UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ (2020)

MEMORANDUM ***

Defendant-Appellant David Ignacio Lopez appeals from the district court’s revocation of his supervised release and the imposition of an additional 60 months of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Lopez argues for the first time on appeal that the supervised release conditions imposed in his original sentence and in his revocation sentence prohibiting him from having contact with minors are unconstitutionally vague. We disagree, concluding that there was no error, let alone plain error. United States v. Johnson, 626 F.3d 1085, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2010). We construe release conditions as not prohibiting unintentional conduct or incidental contacts. See, e.g., United States v. Vega, 545 F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, there was no error in imposing the no-contact conditions because a person of “common intelligence” would understand what they prohibit: knowingly being around or having contact with a minor that is more than incidental. United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010). Nor did the district court plainly err in failing to consider the effect of the no-contact conditions on Lopez’s relationship with his brother because the conditions did not “target[ ]” Lopez’s sibling relationship, United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2012), and Lopez failed to show that they infringe his right to familial association.

Finally, Lopez contends that his sentence is procedurally unsound and substantively unreasonable. We conclude there was no procedural plain error, as described above. We also conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion and impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. United States v. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010). The record reveals that Lopez’s sentence reasonably relates to the statutory goal the district court identified—protecting the public—given the underlying conviction and the nature of the supervised release violation. See United States v. Rudd, 662 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 2011); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

AFFIRMED.