STRIBLING v. WILSON (2019)

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Aaron L. Stribling, AKA Aaron Lamont Stribling, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that he was wrongfully deprived of personal property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Stribling’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim because Stribling failed to allege facts sufficient to show that a meaningful post-deprivation remedy was unavailable to him. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California [l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.”).

To the extent that Stribling alleged that the deprivation of his property violated the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, the district court properly dismissed these claims because Stribling failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1989) (Fourth Amendment does not protect an inmate from the seizure or conversion of his property).

AFFIRMED.