LUJANO v. PIEDMONT AIRLINES INC (2024)

PROCEEDINGS: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS [32]

Before the court is Defendant Piedmont Airlines, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Motion” or “Mot.”). (Dkt. 32.) The Motion is supported by the Declaration of Defendant's attorney, Kelly S. Wood, (Dkt. 32-2 (“Wood Decl.”)), and a Request for Judicial Notice, (Dkt. 32-1 (“Request for Judicial Notice”)). Plaintiff Michelle Lujano (“Plaintiff”) filed an Opposition (“Opp.”). (Dkt. 36.) Plaintiff filed a Reply (“Reply”). (Dkt. 37.) The court found this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and took the matter under submission. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”); L.R. 7-15 (authorizing courts to “dispense with oral argument on any motion except where an oral hearing is required by statute”). Based on the state of the record, as applied to the applicable law, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

This putative class action arises out of a labor dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant. (See generally Dkt. 1-8 (“First Amended Complaint” or “FAC”)). On November 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Orange County Superior Court. (See Dkt. 1-1.) On January 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (See generally FAC.) This case was removed to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, and 1453 on March 7, 2023. (See generally Dkt. 1.)

Plaintiff was a Customer Service Agent employed by Defendant from March 2016 to October 28, 2022. (See FAC ¶ 6). Plaintiff alleges that California law requires “an employer to pay employees overtime [ ] for any work in excess of eight hours in a workday or 40 hours in a workweek,” however, “throughout Plaintiff's employment with [Defendant], Plaintiff was paid overtime wages only when she worked more than 40 hours per week. [I]f Plaintiff worked more than 8 hours in a day but not over 40 hours in the same week, she would not be paid any overtime wages.” (See id. ¶¶ 27-28.) Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of Defendant's “current and former [ ] employees who were subject to Defendant's policy of paying overtime only after working 40 hours in a workweek in the State of California at any time from November 14, 2018, through the present.” (Id. ¶ 16.)

The First Amended Complaint asserts four causes of action against Defendant: (1) violation of California Labor Code §§ 201-203, 510, 1194, 1197, and 1197.1 for “willfully fail[ing] to pay employees all overtime wages all hours worked”; (2) violation of California Labor Code § 226, for “fail[ing] ․ to provide accurate itemized wage statements”; (3) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. for “unfair and unlawful business practices [ ] including the failures to pay all overtime wages”; and (4) violation of the Private Attorney Generals Act (“PAGA”), California Labor Code § 2698 for the aforementioned California Labor Code violations. (See id. ¶¶ 26-42.)

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is properly granted “when there is no issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Unite Here Loc. 30 v. Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation, 35 F.4th 695, 700 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009)). Because Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(6) motions are “functionally identical,” the same standard of review applies to motions brought under either rule. Gregg v. Hawaii, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017).

Review is generally limited to the pleadings. Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Dep't of Health, 654 F.3d 919, 925 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011). The court accepts “all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., 953 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Fleming, 581 F.3d at 925). However, the court is “not required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the [c]omplaint, or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Chandavong v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n, 599 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1020 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting Seven Arts Filmed Entm't, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”).

The court's inquiry concerns “whether the complaint at issue contain[s] ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)) (citation omitted). “Establishing the plausibility of a complaint's allegations is a two-step process that is ‘context-specific’ and ‘requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’ ” Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937). Under this standard, “[m]ere conclusory statements in a complaint and ‘formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action’ are not sufficient.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (second alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

Under Rule 12(c), courts “have discretion to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend, or dismiss the action instead of entering judgment.” Ryan v. Salisbury, 382 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1047 (D. Haw. 2019) (citations omitted); see also Chandavong, 599 F. Supp. 3d at 1020; Gregg, 870 F.3d at 887. Although Rule 12(c) “does not expressly provide for partial judgment on the pleadings, neither does it bar such a procedure; it is common to apply Rule 12(c) to individual causes of action.” Mays v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Strigliabotti v. Franklin Res., Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2005)).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff argues that she and her proposed class were denied overtime pay in violation of several state and federal laws because they were paid overtime only when they worked over 40 hours in a week, and not when they worked over 8 hours in a day. See generally FAC. Defendant argues that there is a valid Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) in place between Defendant and Plaintiff's union which covers the issue of overtime pay. See Mot. at 3-4. Defendant contends that under the Railway Labor Act and the California Labor Code, Plaintiff's claims are exempted by this CBA. See generally Mot.

A. The Court May Take Judicial Notice of the All Documents Requested by Defendant.

Defendant requests that the court take judicial notice of seven documents: (1) the CBA between Defendant and Plaintiff's union, Communications Workers of America Association, effective November 5, 2018 (“CBA”), (see Dkt. 32-3); (2) Statement of Findings by the IWC of the State of California in Connection with the Revision in 1976 of Its Orders Regulating Wages, Hours, and Working Conditions, (see Dkt. 32-5 (“Statement of Findings”)); (3) Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order 9-76, (see Dkt. 32-4); (4) IWC Wage Order 9-80, (see Dkt. 32-6); (5) IWC Wage Order 9-90 (see Dkt. 32-7); (6) IWC Wage Order 9-98, (see Dkt. 32-8); and (7) IWC Wage Order 9-2000, (see 32-9),¹ (“collectively, “Seven Documents”). Plaintiff does not oppose the Request for Judicial Notice for the Seven Documents. (See generally Opp.)

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the court may take judicial notice of facts that are either “generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 201(b). Judicial notice is appropriate for “materials incorporated into the complaint or matters of public record.” Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). Courts cannot take judicial notice of facts subject to reasonable dispute. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.11, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (“Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The court finds the Seven Documents are each appropriate for judicial notice. First, the court takes judicial notice of the CBA because “courts regularly take judicial notice of collective bargaining agreements on a motion to dismiss when the documents are ‘not subject to reasonable dispute.’ ” See Garza v. WinCo Holding, Inc., 2022 WL 902782 at *5 (E.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (citing cases); Ettedgui v. WB Studio Enterprises Inc., 2020 WL 9256608, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2020). Here, because “Plaintiff neither opposes Defendant's request nor disputes the validity of the CBA,” the court finds this document appropriate for judicial notice. Bartlett v. All Am. Asphalt, 2020 WL 6118818, at *4 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2020); see also Morris v. Clark Pacific, 2020 WL 6526248, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2020) (taking judicial notice of CBA where plaintiff did “not dispute the authenticity of the CBA, that he was a member of the Union, or that he was a covered employee according to the terms of the CBA when the allegations in his complaint took place”).

Second, the court takes judicial notice of the Statement of Findings because “judicial notice may be taken of records of state agencies and other undisputed matters of public record.” Easter v. CDC State of Cal., 2008 WL 5054103, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2008) (citing Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Third, the court takes judicial notice of the IWC Wage Order Documents because “Industrial Wage Orders are [ ] properly subject to judicial notice.” See Mendoza v. Home Depot, U.S.A. Inc., 2010 WL 424679, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2010); Vasserman v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 65 F.Supp.3d 932, 943 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (same). In sum, Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice of the Seven Documents is GRANTED.

B. The Railway Labor Act Exemption Within IWC Wage Order 9 Precludes Plaintiff's Claims.

“In California, ‘wage and hour claims are today governed by two complementary and occasionally overlapping sources of authority: the provisions of the Labor Code, enacted by the Legislature, and a series of 18 wage orders, adopted by the IWC.’ ” Miller v. LS & Partners at CA, LLC, 2019 WL 1718885, *3, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68026, *7 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1026, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 273 P.3d 513 (2012)). Of interest in this case are California Labor Code § 510 (“Labor Code § 510”) and IWC Wage Order 9 (“Wage Order 9”).

Labor Code § 510 requires overtime pay “at the rate of no less than one and one–half times the regular rate of pay for an employee” for “any work in excess of eight hours in one workday and any work in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek.” Cal. Labor Code § 510(a). IWC Wage Order 9 (“Wage Order 9”) adopts these same requirements for overtime pay. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, §§ 11090 (1), (3) (transportation industry employees “shall not be employed more than eight (8) hours in any workday or more than 40 hours in any workweek unless the employee receives one and one-half (1 1/2) times such employee's regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 hours in the workweek”). However, Wage Order 9 stipulates that “this order shall not be deemed to cover those employees who have entered into a collective bargaining agreement under and in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act” (hereinafter, “the RLA Exemption”).² Wage Order 9 § 1(E).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant denied Plaintiff and proposed class members overtime pay under Labor Code § 510 and Wage Order 9. (See generally FAC.) Defendant argues that because the CBA between Plaintiff and Defendant addresses overtime policy and was formed in accordance with the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), Plaintiff's claims are exempted from the overtime provisions of Wage Order 9 and Labor Code § 510 pursuant to the RLA Exemption. (See Mot. at 3-9.) Plaintiff counters that the plain language of the RLA Exemption only exempts overtime claims under Wage Order 9, not under Labor Code § 510. (See Opp. at 1-3 (“Wage Order No. 9 does not exempt airline employees from the Labor Code's overtime provisions. The Wage Order states in pertinent part: ‘this order shall not be deemed to cover those employees who have entered into a collective bargaining agreement ․’ ”) (emphasis in original).)

1. The CBA Was Formed in Accordance with the Railway Labor Act.

Before the court may consider the scope of the RLA Exemption, the court must determine whether the CBA was formed “in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act” and is therefore eligible for the RLA Exemption. See Wage Order 9 § 1(E). An agreement which is formed “between a ‘carrier,’ [ ] and its ‘employees,’ [ ] that address[es] in detail the terms and conditions of all [ ] employment, such as compensation, [ ] training requirements, [ ] work scheduling practices, [ ] and corrective action policies/grievance procedures” is formed in accordance with the RLA. See Horowitz v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 2021 WL 4079184, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2021) (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1) (providing that it is “the duty” of all “carriers” and their “employees” to “make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions”); 45 U.S.C. § 181 (stating that provisions of RLA apply to “every common carrier by air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce”)).

The court finds the CBA meets these criteria. The CBA is formed between Defendant, “the carrier,” and “the fleet and passenger service employees in the service of [Defendant].” See CBA at 4. The CBA describes in detail the “terms and conditions” of employment, including “compensation,” (see id. at 27-29), “training,” (see id. at 19), “hours of service,” (see id. at 11-14), and “grievance procedures,” (see id. at 49-50; see also id. at 77 (“This Letter of Agreement is made and entered into in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act ․”).) Accordingly, the court concludes the CBA was formed in accordance with the RLA.

2. Relevant Precedent Weighs in Favor of Precluding Plaintiff's Claims Under the Railway Labor Act Exemption of Wage Order 9.

The court finds relevant precedent favors Defendant's argument that the RLA Exemption in Wage Order 9 exempts Plaintiff's overtime claims under the Labor Code. In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that “the RLA exemption excuses [employers] from both Wage Order 9's overtime requirements and Section 510’s overtime requirements” where there is a CBA formed in accordance with the RLA which speaks to overtime. Angeles v. US Airways, Inc., 790 Fed. App'x 878, 880 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Angeles”). The Ninth Circuit premised this decision largely upon the legislative history of Wage Order 9. The RLA exemption was added to Wage Order 9 in 1976 to make it easier to “enforce standards for employees crossing state lines and [because] the exempted employees were better protected by their collective bargaining agreements pursuant to the Railway Labor Act.” Id. at 879-80 (citing the Statement of Findings). Although the California Labor Code added overtime requirements in 1999, the Code expressly retained all exemptions within valid wage orders in effect before 1997. See id. at 880 (citing Cal. Lab. Code § 515(b)). “The RLA exemption is such an exemption because it was adopted in 1976 and has been retained in all subsequent versions of Wage Order 9 ․ [I]t was a preexisting exemption that the Legislature acknowledged and incorporated into the statutory scheme through Section 515(b).” Id.³

Although Angeles is an unpublished opinion, courts in the Northern District and Central District of California have adopted its reasoning that the RLA exemption in Wage Order 9 extends to the Labor Code. For example, in Solis v. American Airlines, the court relied on Angeles to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the plaintiff's claims for failure to pay overtime under the California Labor Code, including section 510. 2021 WL 4893247, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2021). Similarly, when evaluating the RLA Exemption, a district court in the Northern District found that “where a defendant establishes the applicability of an exemption from a provision of a wage order [such as Wage Order 9], and, consequently, bars any claim for violation of such provision, the exemption likewise bars claims for violation of identical provisions set forth in ‘statutes and regulations.’ ” Horowitz v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 2021 WL 4079184, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2021) (relying on Angeles, 790 Fed. App'x at 880; Collins v. Overnite Transp. Co., 105 Cal. App. 4th 171, 173, 177-80, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 254 (2003)).

Plaintiff points to Meek v. SkyWest, Inc., which reached an opposite conclusion on the question of whether the RLA Exemption precludes overtime claims under Labor Code § 510. See 2019 WL 6841367, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019). However, the court is not persuaded by Meek’s reasoning. Notably, the decision in Meek was reached prior to Angeles, Horowitz, and Solis. Moreover, Meek does not address the legislative history of Wage Code 9 as Angeles did. See generally 2019 WL 6841367, at *2-4. The court considers this legislative history persuasive evidence that the RLA Exemption extends to overtime claims under Labor Code § 510, and therefore follows Angeles and its progeny.

Plaintiff also relies on Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., in which the California Supreme Court held that the RLA Exemption does not reach Labor Code § 226(a) on wage statements. 9 Cal. 5th 732, 743-49, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 466 P.3d 309 (2020) (“Ward”). However, the court finds the decision in Ward does not benefit Plaintiff in this case, because the California Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that a case on overtime exemptions reach a different result because “the history of overtime regulation in California is essentially the reverse of the history of wage statement regulation,” underscoring that the Ward reasoning is inapplicable to the case at hand. Id. at 747-48, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 466 P.3d 309 (“No one disputes that the exemption remains fully operative with respect to matters other than wage statements ․”).⁴ Accordingly, the court finds that the relevant precedent weighs in favor of extending the RLA Exemption in Wage Order 9 to Labor Code § 510.

3. The RLA Exemption Precludes All of Plaintiff's Claims.

The court next considers whether the RLA Exemption applies to Plaintiff's claims. As discussed above, Plaintiff raises four cases of action: (1) violation of California Labor Code §§ 201-203, 510, 1194, 1197, and 1197.1; (2) violation of California Labor Code § 226; (3) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; and (4) violation of California Labor Code § 2698 seeking recovery under PAGA. (See FAC ¶¶ 26-42.)

Plaintiff's first cause of action is “brought pursuant to Labor Code §§ 201-203, 510, 1194, 1197, and 1197.1, which require an employer to pay employees overtime.” (See FAC ¶ 27.) As discussed in Section III(B)(2), infra, the RLA Exemption precludes claims related to overtime under Labor Code § 510 where “employees [ ] have entered into a collective bargaining agreement under and in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act.” See Wage Order 9 § 1(E). The CBA between Plaintiff and Defendant was formed in accordance with the RLA and addresses employee overtime policies. (See Sec. B(a), supra; CBA at 16-18.) Plaintiff's first cause of action is “brought pursuant to Labor Code §§ 201-203, 510, 1194, 1197, and 1197.1, which require an employer to pay employees overtime.” (See FAC ¶ 27.) Thus, the court finds Plaintiff's claim under Labor Code § 510 is barred by the RLA Exemption.

