UNITED STATES v. OWENS (2026)

Jesse Owens was serving a term of supervised release when he was charged with several South Carolina state law crimes, including first-degree assault and battery. At a revocation hearing, the district court found that he'd violated the relevant statute, revoked his supervised release, and sentenced him to the statutory maximum of two years' imprisonment. While he didn't object below, Owens now argues that the district court erred in deciding that South Carolina first-degree assault and battery is a “crime of violence” and thus incorrectly calculated the range provided by the Sentencing Guidelines.

We affirm.

I.

In 2018, Owens was convicted of possessing a firearm and ammunition while subject to a domestic violence restraining order, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 924(a)(2). For that offense, he was sentenced to 76 months' imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. He began his term of supervised release in April 2023.

In July 2025, Owens's probation officer filed a revocation petition alleging that Owens had committed five violations of supervised release, including four new allegations of criminal conduct. Two violations related to the same incident, for which he was charged with first- and third-degree assault and battery in South Carolina state court.

The victim of the alleged assault testified at the revocation hearing. She stated she went to Owens's house after he took her dog without permission. When she entered the home, he locked the door behind her and then bit her arm, choked her, and punched her repeatedly. Owens held her there over a period of about eight hours, during which she passed in and out of consciousness.

She eventually escaped and sought help from a neighbor, who summoned the police. The government introduced photos of her injuries, showing that she had two swollen black eyes, bruises all over her body, and bite marks that pierced the skin.

After hearing the government's evidence, Owens argued that the police investigation was “surprisingly sparse” and that the victim wasn't a credible witness. J.A. 74–76.

The district court found that the government had proved the relevant violations by a preponderance of the evidence and that the conduct constituted first-degree assault and battery, in violation of South Carolina Code § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i). The court also assessed the conduct as a Grade A violation. Owens didn't object to the court's characterization of his conduct, nor did he challenge the ruling about the violation's severity.

The district court calculated the Sentencing Guidelines advisory range as 12 to 18 months' imprisonment, based on the Grade A violation and Owens's criminal history category of I. The government requested a 24-month sentence, while Owens sought a sentence within the guidelines range.

The district court revoked Owens's supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months in prison, plus another 12 months of supervised release. As the court explained, “the guideline imprisonment range of 12 to 18 months [was] inadequate” and an upward variance was necessary, largely due to Owens's “history of violence,” including a prior conviction for first-degree assault and battery, and the fact that he “beat the victim unmercifully.” J.A. 84, 85, 87–88. The court also found that Owens, “as evidenced by his criminal history, underlying offense, and the current violations, is aware of the consequences of engaging in new criminal conduct and behavior and appears to have little ․ regard for the conditions imposed by the court.” J.A. 85.

This appeal followed.

II.

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Grade A violations include, among other things, “conduct constituting” a state offense “punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year” that “is a crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1) (2025). A “crime of violence” is one that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(1).

We apply a categorical approach when analyzing whether a given statute meets this definition, “asking whether an offense's statutory elements necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Mack, 56 F.4th 303, 305 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). When a statute is “divisible,” meaning that it “lists elements in the alternative,” we apply a “modified categorical approach that first identifies what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted of and then asks whether that offense satisfies the categorical approach.” Id. at 306 (cleaned up); see also Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 504–06, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016) (explaining both analytical methods).

We've held that first-degree assault and battery in violation of South Carolina Code § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i) is a “crime of violence” for purposes of the guidelines. See Mack, 56 F.4th at 306. That statutory provision applies when a person “offers or attempts to injure another person with the present ability to do so, and the act ․ is accomplished by means likely to produce death or great bodily injury.” S.C. Code § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i).

Mack's conclusion rested on two determinations. First, that the level of force required under the statute rose to the level of violent force. See Mack, 56 F.4th at 306. And second, that the statute didn't encompass acts committed recklessly. See id. at 307.^* Although we acknowledged that the statute doesn't employ “traditional mens rea terms like willfully, purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly,” we reasoned that “[i]t is hard to imagine how a person could ‘recklessly offer’ or ‘recklessly attempt’ to do something.” Id.

Owens contends that the Supreme Court of South Carolina has recently undermined this reasoning in United States v. Clemons, 442 S.C. 670, 901 S.E.2d 280, 284 (2024), which held that similar South Carolina offenses may be committed recklessly in at least some circumstances. We are not persuaded.

For starters, Clemons involved criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature and second-degree assault and battery, not first-degree assault and battery. See id. at 281. The South Carolina high court's holding that those offenses may be committed recklessly thus has no bearing on Mack's analysis of first-degree assault and battery.

To be sure, the offenses bear some similarities. But all the Clemons court held was that those other offenses may be committed recklessly “under some circumstances,” without specifying what those might be. See id. at 284. Perhaps the court was referring to parts of those statutes distinct from the one defining first-degree assault and battery. Without further clarity, we can't predict how the court would analyze that offense.

At most, Clemons suggests—but does not hold—that first-degree assault and battery may also be committed recklessly. But the first-degree assault and battery statute is divisible, see Mack, 56 F.4th at 306, so we're concerned only with the offense for which Owens was charged, see Mathis, 579 U.S. at 505–06, 136 S.Ct. 2243.

Section 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i) applies to “offers or attempts to injure another person” and Clemons itself notes that offenses “dealing with attempt may require specific intent.” 901 S.E.2d at 284. While Owens argues that Mack's characterization of first-degree assault and battery as divisible was erroneous, nothing in Clemons—a decision that doesn't even mention first-degree assault and battery—suggests otherwise.

III.

Even if Mack and Clemons are indeed in tension, it doesn't follow that Owens would prevail. Because he didn't preserve this argument in the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Simmons, 917 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2019). Owens would thus need to show “(1) that the district court erred, (2) that the error was plain, and (3) that the error affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Ojedokun, 16 F.4th 1091, 1113 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Owens doesn't say how the district court plainly erred in following a circuit precedent that resolves the very same issue he raises on appeal. Indeed, we too are bound to follow Mack, because “one panel cannot overrule a decision issued by another panel” unless the prior decision “rests on authority that proves untenable.” United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

Owens has failed to clear this high bar. Accordingly, the district court's judgment is

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.   The Supreme Court held in Borden v. United States that a statute criminalizing reckless conduct can't qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See 593 U.S. 420, 440, 141 S.Ct. 1817, 210 L.Ed.2d 63 (2021) (plurality op.). Courts rely on precedent interpreting that statute when evaluating whether an offense constitutes a “crime of violence” under the guidelines, given the similarity of the statutory definitions. See Mack, 56 F.4th at 305 n.1.

DIAZ, Chief Judge:

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Benjamin joined.