ISMAIL v. STEINER (2026)

Yousef Ismail, a Middle Eastern male, has worked for the United States Postal Service for over twenty years and, at the time of this suit, served as a mail carrier in the Carpentersville, Illinois post office. In February 2022, police officers escorted Ismail from the workroom floor after a disagreement about overtime with his supervisor that escalated into yelling and profanity. The Postal Service then placed him on emergency leave without pay for two days. Ismail claims that this incident evidenced a pattern of race and national origin discrimination and retaliation as well as a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The district court granted summary judgment for the Postal Service on all claims. Finding no error, we affirm.

I. Background

When reviewing summary judgment, we take the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Hayes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 176 F.4th 994, 1002 (7th Cir. 2026). But here, Ismail did not oppose the Postal Service's Local Rule 65.1 Statement of Facts as he was required to do.¹ As a result, the district court deemed the facts offered by the Postal Service as true. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so (as we will explain later), we too will proceed along these lines.

Ismail was born in Palestine and identifies as Middle Eastern. Mail carriers in his position begin their days casing and sorting their assigned mail on the workroom floor and then make deliveries on their route. Ismail worked between eight and twelve hours a day and requested overtime on a near-daily basis using Postal Service Form 3996.

On February 11, 2022, while Ismail was casing his mail on the workroom floor, his supervisor Salvatore Calabrese told him to return from his route by 5:30 p.m. They debated about how long the route should take given the day's mail volume. As they conversed, Calabrese was standing close to Ismail and was not wearing a mask, which Ismail felt violated COVID protocols. The interaction escalated into yelling, and Calabrese and union steward Benjamin Oswald both asked Ismail to move the discussion to Calabrese's office. Ismail, however, refused and kept yelling on the workroom floor, exclaiming at one point, “I don't give a shit!”

In response, Calabrese left the floor and called the post-master and police; Ismail stayed on the floor. The police eventually arrived and escorted Ismail out of the facility. As a result of his actions, the Postal Service placed Ismail on emergency off-duty status, which led to his immediate removal from work and docking of two days' pay.

Ismail returned to work as usual on Monday, February 14. He later filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement challenging the emergency placement. The parties eventually resolved the grievance by settlement, and the Postal Service agreed to rescind the placement and compensate Ismail for the two days of missing pay.

Ismail raises several other incidents that, he claims, reveal discriminatory treatment. On March 2, 2022, for example, Ismail signed a form indicating that he would work through lunch that day. When Calabrese mistakenly excluded the time from Ismail's records, Ismail complained, and Calabrese corrected the error.

On April 30, 2022, Ismail was mistakenly charged for failing to work while sick with COVID. He informed Calabrese, who corrected this error as well.

On May 26, 2022, Calabrese conducted Ismail's annual route observation to determine the length of the route and the approximate time necessary to complete it. On that day, they were joined by Joseph Hoffarth, a new supervisor from another post office, who was there to be trained. According to Ismail, he found Hoffarth's presence intimidating.

Ismail also asserts that, on June 2, 2022, Calabrese stood close to him while he was talking to the union steward. Ismail viewed this as an indication that Calabrese wanted him to stop talking with the steward and instead return to work.

Ismail filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint about the events of February 11 with the Postal Service on June 10, 2022. After investigating the incident, the Service's EEO Office issued its final decision finding no discrimination or retaliation on November 8, 2022. As of July 2023, Ismail had filed eight other EEO complaints between 2003 and 2018 and thirty-one union grievances between 2006 and January 2022.

After receiving the final agency decision, Ismail filed this lawsuit against the Postal Service. After discovery, the Postal Service filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Ismail appeals.

II. Discussion

We review a district court's summary judgment de novo. Abayomi v. Collins, 182 F.4th 587, 593 (7th Cir. 2026). A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Runkel v. City of Springfield, 51 F.4th 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).

A. Local Rule 56.1

The district court deemed admitted the statements in the Postal Service's statement of facts, citing Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1. We review a district court's enforcement of local rules for an abuse of discretion. Rongere v. City of Rockford, 99 F.4th 1095, 1101 (7th Cir. 2024). Our circuit has long recognized that district courts “may require strict compliance with their local rules[.]” Id. (quoting Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2020)).

Ismail does not dispute the fact that he failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1. Instead, he contends that the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3), which provides that a court “may consider other materials in the record” that are not cited by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

To oppose summary judgment, Ismail had attached the deposition transcript of the union steward to his response brief, which he believes the court ignored. But the district court in fact reviewed the transcript and cited it in its decision. See Ismail v. DeJoy, No. 23-851, 2025 WL 371781, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2025). What is more, the district court asked the Postal Service to provide the full transcript of Calabrese's deposition (rather than just selected pages) so it could better assess the issues Ismail raised. The district court's action were well within its discretion.

B. Discriminatory Treatment

Turning to the merits, Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual on account of race or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). To survive summary judgment, a Title VII plaintiff must point to evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a reasonable jury could find that such discrimination occurred. And, to do so, the plaintiff can utilize one of two well-trodden paths.

First, he can involve the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this approach, he first must present evidence that “(1) [he] is a member of the protected class; (2) [he] met [his] employer's legitimate job expectations; (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside of the protected class were treated more favorably.” Naficy v. Ill. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 697 F.3d 504, 511 (7th Cir. 2012). If the plaintiff overcomes this hurdle, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action. Id. If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to present evidence that the offered reason was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 512.

Second, a Title VII plaintiff can also employ a more holistic approach to the evidence to establish an inference of prohibited discrimination. See Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016).

Here, Ismail employs the McDonnell Douglas framework, and the Postal Service concedes the first three factors: Ismail is a member of a protected class; he performed his job well enough; and emergency placement and forced removal from the workroom floor was a “ ‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or condition” that qualifies as an adverse employment action. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354, 144 S.Ct. 967, 218 L.Ed.2d 322 (2024) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)).

The dispute here centers around the last factor—Ismail's contention that a colleague, Deborah Eckler, was a similarly situated employee who received more favorable treatment. When considering whether two individuals are similarly situated, we take a “flexible, common-sense” approach—“the proposed comparator must be similar enough to permit a reasonable juror to infer, in light of all the circumstances, that an impermissible animus motivated the employer's decision.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2012). Relevant factors include whether the individuals had the same supervisor; whether their respective positions were subject to the same standards; and whether the individuals engaged in similar conduct in similar circumstances. Id. at 847. “Whether a comparator is similarly situated is typically a question for the fact finder, unless, of course, the plaintiff has no evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the plaintiff met his burden on this issue.” McDaniel v. Progress Rail Locomotive, Inc., 940 F.3d 360, 369 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

According to Ismail, Eckler was a white female carrier who was also supervised by Calabrese. He claims that Eckler had confronted and yelled at Calabrese on the workroom floor but was not escorted out by the police. But Ismail did not observe the incident firsthand and has no personal knowledge of this incident. Nor does Ismail know whether Eckler faced discipline for the incident. And Calabrese himself did not recall any serious confrontations with any employees other than Ismail.

Ismail also points to Oswald, who testified that arguments between mail carriers and members of management occasionally took place on the workroom floor. But Oswald did not identify the names or racial and ethnic identities of the mail carriers involved in these altercations. And he acknowledged that such encounters were usually deescalated by the individuals involved.

Simply put, Ismail has failed to create a genuine issue of fact that Eckler had engaged in substantially comparable conduct and later received more favorable treatment. As a result, he has not met his burden to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Furthermore, even when taking the record as a whole, we agree with the district court that no reasonable jury could conclude that the Postal Service's emergency placement of Ismail on February 11 was attributable to his race or national origin, rather than his heated altercation with Calabrese on the work-room floor. See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. Accordingly, the district court properly entered judgment in favor of the Postal Service on this claim.

C. Title VII Retaliation

Title VII also proscribes retaliation against employees who complain of discrimination. To establish a retaliation claim, Ismail must show that: “(1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) there was a but-for causal connection between the two.” Abayomi, 182 F.4th at 596.

Here, the Postal Service agrees that Ismail engaged in protected activity by filing the numerous EEO complaints and does not dispute that he suffered an adverse action that would dissuade an employee from filing future complaints. The contest is about causation.

When a plaintiff brings a Title VII retaliation claim, he can show causation by presenting direct evidence “that [his] complaints and EEO filings were a substantial or motivating factor” in his employer's decisions to take the adverse action against him. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860 (citation modified). Additionally, he can offer circumstantial evidence that could lead to an inference of but-for causation, including: (1) “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, ․ and other bits and pieces from which an inference of retaliatory intent might be drawn”; (2) evidence “that similarly situated employees were treated differently”; and (3) facts indicating “that the employer offered a pretextual reason for an adverse employment action.” Id. (citation modified).

Here, Ismail relies primarily on what he believes to be suspicious timing to draw the causal link between a previous EEO complaint and the February 11, 2022, incident. But the EEO complaint, on which Ismail relies, was filed in 2018 and was closed by January 9, 2019. The three-year gap between the EEO disposition and the events of February 2022 is much too great to raise a reasonable inference of causation. See Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 996 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a thirteen-month period between protected activity and an adverse action did not create a genuine issue of fact as to causation).

Ismail also points to various union grievances he filed, including one in January 2022. But his grievances complained of overtime and timekeeping processing and approval errors rather than actionable discrimination. Accordingly, they cannot form the basis of his Title VII retaliation claim. See McHale v. McDonough, 41 F.4th 866, 871–72 (7th Cir. 2022) (“The charge—whether formal or informal—must be about the discrimination.”) (citation omitted).

Having failed to show suspicious timing, Ismail points again to Eckler to create an inference of retaliation. See Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 560 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f the time interval standing alone is long enough to weaken an inference of retaliation, the plaintiff is entitled to rely on other circumstantial evidence to support her claim.”) (citing Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860–61). But nothing in the record indicates that Eckler had filed any EEO complaints, making her an inapt comparator.

In conclusion, Ismail failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that his protected activity under Title VII motivated the Postal Service's treatment of him on February 11, 2022. Thus, entry of summary judgment on this claim was appropriate.

D. Hostile Work Environment

Finally, Ismail did not expressly allege a “hostile work environment” in his complaint. But the district court, out of an abundance of caution, considered the claim because Ismail had alluded to it in his June 2022 EEO complaint and mentioned it in his response to the Postal Service's summary judgment motion.

To prove a hostile work environment claim, Ismail must show that (1) his work environment was both objectively and subjectively offensive; (2) his protected class was the cause of the harassment; (3) the conduct was either severe or pervasive; and (4) there was a basis for employer liability. Trahanas v. Nw. Univ., 64 F.4th 842, 853 (7th Cir. 2023). When assessing the viability of such a claim, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993).

The district court assumed without deciding that the treatment Ismail suffered on February 11 was severe, humiliating, and physically threatening. The court also assumed that being escorted off the floor unreasonably interfered with Ismail's work performance. But, here again, the court did not find any evidence that Calabrese's actions against Ismail were motivated by his race or national origin. We agree.

Ismail and Calabrese clearly clashed. But, on this record, no reasonable jury could find that Calabrese's treatment of Ismail, however disrespectful or ill-advised, had anything to do with Ismail's race or national origin. See Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1015 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming summary judgment because, even if supervisors were allegedly disrespectful and hostile, there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that any alleged harassment was based in part on protected characteristics).

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See N.D. Ill. LR 56.1(e)(3) (“To dispute an asserted fact, a party must cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact and must concisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact. Asserted facts may be deemed admitted if not controverted with specific citations to evidentiary material.”).

LEE, Circuit Judge.