IN RE: SIMMIE DEAN GRAVES (2026)

ORDER FINDING COUNTY OF PLACER IN CONTEMPT

Discharged Debtors Simmie Dean Graves, Jr., and Zenaida Padlan Graves contend the County of Placer has been offending the statutory discharge injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) by trying to collect a discharged debt. Discerning a parallel to Kafka's Josef K, this Court agrees.

The assessment of civil contempt for violations of a bankruptcy discharge is whether there is “no fair ground of doubt” as to whether the order barred the conduct. In other words, “civil contempt may be appropriate if there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct might be lawful.” Moreover, subjective good faith does not insulate parties from civil contempt. Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U.S. 554, 557 (2019)(9-0 decision).

Case History

Simmie Dean Graves, Jr., and Zenaida Padlan Graves, residents of Placer County, California, filed a joint chapter 7 bankruptcy case on November 2, 2021.

The chapter 7 trustee filed a “no-asset” report on January 5, 2022, concluding there were no nonexempt assets available for distribution to creditors. Accordingly, no deadline to file claims, i.e., no “bar date,” was established.

Debtors received a chapter 7 discharge of all dischargeable debts on February 7, 2022. The case was closed February 11, 2022.

On January 5, 2023, the chapter 7 case was reopened on the debtors’ motion to afford relief to them on the basis they wished to amend Schedule F to add the omitted debt to the County:

Debtors failed to list one creditor. Despite, numerous communications, that creditor [County of Placer] refuses to stop its attempts to collect from Debtors. Debtors needs (sic) to reopen their case and file an amended schedule F that lists this creditor in order to resolve this issue to the satisfaction of the creditor.

No. 21-23788 (dkts. 22-23).

The omitted debt was a repayment obligation for overissuance of $3,264.00 in CalFresh food benefits due to unreported income of Simmie Graves (he found a job that he did not immediately report) at a time that there were two children in the household over age 18, Skyler Graves and Haley Graves.

The County of Placer determined the basis of the debt was “Inadvertent Household Error” (IHE) not implicating criminality. IHE “overissuance is any claim resulting from an unintentional error on the part of the household.” 7 C.F.R. § 273.18(b)(2).

Under applicable nonbankruptcy law, all four adult members of the household are jointly liable for the overpayment.

The County proceeded to attempt to collect from all four household members – debtors Simmie and Zenaida Graves and their children - and has obtained some tax intercepts of Skyler's refunds, which has spawned a sense of outrage.

Although the County admits it has long known of the Graves’ bankruptcy and of their chapter 7 discharge, in an exercise of passive aggression, the County has contended throughout that the copy of the 2-page Discharge Order on Official Form 318 is not good enough because the discharge does not refer to the County of Placer. The January 4, 2023, Motion to Reopen related the County's position: “Debtors need to reopen their case and file an amended schedule F that lists this creditor in order to resolve this issue to the satisfaction of the creditor.” The amendment was made: still not good enough. More about that later.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1334. A motion for contempt of the bankruptcy discharge is a core proceeding the bankruptcy court may hear and determine.

A California county may sue and be sued. Cal. Govt. Code § 23004(a).

Although the self-represented discharged debtors have focused on subsidiary Placer County Treasurer offices, the real party in interest is the County of Placer.

This is a civil contempt motion proceeding. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020. Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014(c)(1), it is ORDERED that Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7017 and 7019, incorporating Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 and 19 apply in this Rule 9014 matter.

Since the County of Placer is the real party in interest, the County of Placer is deemed the Respondent. To the extent it may be necessary, the County of Placer is hereby joined as a party respondent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2).

This redesignation does not prejudice the County of Placer necessitating additional delay because it has been actively represented by the Office of Placer County Counsel during this dispute.

I

Bankruptcy Discharge Law

Settled bankruptcy law holds that a discharge in a so-called “no asset, no bar date” case is good against the World, including otherwise dischargeable debts that are merely omitted from schedules. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A); Beezley v. California Land Title Co. (In re Beezley), 994 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993).

The rationale for that application of the omitted creditor provision of § 523(a)(3)(A) is that if no claims bar date has been set, then after the case is closed it nevertheless remains timely for a creditor to file a proof of claim that will enable participation in any distributable assets that may surface in the future. Beezley, 994 F.2d at 1435-37.

