IN RE: Lawrence Souza (2026)

Chapter 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON U.S. BANK'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY

Before the Court is Debtor's Motion For Summary Judgment on U.S. Bank's Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay ¹ (“Motion for Summary Judgment”).

Selene Finance LP, as servicer for U.S. Bank (“U.S. Bank”), seeks relief from the automatic stay and the co-debtor stay under §§ 362 and 1301 of the Bankruptcy Code ² to obtain of the property located at 3489 Toleo Street, Port Charlotte, Florida 33948 (the “Toleo Street Property”).³ U.S. Bank maintains that it owns the Toleo Street Property.⁴ The Debtor, Lawrence Souza, Jr. (“Debtor”), responds that, although U.S. Bank foreclosed his nonfiling spouse's interest, the foreclosure did not extinguish this marital interest in the property.⁵

Through the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Debtor seeks an order denying U.S. Bank's Motion for Relief from Stay.⁶ The Debtor contends that the undisputed facts establish that the Toleo Street Property is his permanent residence and is protected by Florida's constitutional homestead exemption. And, as a result, the Debtor's interest in the property became part of the bankruptcy estate.⁷ U.S. Bank opposes summary judgment, principally contending that the motion is premature.⁸ U.S. Bank argues that the Debtor must first establish his spouse's homestead interest in the Toleo Street Property, then show that he holds a derivative interest through her.⁹

U.S. Bank's argument, however, raises no genuine dispute of material fact on the dispositive issue: whether the Debtor resided at the Toleo Street Property when the lis pendens was recorded in the state court foreclosure action. U.S. Bank has offered no evidence disputing that the Debtor resided at the property on that date.¹⁰ Indeed, U.S. Bank does not directly contest that fact.

Thus, the Court concludes that no genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding the Debtor's residence at the Toleo Street Property when the lis pendens was recorded. The Debtor is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court will grant the Debtor's Motion for Summary Judgment and deny U.S. Bank's Motion for Relief from Stay.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary Judgment is proper, “only if the movant establishes that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”¹¹ For a movant to prove there is no genuine dispute as to material facts, courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant.¹² After “a movant shows that no genuine dispute of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment.”¹³ It is not enough to suggest there may be factual issues in dispute.¹⁴ The non-movant “must go beyond the pleadings and present competent evidence of specific facts to show that a genuine issue exists.”¹⁵

II. Undisputed Facts

The following facts are undisputed.

The Debtor's non-filing spouse, Cheryl Y. Skeete (“Ms. Skeete”) is the record title owner of the Toleo Street Property.¹⁶ Ms. Skeete acquired the Toleo Street Property on September 7, 2004.¹⁷ Subsequently, on September 30, 2004, Ms. Skeete mortgaged the Toleo Street Property to U.S. Bank.¹⁸

The Debtor has resided at the Toleo Street Property since he and Ms. Skeete were married on August 17, 2022.¹⁹ Neither the Debtor nor Ms. Skeete have “ever maintained another residence” since they wed.²⁰ And, “[a]s of March 27, 2024, the date the lis pendens was recorded in the foreclosure action involving the Home, the Home was [the Debtor and Ms. Skeete's] primary and only residence.”²¹

But Ms. Skeete never conveyed a legal interest in the Toleo Street Property to the Debtor and remains its sole record titleholder.²² Even so, the Toleo Street Property is the Debtor's only home: he owns no other property, sleeps there every night, lists it on his Florida identification card, receives mail there, and registers his vehicles there.²³

Ms. Skeete defaulted on her mortgage to U.S. Bank by missing the payment due February 1, 2023, and every payment thereafter.²⁴ As a result, U.S. Bank commenced an action (the “Foreclosure Case”) in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Charlotte County, Florida (“State Court”) seeking to foreclose its mortgage on the Toleo Street Property.²⁵ U.S. Bank named as defendants in the Foreclosure Case both Ms. Skeete and “The Unknown Spouse of Cheryl Y. Skeete AKA Cheryl Skeete,” among others.²⁶

