BLEDSOE v. GUILIANI (2021)

MEMORANDUM **

Donnell Bledsoe appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his action alleging federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Bledsoe's action because Bledsoe failed to state any plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and stating leave may be denied if amendment would be futile); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel in a criminal proceeding); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (judges are immune from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts; prosecutors are entitled to immunity from § 1983 claims).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Bledsoe's request for appointment of counsel, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.