CALDWELL II v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY (2018)

MEMORANDUM **

Patrick Demon Caldwell II appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional claims relating to a traffic stop and impoundment of his vehicle. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Caldwell’s action for failure to state a claim because Caldwell failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (no Fourth Amendment violation when officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred); Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) (defining a seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of an equal protection claim).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.