DEBRA DUMMITT MEYERS RONALD PALERMO v. CBS CORPORATION FOSTER WHEELER GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY CRANE COMPANY IMO INDUSTRIES INCORPORATED WARREN PUMPS ATWOOD MORRILL COMPANY INCORPORATED USA AURORA PUMP COMPANY CLARK RELIANCE CORPORATION ELLIOTT COMPANY VELAN VALVE CORPORATION AIR LIQUID SYSTEMS CORPORATION (2015)

Appellees have moved this Court to dismiss all claims in this lawsuit with prejudice and dismiss the pending appeal as moot. No Appellant opposes this motion, but several ask that we vacate the district court's remand order and instruct the district court to conduct ancillary proceedings on remand. We agree that vacatur is required in this case,¹ but decline to give the district court any instructions regarding ancillary proceedings. Appellants' concern that an immediate dismissal may prejudice their ability to request costs or attorneys' fees or both is unfounded. As we have recognized before—in this same context—“[t]he district court's dismissal should not prejudice appellants'] right, if any, to apply for attorney's fees and costs, to the extent permitted by law.”² There is no reason to deviate here from our normal practice: “If a case becomes moot on appeal, the general rule is ․ to vacate the judgment of the lower court and remand with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.”³

We VACATE the district court's order remanding this case to state court, GRANT Appellees' motion to dismiss the pending appeal as moot, and REMAND this case with instructions to the district court to dismiss the complaint, leaving any attending ancillary proceedings to its hand.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 326 n.15 (5th Cir. 2009) (“When ․ a party who prevailed below makes the case moot by his unilateral action, a ‘vacatur must be granted.’ ” (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 23 (1994))).

2.   Habetz v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 842 F.2d 136, 138 n.5 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); see Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 21 (recognizing that Article III does not preclude courts from awarding costs “[i]n cases that become moot while awaiting review”); Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[A] determination of mootness does not prevent an award of attorneys' fees on remand.”).

3.   Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 718 (5th Cir. 1999); accord Harris v. City of Houston, 151 F.3d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1998).

PER CURIAM: