Mark Guion, Plaintiff, v. MARSH III 20 20 XYZ 10 (2020)

Cynthia Glenn appeals the district court's order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and summarily dismissing without prejudice the amended civil complaint filed by Glenn and Mark Guion (“Plaintiffs”).¹ The district court found that the complaint was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine ² and that, in any event, the state Defendants were immune from suit, and Plaintiffs had failed to state a cognizable claim against the remaining Defendants. Although we conclude that some of the district court's grounds for dismissal were erroneous, we affirm.

As a threshold matter, we do not agree with the district court that the suit is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We review de novo a district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. Flame S.A. v. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd., 807 F.3d 572, 580 (4th Cir. 2015). “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow and focused, confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cty., 827 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine assesses only whether “the process for appealing a state court judgment to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) [ (2018) ] has been sidetracked by an action filed in district court specifically to review that state court judgment.” Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246, 251 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, although this case is certainly related to Glenn and Guion's family court case, the bulk of the allegations are independent claims and not an invitation for the district court to review and reject the state court judgment. Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing the action on this ground.

The district court also erred in concluding sua sponte that the state Defendants were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. As a general rule, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment protects the states from suit in federal court, as well as arms of the State and State officials.” Lawson v. Union Cty. Clerk of Court, 828 F.3d 239, 250 (4th Cir. 2016) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[b]ecause a defendant otherwise protected by the Eleventh Amendment can waive its protection, it is, as a practical matter, structurally necessary to require the defendant to assert the immunity.” Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 542 (4th Cir. 2014). In this way, it “is akin to an affirmative defense.” Id. Accordingly, the district court should not have raised this defense on its own initiative.

The district court correctly concluded, however, that Defendant Rochelle Y. Conits is protected by absolute judicial immunity, see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam), and that Glenn and Guion failed to state a cognizable claim against any of the remaining Defendants. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Guion died in December 2018.

2.   The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is derived from two Supreme Court decisions: Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.