QIN v. KONG BROWN (2020)

MEMORANDUM **

We sua sponte grant Qin leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

Li Qin appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims challenging the validity of a private arbitration award. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Qin's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it is a “de facto appeal” of prior state court decisions and Qin raises claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with those state court decisions. See id. at 1163-65 (discussing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that claims, as well as requests for damages, are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court decisions where federal adjudication “would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the same issues” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

To the extent that Qin challenges the district court's order denying her motion for reconsideration, we lack jurisdiction over that decision because Qin did not file an amended notice of appeal after the district court denied the motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017).

AFFIRMED.