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IN RE: Martisha Unique Jennings and Markeia Louisa Jennings, Debtor(s).
ORDER
Chapter 7
ORDER DENYING DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS: VIOLATION OF AUTOMATIC STAY
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion for Sanctions: Violation of Automatic Stay (“Motion for Sanctions”) filed by Martisha Unique Jennings (“Debtor”), pro se.1 Debtor and Markeia Louisa Jennings (“Co-Debtor”) (collectively, “Debtors”) filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 10, 2026. Debtor seeks sanctions against Green Alpha Property Management (“Landlord”) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), alleging that Landlord willfully violated the automatic stay by sending postpetition collection letters to Debtor. Landlord filed a Response opposing the Motion.2 The Court scheduled a hearing on the Motion for Sanctions for May 12, 2026, and ordered the parties to file any exhibits that they sought to have admitted into evidence five business days prior to the hearing.3
On April 15, 2026, Debtors filed a Request to Appear Remotely (the “Request”) at the May 12, 2026 hearing, asserting that they do not have a vehicle, reliable transportation, or financial means to travel to the courthouse for an in-person appearance.4 In response to their Request, the Court entered an Order on April 24, 2026, requiring the parties to file any proposed exhibits for the hearing by no later than May 1, 2026, and a joint statement of dispute by no later than 12:00 p.m. on May 5, 2026, so that the Court could determine the Debtors’ request to appear remotely.5 The Court further stated that “unless the Court orders otherwise, Debtors are expected to appear at the hearing in person.”
On April 26, 2026, Debtor filed a Reply to Landlord's Response and attached a copy of a document that appears to be a record of a hospital visit for Debtor on April 16, 2026.6 No documents designated as exhibits for the hearing were filed by either party by the May 1, 2026 deadline.7 Landlord filed a Statement of Dispute on May 5, 2026.8 Debtor did not file a statement of dispute as ordered.9 On May 6, 2026, based on Debtors’ failure to file proposed exhibits as instructed or submit a joint statement of dispute, the Court entered an order denying Debtors’ Request to Appear Remotely.10 On May 8, 2026, Debtors filed correspondence with the Court stating that they would be unable to attend the hearing on May 12, 2026 due to their lack of transportation.11 Debtors further stated in the correspondence that “due to our inability to appear in person, we understand that the Court may deny or close our Motion for Sanctions” and “[w]e do not wish to delay the administration of our bankruptcy case and respectfully request that the main case continue moving forward toward discharge without interruption.”
The Court held a hearing on the Motion for Sanctions, which was attended by Landlord's representative and its counsel. Debtors did not appear. At the hearing, Landlord's counsel represented to the Court that Debtors had not made any postpetition rent payments to Landlord. Landlord did not dispute that it sent two letters to Debtors postpetition: (1) a thirty (30) Day Notice to Vacate sent on April 1, 2026 (“First Notice”) and (2) a five (5) day Notice to Vacate sent on April 6, 2026 (“Second Notice”), but denied its actions constitute a willful violation of the automatic stay because the letters were sent due to computer error. According to the testimony of Landlord's representative, Shequisha Ryans, the First Notice was sent during training on Landlord's new property management software when she inadvertently triggered the automatic generation and mailout of the Notice to Vacate to Debtors and all other tenants. After sending First Notice, Ms. Ryans contacted Debtor to tell her to please disregard the First Notice. She testified that the Second Notice, which demanded payment within five (5) days or eviction proceedings would be commenced, was also sent out due to computer error. Landlord asserts that the computer error has been fixed and is not an ongoing problem.
DISCUSSION
Section 362(k)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). To recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay, a debtor must establish five elements: (1) a bankruptcy petition was filed, (2) the debtor is an “individual” under the automatic stay provision, (3) the creditor received notice of the petition, (4) the creditor's actions in violation of the stay were willful, and (5) the debtor suffered damages. In re Weathers, 670 B.R. 20, 32 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2025) (citing cases). Debtor bears the burden of proof and must demonstrate a willful violation of the automatic stay by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing cases).
Landlord opposes the Motion for Sanctions on two grounds: (1) Landlord's sending of two letters to Debtor in violation of the stay was not “willful” because the letters were inadvertently sent due to computer error, and (2) Debtor has not shown any damages. Landlord's argument that its violation of the stay is not “willful” is unfounded. As previously recognized by this Court in In re Defeo, “the majority of bankruptcy courts have held that a violation of the automatic stay occurring from intentional creditor action following human clerical or computer error still constitutes a “willful” violation.” 635 B.R. 253, 263 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2022) (citing Duby v. U.S. (In re Duby), 451 B.R. 664, 674 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011)); Rijos v. Vizcaya, 263 B.R. 382, 392 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2001) (finding that the “computer did it” defense to a willful violation of stay action is not viable); In re Silk, 549 B.R. 297 (Bankr. D.Mass. 2016); In re Nixon, 419 B.R. 281, 289 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009) (recognizing majority view and citing cases); see also In re Romero, No. 10-00837-HB, 2010 WL 4863781 (Bankr. D.S.C. Nov. 23, 2010). To establish the element of willfulness, Debtor is not required to show that the creditor specifically intended to violate the automatic stay. Defeo, 635 B.R. at 264. The Court cautions Landlord that when it has been notified of a debtor's bankruptcy case, it bears the burden of ensuring that it does not violate the automatic stay by pursuing collection efforts against the debtor, which includes taking necessary steps to prevent its computer system or staff from automatically generating and sending collection notices to a debtor during a pending bankruptcy case. See id. at 263 (citing In re Highsmith, 542 B.R. 738, 747 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2015)) (“When reasonable, actual notice is received, it becomes a creditor's responsibility to ensure it has not violated the stay ․”); Weatherford v. Timmark (In re Weatherford), 413 B.R. 273, 287 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2009) (“When a creditor is put on notice of a debtor's bankruptcy case, the burden remained with [the creditor] to continue monitoring the status of [the debtor's] bankruptcy if they were going to proceed with any collection action over the course of the following months.”) (internal quotations omitted). For these reasons, the Court finds that the willfulness element is satisfied in this case.
To prevail on her § 362(k) claim, however, Debtor must provide concrete evidence of actual damages caused by the stay violation. Romero, 2010 WL 4863781, at *7 (“For purposes of Section 362(k), actual damages should be awarded only if there is concrete evidence supporting the award of a definite amount.”) (quoting In re Rawles, C/A No. 08-00555, 2009 WL 2924005, at *2 (Bankr. D.Md. June 18, 2009)). In the Motion for Sanctions, Debtor seeks actual damages, including emotional distress and any financial harm suffered, as well as punitive damages. As Debtor did not appear at the hearing to prosecute the Motion for Sanctions by presenting evidence to support her claim for damages, there is no proper evidence before the Court to support an award of damages in this case. While Debtor attached a hospital record to her Reply, this document has neither been properly authenticated nor introduced into evidence and therefore cannot be considered to support an award of damages.12 See Fed. R. Evid. 901. The Court concludes that Debtor has failed to meet her burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, Debtor's claim under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) must be denied.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Debtor's Motion for Sanctions: Violation of Automatic Stay is DENIED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
FOOTNOTES
1. ECF No. 31, filed Apr. 6, 2026. The Motion for Sanctions was signed only by Debtor Martisha Unique Jennings and does not appear to seek relief on behalf of Co-Debtor Markeia Louisa Jennings.
2. ECF No. 41, filed Apr. 22, 2026.
3. ECF No. 32, filed Apr. 8, 2026
4. ECF No. 38.
5. ECF No. 42, filed Apr. 24, 2026.
6. ECF No. 46, filed Apr. 26, 2026.
7. Landlord's counsel emailed chambers on April 27, 2026 to report that Landlord did not intend to present any exhibits at the hearing. ECF No. 48.
8. ECF No. 49. Landlord's counsel indicated in the Statement of Dispute that he had not received any communication from Debtors regarding the joint statement of dispute or the issue of settling the case.
9. On May 5, 2026, Debtors filed Correspondence which appeared to be a screenshot of a text message relating to a Xfinity account indicating that the account had been placed for collection with a collection agency. ECF No. 53. This filing appears unrelated to the Motion for Sanctions.
10. ECF No. 52.
11. ECF No. 56.
12. The hospital record merely indicates that Debtor received treatment at the hospital for headache and vomiting on April 16, 2026. Even if the Court were to consider the hospital record, no causal link has been established between the condition treated at the hospital and the emotional distress allegedly caused by the Landlord's actions.
Elisabetta G. M. Gasparini US Bankruptcy Judge District of South Carolina
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Docket No: C /A No. 26-01068-EG
Decided: May 14, 2026
Court: United States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Carolina.
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