The State Court entered a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of U.S. Bank and against Ms. Skeete on July 10, 2025.²⁷ The judgment directed the clerk of court to sell the Toleo Street Property at public auction.²⁸ The clerk then sold the property to U.S. Bank at public auction on October 31, 2025.²⁹ U.S. Bank was the successful bidder.³⁰

U.S. Bank, however, voluntarily dismissed its claims against the Debtor.³¹ And the Debtor continues to reside at the Toleo Street Property.³²

On February 15, 2026, the Debtor commenced this case by filing a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 13.³³ The Debtor's proposed chapter 13 plan treats U.S. Bank's claim by proposing to cure the prepetition arrearage through plan payments.³⁴

III. Analysis

A. The Florida Homestead Exemption

Florida's Constitution safeguards the homestead to “promote the stability and welfare of the state by securing to the householder a home.”³⁵ The Florida Constitution protects homesteads in three respects: (1) an ad valorem tax exemption; (2) protection against forced sale; and (3) restrictions on the owner's alienation and devise of homestead property.³⁶ These protections arise under separate constitutional provisions and serve different purposes.³⁷ Principles governing one form of homestead protection therefore do not necessarily apply to another.³⁸

The Florida Constitution provides a tax exemption for qualifying homestead property under article VII, section 6.³⁹ Article X, section 4(a) generally exempts homestead property from forced sale, subject only to the constitutionally enumerated exceptions.⁴⁰ Article X, section 4(c), in turn, limits the alienation and devise of homestead property when the owner is married or is survived by a spouse or minor child.⁴¹

Florida courts construe the homestead provisions liberally in favor of the family home.⁴² And “organic and statutory provisions relating to homestead exemptions [are] liberally construed in the interest of the family home.”⁴³ That rule of construction is especially important here. Article X, section 4(c)’s protection against alienation extends to a spouse even when the spouse lacks legal title to the homestead.⁴⁴ For Florida homestead purposes, a protected interest need not appear in the public land records; it may include a one-half interest, a possessory right, or another beneficial interest in the property.⁴⁵

Article X, section 4(c) gives a non-titled spouse a substantial, present interest in the marital homestead. It provides, in pertinent part:

(c) The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by spouse or minor child ․ The owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift and, if married, may by deed transfer the title to an estate by the entirety with the spouse joinder before alienating the homestead.46

A married owner cannot mortgage, sell, or convey homestead property to a third party without the other spouse's joinder.⁴⁷ And Florida courts consistently enforce that prohibition even when only the signing spouse holds record title.⁴⁸

This constitutional protection survives the marriage. Article X, section 4(c) restricts devise when the owner is survived by a spouse or minor child ⁴⁹ and Florida law continues to protect a surviving spouse's homestead rights even if that spouse never held record title.⁵⁰ The inquiry, then, does not turn solely on legal title; it also accounts for interests arising from the property's status as the family home.

Florida courts construe homestead protections liberally in favor of preserving the family home.⁵¹ Once homestead status attaches, it generally continues unless the property is abandoned or lawfully alienated.⁵² A temporary absence, without more, does not establish abandonment.⁵³ Nor may a homestead protection be waived except through abandonment or an alienation accomplished in the manner Florida law requires.

Thus, a non-titled spouse who permanently resides in homestead property owned by the other spouse holds a present, constitutionally protected interest in that property. That interest includes the right to withhold joinder from a proposed mortgage, sale, or gift, irrespective of record title.

B. The Toleo Street Property is the Debtor's Homestead

No genuine dispute of material fact exists that the Toleo Street Property is the Debtor's and Ms. Skeete's homestead. “Three requirements must be satisfied for real property to be impressed with the characteristics of homestead property under article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution: (1) the property must be owned by a “natural person”; (2) the owner must have made, or intend to make the real property his or her permanent residence or that of his family; and (3) the property must meet the size and contiguity requirements of article X, section 4(a)(1) of the Florida Constitution.”⁵⁴

Here, the undisputed record establishes that the Toleo Street Property homestead of both the Debtor and Ms. Skeete.⁵⁵ The Debtor and Ms. Skeete have continuously resided at the Toleo Street Property since August 17, 2022.⁵⁶ The record confirms that it is their permanent residence.⁵⁷ The Debtor has therefore established that the property was their homestead when the lis pendens was recorded on March 27, 2024.

U.S. Bank offers no evidence rebutting the Debtor's showing that the Toleo Street Property was the Debtor's and Ms. Skeete's homestead when the lis pendens was recorded on March 27, 2024.⁵⁸ Nor do the Note, Mortgage, and Second Home Rider—executed nearly two decades earlier, on September 30, 2004—create a factual dispute merely because they list Ms. Skeete's then-address as 133 Bailey Avenue, Hillside, New Jersey 07205.

Similarly, the Foreclosure Case returns of service do not contradict the Debtor's and Ms. Skeete's evidence that they lived at the Toleo Street Property on March 27, 2024; the returns say nothing about either person's residence on that date.⁵⁹ At most, the return directed to the “Unknown Spouse of Cheryl Y. Skeete” raises a question about Ms. Skeete's marital status on May 15, 2024.⁶⁰ But the Debtor resolves that question with the parties’ marriage record, which confirms that he and Ms. Skeete were married.⁶¹

Likewise, the tax bills do not contradict the Debtor's and Ms. Skeete's evidence that they resided at the Toleo Street Property on March 27, 2024. Although Ms. Skeete did not claim a property-tax exemption for the property from 2022 through 2025, the homestead definition for tax-exemption purposes differs from the definition in article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.⁶²

Rather than identify evidence creating a genuine dispute over residency, U.S. Bank faults the Debtor for not producing what it considers “typical” proof of domicile—such as utility or cell-phone bills, or a voter-registration card, in the Debtor's name.⁶³ But U.S. Bank does not dispute the Debtor's verified evidence that he lived at the Toleo Street Property, received prescription medication there, and listed the property as his address on his Florida identification.⁶⁴

Although U.S. Bank invokes “multiple issues of genuine dispute as to material fact,” it identifies no evidence that creates one.  ⁶⁵ Its argument merely questions whether Ms. Skeete resided at the Toleo Street Property ⁶⁶ —a challenge that falls short under Rule 56 and, in any event, misses the point. Rule 56 requires a non-moving party to do more than cast doubt in objecting to summary judgment.⁶⁷ And Article X, section 4(a)(1) requires only that the homestead be “the residence of the owner or the owner's family”;⁶⁸ a non-titled spouse's protected possessory interest does not depend on the titled owner's residence.⁶⁹ Because the Debtor's evidence establishes that the Toleo Street Property was his homestead, and U.S. Bank has not properly rebutted that showing,⁷⁰ no genuine dispute exists that the property was the Debtor's and Ms. Skeete's homestead when the lis pendens was recorded on March 27, 2024

C. The Joinder Right is a Property Interest Under § 541

The Debtor's homestead interest in the Toleo Street Property—arising from Florida's constitutional restrictions on alienation and devise—became property of the estate when this case commenced. Section 541(a)(1) broadly defines property of the estate to include “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,”⁷¹ including possessory interests and equitable rights of redemption.⁷²

Florida's spousal-joinder requirement falls comfortably within § 541(a)(1)’s broad definition of estate property.⁷³ It gives the Debtor a present, legally cognizable interest in the homestead—not a merely future or contingent right.⁷⁴ The right of joinder is more than a personal veto over a proposed transfer; it is a constitutionally protected interest in the property itself, because the titled spouse cannot mortgage, sell, or give the homestead without the non-titled spouse's consent.⁷⁵

Because a non-titled spouse's right of joinder is a present legal or equitable interest under § 541(a)(1), the Debtor's homestead interest in the Toleo Street Property became property of the estate when this case commenced—even though he lacks record title.⁷⁶ That interest arises from the Debtor's own constitutionally protected status as a non-titled spouse residing in the marital homestead; it neither depends on record ownership nor on Ms. Skeete separately claiming or maintaining a homestead exemption.⁷⁷

Florida law therefore affords the Debtor a present, legally cognizable interest in the property—equitable, possessory, or both—because it is his permanent residence and homestead.⁷⁸ That interest likewise exists independently of whether Ms. Skeete also permanently resides there.⁷⁹

D. U.S. Bank Holds a Secured Claim Against the Toleo Street Property

Because the Debtor's interest in the Toleo Street Property is estate property, U.S. Bank's mortgage is a “claim” that may be addressed through his Chapter 13 plan. Section 101(5) defines a “claim” expansively as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”⁸⁰ The Code likewise recognizes that a claim may be enforceable against the debtor, the debtor's property, or both.⁸¹ Section 502(b)(1) directs disallowance only to the extent a claim is unenforceable “against the debtor and property of the debtor,”⁸² while § 102(2) confirms that a “claim against the debtor” includes a claim against the debtor's property.”⁸³ Because U.S. Bank holds enforceable in rem rights against the Toleo Street Property, it holds a claim that may be administered through the estate and treated under the Debtor's chapter 13 plan.⁸⁴

This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v. Home State Bank,⁸⁵ There, the Court held that a mortgage lien surviving the discharge of the debtor's personal obligation remains a claim because the lienholder retains a right to payment from the proceeds of a sale of the debtor's property.⁸⁶ The practical import of the Johnson decision is that a debtor who never had personal liability on a mortgage note — such as the Debtor, here — is in an analogous position: the U.S. Bank's in rem interest in the Toleo Street Property constitutes a “claim against the debtor's property” under § 102(2).

E. The Debtor's Ability to “Cure and Maintain” under § 1322(b)(5)

Because the Debtor's interest in the Toleo Street Property is estate property and U.S. Bank holds a claim that may be treated in this Chapter 13 case, the Court concludes that the plan adequately protects U.S. Bank's interest.⁸⁷ Section 1322(b)(5) permits a Chapter 13 plan, notwithstanding § 1322(b)(2)’s anti-modification provision, to cure a default within a reasonable time and maintain payments on a long-term secured or unsecured claim while the case is pending. The provision is central to chapter 13: it allows debtors to halt foreclosure and bring a delinquent mortgage current over a reasonable period.⁸⁸

Nothing in § 1322(b)(5) requires the debtor to be personally liable for the underlying debt.⁸⁹ By its terms, the provision applies to “any unsecured claim or secured claim,” without conditioning relief on borrower status, contractual privity, or personal liability.⁹⁰ A debtor who did not sign the note may therefore provide for a mortgage in a Chapter 13 plan when the mortgagee holds a claim against the debtor's property.⁹¹

Other bankruptcy courts have reached the same conclusion: a chapter 13 debtor may cure a default and maintain mortgage payments under § 1322(b)(5) without personal liability on the debt, so long as the mortgagee holds a lien on property in which the debtor has an interest. In In re Curinton,⁹² Judge Jennemann held that contractual privity is not a prerequisite to treating a creditor's claim in a Chapter 13 plan.⁹³ The mortgagee's lien against the debtor's property supplied the requisite claim, allowing the debtor to provide for the mortgage despite never signing the note.⁹⁴ As the court emphasized, a broad reading of “claim” prevents lenders from using bankruptcy law to thwart a debtor's good-faith effort to reorganize.⁹⁵

Similarly, in In re McNeal,⁹⁶ Judge Glenn held that a debtor with an ownership interest in mortgaged property could cure prepetition arrearages and maintain ongoing payments through a Chapter 13 plan—even though the debtor never signed the note or mortgage.⁹⁷ “Since the Debtor has an ownership interest in the Property that is subject to Deutsche Bank's lien, he may deal with the lien in his bankruptcy case, even though he is not personally obligated for the underlying debt.”⁹⁸ Relying on Johnson and its earlier decision in In re Lozada,⁹⁹ the court recognized that a creditor's enforceable in rem rights against estate property constitute a claim that the debtor may address through a chapter 13 plan..¹⁰⁰

Courts across the country have reached the same conclusion. In In re Rutledge,¹⁰¹ the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York held that a chapter 13 debtor who owned mortgaged real property could cure a prepetition default – even without contractual privity with the mortgagee or personal liability on the note.¹⁰² The real property was property of the estate under § 541(a), thus, the mortgagee held a claim against the debtor under §§ 102(2) and 502(b)(1).¹⁰³ Likewise, in In re Flores,¹⁰⁴ the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that a debtor who co-owned property with her nondebtor spouse – but signed neither the note or mortgage – could treat the mortgagee's in rem claim in her chapter 13 plan.¹⁰⁵ As the court concluded, this treatment did not impermissibly modify the creditor's rights because the plan preserved the lien and otherwise afforded the treatment chapter 13 permits.¹⁰⁶

Accordingly, consistent with Curinton, McNeal, Rutledge, and Flores, U.S. Bank holds a secured claim against estate property. The Debtor may treat U.S. Bank's claim under § 1322(b)(5) by curing the prepetition arrearage within a reasonable time and maintaining the postpetition payments required under the loan documents. This proposed treatment preserves U.S. Bank's lien rights and adequately protects its interest in the Toleo Street Property.

IV. Conclusion

In sum, no genuine dispute of material fact exists. On the date the lis pendens was recorded, the Toleo Street Property was the homestead of the Debtor and Ms. Skeete. And the Debtor's interest in that property—whether arising from Florida's constitutional restrictions on devise or its joinder requirement—became property of the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of the case. U.S. Bank therefore holds a secured claim against estate property, and the Debtor's plan treatment—curing the prepetition arrearage while maintaining regular postpetition payments—adequately protects that claim. Accordingly, the Debtor is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Motion for Relief from Stay.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. The Debtor's Motion For Summary Judgment on U.S. Bank's Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay (Doc. No. 30) is GRANTED.

2. U.S. Bank's Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay and Co-Debtor Stay (Doc. No. 17) is DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Doc. No. 30.

2.   11 U.S.C. §§ 101 – 1532 (the “Bankruptcy Code” or the “Code”). Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Bankruptcy Code.

3.   See generally Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay and Co-Debtor Stay, at 2-3 (Doc. No. 17) (“Motion for Relief from Stay”).

4.   Id. at 2 (“Secured Creditor is the current owner of the Property”).

5.   See Response in Opposition to Motion for Relief from Stay re: 3489 Toleo St., Port Charlotte, Florida 33948-7456 (Doc. No. 18).

6.   The Court conducted preliminary hearings on U.S. Bank's Motion for Relief from Stay on April 7, 2026, and April 21, 2026. See Doc. Nos. 23 & 26 (hearing proceeding memos). Following those hearings, the Court set the matter for trial. Doc. No.28. The trial was cancelled after the Debtor filed the Motion for Summary Judgment. Notice of Cancelled Trial (Doc. No. 36).

7.   Doc. No. 30, at 10.

8.   Response to Debtor's Motion for Summary Judgment on U.S. Bank's Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay, at 2 (Doc. No. 34).

9.   Id.

10.   Doc. No. 35, at 2 (“At the end of the day, the U.S. Bank never actually disputes the one fact that matters: where the Debtor lived on March 27, 2024”).

11.   N. Shore Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co., 68 F.4th 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2023).

12.   Davis v. Legal Servs. Alabama, Inc., 19 F.4th 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2021) (“courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant”).

13.   Id.

14.   See Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 931–32 (7th Cir. 1995)) (“unsupported speculation ․ does not meet a party's burden of producing some defense to a summary judgment motion”).

15.   Id.

16.   See Doc. No. 30, at 2 (noting title to the Toleo Street Property “was solely in the Debtor's spouse's name”). See also (Doc. No. 34-3) (2022 - 2024 real property tax bills solely in the name of Ms. Skeete).

17.   See Warranty Deed, recorded Sept. 27, 2004, in Official Records Book 2551, Page 2192, Official Records of Charlotte County, Fla. (dated Sept. 7, 2004). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court takes judicial notice of the Warranty Deed. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (permitting a court to “judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it ․ can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”). A court may take judicial notice on its own or upon a party's request. Fed. R. Evid. 201(c).

18.   Doc. No. 34, at 1.

19.   See Declaration of Lawrence Souza, Jr., at ¶ 4 (Doc. No. 30-1) (noting the Toleo Street Property “has been [Debtor's] permanent residence and homestead continuously since [his] marriage to [Ms. Skeete] on or about August 17, 2022”); Declaration of Cheryl Skeete, at ¶ 5 (Doc. No. 30-2) (same).

20.   Doc. No. 30-1 ¶ 9; Doc. No. 30-12 ¶ 8.

21.   Doc. No. 30-1 ¶ 8; Doc. No. 30-12 ¶ 7.

22.   See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

23.   Doc. No. 30-1 ¶¶ 10-15.

24.   See Doc. No. 34 at 2. See also Complaint, U.S. Bank Tr. Nat'l Assn v. Skeete, Case No. 24000767CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Filed Mar. 26, 2024). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court takes judicial notice of the docket in the state court foreclosure case.

25.   Complaint, U.S. Bank Tr. Nat'l Assn v. Skeete, Case No. 24000767CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Filed Mar. 26, 2024). See also Doc. No. 17, at 2 (“Secured Creditor filed a foreclosure complaint on March 26, 2024, in the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Charlotte County, Case Number: 24000767CA”).

26.   Id.

27.   Final Judgment, U.S. Bank Tr. Nat'l Assn v. Skeete, Case No. 24000767CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Filed July 10, 2025).

28.   Id.

29.   Certificate of Sale, U.S. Bank Tr. Nat'l Assn v. Skeete, Case No. 24000767CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Filed Oct. 31, 2025).

30.   Certificate of Title, U.S. Bank Tr. Nat'l Assn v. Skeete, Case No. 24000767CA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Filed Nov. 13, 2025).

31.   Doc. 18 at 1; Doc. 17 at 11 (“Exhibit A”). Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.250(b), the dismissal of a party against whom a notice of lis pendens has been recorded cancels the lis pendens automatically upon recording of the notice of dismissal. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.250(b). Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.250(b).

32.   Doc. 17 at 2-3.

33.   Doc. 1.

34.   Doc. 2.

35.   Pub. Health Tr. of Dade Cnty. v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 948 (Fla. 1988) (citing Bigelow v. Dunphe, 143 Fla. 603, 197 So. 328 (1940)).

36.   See Baldwin v. Henriquez, 279 So. 3d 328, 332 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (Badalamenti, J) (citing Chames v. DeMayo, 972 So. 2d 850, 853 (Fla. 2007)) (“The Florida Constitution defines and protects homestead in three different ways.”).

37.   See Baldwin, 279 So. 3d at 332 n 3 (noting these provisions are “separate and distinct, the principles relating to one do not necessarily govern the other” (cleaned up)) (quoting Crain v. Putnam, 687 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)).

38.   Id.

39.   See Fla. Const. art. VII, § 6 (affording a $25,000 homestead exemption for all levies and an additional $50,000 exemption for all levies other than school district levies).

40.   See Fla. Const. art. X, § 4(a) (exempting a homestead from forced sale except for specific enumerated obligations). See also Osborne v. Dumoulin, 55 So. 3d 577, 582 (Fla. 2011) (noting homestead exemption “protects the homestead against every type of claim and judgment except those specifically mentioned in the constitutional provision itself.”

41.   See Fla. Const. art. X, § 4(c) (restricting the devise of a homestead interest so long as the claimant is “survived by spouse or minor child”).

42.   Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018, 1020 (Fla. 2001) (“the homestead exemption is to be liberally construed in the interest of protecting the family home”).

43.   Id., quoting Milton v. Milton, 63 Fla. 533, 58 So. 718, 719 (1912)

44.   See L. v. L., 163 So. 3d 553, 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“it is [ ] beyond dispute that [a spouse], although not a title holder, also had a protected interest in the marital home under Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution”).

45.   Bessemer Props. v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 27 So. 2d 832, 833 (1946), quoted in Law, 163 So. 3d at 557 n.3. See also Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819, 75 So. 30, 34 (1917) (Browne, J., concurring) (“The word interest as used does not mean title. It denotes a beneficial property right in the land.”). See also In re Ballato, 318 B.R. 205, 209 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004) (“The homestead exemption provided for under the Florida Constitution makes no distinction between the types of ownership interests in land that qualify for the exemption, and has been interpreted as applying to any interest in land”).

46.   Fla. Const. art. X, § 4(c).

47.   See Isaacs v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 373 So. 3d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“Florida courts have consistently interpreted this provision as prohibiting a married homestead owner from alienating the homestead property to a third party without the spouse's consent”).

48.   see Brown V. Towd Point Mortg. Tr. 2017-6, 423 So. 3d 887, 892 (fla. 4th Dca 2025), Quoting crawford V. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 266 So. 3d 1274, 1277 (fla. 5th Dca 2019) (construing Article X, Section 4(c) to Prohibit Alienation Without the Non-titled Spouse's Consent, “even Where Only the Signatory Spouse Is an Owner of Record on the Property's Deed”)

49.   Fla. Const. art. X, § 4(c) (“The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by spouse or minor child”).

50.   See Knapp v. Fredricksen, 148 Fla. 311, 314, 4 So. 2d 251, 252 (1941) (“If the widow acquired and retains homestead exemption rights in property after the death of the husband, such exemption, if existing at her death, would inure to her heirs. Sec. 2, Art. X, Constitution.”).

51.   See, e.g., Advance Credit, Inc. v. Gamboa (In re Gamboa), 778 F. App'x 829, 832 (11th Cir. 2019) (“the homestead exemption is to be liberally construed in favor of the homestead claimant”) (internal citations omitted); Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56, 58–59 (Fla. 1992) (liberally construing the Homestead Exemption to protect a home from civil or criminal forfeiture).

52.   See Osborne, 55 So. 3d at 585 (“As some courts have noted, it is not possible under Florida law to stop receiving the benefits of the Homestead Exemption without abandonment or alienation.”).

53.   See L'Engle v. Forbes, 81 So. 2d 214, 216 (Fla. 1955) (“temporary absence” is not enough).

54.   Aronson v. Aronson, 81 So. 3d 515, 519 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

55.   Doc. No. 30 ¶ 12-14 (“I sleep at the home daily ․ My Florida ID reflects the Home as my address ․ I receive mail at the Home, including prescription medications and other correspondence ․ For years prior to March 27, 2024, my mail and daily prescription medications were regularly delivered to the Home”).

56.   See Declaration of Lawrence Souza, Jr., at ¶ 4 (Doc. No. 30-1, at 1) (noting the Toleo Street Property “has been [Debtor's] permanent residence and homestead continuously since [his] marriage to [Ms. Skeete] on or about August 17, 2022”); Declaration of Cheryl Skeete, at ¶ 5 (Doc. No. 30-2, at 1) (same).

57.   See supra notes 19 - 23 and accompanying text.

58.   See generally Doc. No. 34.

59.   Doc. Nos. 34-1 & 34-2.

60.   See Doc. No. 34-2 (noting Malik Skeete's alleged statement that Ms. Skeete was not married).

61.   Doc. No. 30-3.

62.   See Phillips v. Hirshon, 958 So. 2d 425, 427 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), quoted in Baldwin, 279 So. 3d at 332 (Noting “the definition of homestead property for [exemption from taxation] purposes is not the same as Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution”).

63.   Doc. No. 34 ¶ 5.

64.   Compare Doc. 34 ¶4 (“Debtor fails to provide an unexpired form of identification to the Court and fails to provide typical documents that would demonstrate Debtor's ongoing domicile at the Property; such as, a monthly bill from a utility company or mobile phone company, or a voter registration card, etc.”), with Doc. 30-1 ¶ 12-14 (“I sleep at the home daily ․ My Florida ID reflects the Home as my address ․ I receive mail at the Home, including prescription medications and other correspondence ․ For years prior to March 27, 2024, my mail and daily prescription medications were regularly delivered to the Home”).

65.   Doc. No. 34 ¶ 9.

66.   Id. ¶ 8 (“Debtor has failed to factually prove that the Borrower, from whom the Debtor is seeking as the basis for his marital homestead protection, treats the Property as her homestead property”).

67.   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact [ ] is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record ․ ; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence [ ] of a genuine dispute ․”).

68.   Fla. Const. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (emphasis supplied).

69.   See Judd v. Schooley, 158 So. 2d 514, 517 (Fla. 1963) (“it is legally possible for a married woman, in good faith, to claim a permanent home in Florida property even though her husband is legally domiciled elsewhere”).

70.   “If a party ․ fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), ․ the court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; and grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

71.   U.S.C. 521 (a)(1).

72.   See In re Saylors, 869 F.2d 1434, 1436–37 (11th Cir. 1989) (Section 541 includes all legal and equitable interests ranging from a true “possessory interest,” to an “equitable right of redemption.”).

73.   See Law, 163 So. 3d at 556 (“This court has also held that a one-half interest, the right of possession, or any beneficial interest in land gives the claimant a right to exempt it as his homestead.”) (citing Ezem v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg., 153 So. 3d 341, 344 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)).

74.   See Law, 163 So. 3d at 556 (holding that spouse, “although not a title holder, also had a protected interest in the marital home under Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution”).

75.   Id.

76.   See Ezem, 153 So. 3d at 344, 27 So. 2d at 833 (“The fact that Appellant does not hold record title to the property is immaterial, because record title is not a prerequisite to a finding that the property is homestead”); Taylor v. Maness, 941 So.2d 559, 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“[T]he individual claiming the homestead exemption need not hold fee simple title to the property”).

77.   See id. See also supra note 69.

78.   See Law, 163 So. 3d at 556 (“This court has also held that a one-half interest, the right of possession, or any beneficial interest in land gives the claimant a right to exempt it as his homestead.”) (citing Ezem, 153 So. 3d at 344).

79.   See Judd, 158 So. 2d at 517 (“it is legally possible for a married woman, in good faith, to claim a permanent home in Florida property even though her husband is legally domiciled elsewhere”).

80.   11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

81.   11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1).

82.   Id.

83.   11 U.S.C. § 102(2).

84.   See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 80, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2156, 115 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1991) (holding that a debtor may treat a mortgage lien in chapter 13 even though there is no personal liability on the debt).

85.   501 U.S. 78, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 115 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1991).

86.   See Johnson, 501 U.S. at 84–85 (holding bankruptcy court erred in concluding that the discharge of personal liability on a note constituted the termination of the Bank's claim against the debtor).

87.   Doc. No. 2 ¶ 5(a).

88.   See In re Bozeman, 57 F.4th 895, 902 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Muhammad, 536 B.R. 469, 471 n.1 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2015)) (noting § 1322(b)(5) enables debtors “to stave off foreclosure and catch up [their] mortgage within a reasonable amount of time”).

89.   11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5). See also In re Curinton, 300 B.R. 78, 84 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) (rejecting “the decisions of the few courts that continue to require privity between debtors and creditors”); In re Mack, No. CV 22-02503-DD, 2023 WL 1869211, at *2 (Bankr. D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2023) (determining, based on Johnson v. Home State Bank, that mortgagee has a secured claim that is subject to cure by a chapter plan despite the debtor not being obligated on the loan).

90.   See In re Curinton, 300 B.R. at 82 (quoting Bank of America v. Garcia (In re Garcia), 276 B.R. 627, 631 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002)) (“the Bankruptcy Code recognizes a debtor-creditor relationship whenever a creditor holds a claim secured by the debtor's property, even if the debtor has no personal liability.”).

91.   See id. at 85 (holding the debtor can treat the bank's claim in a chapter 13 plan – despite lacking personal liability on the claim – because the bank has a claim against the debtor's property).

92.   300 B.R. 78 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).

93.   See id. at 85 (“This Court rejects the decisions of the few courts that continue to require privity between debtors and creditors.”)

94.   See id. (“Pursuant to Johnson, the debtor can include the subject property in the debtor's Chapter 13 plan because Western United has a claim against the debtor's property”).

95.   See id. (reasoning a broad construction of “claim” prevents “lending institutions from manipulating bankruptcy law to thwart a debtor's good faith attempt to reorganize a debt in bankruptcy”).

96.   No. 3:11-BK-3148-PMG, 2011 WL 4381725, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2011).

97.   Id. at *3

98.   Id.

99.   446 B.R. 604 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).

100.   In re McNeal, 2011 WL 4381725, at *3.

101.   208 B.R. 624 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997).

102.   Id. at 628.

103.   Id. at 629.

104.   345 B.R. 615 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006).

105.   Id. at 617.

106.   Id. at 618.

Luis E. Rivera II United States Bankruptcy Judge