UNITED STATES v. JAMES (2020)

Sigmund Diaola James appeals the district court's order denying his motion for a reduction of his sentence under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. James was found guilty in 2009 of multiple offenses stemming from his role in a drug trafficking and money laundering conspiracy, including a count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute 5 kilograms or more of powder cocaine and 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. The district court sentenced him to life in prison on the conspiracy count.

The First Step Act provides that a court that imposed a sentence for a “covered offense”—defined as a violation before August 3, 2010, of a law whose statutory penalties were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010—may impose a reduced sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect when the covered offense was committed. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(a), (b), 132 Stat. at 5222; United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 176 (4th Cir. 2019). As is relevant here, the Fair Sentencing Act amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2018) by increasing the amounts of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the mandatory minimum sentences for trafficking offenses. See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 269, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012).

The district court concluded that James was not eligible for a reduction of his sentence because the Fair Sentencing Act did not affect the statutory penalties for convictions involving powder cocaine. But the district court did not have the benefit of our recent decision in United States v. Gravatt, 953 F.3d 258, 263-64 (4th Cir. 2020), in which we held that a conspiracy offense involving 5 kilograms or more of powder cocaine and 50 grams or more of crack cocaine—the same offense for which James was convicted—was a covered offense under the First Step Act even though the Fair Sentencing Act did not modify the statutory penalties for offenses involving powder cocaine.

In light of our recent decision in Gravatt, we vacate the district court's order and remand for further proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

PER CURIAM:

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.