SMETS v. WILSON (2018)

MEMORANDUM ***

Janice Smets appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her action alleging age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and Title VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Smets’s age discrimination claim because Smets failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she was discriminated against on the basis of her age. See Cotton v. City of Alameda, 812 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1987) (setting forth elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Smets’s retaliation claim because Smets failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant took an adverse employment action against her. See Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth elements of a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII).

The district court properly denied Smets’s motion to remand the action to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409 (“Filing a civil action ․ shall terminate Commission processing of the appeal.”).

We reject as without merit Smets’s contention that the district court lacked jurisdiction over her action as a “mixed case” complaint or appeal under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Smets’s motion to correct the opening brief (Docket Entry No. 26) is granted.

AFFIRMED.