Thus, under the § 523(a)(3)(A) construct, if the case were ever to be reopened to administer additional property-of-estate assets, then a claims bar date would be fixed with notice to scheduled creditors or whose claims are on file.

In contrast, § 523(a)(3)(B) provides that omitted debts that may be excepted from discharge under “bad acts” discharge exceptions at 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(6) remain vulnerable to adversary proceedings to establish the necessary facts relating to fraud, fiduciary defalcation, larceny, and willful and malicious injury. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(B).

The penalty to debtors for omitting creditors is forfeiture of the 60-day time-bar per Rule 4007(c) and § 523(c) for nondischargeability actions alleging fraud, larceny, fiduciary defalcations, and willful and malicious conduct under §§ 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(6). Beezley, 994 F.2d at 1435-37; In re Franklin, 179 B.R. 913, 924 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995).

Although the Debtors amended their schedules to include the County of Placer after the case was reopened, Beezley teaches that an after-the-fact scheduling of an omitted debt is “useless,” i.e. of no legal consequence with respect to whether the debt is discharged.

Beezley explained that since dischargeability is unaffected by scheduling in a “no asset, no bar date” case, “reopening the case merely to schedule the debt is for all practical purposes a useless gesture.” Beezley, 994 F.2d at 1437.

Amending a schedule, while of no legal consequence in a “no asset, no bar date” case, does have a practical consequence for case administration. Adding an omitted creditor assures the omitted creditor is on the clerk's notice list for notice of any future bar date that may be fixed upon discovery of omitted assets that could become the basis for distribution to creditors.

The debtor must give the trustee and any affected entity notice of the amendment to schedules but mere informal communication may satisfy the notice requirement. No formal service is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009(a)(1).

The record shows that the Graves gave the County notice promptly after amending the schedules. The County says that was not good enough.

Although the County contends it still could try to prosecute a nondischargeability action under § 523(a)(3)(B) for fraud, larceny, defalcation, or willful and malicious acts per §§ 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(6), it is unclear whether the County could meet Rule 9011 fraud pleading standards for what has been determined to reflect “Inadvertent Household Error.”

Beezley is a widely-known, oft-cited Ninth Circuit precedent (100s of Westlaw case citations) that could not have escaped the notice of any competent lawyer interested in the question of discharge of omitted debts.

It follows that, from the moment the County was notified of the Graves’ bankruptcy discharge, the County was on inquiry notice to ascertain the status and effect of the discharge.

II

Enforcing the Bankruptcy Discharge

The Supreme Court in Taggart addressed the issue whether a “creditor's good-faith belief that the discharge injunction does not apply precludes a finding of civil contempt” in a case in which the Ninth Circuit had disapproved a bankruptcy court's civil contempt sanctions of $105,000 attorney's fees, $5,000 emotional distress damages, and $2,000 punitive damages.

Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court announced a “no fair ground of doubt” civil contempt standard for when sanctions may be appropriate when a creditor violates a discharge order based on an objectively unreasonable view of the discharge order or the statutes that govern its scope. Taggart, 587 U.S. at 561-62.

The Court reasoned that the § 524(a)(2) provision specifying that a discharge order “operates as injunction” when taken in combination with § 105(a) authorizing a court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions” of title 11, brings with it the “old soil” of civil contempt sanctions to coerce compliance with an injunction or compensate for losses stemming from noncompliance with the injunction. Thus, it ruled that as part of the “old soil” they bring with them, “the bankruptcy statutes incorporate the traditional standards in equity practice for determining when a party may be held in civil contempt for violating an injunction.” Taggart, 587 U.S. at 561.

After Taggart, clear and convincing evidence and strict liability standards no longer govern. Rather, the new Taggart standard is one of objective reasonableness based on “basic fairness.” Subjective belief that conduct is permitted will not insulate one whose subjective belief is objectively unreasonable. The absence of willfulness does not relieve civil contempt. A record of continuing and persistent violations and persistent contumacy justified placing the burden of any uncertainty in the decree on the shoulders of the party who violated the court order. Taggart, 587 U.S. at 561-62, citing McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1949).

Here, the County's persistent pattern of violations justifies placing the burden on the County to demonstrate that its conduct was not objectively unreasonable.

III

Scope of Bankruptcy Discharge

The discharge issues in this case involve the debtors’ rights and the rights of the debtors’ adult children.

A

The “Adult” Children Not Discharged

One bone of contention that has confused and aggrieved the parties relates to whether it is permissible for the County to collect the $3,264.00 overpayment from Skyler Graves and Haley Graves, the other adult members of the Graves household at the time of the overpayment of benefits. The short answer is, yes.

The terms of the bankruptcy discharge are fixed by 11 U.S.C. § 524(a).

Although the discharge protects debtors from personal liability for a discharged debt, 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) provides the discharge does not affect the liability of any other person.

A common example of § 524(e) involves insurance and personal injury torts. The discharged tortfeasor is protected from liability but the insurance company still has to pay.

The discharged debtors in this case are Simmie and Zenaida Graves because they are the debtors in this bankruptcy case.

The Graves’ discharge does not affect the liability of any other person or entity, including their 18+-year-old “adult” children. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e).

Under applicable nonbankruptcy law, each adult member of a household at the time of an overpayment of federally subsidized CalFresh food benefits is jointly and severally responsible for repaying the overpayment. 7 C.F.R. § 273.18(a)(4).

As the Graves’ children Skyler and Haley Graves had reached their 18th birthdays, they are not debtors in the bankruptcy case and are deemed adult members of the household at the time of the overpayment. Hence, they are jointly and severally liable with the debtors.

In order for them to enjoy the protection of bankruptcy discharges, they would have to file their own cases.

To be sure, arguments about fairness and public policy cut both for and against the rule fixed by 7 C.F.R. § 273.18(a)(4). However hardhearted it may be and however unfortunate for intrafamily dynamics it may be, § 524(e) says what it says.

In short, Skyler Graves and Haley Graves cannot avail themselves of the protection of the Simmie Graves and Zenaida Graves bankruptcy discharge and are exposed to joint and several liability for the full amount.

The implication for the present case is that it is not a violation of the Graves’ bankruptcy discharge for the County to intercept tax refunds owed to Skyler Graves and Haley Graves. There is no bankruptcy reason to prevent collection against the adult children under principles of joint and several liability.

Once debtors make a plausible claim that a creditor is violating a discharge order, the burden shifts to the creditor to establish that there is an objectively reasonable basis for concluding the creditor's conduct might be lawful. That burden shift is long settled. E.g., In re Larsen, 580 B.R. 901, 913-14 (Bankr. D. Id. 2017)(Discharge); In re Gurrola, 328 B.R. 158, 174-75 (9th Cir. BAP 2005)(Same); Morris v. Peralta (In re Peralta), 317 B.R. 381, 389 (9th Cir. BAP 2004)(automatic stay).

In short, the County has the burden to demonstrate that there is an objectively reasonable basis for concluding its conduct might be lawful.

B

Debtors Discharged

The assessment of the conduct of the County with respect to allegedly contemptuous violations of the bankruptcy discharge, as noted above, is whether there is “no fair ground of doubt” as to whether the order barred the conduct. Thus, “civil contempt may be appropriate if there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct might be lawful.” Moreover, under civil contempt standards, parties cannot be insulated by subjective good faith. Taggart, 587 U.S. at 557-65.

In its Opposition to Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. 51), the County says that once it became aware of the Graves’ bankruptcy case on April 22, 2022, it updated internal records to cease collection efforts against the Graves. So far, so good – that would comply with the bankruptcy discharge.

Then the County says that on August 23, 2022, it received a letter from Skyler Graves demanding cessation of collection efforts and directing the County to talk to the Graves’ bankruptcy attorney.

The County says that it did contact the debtors’ attorney in 2022 who, in layered hearsay, “advised that the Overpayment was not included in Debtors’ bankruptcy case and was not discharged.”

Although the debtors’ attorney has not been called upon to provide evidence about that conversation, it is logical to infer that the County representative conflated two distinct concepts.

A competent attorney would have made two separate points: (1) the overpayment debt was in fact omitted from the schedules but, per Beezley, was nevertheless discharged in the “no asset, no bar date” case; and (2) per § 524(e), the other adult family members were not discharged.

It is exceedingly unlikely that a debtor's attorney confronted with an omitted garden-variety debt in a “no asset, no bar date” case would admit that the debt was not discharged. This Court's experience of the subject attorney is that he is not manifestly incompetent.

Although the County has subsequently contended that the debtors’ attorney conceded that the debt was not discharged, the record of the case, especially the Amendment to Schedule F after the purported conversation, does not support that proposition.

The County says communications between County and Debtors since April 2022 have involved contacts by Debtors regarding collections against adult children and in connection with Debtors’ proceedings before the California Department of Social Services (CDSS) in an effort to achieve compromise or deem the overpayment uncollectible. Opposition at p. 2.

If the story ended there, then this Court might rule, consistent with the Supreme Court in Taggart on the need to consider “good faith” and “basic fairness” in assessing civil contempt sanctions, that no sanction is appropriate. Taggart, 587 U.S. at 561.

The story, however, does not end there. The rest of the story smacks of stark violation of the bankruptcy discharge injunction.

IV

California Department of Social Services (CDSS) Proceedings

The County's defense unravels in the California Department of Social Services (CDSS) proceeding in In re Zenaida Graves, No. 105190682, (Dec. 18, 2025).

Again, the Taggart standard is there is “no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct might be lawful.” Taggart, 587 U.S. at 557-65.

The Graves, offended by tax intercepts of son Skyler's income tax refunds, sought administrative relief on multiple theories, including limitations periods, compromise policy, and illegality, initiated a CDSS administrative proceeding.

The appropriate non-contumacious response would have been to contend that the non-debtor adult children are not protected by the parents’ bankruptcy discharge, leaving ruling on application of compromise standards to the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).

Instead, the County chose to counter-attack Simmie and Zenaida Graves and to contend they were not protected by their chapter 7 discharge. That direct assault on the discharge was egregious civil contempt.

The CCSS ALJ held a hearing on November 20, 2025, on the protest by Simmie and Zenaida Graves on their dispute of “the County's ability to collect on the overissuance, both against them [Simmie and Zenaida Graves] and their adult children.” The official report of the hearing and decision is in evidence on the bankruptcy docket (“Hearing Report”). (Dkt. 60).

The fatal disconnect comes from the mouth of the County Representative who admitted what the County had been doing from the outset with respect to the Graves. The County contended that the allegedly discharged debtors have not proved that they have been discharged and that their copy of the order of discharge is not good enough:

The County Representative testified that there have been three separate tax intercepts on this account, currently against one of the Claimants adult children, and that the current total balance on the account is $2,773.41, with all four adult household members listed as current responsible parties.

The County Representative testified that, although the Claimants have indicated that they have filed bankruptcy and that this debt should be discharged, they have not provided a bankruptcy discharge order that includes the County as a creditor, ultimately failing to prove their claim. The County Representative testified that the Claimants did provide the first two pages of a bankruptcy order from February 7, 2022, but that the paperwork was incomplete and did not include sufficient information to show that the Claimants had discharged the debt in this case.

Hearing Report at pp 2-3 (Dkt. 60) (emphasis supplied).

Strike one; as a matter of law, the County, faced with a copy of a bankruptcy discharge, has the burden to demonstrate that the overissuance debt is not covered by the discharge.

The County had a duty to consult the public docket of the bankruptcy court that is readily available on-line.

It is not acceptable for County bureaucrats to rope-a-dope a debtor by claiming the debtor has not proved the existence of the discharge to the satisfaction of the County bureaucrats.

There is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the County's conduct might be lawful.

Strike two; the County admits that it has a copy of the discharge order. A simple check of the public Bankruptcy Court docket, that has been available to the County and its lawyers, would have revealed that the discharge was entered, that the trustee found no assets to distribute, and that no deadline to file claims was fixed.

As explained above, settled law of the Ninth Circuit established in Beezley holds that in a “no asset, no bar date” case such as this that all debts are discharged, except to the extent by way of § 523(a)(3)(B) there may be a meritorious case for exception to discharge under §§ 523(a)(2), (a)(4), or (a)(6)

Recognition that the docket shows: (1) trustee report of “no assets”; (2) no deadline for filing claims; and (3) discharge entered, ends the legal inquiry needed to determine whether unscheduled garden-variety debt is discharged.

There is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the County's conduct might be lawful.

Although not necessary as a matter of law in a “no asset, no bar date” case, the docket also reflects that the debtors did amend their schedules to name the County as a creditor.

The County Representative testified that if the Claimants could provide documentation showing that the county had been listed as a creditor in their bankruptcy discharge order, then the County would take appropriate action and remove the Claimants as responsible parties on the overissuance.

Hearing Report at p.3 (Dkt. 60).

Amending the debtors’ schedules to add the County, while not legally significant, assured the County is on the clerk's notice list for a future bar date fixed upon discovery of omitted assets that could become the basis for distribution to creditors.

The copy of their amendment adding the County as a creditor that debtors sent to the County promptly after filing satisfied the Rule 1009(a)(1) requirement of notice be given to any affected entity. No formal service of notice is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009(a)(1).

The record shows that the Graves gave the County notice promptly after amending the schedules. The County says that was not good enough.

Strike three. There is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the County's conduct might be lawful.

The County Representative said the debtors “have not provided a bankruptcy discharge order that includes the County as a creditor.” Preposterous. The two-page discharge order is the complete order.

The Supreme Court explained that the two-page Official Form 318 discharge order “goes no further than the statute: It simply says that the debtor ‘shall be granted a discharge under § 727.’ ” Taggart, 587 U.S. at 557-58. “The words of the discharge order, though simple, have an important effect: A discharge order ‘operates as an injunction’ that bars creditors from collecting any debt that has been discharged. § 524(a)(2).” Id.

No chapter 7 discharge order issued by a Bankruptcy Court ever contains the name of a creditor. No County bureaucrat can impose an additional requirement on the Bankruptcy Court.

Strike four. There is “no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the county's conduct might be lawful” by demanding something expressly declaring that a particular debt is discharged.

Next, the Debtors “testified that it was also their understanding, per their attorney's advice, that all of their debts would be discharged in bankruptcy, regardless of whether a particular creditor was listed in the paperwork.” Hearing Report at p.3. The attorney's advice, based on Beezley, appears to have been correct in law and fact.

At the administrative law hearing:

During the open record period the Claimants submitted a 10-page packet consisting of bankruptcy documents, including a February 7, 2022, order discharging debts the county is not listed on those documents. The bankruptcy documents also included an Amendment Cover Sheet filed with the bankruptcy court on January 23, 2023, in that same case. These documents list the Placer County Revenue Services Division among the unsecured creditors sought to be added to the case in that filing. There is no proof of service, nor a further order, listing the County.

Hearing Report at p.4 (Dkt. 60).

This confirms that both the County and the ALJ knew of the existence of the discharge and knew that the County had been added as a listed creditor.

Strike five. There is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the County's conduct might be lawful.

As explained above, the proposition that creditors must be listed in a bankruptcy discharge order lacks merit. No creditor is ever listed in a bankruptcy discharge order.

Strike six. The ALJ erred, as a matter of law, by accepting the County's assertions that a discharge or some other order needs to state that a debt to the County is discharged.

Strike seven. There is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the County's conduct in making that argument might be lawful.

This Court likewise infers that it was the County that urged upon the ALJ that the (legally insignificant) amendment adding the County as a creditor needed to be served on the County.

Strike eight. There is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct or the ALJ's analysis might be lawful.

Next,

The County submitted a one-page response noting that the Claimants have not provided the full bankruptcy discharge paperwork, and as such, the County is entitled to continue collecting on the overissuance against all responsible adults.

Hearing Report at p.4 (Dkt. 60).

The County's submission is an assertion that it is entitled to continue collecting against the discharged debtors, contrary to the County's earlier assertion in this Court that it ceased collecting on the discharged debt from the debtors.

Strike nine. There is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the County's conduct in advancing that position to the ALJ might be lawful.

The ALJ made the following findings:

Based on the documentation submitted by the Claimants, it is found that the Claimants have not submitted documentation showing that the debt against them from the County in this case was discharged in their bankruptcy case. The Claimants’ statement that their attorney told them that all parties listed on the bankruptcy amendment paperwork were properly served, and that the clerk informed them that no objections had been filed, were considered, but ultimately other evidence was persuasive.

Nothing in this Decision prevents the Claimants from providing further evidence that the County's CalFresh overissuance in this case was properly discharged in bankruptcy court.

Hearing Report at p.5 (Dkt. 60).

The ALJ's findings are clearly erroneous in fact and in law. The Debtors did submit complete documentation showing the debt to the County was discharged in their “no asset, no bar date” chapter 7 case. The County and the ALJ imposed on the debtors a phantom requirement for paperwork that never exists in a discharge order.

Whether there was service or not upon the County of the Amendment adding the County as a creditor is irrelevant because the amendment, as held by the Ninth Circuit in Beezley, is of no legal significance. The debtors fulfilled their notice duty under Rule 1009(a)(1) when they showed a copy of the amendments. The County and the ALJ were imposing another phantom requirement on the debtors by disregarding the Amended Schedule on the pretext there was not evidence of formal service.

Strike ten. There is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the County's conduct might be lawful.

The ALJ's Kafkaesque provision that the Claimants could provide “further evidence” was based on the County's assertions that unambiguously violated the bankruptcy discharge.

After addressing other issues raised by the Claimants Simmie and Zenaida Graves, on December 18, 2025, the CDSS ALJ ruled:

Based on the above, it is determined that the County has correctly included the Claimants [Simmie and Zenaida Graves] in its collection actions on this CalFresh overissuance, and the County is not estopped from doing so based on the documents in the record.

Nothing in this Decision prevents the Claimants from providing further bankruptcy documentation to the County in support of their position that the CalFresh overissuance in this case has been successfully discharged as against them in bankruptcy proceedings.

Stephen Mulnick, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Report at p. 13 (Dkt. 60).

Strike eleven. There is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the County's arguments or the ALJ's findings might be lawful.

Armed with the December 18, 2025, CDSS order, the County addressed a letter to Simmie Graves on January 14, 2026, demanding immediate payment of $2,773.81 and threatening referral for state and federal tax intercepts.¹

Strike twelve. There is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct in demanding payment of a discharged debt might be lawful.

V

But wait, there is more. The County sent billing statements to Simmie Graves dated November 21, 2022, and June 20, 2025, respecting the overpayment.

In the County's April 29, 2026, Opposition, it asserts that the debtors’ bankruptcy attorney told a County Revenue Services employee on August 23, 2022, that “he does not represent Skyler Graves and the Overpayment was not listed as a debt in Debtors’ bankruptcy case and was not discharged in Debtors’ bankruptcy case.” (Decl. Lori Lynch, Dkts. 51-52).

The problem is that the County makes an unwarranted inference from its layered hearsay conversation with debtors’ counsel. It conflates separate concepts. Counsel's alleged statement only rings true if it is understood to mean that he did not represent Skyler and Haley Graves, that the Placer County debt was not scheduled, and that the debt of Skyler Graves was not discharged.

What does not ring true is the County's inference that the Debtors’ counsel said the debtors’ debt to the County was not discharged. After Beezley no seasoned bankruptcy attorney, such as debtors’ counsel, would have said that an unscheduled debt in a “no asset, no bar date” case was not discharged as to debtors.

This view is confirmed by the fact that after the County's November 21, 2022, billing statement addressed to the debtors, the debtors’ counsel assisted them in reopening their bankruptcy case on January 5, 2023, and in amending their schedules on January 23, 2023, to add Placer County as a creditor. (Dkts. 22-25.) That is precisely what a knowledgeable debtors’ counsel would do in a “no asset, no bar date” case in light of Beezley.

As the Ninth Circuit explained in Beezley, the act of amending schedules to add omitted creditors is “useless” in terms of legal consequence. At most it shows good faith by debtors if further case administration becomes needed.

It follows that the debtors-counsel-made-us-do-it excuse is, to use the Ninth Circuit's word, “useless.”

Viewed in isolation, the November 21, 2022, billing statement might have been an inconsequential discharge injunction violation, that led the Debtors to amend their schedules.

But the June 20, 2025, billing statement to Simmie Graves distinctly violated the discharge injunction.

The County's Supplemental Opposition to Motion to Sanction Creditor for Contempt of Court attempted to explain away the January 14, 2026, demand letter to Simmie Graves.

The County says the January 2026 demand letter:

[W]as transmitted to Simmie Graves based on the County's reliance on the CDSS Decision, which indicated the Debtors failed to provide sufficient information to establish the Overpayment was discharged as to the Debtors. These letters were not sent in deviance or disregard of the Debtors’ Discharge Order but were based on the County's objectively reasonable belief they were lawful. This belief was the result of representations made by Debtors’ bankruptcy attorney and an Administrative Law Judge.

(Dkt. 56) at 3-4.

Strike thirteen. There is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the County's arguments or the ALJ's findings might be lawful.

The County says it “remains concerned that Debtors will continue to conflate any collection efforts against their adult children as attempts to collect on the Overpayment against them.”

This Court is not confused into conflation. As noted earlier in this Opinion, the adult children are jointly and severally liable and remain vulnerable to collection.

Rather, the County has been deluded into conflating what it thinks the Graves’ lawyer told a County employee back in 2022. The County has the burden to demonstrate why its actions are objectively reasonable. But it proffers no direct evidence of the actual statements made to a County employee in a telephone interview in 2022 before the schedules were amended to add the County as a creditor. Nor has the County explained why it has not attempted to confirm with that lawyer what he actually said or to provide a declaration from him. It is a classic example of the “missing witness” that the County had the ability, but did not choose, to produce. As already noted, the County's conflated inferences are, in view of the pervasiveness of Beezley, too improbable to be believed.

***

The record being rife with at least thirteen examples of bankruptcy discharge violations by the County of Placer against Simmie and Zenaida Graves, the civil contempt question becomes what to do about it.

The thirteen named examples evince continuing and persistent contumacy, for each of which there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the County's conduct might be lawful under the discharge order.

The gravity of the violations steadily increased, especially when the County elected to counterattack the debtors in the CDSS proceedings.

Worse, the County's counterattack on the Graves at CDSS was entirely gratuitous. The main issue being the legitimacy of collections against the debtors’ jointly and severally liable adult children for which the outcome was a foregone conclusion because black-letter law limits the discharge to the debtors.

The January 14, 2026, demand letter to Simmie is proof positive that the County continues to run amok in a manner that smacks of Franz Kafka.

The amount necessary to coerce the County into compliance with the bankruptcy discharge is $39,000 ($3,000 per strike).

It is evident that this prolonged and frustrating dispute has caused considerable emotional distress to the Graves.

Emotional distress damages are assessed at $5,000. It is noted that the Supreme Court in Taggart had nothing negative to say about the Taggart bankruptcy court's awards of emotional distress damages and punitive damages. Cf. Valdellon v. PHH Mortgage Corp., 2026 Westlaw 1068902 (9th Cir. 2026).

The County is fortunate that the Graves did not engage legal counsel to assist them in dealing with the County. If they had done so, the likely compensable professional fees would have exceeded $20,000. If, in an eventual appeal, the Graves elect to engage counsel to help defend their award, a fee award for a successful appellate defense also would be available.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Hello Simmie:Case No. 1B14888CalFresh Overissuance $2,773.81This letter is to inform you that the Placer County Health and Human Services Department referred the above-referenced debt to its collection division for recovery. The balance is due and payable immediately.Payments may be made online [online address omitted] or by calling [phone # omitted]. You may also mail your payment to Placer County HHS [address omitted]. Make sure to include your case number.If you are unable to pay the full balance at this time, then it is imperative you contact our office to discuss repayment arrangements. Failure to respond may result in additional collection actions, including but not limited to:Referral to the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) for state tax intercept; and/orReferral to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for federal tax refund or federal payment intercept.To avoid further enforcement action, you must contact our office immediately at [phone #] to arrange full payment or establish an approved repayment plan.Health and Human Services DepartmentRevenue Services DivisionDkt. 60, Ex. G.

CHRISTOPHER M. KLEIN, Bankruptcy Judge: