SHELTON v. Tonya Strozier, Defendant. (2020)

MEMORANDUM **

Shekesha Renee Shelton appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her employment action alleging claims under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 736 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Shelton failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Tucson Unified School District’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Shelton’s November 2015 and May 2016 evaluation scores, and its failure to accommodate Shelton’s request for coverage to express breast milk on May 19, 2016, were pretextual. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 228-30, 135 S.Ct. 1338, 191 L.Ed.2d 279 (2015) (setting forth burden-shifting framework for PDA claims).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shelton’s motion to amend the complaint because Shelton failed to comply with the local rules. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that this court gives “[b]road deference” to district court’s interpretation of its local rules); D. Ariz. Loc. R. 15.1(a).

We reject as without merit Shelton’s contention that the district court’s grant of summary judgment violated her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. See Johnson v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] summary judgment proceeding does not deprive the losing party of its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.”).

AFFIRMED.