SARGEANT v. BELL (2018)

MEMORANDUM ***

In this action asserting claims under the Montana Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mike Sargeant and Ryan Funke appeal from the grant of summary judgment to Lake County, Montana; the Lake County Sheriff’s Department; and Lake County Sheriff Don Bell. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Recounting both documentary evidence and the statements of over a dozen named, credible witnesses, the warrant application contained ample, particularized allegations raising a “fair probability” that unlawfully possessed animal parts would be found in Sargeant and Funke’s homes in violation of Montana Code Annotated § 87-6-202. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95, 126 S.Ct. 1494, 164 L.Ed.2d 195 (2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ); see also Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2009).

2. The warrant was also sufficiently particularized. By directing officers to seize only those wildlife mounts that could reasonably be believed to be those that the Farrars identified in their witness statements, the warrant both (1) provided an “objective standard[ ] by which executing officers [could] differentiate items subject to seizure from those which [were] not” and (2) cabined the universe of mounts subject to seizure to those for which probable cause existed—i.e., those which the Farrars had identified as having likely been taken unlawfully. United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986). Because the warrant “provide[d] ․ guidelines to distinguish items used lawfully from those the government had probable cause to seize,” id. at 964, the warrant was sufficiently particular under both the Fourth Amendment and the Montana Constitution, see State v. Cotterell, 347 Mont. 231, 198 P.3d 254, 267 (2008).

AFFIRMED.