PEREZ v. BLANCHE (2026)

Petitioner Maria Angelica Gonzalez Perez (“Perez”) and her four children seek review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming and adopting the adverse decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying their requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection from removal under the Convention Against Torture (“C.A.T.”). We deny the petition for review because Perez failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before the Board.

I.

Perez and her children are natives and citizens of Mexico. They lived in Ciudad Hidalgo, Michoacán, until 2014, when they left Mexico and entered the United States after requesting political asylum at the border. (Perez's husband entered this country separately, without inspection.) Perez and her children were placed in removal proceedings, where they conceded their removability. Perez applied for the abovenoted forms of relief based on her experience with the Caballeros Templarios cartel—the Knights Templar—in 2014. The IJ conducted a hearing on those applications in November 2018. Perez testified at that hearing.

Perez stated that, in September 2014, she received a phone call from someone identifying themselves as a member of the Knights Templar. The caller claimed to know where she and her children lived and where the children attended school. He described the children's school schedule and provided other details suggesting that the family was being monitored. He threatened that the children would be kidnapped if she did not pay the cartel 5,000 pesos per child. He also warned her not to contact the authorities because that would be worse for her and her children. Perez said that she hung up the phone and (temporarily) disconnected it. She did not contact the authorities, because “[i]n my town there is corruption and we all know about it.” A.R. 128. She explained that the police in Ciudad Hidalgo are known to ignore, if not facilitate, cartel extortion.

Two days later, the caller contacted Perez a second time, again identifying himself as a member of the Knights Templar cartel and directing her not to hang up the phone. He admonished Perez that he “was not playing around,” and that he knew the location of her children. A.R. 129. At that point, she hung up the phone, gathered her children from their schools, and fled Ciudad Hidalgo with the children and her husband to a small farmhouse five hours away. After staying at the farmhouse for a few days and raising funds from friends, the family emigrated to the United States.

Perez also testified regarding an incident in October 2013 involving her sister, Maria Lidia. Maria Lidia's family had received phone calls from Knights Templar members demanding money, and the family ignored the demands until the cartel kidnapped Maria Lidia's husband and then demanded 3 million pesos as ransom. It was at that point that Maria Lidia contacted Perez and asked for help. The family was able to secure the husband's return after transferring 1 million pesos, the titles to two vehicles, and the deed to the family's house to the cartel.

Like Perez, her sister did not report the kidnapping to the police because of their reputed corruption. Maria Lidia apparently did contact the military for assistance, but military officials responded that it was not their responsibility. She and her family remain in Mexico but periodically relocate in order to evade the cartel.

Another of Perez's sisters, Selena, as well as Perez's father continue to live in Ciudad Hidalgo and have not been extorted or harmed. Perez has not heard from the Knights Templar cartel since she left Mexico in 2014. But she does not believe that she and her family can return, because “everything in Mexico is the same.” A.R. 137.

Apart from her own testimony, Perez's application was supported by her sworn affidavit in addition to one from her sister Maria Lidia; news articles documenting widespread criminal activity, including kidnappings, in Mexico along with corruption and lawlessness among the police in Ciudad Hidalgo; a report documenting prior police advice not to report cartel extortion; and a 2017 State Department report noting the violence perpetrated by organized criminal groups in Mexico along with endemic corruption among public officials.

After hearing the evidence, the IJ found Perez's testimony credible but nonetheless denied her relief. With respect to the asylum claim, the IJ found that:

(1) Perez had not shown that she suffered past persecution in Mexico. The threats from the Knights Templar, “while intimidating, were not credible or immediate,” given that the cartels never carried through on their threats even after Perez and her family failed to comply with their demands. A.R. 429.

(2) Even if Perez established past harm, she failed to tie that harm to a protected ground, including membership in a particular social group. The social group that Perez identified was “resident of a town that cannot be protected by the government.” Assuming that was a cognizable social group, Perez did not connect that group to the alleged harm she suffered. “There is no evidence that the cartel members were concerned with any characteristic other than the respondent's perceived ability to ‘fill their coffers.’ Instead, the threats are more indicative of extortion and general crime, which are not bases for asylum.” A.R. 430 (citations omitted).

(3) Perez did not demonstrate that the Mexican government is unable or unwilling to protect her from the cartel's threats. She never sought out the assistance of the authorities when contacted by the cartel, and the documentary evidence she submitted indicated that Mexican authorities are treating crime seriously and are taking steps to reduce cartel violence. A.R. 430.

(4) In view of the foregoing findings as to past persecution, Perez was not entitled to a presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution in Mexico. Further, she had not otherwise demonstrated that she harbors such a well-founded fear: (a) Although she subjectively fears that the Knights Templar cartel will harm her if she returns to Mexico, she did not present evidence suggesting how the cartel will find and harm her. Her father and one sister continue to reside in Ciudad Hidalgo safely. (b) The record did not reflect a pattern or practice of persecution of persons similarly situated to Perez. “Generalized violence and harsh conditions are not enough to demonstrate such a pattern or practice.” (c) She did not demonstrate that she was unable to relocate within Mexico to avoid the harm she fears. She and her family did relocate internally for a brief time after the second threatening phone call and avoided harm; her sister had successfully relocated elsewhere in Mexico after her husband was kidnapped; and the documentary evidence likewise suggested that internal relocation was possible as a means of evading the cartel. A.R. 430-31.

(5) Because Perez did not demonstrate her eligibility for asylum, she necessarily failed to meet the more stringent criteria for withholding of removal. A.R. 432.

(6) Finally, as to the CAT claim, torture entails “an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment,” and Perez had not shown she faced a “substantial risk” of such severe mistreatment if she were returned to Mexico. Although her evidence indicated that violence is widespread throughout Mexico, “[t]his generalized violence, while concerning, does not demonstrate that the respondent faces a substantial risk of torture.” Likewise, with respect to cartel violence in Mexico, Perez had not shown that the Knights Templar cartel was more likely than not to learn of her prospective return to Mexico, find her, and torture her, or that the Mexican government would acquiesce in the cartel's torture. And, again, she had not shown why relocation within Mexico would not suffice as a way to avoid the cartel. AR. 432-33.

Perez appealed the IJ's adverse decision to the BIA. After setting forth the facts of her case and the general legal principles applicable to her claims for relief, she presented her arguments as to the IJ's denial of asylum and withholding exclusively in the following four numbered paragraphs of her brief:

17. The government of Mexico could [not] protect and would not be able to protect Respondents [Perez and her children] if they were forced to go back to Mexico. This is evident by the widespread corruption of police officers in Mexico.

18. Respondent suffered past persecution and fears future persecution on account of her membership in a particular social group.

19. These horrifying events clearly establish that (1) Respondent suffered past persecution based on membership in a particular social group, (2) Respondents have a well-founded fear of future persecution based on membership in a particular social group, (3) it is more likely than not that Respondents would be persecuted because of membership in a particular social group, and (4) that it is more likely than not that Respondents would be tortured if removed to Mexico. We know this to be true because Respondent's brother-in-law was indeed kidnapped after they failed to pay Caballeros Templarios.

20. The Court, however, determined that the “threats, while intimidating, were not credible or immediate, given that the cartels never carried through on their threats even after [Perez] failed to comply with their demands.” November 7, 2019 Decision (“Decision”) at 4. The cartel[']s threats were clearly credible and immediate given that Respondent's brother-in-law was kidnapped for one month because they failed to comply with the cartel's demands. And Respondents were not harmed or kidnapped because they fled immediately after receiving the second threat. Under the Court's reasoning, Respondents should have waited until after they were kidnapped or harmed before fleeing. The threats cannot be mere harassment when the same cartel has carried out their threats against Respondents’ family.

A.R. 23.

The BIA adopted the IJ's opinion as its own and affirmed the denial of relief, stating as follows:

We agree with the Immigration Judge, for the reasons set forth in the [IJ's] decision, that the respondent did not prove that her harm rose to the level of persecution, that her harm was on account of a protected ground, that the Mexican government was unable or [unwilling] to protect her, that her subjective future fear of harm was objectively reasonable, and that she could not relocate. We also agree with the Immigration Judge that she did not prove her entitlement to [relief under] CAT.

A.R. 4 (citations & footnote omitted).

II.

In order to qualify for asylum, Perez must establish that she qualifies as a “refugee,” meaning she is “unable or unwilling” to return to Mexico because (1) she either has suffered past harm in her home country rising to the level of persecution or has a well-founded fear of suffering harm in the future that rises to the level of persecution, (2) the harm she experienced (or reasonably fears) is on account of one or more statutorily protected grounds including, as relevant here, membership in a particular social group, and (3) the mistreatment she experienced (or fears she will encounter in the future) was (or will be) committed by the government or by a private actor that the government was either unable or unwilling to control. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1); Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668, 669–71, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Borjas Cruz v. Garland, 96 F.4th 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 2024); Gonzalez Ruano v. Barr, 922 F.3d 346, 352, 354 (7th Cir. 2019); Orellana-Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476, 484–86 (7th Cir. 2017); Urbina-Dore v. Holder, 735 F.3d 952, 953 (7th Cir. 2013). She bears the burden of proving each of these elements, such that her failure to establish any one of them would be fatal to her claim for asylum, obviating any need to consider the other elements. E.g., de Paz-Peraza v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 390, 395 n.2 (7th Cir. 2025).

Perez must establish the same elements in order to qualify for withholding of removal, except that she must demonstrate a clear probability of persecution, as opposed to a reasonable possibility of persecution, if she is returned to Mexico. E.g., Rivas-Jarquin v. Bondi, 149 F.4th 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2025). So, if she does not meet the bar for asylum, she necessarily does not meet the standard for withholding of removal. Id.

Finally, in order to qualify for relief under the CAT, Perez must establish that it is more likely than not she will be subject to torture if she is returned to Mexico. Barry v. Barr, 916 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2019); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a).

Torture is defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity. ․

8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); see Fiddler v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 757, 760–61 (7th Cir. 2025). We will find the petitioner's burden satisfied if she shows there is a substantial risk she will be tortured if removed from the United States. Barry, 916 F.3d at 669. Consistent with the definition of torture, she must make some showing that the torture will be perpetrated by, at the behest of, or with the consent or acquiescence of public officials. Id.

Before seeking judicial review of the agency's adverse decision, a petitioner must exhaust the administrative remedies available to her as a matter of right. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).

A court may review a final order of removal only if the applicant first exhausts “ ‘all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right,’ 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), and ․ this includes the obligation first to present to the Board any arguments that lie within its power to address.” Issaq v. Holder, 617 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ghaffar v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2008)). To exhaust a claim, the petitioner must argue it specifically and with enough detail to put the Board on notice that the petitioner is trying to challenge the immigration judge's decision based on that argument. Kithongo v. Garland, 33 F.4th 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2022). “It is not enough that the new argument bears some relation to the evidentiary record.” Nyandwi v. Garland, 15 F.4th 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2021).

Munoz-Rivera v. Garland, 81 F.4th 681, 687–88 (7th Cir. 2023) (footnote omitted); see also Perez-Castillo v. Blanche, 177 F.4th 837, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2026) (argument not made to Board waived for purposes of judicial review). The exhaustion provision of section 1252(d)(1) is a mandatory claim-processing rule, as opposed to a jurisdictional rule. Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417–23, 143 S.Ct. 1103, 215 L.Ed.2d 375 (2023); Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 2016). As such, the rule is subject to waiver and forfeiture, but if properly invoked by the government, it must be enforced. Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U.S. 17, 20, 138 S.Ct. 13, 199 L.Ed.2d 249 (2017); Chavarria-Reyes, 845 F.3d at 279.

As the government points out, Perez made only cursory challenges to the IJ's adverse conclusions as to her asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims in the four numbered paragraphs we quoted above. In those paragraphs, she did not articulate to what particular social group she and her family belonged; she did not confront the IJ's determination that the Knights Templar were only interested in extorting money from her family and had not targeted her based on her membership in any social group; she did not preserve an argument that she had an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution; nor, relatedly, did she argue that internal relocation would not enable her to avoid future harm from the cartel. (The possibility of relocation, of course, bore upon the likelihood of future persecution.) It may be clear enough that Perez intended to challenge the IJ's adverse holdings on some if not all of these points, but in no way did Perez—who was represented by counsel ¹ —actually develop an argument engaging with the IJ's reasoning and alerting the Board as to why, exactly, she believed the IJ erred.² “Exhaustion means not just taking an appeal to the Board but also presenting an argument, so that the Board has ‘an opportunity to pass upon the particular legal arguments and contentions that [the alien] now raises.’ ” Chavarria-Reyes, 845 F.3d at 279 (quoting Zeqiri v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 364, 369–70 (7th Cir. 2008)); see also Khan v. Holder, 766 F.3d 689, 701–02 (7th Cir. 2014); cf. Long-Gang Lin v. Holder, 630 F.3d 536, 543 (7th Cir. 2010) (merely mentioning IJ's adverse findings, without advancing arguments as to why those findings were erroneous, was insufficient to preserve challenge in court of appeals).³

Perez therefore forfeited any argument as to these points, which were essential both to her asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims and to the IJ's rationale for denying relief to Perez on those claims. Because she forfeited those arguments, she deprived the Board of the opportunity to address the merits of the arguments and therefore failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Perez consequently cannot raise such arguments here; and because those arguments address essential elements of her claims, relief as to these claims is foreclosed to her in this court.

III.

The events that Perez has recounted are disturbing. But she failed to make a comprehensive case in her appeal to the Board, leaving key elements of her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT—and the IJ's reasons for denying those claims—unaddressed. She therefore forfeited any arguments she might have had as to those elements, and in turn failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required by section 1252(d)(1). The government has timely noted and relied upon the lack of exhaustion, and we are obligated to recognize the lack of exhaustion and deem relief to Perez on her asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims foreclosed. E.g., Chavarria-Reyes, 845 F.3d at 279. The petition for review is DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Perez is represented by different counsel in this court.

2.   By contrast, Perez arguably at least minimally developed arguments as to why, in her view, the IJ erred in not treating the cartel's threats to her family as imminent and credible, and why the Mexican police would be unable or unwilling to protect her family from the cartel if she and her children were deported to Mexico.

3.   Perez's notice of appeal to the Board (A.R. 36-39) is of no help to her in this regard, in that it does not outline any of the arguments she intended to raise with the Board. Cf. Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d 560, 564 n.3 (7th Cir. 2010) (petitioner's notice of appeal “stated the basic contours of the claims she wished to make” to the Board, so as to preserve those arguments and exhaust her administrative remedies).

Rovner, Circuit Judge.