SAMUEL HOGSETT v. THOMAS LILLARD (2023)

In 2007, a jury convicted Samuel Hogsett of three federal crimes, including being a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The sentencing court found that Hogsett was an armed career criminal because he had three prior convictions for violent felonies. As a result, he faced a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on his § 922(g) conviction instead of the then-applicable 10-year maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), (e)(1) (2006). The court sentenced him to 295 months' imprisonment on that count. In 2021, long after Hogsett's convictions became final, the Supreme Court interpreted “violent felony” in § 924(e) to exclude crimes that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1834 (2021) (plurality opinion). Hogsett thinks one of the convictions supporting his sentencing enhancement could have been committed recklessly, so he asserts that Borden establishes that his § 922(g) sentence is above the statutory maximum. Hogsett wants to bring a collateral challenge to that sentence.

To collaterally attack a conviction or sentence, a federal prisoner files a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Mangine v. Withers, 39 F.4th 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2022). The problem for Hogsett is that he filed a § 2255 motion in 2010, and a prisoner can only file another § 2255 motion in one of two specific circumstances:

A second or successive motion must be certified ․ by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain—

(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or

(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.

§ 2255(h). Thus, “[i]ntervening Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions ․ are outside the ambit of § 2255(h).” Mangine, 39 F.4th at 447. Because he did not satisfy the requirements to file a successive § 2255 motion, Hogsett filed a § 2241 habeas petition instead.

Hogsett argued that he was eligible to file a § 2241 habeas petition under § 2255(e), the “saving clause.” Under § 2255(e), “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a [federal] prisoner” who previously filed a § 2255 motion “shall not be entertained ․ unless it ․ appears that the remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Since In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998), we have interpreted § 2255(e) to allow a prisoner to seek habeas relief under § 2241 if:

(1) [his] claim relies on a statutory interpretation case, not a constitutional case and thus could not have been invoked by a successive § 2255 motion; (2) [he] could not have invoked the decision in his first § 2255 motion and the decision applies retroactively; and (3) the error is grave enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.

Mangine, 39 F.4th at 447 (quoting Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019)). The district court denied Hogsett's § 2241 petition, holding that even if Hogsett's sentence on his § 922(g) conviction was above the statutory maximum, there could be no miscarriage of justice because his total sentence was within the advisory Guidelines range. Hogsett appealed.^*

While Hogsett's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Hendrix, holding that § 2255(e) “does not permit a prisoner asserting an intervening change in statutory interpretation to circumvent [the] restrictions on second or successive § 2255 motions by filing a § 2241 petition.” 599 U.S. ----, 2023 WL 4110233, at *5 (June 22, 2023). Instead, the saving clause is designed to “cover[ ] unusual circumstances in which it is impossible or impracticable for a prisoner to seek relief from the sentencing court” in a § 2255 motion. Id. at *6 (giving examples including the dissolution of the sentencing court). The Court abrogated Davenport and its counterparts in other circuits because they were an improper end-run around § 2255(h)'s limitations on filing second or successive motions. Id. at *7–8. “The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy” § 2255(h)'s requirements, the Court explained, “does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause. It means that he cannot bring it at all.” Id. at *9.

The parties agree that Jones abrogates Davenport and controls this case. Hogsett previously filed a § 2255 motion, and he now wishes to invoke Borden to mount a new collateral attack on his sentence. Because Borden is a statutory interpretation decision, § 2255(h) does not permit Hogsett to file a successive § 2255 motion, and Jones forecloses the possibility of filing a § 2241 habeas petition via § 2255(e). 2023 WL 4110233, at *9. The district court applied Davenport and denied Hogsett's § 2241 petition on the merits, but Jones holds that federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions filed by federal prisoners in Hogsett's position. Id. We therefore vacate the district court's judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.   We thank Alison Guernsey and the Federal Criminal Defense Clinic at the University of Iowa College of Law for representing Hogsett and then-law-student Paige Roff for ably arguing the appeal on his behalf.

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge.