WINFIELD v. UNITED STATES PROBATION PRETRIAL SERVICES (2020)

Paul Winfield, former federal prisoner # 17050-043, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in which he challenged his conviction for bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). The district court found that he did not satisfy the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Christopher v. Miles, 342 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 2003).

A prisoner may use § 2241 to challenge his conviction only if the remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to contest the legality of his detention. § 2255(e). Winfield must establish the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of a § 2255 motion by satisfying the criteria of the savings clause of § 2255. See § 2255(e); Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 2001); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001). Under this circuit’s existing precedent, Winfield can meet that criteria if he shows that his petition presents a claim based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision that supports that he may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense and that the claim was foreclosed by circuit law when it should have been raised at trial, on direct appeal, or in his initial § 2255 motion. See Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904.

Winfield contests the legality of his conviction and argues that he can satisfy the Reyes-Requena criteria in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 195 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016). He contends that even though the Court in McDonnell did not construe his statute of conviction, the decision—which he asserts is retroactively applicable—is apposite because it narrowed the conduct that qualified as bribery and set forth principles for how guilt should be decided in prosecutions for federal bribery offenses. Winfield asserts that the holding of McDonnell indicates that § 666 is overbroad, that he was charged with, and convicted of, a nonexistent offense, and that his prosecution raised federalism concerns.

In McDonnell, the Court construed the definition of “official act” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3), and did not delimit, consider, or invalidate an element of § 666. See 136 S. Ct. at 2365-2375. The decision in McDonnell did not address § 666 and interpreted a component of a materially different crime. 136 S. Ct. at 2365-75. Moreover, a bribery offense under § 666 is not restricted to “official acts,” as defined in § 201(a)(3) and interpreted by McDonnell, and broadly bars corruptly soliciting or accepting a thing of value in exchange for influence or reward in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions. § 666(a)(1)(B) & § 666(b); see United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 345-47 (5th Cir. 2009); cf. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 56-58, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (describing expansive language of § 666 and rejecting arguments in favor of circumscribing text). Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the holding of McDonnell applies to the expansive language of § 666 that, by its plain text, covers more than “official acts.” See § 666(a)(1)(B) & § 666(b).

Winfield has not shown that he was convicted of a nonexistent offense in light of McDonnell. Thus, regardless whether McDonnell applies retroactively, or his instant challenge to § 666 was previously foreclosed, he has not established that he can meet the Reyes-Requena requirements to proceed under the savings clause. 243 F.3d at 903-04; see also Jeffers, 253 F.3d at 830.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

PER CURIAM:* FN* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.