In addition, secondary claims, or “derivative” claims, which depend on the same alleged misconduct as a primary claim fail if the primary claim fails. See, e.g., Garza v. WinCo Holding, Inc., 2022 WL 902782, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (“The Court finds that Garza's fourth through seventh causes of action are all derivative from the overtime, minimum wage, and rest period violations, and similarly fail for the reasons stated above.”) (citing cases); EM Gen., LLC. v. Elec. Com., LLC, 2021 WL 6618660, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2021) (“Because Plaintiff's claim for accounting is based upon alleged misconduct that was wholly permitted under the express terms of the [contract at issue] and is derivative of the other failed claims, it too must fail.”). Therefore, the court finds Plaintiff's related overtime claims under this cause of action, pursuant to Labor Code §§ 201-203, 1194, 1197, and 1197.1, are likewise precluded as derivative of Plaintiff's claim under Labor Code § 510. Similarly, Plaintiff's remaining three causes of action are derivative of the first cause of action. Under the second cause of action Plaintiff claims Defendant violated Labor Code § 226, by “fail[ing] ․ to provide accurate itemized wage statements ․ due to Defendant's failure to properly pay all overtime wages.” (See FAC ¶ 32.) Under the third cause of action, Plaintiff claims Defendant violated Business and Professions Code § 17200 for “unfair and unlawful business practices [ ] including the failures to pay all overtime wages.” (See id. ¶¶ 35-36.) Under the fourth cause of action, Plaintiff claims Defendant violated Labor Code ¶ 2698 and seeks recovery under PAGA for the aforementioned Labor Code violations. (See id. ¶¶ 40-42.) Because these remaining three causes of action rely on the same set of facts as the first cause of action—that Plaintiff was denied overtime pay by Defendant—these three causes of action are derivative of the first cause of action and are thus precluded.

In sum, the court concludes that all of Plaintiff's claims are barred by the RLA Exemption. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED.

4. Disposition and Denial of Leave to Amend

For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS the Motion as to all of Plaintiff's claims. When ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, “leave to amend should be granted even if no request is made unless amendment would be futile.” See Pac. W. Group v. Real Time Solutions, 321 Fed. Appx. 566, 569 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis in original); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.”). In this case, the court finds amendment would be futile because the very basis of Plaintiff's claims and requested relief rely on overtime pay, which the court concludes falls squarely under the RLA Exemption. See, e.g., Always Smiling Prods., LLC v. Chubb Nat'l Ins. Co., 2022 WL 4102315, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2022) (“Here, leave to amend would be futile because the plain terms of the policy do not permit coverage for the COVID-related costs that plaintiff incurred.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant are DISMISSED without leave to amend. The court also ORDERS Defendant to lodge a proposed judgment consistent with this Order within ten (10) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff shall then file any objections to the proposed judgment within ten (10) days of Defendant filing the proposed judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Hereinafter, the court will refer collectively to the Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order 9-76, (see Dkt. 32-4); (4) IWC Wage Order 9-80, (Dkt. 32-6); (5) IWC Wage Order 9-90 (Dkt. 32-7); (6) IWC Wage Order 9-98, (see Dkt. 32-8); and (7) IWC Wage Order 9-2000, (see 32-9), as the “IWC Wage Order Documents.”

2.   This provision is subject to exceptions within Wage Order 9 that are not relevant to this case.

3.   The legislative history of Wage Order 9 and the RLA discussed by the Ninth Circuit in Angeles largely mirrors the arguments within Defendant's present motion. See Mot. 3-7.

4.   Likewise, Plaintiff directs the court to Gutierrez v. Brand Energy Services of California, Inc., in which the court declined to extend a CBA exemption in Wage Order 16 to the relevant Labor Code provision on pay rate. See 50 Cal. App. 5th 786, 803-805, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 173 (2020). However, the Gutierrez court stated that even where an express Labor Code exemption is not present, there may be a “valid basis for inferring [that a Wage Order exemption extends to the Labor Code] based on the legal scheme as a whole.” Id. at 801, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 173. Unlike Angeles, Gutierrez did not involve Wage Order 9 or Labor Code § 515(b), which retained pre-1997 Wage Order exemptions such as the RLA Exemption. See generally id. The court therefore concludes the weight of legislative history and intent surrounding the RLA Exemption, as explored in Angeles and its progeny, weighs in favor Defendant's position.

FRED W. SLAUGHTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE