BRAY v. VILLEGAS CCWF (2020)

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Amber Merrie Bray appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Bray’s action because Bray failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants disregarded an excessive risk to Bray’s serious medical needs. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bray’s state law claims because Bray failed to state a federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (district court in its discretion “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Bray’s motion to appoint counsel (Docket Entry No. 4) is denied.

The Clerk will file the opening brief received at Docket Entry No. 5.

AFFIRMED.