LINDER v. Drug Enforcement Administration, Defendant. (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

Federal prisoner David William Linder appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations. Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Linder’s action because Linder failed to file it within the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Winter v. United States, 244 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001) (FTCA claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (a complaint may be dismissed as time-barred if the running of the statute of limitations is apparent on the face of the complaint, and the allegations of the complaint would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.).

The district court properly concluded that Linder was not entitled to equitable tolling. See Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (explaining elements necessary for equitable tolling).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.