ELLIS v. Karen Barcklay; et al., Defendants. (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

Arizona state prisoner Michael Ellis appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference in the treatment of his skin condition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Ellis’s claims against defendants Barclay-Dodson, Devon, Myers, and Johnson because Ellis failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-60 (deliberate indifference is a high legal standard; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ellis’s deliberate indifference claim against defendant Corizon Inc. because Ellis failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any policy or custom of Corizon Inc. caused him to suffer a constitutional injury. See Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (discussing requirements to establish liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (a private entity is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the entity acted under color of state law and the constitutional violation was caused by the entity’s official policy or custom).

AFFIRMED.