GUTIERREZ v. AMPLIFY ENERGY CORP (2022)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS CAPETANISSA MARITIME CORPORATION, V.SHIPS GREECE, LTD., AND COSTAMARE SHIPPING CO.’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION [305, 306, 307]

Before the Court are three motions to dismiss for lack personal jurisdiction filed by Capetanissa Maritime Corporation (“Capetanissa”), V.Ships Greece, Ltd. (“V.Ships”), and Costamare Shipping Co., S.A. (“Costamare Shipping”) (collectively, the “Moving Defendants”). See Capetanissa's Motion to Dismiss, July 15, 2022 (“Cape. Mot.”) (Dkt. 305); Costamare Shipping's Motion to Dismiss, July 15, 2022 (“Cost. Mot.”) (Dkt. 306); V.Ships’ Motion to Dismiss, July 15, 2022 (“V.Ships Mot.”) (Dkt. 307).

Because the three motions raise common issues and jurisdictional challenges, the Court considers them together. For reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the motions to dismiss.

INTRODUCTION

On January 25, 2021, two vessels—the MSC Danit and the Beijing—allegedly struck and damaged Amplify's pipeline (the “Pipeline”) about fifteen miles off the coast of California, resulting in damage to the Pipeline and oil spill into the San Pedro Bay. See Defendant/Third Party Plaintiffs’ Amended Third-Party Complaint, June 21, 2022 (“Amended Complaint” or “FAC”) (Dkt. 277) ¶¶ 106–50.

In June 2022, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs Amplify Energy Corp., Beta Operating Company, LLC, and San Pedro Bay Pipeline Company (collectively, “Amplify”) filed a Third-Party Complaint against several entities seeking recovery for damage to its pipeline and the resulting oil spill. See Amended Complaint.

Of those entities, three moved to dismiss for lack personal jurisdiction: Capetanissa, V.Ships, and Costamare. See Cape. Mot. (Dkt. 305); Cost. Mot. (Dkt. 306); V.Ships Mot. (Dkt. 307).

Amplify opposed. See Amplify's Opposition to Capetanissa Mot., August 4, 2022 (“Cape. Opp.”) (Dkt. 343); Amplify's Opposition to Costamare Shipping Mot., August 4, 2022 (“Cost. Opp.”) (Dkt. 344); Amplify's Opposition to V.Ships’ Mot., August 4, 2022 (“V.Ships Opp.”) (Dkt. 345). And Moving Defendants subsequently filed their replies. See Capetanissa Reply, August 11, 2022 (Dkt. 356); Costamare Shipping Reply, August 11, 2022 (Dkt. 357); V.Ships’ Reply, August 11, 2022 (Dkt. 357).

Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and applicable law, the Court finds the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Capetanissa, V.Ships, and Costamare Shipping proper under Rule 4(k)(1) and Rule 4(k)(2). Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motions to dismiss.

I. Background

Amplify filed its Amended Complaint on June 21, 2022, against—among others—three entities that own, operate, and/or manage the Beijing: Capetanissa, Costamare Shipping, and V.Ships. The Amended Complaint sought to recover damages for the physical injury to the Pipeline and loss of oil, FAC ¶¶ 161–69, economic losses from Amplify's shut down of its California operations, and for contribution for Plaintiffs’ damages and clean-up costs. Id. at 5–6.

On May 20, 2022, Capetanissa filed a petition of limitation of liability under the Limitation Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30502, et seq. See In re the Matter of the Complaint of Capetanissa Maritime Corporation, No. 2:22-cv-03462-DOC-JDE, 2022 WL 1601201 (C.D. Cal.) (the “Limitation Action” or In re Capetanissa). That action seeks exoneration from liability relating to Amplify's allegations that the Beijing struck the Pipeline and caused the oil spill, or alternatively a limitation of that liability to the value of the vessel. See Complaint, In re Capetanissa, (Dkt. 1). Capetanissa filed the Limitation Action as the Beijing's owner and “on behalf of its officers, employees, crew, agents, and managers.” Ex. 20 to Complaint, In re Capetanissa, (Dkt. 1-20), at CAPE000038. The Court granted the request for a stay in part, allowing “Amplify's [Oil Pollution Act] OPA claims, including claims against the Limitation Act Parties” to proceed and staying all other claims. Order, In re Capetanissa (Dkt. 245), at 5.

On May 25, 2022, this Court held Amplify's Oil Pollution Act claims were not subject to the Limitation Act stay and could proceed. Id. Shortly thereafter on June 24, 2022, Capetanissa filed a notice appealing that Order, see Notice of Appeal, In re Capetanissa (Dkt. 284), and later returned to this Court to seek additional protection, namely, a stay of Amplify's OPA claims pending appeal, Stay Motion, In re Capetanissa (Dkt. 328).

In July 2022, Capetanissa, Costamare Shipping, and V.Ships each filed a motion to dismiss Amplify's Amended Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. In support, each attached a declaration from John Harry Webster, Legal Counsel at Costamare Shipping. See Capetanissa Mot. Ex. 1; Costamare Shipping Mot. Ex. 1; V. Ships Mot. Ex. 1. V.Ships also attached a declaration from Konstantinos Kontes, Managing Director at V.Ships. V.Ships Mot. Ex. 2.

In support of jurisdiction, Amplify submits several pieces of evidence that the Court finds relevant here: the Deposition Transcript of John Harry Webster, Ex. 3 to Declaration of K. Ross Powell (Dkt. 346-3) (“Webster Dep. Tr.”); the agreement between Capetenissa and Costamare Shipping (Dkt. 346-19) (“Costamare Contract”); the agreement between Capetanissa and V.Ships (Dkt. 346-20) (“V.Ships Contract”); and the agreement between Capetanissa and the charterers (Dkt. 346-21) (“Charter Party”).

Since filing its original complaint in May 2022, Amplify served jurisdictional discovery requests on the Moving Defendants, seeking deposition testimony about the declaration and other jurisdictional topics. According to Amplify, the Moving Defendants did not fully cooperate. See Capetanissa Opp. at 23.

II. The Parties

Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Amplify Energy Corp. is organized under the laws of Delaware and headquartered in Houston, Texas. FAC ¶ 1. Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Amplify Energy Corp. is organized under the laws of Delaware and headquartered in Houston, Texas. Id. ¶ 2. Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff San Pedro Bay Pipeline Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of Amplify Energy organized under the laws of California and headquartered in Long Beach, California. Id. ¶ 3.

Capetanissa is a Liberian corporation with its principal office in Liberia, and whose director and officer resides in Greece. Cape. Mot. at 6. Costamare Shipping is a Panamanian corporation with headquarters in Greece, whose registered agent for service of process is in Panama. Cost. Mot. at 7. V.Ships is a Bermuda corporation with its principal place of business in Greece, and whose agent for service of process is in the United Kingdom. V.Ships Mot. at 6. The Moving Defendants contend they have no bank accounts, employees, or agents in any U.S. State, including California. Cape. Mot. at 6; V.Ships Mot. at 6; Cost. Mot. at 7.

III. Legal Standard

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a defendant may seek dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). “Where a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff's allegations of jurisdictional facts must be supported by competent proof, Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96–97, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010), and courts may consider evidence presented in affidavits and declarations. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). In the absence of an evidentiary hearing or formal discovery, however, “this demonstration requires that the plaintiff ‘make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.’ ” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 922). Thus, a plaintiff “need only demonstrate facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the defendant.” Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). All uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are taken as true and all disputed facts are resolved in plaintiff's favor. Id.; Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800.

A court may exercise either “general” or “specific” personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Easter v. Am. W. Fin., 381 F.3d 948, 960 (9th Cir. 2004). General jurisdiction exists when a defendant's contacts with the forum are so “continuous and systematic” that personal jurisdiction is proper in any action. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Absent general jurisdiction, a court may also exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant, which is “based on the relationship between the defendant's forum contacts and the plaintiff's claim.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006). “The general rule is that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper if it is permitted by a longarm statute and if the exercise of that jurisdiction does not violate federal due process.” Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1154–55 (citing Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Bank of Coops., 103 F.3d 888, 893 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Specific personal jurisdiction “focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int'l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation and citation omitted). “[T]he defendant's suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

B. California Personal Jurisdiction

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A), federal district courts have personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant that would be “subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); see Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1129. California's longarm statute provides that “[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10. Thus, the court's jurisdictional analysis under California law and federal due process is the same. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1205.

C. Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), on the other hand, “is not limited to the contours of a state longarm statute,” Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 461 (9th Cir. 2007), and provides a mechanism to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant if “the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). Under Rule (4)(k)(2), a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if (1) the claim arises under federal law, (2) the defendant is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of any state court of general jurisdiction, and (3) exercising jurisdiction comports with due process. See Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1159.¹

D. Due Process

The exercise of personal jurisdiction, whether under Rule 4(k)(1) or Rule 4(k)(2), must comport with due process. The due process analysis under Rule 4(k)(2) is “nearly identical” to the analysis under Rule 4(k)(1) “with one significant difference: rather than considering contacts between the defendant and the forum state, we consider contacts with the nation as a whole.” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1072 (emphasis added). A non-resident defendant must have “ ‘certain minimum contacts’ with the forum ‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)).

In the Ninth Circuit, a three-part test determines whether personal jurisdiction satisfies due process: (1) the non-resident defendant must purposefully direct its activities at the forum, or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one that arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Id. at 1205–06 (citing Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802).

1. Purposeful Availment or Direction

As the parties point out, there is some inconsistency in Ninth Circuit jurisprudence regarding whether the “purposeful direction” or “purposeful availment” analysis applies here. Compare Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (stating purposeful availment analysis is most often used in contract cases and purposeful direction analysis in suits sounding in tort) with Holland Am. Line, 485 F.3d at 460 (“[It] is well established that the Calder [purposeful direction] test applies only to intentional torts”.)

To satisfy the purposeful availment test under the first prong, a court evaluates whether the defendant “performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business within the forum state.” Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990). To determine whether a defendant “purposefully directed” its activities at the forum, the Ninth Circuit asks whether the defendant: “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803 (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984).

The Ninth Circuit has explained that the two tests are similar. “At bottom” both tests “ask whether defendants have voluntarily derived some benefit from their interstate activities such that they ‘will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.’ ” Glob. Commodities Trad. Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, S.A., 972 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2020).

2. Forum-Related Activities

The second requirement for specific, personal jurisdiction is that the claim asserted in the litigation arises out of the defendant's forum related activities. Ziegler v. Indian River Cnty., 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995); Terracom v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1995). This litigation, according to Amplify, arises out of Moving Defendants’ contacts with California and the United States because the anchor-dragging incidents were a result of their use of California ports and the navigable waters of the United States. FAC ¶ 82.

3. Reasonableness

“If the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476–78, 105 S.Ct. 2174); see also CYBERSitting, LLC v. The People's Republic of China, 805 F. Supp. 2d 958, 973 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Courts consider seven factors when deciding whether the exercise of jurisdiction is “reasonable”: “(1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the existence of an alternative forum, (3) convenient and effective relief for the plaintiffs, (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the suit, (5) efficient resolution of the controversy, (6) purposeful interjection, and (7) conflicts with sovereignty.” Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1987).

IV. Discussion

The Court concludes that Moving Defendants have established sufficient contacts with California and the United States for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction; that Amplify's claims arise out of those contacts; and that Moving Defendants have not met their burden of showing that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is unreasonable. The Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Moving Defendants here is thus proper.

A. Moving Defendants Purposefully Directed Their Activities at, and Purposefully Availed Themselves of the Privileges of Conducting Activities in, California and the United States

Amplify's Amended Complaint alleges that, as owner of the Beijing, Capetanissa is responsible for, among other operations, employing the crew and sailing the vessel and is kept apprised of the Beijing's movements through Costamare Shipping and V.Ships. FAC ¶¶ 50, 51; see also Webster Dep. Tr. 192:9-21. The crew, moreover, sails the Beijing to \ports “to deliver and/or receive cargo through that port in accordance with the ongoing business relationship between Capetanissa and its third-party charterer.” Cape. Opp. at 19 (citing the Charter Party, at CAPE000063). Amplify further alleges that Capetanissa had control over or awareness of the Beijing's operations and travels—including its chosen ports of call—and derived commercial and financial benefits from those operations. FAC ¶ 69.

In its challenge to personal jurisdiction, Capetanissa asserts that it “cannot control where the [Beijing] Vessel trades”—a duty that “is exclusively left to charterers.” Cape. Mot. 3. While Capetanissa admits that “this is relevant to Capetanissa's knowledge that the Vessel might call at the United States,” id., it argues that “such a passive act” cannot support the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the company unless “Capetanissa itself created the relevant contact” with the forum. Id. Capetanissa further argues, without disputing, that its hiring of the “January 2021 crew alone would not subject them to this Court's personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 4. Compare Cost. Mot. at 15–16 (“Costamare Shipping did not employ the crew.”); V.Ships Mot. at 3 (“V.Ships did not employ the crew as a matter of fact.”).

The Court disagrees. Capetanissa's conduct is far from “passive.” To begin, the charter party Capetanissa negotiated and entered for the Beijing provides that Capetanissa shall remain responsible “for the navigation of the vessel, acts of pilots and tug boats, insurance, crew, and all other similar matters ․” Charter Party, at CAPE000071. Even more, the agreement contains countless references to the United States or compliance with United States’ laws, discussing—in distinct clauses—the U.S. Tax Reform Act, the Oil Pollution Act, the U.S. Anti-Drug Abuse Act, requirements of the U.S. Coast Guard, cooperation with U.S. Customs, and registration with the U.S. Department of Transportation. Id. at CAPE 000093–95. And since Capetanissa does not dispute its hiring of the crew that sailed to California at the relevant time, the Court takes it as true for purposes of personal jurisdiction. See Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1122.

Capetanissa's express steps of negotiating and entering the charter agreements that invoke U.S. laws, hiring the crew that sailed to the United States and California, and remaining contractually responsible for the Beijing's operations regardless of its location are precisely “the type of affirmative conduct which allow[ ] or promote[ ] the transaction of business” in California and the United States rendering its contacts with the forum beyond random or fortuitous. See Sher, 911 F.2d at 1362.

The same is true for V.Ships and Costamare, both of whom similarly dislodge responsibility by unduly focusing on whether they “control” where the charterers choose to send the Beijing and whether they specifically outfitted the Beijing to call at California ports. They assert, for example, that the Beijing “has not been modified to enable it to call specifically at Los Angeles – Long Beach,” that “the applicable charter party agreement does not expressly state that the Beijing is suited to call Los Angeles – Long Beach,” that only “1.24% [of port calls] were to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach,” and that the “mere knowledge of where the charterers decide to send the vessel to conduct commercial operations is insufficient to demonstrate ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum.” See Cost. Opp. at 12; V.Ships Opp. at 11. Costamare Shipping further asserts that notwithstanding its “execution of [ ] management services” for the Beijing, such as “commercial contract negotiations [ ] including ․ charter party agreements,” it has no “authority to control where the Vessel trades.” Cost. Mot. at 3. V.Ships also contends that it “did not book the cargo shipped aboard the BEIJING to Los Angeles–Long Beach in January 2021” and “did not direct the BEIJING to Los Angeles – Long Beach in January 2021.” V.Ships Mot. at 15.

Be that as it may, when V.Ships took over technical management of the Beijing in 2019, it entered a contract with Capetanissa in which it agreed to “issu[e] to the Crew ․ appropriate voyage instructions and monitor[ ] voyage performance,” “carry[ ] out the necessary communications with the shippers, charterers and others involved with the receiving and handling of the Vessel at the relevant loading and discharging ports”—including, as relevant here, the California ports—and “arrang[e] for port entrance and clearance.” V.Ships Contract, at CAPE000040.

Costamare Shipping's “commercial management” responsibilities, based on its contract with Capetanissa, similarly include “issuing to the Crew ․ appropriate voyage instructions and monitoring voyage performance,” “carrying out the necessary communications with the shippers, charterers and others involved with the receiving and handling of the Vessel at the relevant loading and discharging ports,” and “negotiating the employment of the charterer.” See Costamare Shipping Contract, at CAPE 000032. Its contract reveals, moreover, that Costamare Shipping is the agent of the owner, Capetanissa. See e.g., id. at CAPE 000031 (identifying Costamare Shipping as the “Managers” and providing that “the Managers shall carry out Management Services in respect of the Vessel as agents for and on behalf of the Owners.”); id. at CAPE 000032 (“[T]he Managers undertake ․ to provide the agreed Management Services as agents for and on behalf of the Owners ․”).

Moreover, Costamare Shipping does not dispute that its fleet, which includes the Beijing, has traveled to California ports more than 60 times—and the United States more than 200 times—since 2018 alone. There can be no question that Costamare Shipping derived some benefit from their forum activities and that their connection with both California and the United States are not “solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts” and such that they “ ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’ ” Terracom 49 F.3d at 560 (quoting World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 580, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)).

Moving Defendants’ active role in managing the Beijing and its operations throughout its port calls to California and the United States establishes the “minimum contacts” for personal jurisdiction purposes.

B. Amplify's claims Arise from the Moving Defendants’ Contacts with California and the United States

As to the second prong, the conduct gave rise to the instant cause of action—the pipeline strike—took place about fifteen miles off the coast of California and in navigable U.S. waters during one of Beijing's trips, of which Moving Defendants—as described above—were, to varying degrees, responsible. See Terracom, 49 F.3d at 561.

C. Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Over the Moving Defendants is Reasonable

Because Amplify satisfies the first two prongs of specific jurisdiction, the burden shifts to Moving Defendants to “present a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable” under the third prong. CYBERSitting, LLC v. People's Republic of China, 805 F. Supp. 2d 958, 973 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Moving Defendants have not done so here. In assessing the seven factors of reasonableness, see Lake, 817 F.2d at 1422, the Court finds that they are either neutral or weigh in Amplify's favor.

1. Burden on Moving Defendants

The Court is sensitive to the considerable burden placed on a defendant forced to litigate in a foreign country under foreign law. However, “modern advances in communications and transportation have significantly reduced the burden of litigating in a foreign country.” Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988). “Moreover, this factor is less salient when the defendant ․ has traveled to the forum on business related to the instant action.” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Additionally, for this factor to weigh against reasonableness, the litigation must be “so gravely difficult and inconvenient” for defendants that they would be placed at a “severe disadvantage in comparison to [their] opponent.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478, 105 S.Ct. 2174.

Moving Defendants fail to show they would suffer a hardship should it be forced to litigate in California. Indeed, where Capetanissa has “voluntarily filed” a separate limitation of liability action before this same Court, it has “implicitly held itself out as being capable of litigating in California,” Mattel Inc. v. Greiner and Hausser GmbH, 354 F.3d 857, 867 (9th Cir. 2003).

2. Existence of an alternative forum

There is no evidence that an alternative forum would elect to hear this case when several related cases are filed and consolidated before this Court. See Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 476; Fed. Prac. & Proc. (Wright & Miller) § 3854. The interests of judicial economy are likely to demand transfer back to the Central District of California.

3. Convenience for Plaintiffs

Amplify's wholly owned subsidiary, San Pedro Bay Pipeline Co., is a resident of the state of California, and it, along with the other Amplify Defendants, are litigating several other cases related to the same conduct and incident before this same Court, rendering this the most convenient forum for the Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiffs. There is a strong presumption in favor of a domestic plaintiff's choice of forum, which can be overcome only when the private and public interest factors clearly point towards trial in the alternative forum. Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2000)

4. California's interest in adjudicating the suit

California has a clear interest in determining the safety of its ports and waterways. See Cree, Inc. v. Fastbuy, Inc., 2018 WL 4850404 at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2018) (finding California has a “strong interest” in addressing “misuse” of its ports). California also “maintains a strong interest in providing an effective means of redress for its residents [who are] tortiously injured.” Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1200. Here, at least one Amplify Third Party Plaintiff/Defendant is a California corporation whose principal place of business is in California.

5. Efficient resolution of the controversy

In making this determination, courts focus on the location of the evidence and witnesses. Caruth v. International Psychoanalytical Ass'n, 59 F.3d 126, 129 (9th Cir. 1995). There is no dispute that this Court is the nearest district to the location of the injury, making it the most “efficient forum for resolution of a claim.” See Tuazon v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006).

6. Purposeful interjection

Although the Court has already determined that Moving Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in California and the United States, and directed their activities here, the degree of interjection is nonetheless a factor in assessing the overall reasonableness of jurisdiction under this prong. See Ins. Co. of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 1981).

As detailed previously, Moving Defendants’ contacts with California and the United States are extensive. They “purposefully interjected” themselves into the forum by managing and operating a vessel that made frequent port calls to California and the United States; negotiating agreements under which the Beijing sailed to California and the United States; and facilitating port call deliveries for and operations of the Beijing in this forum.

7. Conflicts with foreign sovereignty

This factor concerns the extent to which the district court's exercise of jurisdiction in California would conflict with the sovereignty of Moving Defendants’ home countries. Core–Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993). “Litigation against an alien defendant creates a higher jurisdictional barrier than litigation against a citizen from a sister state because important sovereignty concerns exist.” Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199. “Although this factor is important, it is not controlling.” Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1133 (citing Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984) (“If [this factor were] given controlling weight, it would always prevent suit against a foreign national in a United States court.”)).

Moving Defendants have not presented any evidence that their home countries of Liberia, Panama, or the United Kingdom would have an interest in adjudicating this suit. The disputed conduct took place in the United States and affected California.

Thus, on balance, the Court concludes that Moving Defendants have not met their burden of presenting a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial justice.

V. DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Moving Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Dkts. 305, 306, 307).

FOOTNOTES

1.   Rule 4(k)(2) was enacted to fill a crucial gap in the courts’ jurisdiction: a defendant may have sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole to satisfy due process, but her insufficient contacts with any single state would still shield her from service by a federal court sitting in that state. Useful as Rule 4(k)(2) may be, however, courts—particularly in this circuit—cautiously employ it to invoke jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit observed as much over a decade ago: “Indeed, in the fourteen years since Rule 4(k)(2) was enacted, none of our cases has countenanced jurisdiction under the rule.” Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 462 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Fumoto Giken Co. v. Mistuoka, No. CV149797DMGMRWX, 2015 WL 12766167, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2015) (noting “the Ninth Circuit's cautious application of Rule 4(k)(2)”).

DAVID O. CARTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE