UNITED STATES v. COX (2019)

MEMORANDUM ***

William Cox, Jr. contends that the district court should have suppressed the recording of a phone call he placed from jail, information from which was used to secure a search warrant for his car. He argues the conversation was “a protected communication under the [Secured Communications Act (SCA) ] or the Fourth Amendment,” so “a warrant was required for law enforcement to lawfully access those recorded calls.” We disagree and affirm.

1. Although the SCA prohibits “intentionally access[ing] without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided,” or exceeding authorized access to that facility, to obtain access to electronic communication stored therein, 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a), suppression is not a remedy available for violations of those provisions. The statute provides that “[t]he remedies and sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter.” Id. § 2708. Suppression is not among the remedies and sanctions described. Id. § 2701. For that reason, this circuit has long recognized that “the [SCA] does not provide an exclusion remedy. It allows for civil damages and criminal punishment but nothing more.” United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

2. The Fourth Amendment is no more help than the SCA to Cox. United States v. Van Poyck is clear that “any expectation of privacy in outbound calls from prison is not objectively reasonable and that the Fourth Amendment is therefore not triggered by the routine taping of such calls.” 77 F.3d 285, 291 (9th Cir. 1996).

AFFIRMED.