IN RE: Payden Biram STEWART (2026)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY PAYDEN BIRAM STEWART

Before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) (Doc. No. 12),¹ Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter “Motion Brief”) (Doc. No. 13), and Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (“Statement of Undisputed Facts” or “SUF” when citing) (Doc. No. 14) filed by Payden Biram Stewart (the “Debtor”). Also before the Court are the Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Response”) (Doc. No. 20), Brief in Support of Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (“Response Brief”) (Doc. No. 22), and Response to Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (“Response to Statement of Undisputed Facts” or “Resp. SUF” when citing) (Doc. No. 21) filed by Jimmy and Savannah Woods, as Administrators of the Estate of Ashton Rae Woods (the “Administrators”). In addition, before the Court is the Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (“Reply Brief”) (Doc. No. 23) filed by the Debtor.

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds the Debtor's Motion should be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.”).

I. JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). The parties have consented to this Court's entry of final orders or judgment in this adversary proceeding. The following constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law made in accordance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052.

II. FACTS

In their Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (Doc. No. 1) (“Complaint”), the Administrators seek to have the debt the Debtor owes to the Estate of Ashton Rae Woods, deceased, (the “Estate”) determined to be nondischargeable as a debt “for willful and malicious injury to another entity or to the property of another entity,” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The Debtor filed an Answer (Doc. No. 6) (“Answer”) to the Complaint denying that the debt should be declared nondischargeable.

From the Statement of Undisputed Facts and the Response to Statement of Undisputed Facts the Court finds the following material facts are not disputed:

On or about October 7, 2022, the Debtor was operating a vehicle when he caused a collision that resulted in the death of Ashton Rae Woods. (SUF ¶ 1). The Debtor was transported by medical flight from the accident and administered Zofran and Fentanyl medications by medical technicians during the flight to UAMS. (SUF ¶ 3). The video from the Debtor's dash cam recorder showed the Debtor's vehicle crossing the median highway seven times on the Debtor's way home after working a twelve-hour shift as a lineman for his employer, MDR Construction, prior to the accident. (SUF ¶ 4).

The State of Arkansas charged the Debtor with two misdemeanor offenses related to the fatal collision. (SUF ¶ 5). On September 24, 2024, the Debtor pled guilty to the charges of (1) careless and prohibited driving and (2) negligent homicide. (SUF ¶ 5). Neither of the charges raised by the State of Arkansas involved illegal drug use or intoxication by the Debtor. (SUF ¶ 5).

On October 24, 2022, Jimmy and Savannah Woods were appointed as Administrators for the Estate of Ashton Rae Woods. (SUF ¶ 6).

On December 16, 2024, the Debtor filed a case under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. (SUF ¶ 1). The Debtor listed the debt he owed to the Estate in his bankruptcy schedules. (SUF ¶ 7).

On December 30, 2024, the Administrators filed a motion for relief from stay to allow the state court to determine the Estate's wrongful death claim against the Debtor. (SUF ¶ 8). An order granting the motion for relief from stay was entered by this Court on January 28, 2025. (SUF ¶ 8).

The Administrators filed the complaint for wrongful death in the Circuit Court of Cleburne County, Arkansas, Case No. 12CV-23-114 (the “State Court Action”), alleging the Debtor breached a duty to keep a proper lookout which ultimately caused the death of Ashton Rae Woods. (SUF ¶ 9). The Administrators filed an amended complaint in the State Court Action on August 16, 2023, reciting the allegations of the original complaint and adding allegations that the Debtor was under the influence of illegal drugs prior to the accident. (SUF ¶ 10). The Debtor filed an answer to both the original complaint and the amended complaint specifically denying the allegations. (SUF ¶ 11).

On April 7 and 8, 2025, a trial was held in the State Court Action. (SUF ¶ 14). At the conclusion of the trial, the jury issued a $275,000.00 verdict against the Debtor in favor of the Estate for the decedent's loss of life, funeral expenses, conscious pain and suffering of the deceased prior to her death, and medical expenses related to the fatal injury. (SUF ¶ 14). No findings of intoxication were made and no evidence of intoxication prior to or at the time of the accident was introduced at trial. (SUF ¶ 14). No punitive damages were awarded; no punitive damage claim was submitted to the jury. (SUF ¶ 14; Resp. SUF ¶ 14). On April 21, 2025, a judgment was entered against the Debtor in the State Court Action in the amount of $275,000.00. (SUF ¶ 15).

On February 6, 2025, the Administrators filed their Complaint initiating this adversary proceeding. (SUF ¶ 12). The Debtor filed his Answer on February 28, 2025. (SUF ¶ 13).

The Debtor filed his Motion seeking summary judgment on June 25, 2025. The Motion asserts that “[t]he action of [the Debtor] in causing the accident resulted in a general negligence claim for wrongful death but his actions do not rise to the ‘willful and malicious’ standard under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).” (Mot. at 3). The Debtor argues that his actions were not willful and malicious “because the [Debtor] did not intend or deliberately cause the accident or the death of Ashton Rae Woods.” (Mot. at 3). In support of his Motion the Debtor relies on the following:

The complaint filed by the Administrators in the State Court Action dated May 31, 2023 (Mot. Ex. A);

The answer to the complaint filed by the Debtor in the State Court Action dated June 23, 2023 (Mot. Ex. B);

The amended complaint filed by the Administrators in the State Court Action dated August 16, 2023 (Mot. Ex. C);

The answer to the amended complaint filed by the Debtor in the State Court Action dated August 31, 2023 (Mot. Ex. D);

The amended answer to the amended complaint filed by the Debtor in the State Court Action dated September 8, 2023 (Mot. Ex. E);

The jury instructions filed by the Administrators in the State Court Action dated March 9, 2025 (Mot. Ex. F);

The Jury Verdict filed in the State Court Action on April 8, 2025 (Mot. Ex. G);

The Judgment entered in the State Court Action on April 21, 2025 (Mot. Ex. H);

The Criminal Information dated September 20, 2023, filed in the Stone County Circuit Court, Case No. 69CR-23-92 (Mot. Ex. I);

The Affidavit of Probable Cause dated September 20, 2023, filed in the Stone County Circuit Court, Case No. 69CR-23-92 (Mot. Ex. J);

The Plea Agreement dated September 24, 2024, filed in the Stone County Circuit Court, Case No. 69CR-23-92 (Mot. Ex. K);

The Plea Statement dated September 24, 2024, filed in the Stone County Circuit Court, Case No. 69CR-23-92 (Mot. Ex. L);

The Conditions of Suspended Sentence dated September 24, 2024, filed in the Stone County Circuit Court, Case No. 69CR-23-92 (Mot. Ex. M);

The Sentencing Order dated September 24, 2024, filed in the Stone County Circuit Court, Case No. 69CR-23-92 (Mot. Ex. N);

The Survival Flight Records Report, page 1, from Incident No. 22-24179, dispatching an air ambulance to the scene of the accident on October 7, 2022 (Mot. Ex. O);

The transcript of Payden Stewart's testimony at trial on April 7, 2025, in the State Court Action (Mot. Ex. P); and

The transcript of Payden Stewart's testimony at trial on April 8, 2025, in the State Court Action (Mot. Ex. Q).

Exhibits at 1-2. (Doc. No. 15).

The amended complaint filed by the Administrators in the State Court Action included the following general allegations:

2. In October, 2022, Decedent, Ashton Rae Woods, was operating her vehicle in a lawful and prudent manner.

3. Defendant, Stewart, had a duty to keep a proper lookout and to keep in his lane of traffic.

4. Defendant crossed a double yellow line and crossed into Ashton's lane of traffic.

․

7. Defendant, Stewart, breached this duty, seriously injuring, and ultimately killing, Ashton Rae Woods due to this breach of his duty. Ashton lay in her car for several minutes, groaning in pain. Defendant did nothing to help her.

8. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant, Stewart's, failure to keep proper lookout, Ashton Rae Woods was seriously injured wherein she ultimately died from her injuries.

9. Accordingly, Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendant, Stewart, seeking compensation for loss of relationship, hedonic damages, conscience [sic] pain and suffering suffered by Ashton Rae Woods, medical bills incurred as a result of the accident and burial/funeral expenses.

10. Defendant knew or ought to have known, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, that his conduct would naturally and probably result in injury or death, and that he continued such conduct in reckless disregard of the consequences from which malice may be inferred.

(Mot. Ex. C, at 1-2).

In the Debtor's amended answer to the amended complaint, he admitted that he had a duty to keep a proper lookout and to keep in his lane of traffic. (Mot. Ex. E, at 1-2). He also admitted that he was negligent and breached his duty of care. (Mot. Ex. E, at 2).

As stated in the Statement of Undisputed Facts, the Debtor pled guilty to the charges of (1) careless and prohibited driving and (2) negligent homicide. (SUF ¶ 5). As to Count 1, the Criminal Information provides:

Careless and Prohibited Driving: It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any vehicle in such a careless manner as to evidence a failure to keep a proper lookout for other traffic, vehicular or otherwise, or in such a manner as to evidence a failure to maintain proper control on the public thoroughfares or private property in the State of Arkansas.

(Mot. Ex. I, at 1). As to negligent homicide Count 2, the Criminal Information states “A person commits negligent homicide if he or she negligently causes the death of another person, ․ as a result of operating a vehicle.” (Mot. Ex. 1, at 2).

The Court also notes the following testimony by the Debtor in the State Court Action:

(Cross Examination by Luther Sutter)

Q Do you normally drive on the other side of the road, like you did in this video?

A No, sir.

Q Then why were you driving on the other side of the road on this day?

A I don't recall. I couldn't tell you.

Q You know bad things can happen when you drive on the other side of the road on a double yellow; right?

A I understand that.

(Mot. Ex. P, at 11).

(Direct Examination by Luther Sutter)

Q Would you agree with me that you crossed the center line seven times?

A I would.

Q Would you agree with me that you knew that those center lines were there for a reason?

A Yes, I know that.

․

Q And so, sir, this video shows that you knew or should have known that what you were doing is dangerous, doesn't it?

A I do know that crossing a double yellow is dangerous, but I was not consciously thinking, this is gonna hurt somebody.

․

Q All right. In fact, you probably haven't watched – the most you've watched this video is through this trial, isn't it?

A Yeah.

Q It's –

A I don't like to watch it.

Q I know, because you don't like to think about what you did, do you?

A Who would?

Q This family.

A I know, but –

Q And so you, you knew that you shouldn't cross the center line, correct?

A Everyone knows that.

Q And you knew that if you continued to cross the center line, you could hurt somebody, didn't you?

A I do know that. I was not consciously crossing the center line thinking that I was gonna –

Q So you were unconsciously driving down the road? Is that what you're telling the jury?

A That's out of context. I'm not talking about consciousness. Doing it on purpose, thinking it'll be okay.

Q You weren't looking at the road, were you?

A I couldn't tell you. I could have been looking at the sky, but I'd be guessing. I don't know.

Q Well, where should you be looking if you're driving down the road between 55 and 57 miles an hour on that curvy road? Where should you be looking?

A You should be looking straight ahead.

Q And you weren't looking straight ahead, were you?

A I'd have to speculate because I don't recall.

Q You're not telling this jury that you were looking straight ahead and you saw Ashton coming forward, and you moved into her lane anyway, are you?

A I'm not saying that.

Q So you know that you didn't act intentionally, but you can't tell me whether or not you were keeping your eyes on the road; right?

A Right.

Q Let me ask a question. You deny that you acted intentionally when your truck moved over into Ashton's Lane; correct?

A It was – yeah, not intentional.

․

(Cross Examination by Andy Turner)

Q Now, are you telling the ladies and gentlemen of this jury that you did this on purpose?

A No.

Q Would you ever do something like this on purpose?

A No.

(Mot. Ex. Q, at 4-13).

The Administrators filed their Response to the Motion on August 7, 2025. In their Response the Administrators assert “[t]here are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.” (Resp. at 1). The Administrators assert that the Debtor “engaged in conduct that was substantially certain to cause harm.” (Resp. at 1). In addition, the Administrators assert “[a] reasonable trier of fact could conclude that [the Debtor's] decision to remain in the wrong lane at highway speed demonstrates an objective substantial certainty of harm.” (Resp. at 2).

In support of their Response, the Administrators rely on the deposition testimony of Kirk Barry (the “Deposition”) and the dash cam footage, asserting the evidence “creates a triable issue as to whether [the Debtor's] conduct was willful and malicious.” (Resp. at 2).

The Deposition was taken on February 17, 2025, and has the style of the State Court Action. The Debtor was represented by Kaleb Jones and the Administrators were represented by Luther Sutter. Mr. Barry testified that he was hired “to review the provided material and to reconstruct the traffic accident and arrive at opinions, if possible, about how the collision occurred.” (Depo. at 17). Mr. Jones asked Mr. Barry about the opinions he reached prior to reviewing the dash cam video and he went over several opinions. One of Mr. Barry's opinions was that the Debtor “was driving at a grossly reckless manner with a disregard for life.” (Depo. at 25). When asked by Mr. Jones how he reached that conclusion, the following colloquy followed:

A Well, in simple terms, Mr. Stewart is driving his vehicle completely on the wrong side of the road on what is essentially a straightaway section and hits a vehicle head on. In my opinion, that is grossly reckless with a disregard for life. There's no reason for Mr. Stewart to be on the wrong side of the road in broad daylight, and I don't mean just a little on the wrong side of the road. He's all the way over in the opposing lane of travel like the westbound lane belongs to him, and that, in my opinion, is grossly negligent.

And then to finish the question that you had, the next opinion, “Mr. Stewart knew or should have known that his conduct would lead to serious injury or death to another,” that was arrived at prior to looking at the video evidence.

Q Okay. So to summarize, because Mr. Stewart crossed the center line and, in your opinion, he was completely within the westbound lane of travel when he made contact with the Kia, he was driving in a grossly reckless manner with a disregard for life. Is that a correct summary?

A Almost. I would add that there is a possibility that the right rear bed of his truck could be on the double yellow line, or perhaps there's an outside possibility that it's in his own lane of travel. Other than that, yes, that would summarize my opinion on that issue.

Q How many accidents have you reconstructed? A Approximately ten thousand.

Q Of those ten thousand, can you give me a rough estimate, maybe percentage wise, how many you have worked where there has been a center line issue like this one, where somebody's crossed the center line?

A Very common issue.

(Depo. at 31–32). Mr. Barry later testified that in his opinion as an expert “you never want to drive on the wrong side of the road at 55 miles an hour simply because you can.” (Depo. at 36)

There were also questions and answers between Mr. Jones and Mr. Barry about whether Mr. Barry's opinions were addressing the Debtor's mindset at the time of the accident. The following is an excerpt of that colloquy:

Q I believe you told me earlier too that you had never testified as a human factors expert; right?

A Correct.

Q Would you agree with me that these opinions that you've reached in regard to Mr. Stewart's mindset would be, for lack of a better term, dipping the toe in the human factors area?

A Mr. Jones, I don't agree with you that I am addressing Mr. Stewart's mindset at all. That's not my opinion in this case.

Q Well, later on in your opinion don't you talk about whether or not you believe he's tired or sleepy prior to the accident?

A Now you want to talk about the video evidence?

Q Well, you just said that you don't get into his mindset in your opinion.

A That is correct. Based – we're looking at Page 2 of my opinions.

Q Yes, sir.

A And we're talking about grossly reckless manner and serious injury or death to another. Those – my opinions are not based upon Mr. Stewart's mindset. They're based upon the conduct of driving a vehicle on a highway. No one's mindset. Don't drive on the wrong side of the road. If you do, you're going to cause, perhaps, right, serious injury or death to another. It's not a mindset issue. It's a conduct issue.

Q But you agree with me that, based upon your qualifications, education, and background, you cannot give an opinion as to Mr. Stewart's mindset at the time of the accident; correct?

A Correct. I don't have any opinions regarding Mr. Stewart's mindset at the time of the collision.

(Depo. at 37–38). From the video footage available, Mr. Barry also reached the opinion that in the 95 seconds of video footage time, the Debtor was driving over the yellow line for 47 seconds, or about one-half of the time. (Depo. at 42).

The Administrators argue that the Deposition raises a fact question on the issue of willful and malicious injury and genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.

In the Debtor's Reply Brief, the Debtor argues that he did not intend to cross the median or intend to cause Ashton Rae Woods’ death. He further argues that even if the Court found willful injury, the record does not support a finding of a malicious injury, and summary judgment is appropriate.

Finally, the parties do not dispute that 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) was not pled in the Complaint and does not apply to the facts of this case.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable to adversary proceedings by Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The movant has the burden “to establish the absence of a material fact issue by identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admission on file, and affidavits.” In re Harrold, 257 B.R. 916, 917 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2000) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23). “Once the moving party has met this initial burden of proof, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial and may not rest on its pleadings ․” Edwards v. City of Ferguson (In re Edwards), 601 B.R. 660, 662 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2019) (first citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986); then citing Bass v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 418 F.3d 870, 872–73 (8th Cir. 2005)).

In applying the summary judgment standard, “the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence.” Zaitz Tr., LLP v. Bremer Bank (In re Solberg), 604 B.R. 355, 358 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2019) (first citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588–89; then citing Tyler v. Harper, 744 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir. 1984)). At the summary judgment stage, the court does not “weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or attempt to discern the truth of any factual issue.” Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 526 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Peter v. Wedl, 155 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 1998)).

“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Lund-Russ Constructors, Inc. v. Buchanan (In re Buchanan), 31 F.4th 1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2021) (en banc)).

B. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge debts “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Exceptions to discharge are “narrowly construed against the creditor and liberally construed for the debtor, thus effectuating the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code.” N. Hills Collections, Inc. v. McArthur (In re McArthur), AP Case No. 23-05002, 2023 WL 5597826, at *2 (Bankr. D.S.D. Aug. 29, 2023) (citing Caspers v. Van Horne (In re Van Horne), 823 F.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1987)).

“Willful and malicious are two distinct requirements” that a creditor seeking a nondischargeable determination must prove for the discharge exception of Section 523(a)(6) to apply. Fischer v. Scarborough (In re Scarborough), 171 F.3d 638, 641 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991)). To prevail under this section, “the party seeking to prevent discharge must show ․ that the debt is for both ‘willful ․ injury’ and ‘malicious injury.’ ” Blocker v. Patch (In re Patch), 526 F.3d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)).

As explained by the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiff must prove the following three elements under Section 523(a)(6): “(1) the debtor caused an injury to the creditor; (2) the injury must have been willfully inflicted—that is, the debtor must have desired the injury or must have been substantially certain that his conduct would result in the injury; and (3) the debtor's action must have been malicious.” Luebbert v. Glob. Control Sys., Inc. (In re Luebbert), 987 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing Patch, 526 F.3d at 1180–81). The plaintiff must prove each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing Patch, 526 F.3d at 1180). Each of the three elements will be discussed separately below.

(1) Injury to the Estate

“Courts considering the applicability of the § 523(a)(6) exception to discharge must ‘first determine exactly what injury the debt is for and then determine whether the debtor both willfully and maliciously caused that injury.” ’ Id. at 780 (quoting Patch, 526 F.3d at 1181). Here, the specific debt the Administrators seek to have be determined nondischargeable is the $275,000.00 judgment entered in favor of the Estate in the State Court Action. The judgment was for Ashton Rae Woods’ loss of life, funeral expenses, conscious pain and suffering prior to her death, and medical expenses related to her fatal injury. The injury that gives rise to that judgment is the wrongful death of Ashton Rae Woods caused by the fatal collision that occurred when the Debtor crossed the median highway. For the reasons stated, the summary judgment record supports a finding that the Estate's debt was caused by an injury and that injury is the wrongful death of Ashton Rae Woods resulting from this fatal collision.

(2) Willful Injury

The Supreme Court has made it clear that the “word ‘willful’ in (a)(6) modifies the word ‘injury,’ indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.” Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998). “ ‘Willful,’ standing alone, means intentional or deliberate.” Barclays Am./Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 774 F.2d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 1985). “Debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of § 523(a)(6).” Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 64. The Supreme Court explained:

Had Congress meant to exempt debts resulting from unintentionally inflicted injuries, it might have described instead “willful acts that cause injury.” Or, Congress might have selected an additional word or words, i.e., “reckless” or “negligent,” to modify “injury.” Moreover, as the Eighth Circuit observed, the (a)(6) formulation triggers in the lawyer's mind the category “intentional torts,” as distinguished from negligent or reckless torts. Intentional torts generally require that the actor intend “the consequences of an act,” not simply “the act itself.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, Comment a, p. 15 (1964) (emphasis added). The Kawaauhaus’ more encompassing interpretation could place within the excepted category a wide range of situations in which an act is intentional, but injury is unintended, i.e., neither desired nor in fact anticipated by the debtor. Every traffic accident stemming from an initial intentional act—for example, intentionally rotating the wheel of an automobile to make a left–hand turn without first checking oncoming traffic—could fit the description. See 113 F.3d, at 852. A “knowing breach of contract” could also qualify. See ibid. A construction so broad would be incompatible with the “well-known” guide that exceptions to discharge “should be confined to those plainly expressed.” Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562, 35 S.Ct. 287, 289, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915).

Id. at 61–62.

“[T]he correct rule is that a judgment debt cannot be exempt from discharge in bankruptcy unless it is based on what the law has for generations called an intentional tort, a legal category that is based on ‘the consequences of an act rather than the act itself.’ ” Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, comment a, at 15 (1965)), aff'd sub nom. Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. 57. “Unless the actor ‘desires to cause consequences of his act, or ․ believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it,’ he or she has not committed an intentional tort.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, at 15 (1965)). The category of “wrongs known as intentional torts ․ excludes injuries caused by acts that are merely negligent, grossly negligent, or even reckless.” Id. Expert testimony establishing that conduct that was “certain or substantially certain to cause physical harm ․ is not enough.” Id. at 853. The debtor must believe his conduct was substantially certain to cause the creditor to suffer harm. Id.

Although an action under Section 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury, the amended complaint in the State Court Action does not contain any allegations of deliberate or intentional actions on the part of the Debtor. Instead, as alleged by the Debtor and not disputed by the Administrators, the amended complaint alleges a breach of the Debtor's duty to keep a proper lookout and to keep in his lane of traffic.

The Debtor pled guilty to (1) careless and prohibited driving and (2) negligent homicide. Neither offense involves an intentional tort. Careless and prohibited driving refers to acting in a careless manner, not deliberately or intentionally. Similarly, negligent homicide, refers to the actor negligently causing the death of another person as a result of operating a vehicle. Again, not a deliberate or intentional act.

Mr. Barry opined that by driving his vehicle on the wrong side of the road the Debtor was acting “grossly reckless with a disregard for life,” and by driving in the wrong lane “as if it belonged to him” was “grossly negligent.” The category of “wrongs known as intentional torts ․ excludes injuries caused by acts that are merely negligent, grossly negligent, or even reckless.” Geiger, 113 F.3d at 852.

Mr. Barry also testified that, in his opinion, the Debtor “knew or should have known that his conduct would lead to serious injury or death to another.” As stated above, the Eighth Circuit addressed this type of opinion stating expert testimony establishing that conduct is “certain or substantially certain to cause physical harm ․ is not enough.” Id. at 853.

The Debtor testified in the State Court Action that he did not intentionally move into Ashton Rae Woods’ lane to cause an accident and did not hit her vehicle on purpose. No evidence in the summary judgment record disputes his testimony.

For the reasons stated, the Debtor has met his burden of proving that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find that the Debtor deliberately and intentionally desired to cause injury to the Estate. Further, the Administrators have failed to set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine dispute as to any material fact on this element for trial.

(3) Malicious Injury

Even if the Administrators had set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine question for trial on the element of willful injury, they must also overcome this same burden concerning the element of malice. “To give effect to the distinction between ‘malicious’ and ‘willful,’ [the Eighth Circuit has] held that malice requires more than just reckless behavior by the debtor.” Scarborough, 171 F.3d at 641 (citing Johnson v. Miera (In re Miera), 926 F.2d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1991)). Malice requires that the debtor “acted with the intent to harm.” Id. (citing Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. 57). Malicious conduct requires that “the conduct must not only be ‘certain or almost certain to cause ․ harm,’ it must also be ‘targeted at the creditor.’ ” Miera, 926 F.2d at 744 (quoting Long, 774 F.2d at 881). As stated by the Eighth Circuit, “[b]efore § 523(a)(6) applies to exempt the judgment from discharge, [the debtor's] actions must also have been malicious, or targeted at [the creditor], so that [the debtor] was ‘certain or almost certain to cause [the creditor] ․ harm.’ ” Scarborough, 171 F.3d at 643 (citing Miera, 926 F.2d at 743–44).

In response to the Motion, the Administrators submitted the Deposition of Mr. Barry asserting that his opinions create a genuine dispute of material fact to avoid summary judgment. However, Mr. Barry's opinions, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the Administrators, fall short of creating a genuine dispute of material fact to show the Debtor acted with malice in injuring Ashton Rae Woods or her Estate. Indeed, the standard for maliciousness is not met by the record.

There is no evidence that the Debtor specifically intended any harm to Ashton Rae Woods or her Estate. Although Mr. Barry opined that the Debtor knew or should have known that his conduct would lead to serious injury or death, nothing in the record would support a finding that he intended this serious injury or death to be suffered by Ashton Rae Woods or her Estate.

As stated by the Eighth Circuit by way of an example:

A person who deliberately and intentionally turns the wheel of an automobile to make a left-hand turn without looking up to see if traffic is coming the other way, an act very likely to lead to injury, however foolish or even reckless he or she may be, simply cannot fairly be described as committing an intentional tort.

Geiger, 113 F.3d at 852. Indeed, it is not even alleged in the State Court Action that the Debtor intended to inflict an injury on the deceased, and it cannot be said that he believed her death was substantially certain to result.

For the reasons stated, the Debtor has met his burden of proving that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find that the Debtor maliciously injured Ashton Rae Woods or the Estate, and the Administrators have failed to set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on this element for trial.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment underlying this case cannot give rise to a debt for willful and malicious injury by the Debtor to be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).² The Debtor has met his burden of proving that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find that the Debtor deliberately and intentionally desired to cause injury to Ashton Rae Woods or the Estate or to find that the Debtor maliciously injured Ashton Rae Woods or the Estate. The Administrators have failed to set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding these two elements. Therefore, as a matter of law this Court finds that the judgment debt owed by the Debtor to the Estate is not for willful and malicious injury under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The Debtor's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Judgment on the Complaint is entered in favor of the Debtor and against the Administrators. Accordingly, the State Court judgment owed to the Estate is determined to be a dischargeable debt.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “Doc. No.” here and throughout this order refers to the docket numbers as reflected on the docket sheet for AP Case No. 4:25-ap-01003.

2.   This result is consistent with other cases in this Circuit. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding debt for injuries dischargeable where drunk driver crossing center line and colliding with oncoming vehicle may have had reckless disregard for risks involved but did not intend to inflict injury); Reale v. Schaefer (In re Schaefer), AP Case No. 08-4029-705, 2008 WL 2437950, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. June 13, 2009) (finding debt for damages to property dischargeable where intoxicated driver was not alleged to have intentionally inflicted the damage).

Phyllis M. Jones, United States Bankruptcy Judge