YOUNGER v. WIELENGA (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

David Michael Younger, a federal prisoner and former pretrial detainee, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his civil rights action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), alleging that defendants’ surveillance policy violated his rights to bodily privacy and religious freedom. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

To the extent that a Bivens remedy exists for Younger’s Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily privacy claim and First Amendment free exercise claim, the district court properly granted summary judgment because Younger failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ policy was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (stating that a regulation impinging on First Amendment rights is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and articulating the factors for determining whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest); Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Turner rational relationship test to pretrial detainee’s right to bodily privacy claim, and explaining that prison policy that allows for infrequent, irregular, or from a distance observation may not constitute a constitutional violation); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1857, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017) (cautioning against further extensions of Bivens to “new” contexts and requiring a special factors analysis before extending the Bivens remedy).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.