STEVENS v. FOSTER (2018)

MEMORANDUM **

Nevada state prisoner Theodore Stevens appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from his transfer and placement in administrative segregation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to amend. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Stevens leave to file a second amended complaint because further amendment would be futile. See id. (dismissal without leave to amend is proper “where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be futile”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (concluding that “discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation” required to create a liberty interest).

In his opening brief, Stevens failed to challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants, and therefore Stevens waived any challenge to summary judgment. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]rguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”); Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim․”).

AFFIRMED.