately considers whether DirecTV may join in Cox's Motion even though the operative pleadings as between Cox and DirecTV differ.

D. DirecTV's Joinder Request

As a threshold matter, the Court evaluates only whether the allegations that Entropic identified in its supplemental brief warrant a different outcome here. The Court does not consider new substantive arguments concerning eligibility. Entropic should have raised those arguments in its Opposition.

DirecTV's Joinder Request is moot. The ’213 and ’422 Patents are invalid for the same reasons stated above. The only portion of the analysis that could potentially differ with respect to different Defendants is the effect of fact pleadings concerning whether claim elements are “well-understood, routine, [or] conventional.” Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1128; see also Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368. As discussed below, the allegations in the Amended Complaint do not compel a different outcome here.

The allegations in the Amended Complaint provide background about the types of problems and challenges to managing bandwidth in a point-to-point network in which devices compete over shared resources.⁷¹ The Amended Complaint then concludes that “it was not routine or conventional to distinguish between types of data or to guarantee bandwidth for a type of data flow.”⁷²

With respect to the ’213 Patent, Entropic argues that the claims are patent-eligible because they are directed to specific functionality not available in prior art systems.⁷³ That functionality is an NC node that “allocates and aggregates guaranteed” QoS flows for other nodes in the network.⁷⁴ Entropic contends that “an NC node is understood in the art and in the context of the patents as a node that can change based on network conditions and is not pre-defined.”⁷⁵

The Court does not find that argument persuasive. The Court considered the meaning of NC node, above, and it rejected Entropic's proposal that NC node be construed as limited to “a node that manages and coordinates QoS service flows by layer 2 messages among peer nodes of the flows.” To the extent that Entropic now seeks to advance a different proposed construction, the Court finds that argument untimely. Even if not, however, Entropic acknowledges that an NC node “is understood in the art.”⁷⁶ Further, as DirecTV points out, “[t]he claims are not directed to a method of determining which node should be the NC node, nor do they address a situation where the NC node changes.”⁷⁷ Accordingly, the NC node itself and its alleged fluid nature cannot provide an inventive concept under Step Two. For that reason, too, Entropic's arguments concerning the dependent claims are not persuasive.⁷⁸

With respect to the functions, Entropic argues that “broadcasting a request for a guarantee QoS flow,” determining whether resources can support the request, and either allocating resources to support the flow or determining the maximum data rate that could be supported, are unconventional.⁷⁹ However, the pleading merely quotes the claim language, concludes that the disclosed steps are unconventional, and references the background discussion at Paragraphs 135-142.⁸⁰ While the background allegations discuss latency and bandwidth management problems, they do not explain how the claimed steps provide an inventive solution to the latency problem nor how those steps are unconventional. See Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc., 72 F.4th 1355, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citing authority disregarding conclusory allegations in assessing eligibility). Thus, the contextual allegations do not change the outcome here.

Entropic also argues that the “maximum data rate” limitation provides an inventive concept.⁸¹ However, Entropic points to a non-limiting embodiment in the specification that describes the process with reference to certain criteria that must be met.⁸² The claim is not so limited. It discloses only “determining a maximum data rate that would have resulted in a successful request.”⁸³ That claim language is result-oriented; it is not directed to a specific solution. See Hawk Tech. Sys., LLC v. Castle Retail, LLC, 60 F.4th 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Entropic's allegations related to the “maximum data rate” are also conclusory.⁸⁴ Thus, the allegations do not change the outcome here.

With respect to the ’422 Patent, Entropic argues that “Claim 1 leverages the NC node—as opposed to a dedicated controller—to aggregate PQoS flow data for the network, and thus recites a specific improvement in network functionality.”⁸⁵ For the reasons discussed above, the NC node itself and its alleged fluid nature cannot provide an inventive concept here. The allegations in the Amended Complaint do not compel a different outcome here. Like the allegations at Paragraphs 161-163, discussed above, the allegations at Paragraphs 177-179 merely quote the claim language, conclude that the disclosed limitations are unconventional, and cite to the background portion discussed above.⁸⁶ They do not explain how the claimed steps provide an inventive solution nor how the claimed steps are unconventional. See Trinity, 72 F.4th at 1365–66.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court does not find that the allegations in the Amended Complaint compel a different outcome with respect to eligibility. The ’213 and ’422 Patents are invalid for the reasons stated above. DirecTV's Joinder Request is DENIED as moot.

V. DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:

1. Cox's instant Motion for judgment on the pleadings [ECF No. 64 in the 1047 Case] is GRANTED.

2. The ’213 and ’422 Patents are directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and, accordingly, the claims of those Patents are INVALID.

3. Because the allegations in the Amended Complaint do not compel a different outcome, the Court's patent-eligibility conclusions do not differ as between Cox and DirecTV. DirecTV's Joinder Request is DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Compl. (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1 in Case No. 2:23-cv-01047 (the “1047 Case”)], Ex. O (the ’213 Patent) [ECF No. 1-15]. The 1047 Case is now administratively closed and consolidated with Case No. 2:23-cv-01043 (the “1043 Case”). See Order Granting Joint Stip. to Consolidate Cases [ECF No. 129 in the 1043 Case]. Because Cox filed its instant Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 64] prior to consolidation, unless otherwise indicated the electronic court filing citations herein correspond to the 1047 Case.

2.   Complaint, Ex. Q (the ’422 Patent) [ECF No. 1-17].

3.   See generally Complaint.

4.   Id.

5.   See id. at ¶¶ 1 & 2.

6.   See id. at ¶¶ 3 & 4.

7.   See Motion; Entropic's Opp'n to the Motion (the “Opposition”) [ECF No. 66]; Cox's Reply in Supp. of the Motion (the “Reply”) [ECF No. 69].

8.   Complaint ¶¶ 335 & 369.

9.   See generally Motion.

10.   See ’213 Patent 1:55-63 & 3:58-65.

11.   Id. at 3:48-65.

12.   Id. at 3:62-65.

13.   Id. at 4:31-35.

14.   See id. at 3:7-9.

15.   Id., Claim 1.

16.   ’422 Patent, Claim 1.

17.   Motion 19:25-20:1.

18.   Opposition 1:5-16.

19.   See ’213 Patent, Claims 1, 13, & 23.

20.   Entropic asserts at least Claim 1 against Cox in this case. See Complaint ¶ 355.

21.   Opposition 14:1-4.

22.   Motion 20:4-10; see also Reply 7:13-14.

23.   ’213 Patent at 2:15-37; see also id. at 3:48-65.

24.   Id. at 1:55-59. The Court further notes that the discussion of the role of the NC beginning at column 4, line 2, applies to only some embodiments.

25.   Complaint, Ex. P (claim chart for ’213 Patent) [ECF No. 1-16] (citing MoCA 1.1 § 1.2 and MoCA 2.0 § 3).

26.   ’213 Patent, Claim 1.

27.   Id.

28.   Id.

29.   Id.

30.   Opposition 5:14-16.

31.   Id. at 16:1-3 & 14:26-15:6.

32.   The applicant did, however, expressly disclose “Layer 2 Management Entity (L2ME) messages” in Claim 16 of the ’422 Patent. That drafting choice further suggests that the scope of Claim 1 is not so limited, and it supports the Court's decision to disregard Entropic's proposed construction.

33.   Motion 23:13-25.

34.   Reply 8:22-26.

35.   See Opposition 16:7-11.

36.   Id. at 14:1-4.

37.   See supra, Part IV.A.2.

38.   Opposition 14:20-22.

39.   See id. at 16:7-11.

40.   Motion 11:23-26.

41.   Opposition 1:16-24.

42.   See ’213 Patent, Claims 1, 5, & 12-17.

43.   Entropic asserts at least Claim 1 in its Complaint. See Complaint ¶ 369.

44.   See Opposition 14:1-4.

45.   Motion 12:1-7.

46.   See supra, Part IV.A.2.

47.   See supra, Part IV.A.3.a.

48.   ’213 Patent, Claim 1.

49.   Id.

50.   See supra, Part IV.A.3.a.

51.   Motion 14:6-12.

52.   ’422 Patent, Claim 1.

53.   Id.

54.   Motion 15:10-16.

55.   Id. at 15:17-25.

56.   See supra Part IV.A.3.b.

57.   Motion 17:6-11.

58.   Id. at 17:28-18:3.

59.   See supra Part IV.A.4.

60.   Opposition 8:26-10:3.

61.   Id. at 11:1-6.

62.   Reply 9:11-16.

63.   ’422 Patent 3:55-60.

64.   DirecTV's Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No. 160 in the 1043 Case].

65.   See generally id.

66.   First Am. Compl. (the “Amended Complaint”) [ECF No. 168 in the 1043 Case].

67.   Entropic's Supp. Brief (the “Entropic's Supplemental Brief”) [ECF No. 309 in the 1043 Case]; Cox's Resp. (the “Cox's Response”) [ECF No. 350 in the 1043 Case]; DirecTV's Resp. (the “DirecTV Response”) [ECF No. 351 in the 1043 Case].

68.   See generally Entropic's Supplemental Brief.

69.   Cox's Response 4:2-7.

70.   See generally DirecTV's Response.

71.   Amended Complaint ¶¶ 135-142.

72.   Id. ¶ 143.

73.   See generally Entropic's Supplemental Brief.

74.   Id. at 5:7-11; see also id. at 6:12-26.

75.   Id. at 6:16-18.

76.   Id.

77.   DirecTV's Response 5:8-10.

78.   See Entropic's Supplemental Brief 9:7-19.

79.   Id. at 6:18-26.

80.   Amended Complaint ¶¶ 161-163.

81.   Entropic's Supplemental Brief 10:12-14.

82.   Id. at 10:14-24.

83.   ’213 Patent, Claim 1.

84.   Amended Complaint ¶ 163.

85.   Entropic's Supplemental Brief 12:26-28.

86.   Amended Complaint ¶¶ 161-163 & 177-179.

John W. Holcomb, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE