GLADDEN v. BERRY (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

David Gary Gladden appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action related to the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) denial of his applications for a second-class airman medical certificate. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Gingery v. City of Glendale, 831 F.3d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 2016) (district court’s subject matter jurisdiction); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1997) (summary judgment). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Gladden’s claims directly challenging the denial of his applications for a second-class airman medical certificate because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to Gladden’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See 49 U.S.C. § 44703(d)(1), (3) (denial of an application for an airman certificate may be appealed to the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”); a person substantially affected by an order of the NTSB may seek judicial review under 49 U.S.C. § 46110).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Gladden’s constitutional claims challenging the FAA’s practices and procedures because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the collateral attack doctrine. See Americopters LLC v. FAA, 441 F.3d 726, 736 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The collateral attack doctrine prevents plaintiffs from crafting constitutional tort claims either as a means of relitigating the merits of the previous administrative proceedings, or as a way of evading entirely established administrative procedures.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.