ABRAHAM v. CORIZON HEALTH INC (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

Andrew Abraham appeals the district court's orders: (1) dismissing his claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) granting summary judgment on his claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and (3) denying his motion to amend, as futile, his claim under Oregon's Public Accommodation Act, Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.142. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

This Court reviews de novo a district court's order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). L.A. Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2017). A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). We review a district court's denial of leave to amend on grounds of futility de novo. Hildes v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 734 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2013).

1. The district court properly dismissed Abraham's Title II claim against Corizon Health, Inc. (“Corizon”), a private corporation, because “[o]nly public entities are subject to Title II.” City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1773, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015).

2. The district court also properly granted Corizon's motion for summary judgment on Abraham's Rehabilitation Act claim. To be liable under the Rehabilitation Act, an entity must actually receive federal financial assistance, not merely benefit economically from it. Sharer v. Oregon, 581 F.3d 1176, 1177–78, 1181 (9th Cir. 2009). Abraham presented no evidence that Corizon received federal financial assistance directly or indirectly in 2015. See id. at 1180–81.

3. Abraham argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to amend his Oregon Revised Statute § 659A.142 claim as futile because, contrary to the court's conclusion, Corizon is a “place of public accommodation,” as defined by § 659A.400. Oregon courts have yet to address whether a private contractor like Corizon constitutes a “place of public accommodation.” It also appears that the district court did not consider whether there existed independent or supplemental jurisdiction over Abraham's § 659A.142 claim when it granted a summary judgment to Corizon on Abraham's final federal claim. We therefore vacate the district court's order denying Abraham's motion to amend as futile and remand for the court to consider its jurisdiction over Abraham's § 659A.142 claim in the first instance. See Brigham v. Eugene Water & Elec. Bd., 357 F.3d 931, 942 n.19 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e also remand the employees’ state-law claims to the district court for reconsideration—including whether the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over such claims is appropriate in the first instance given the paucity of state law authority on the precise topic at issue in this litigation.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c))).

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED. Each party shall bear its own costs.