UNITED STATES v. SANTIAGO (2020)

A federal jury convicted Christy Santiago of conspiracy to distribute suboxone to a federal inmate, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018), and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute suboxone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(E), 846 (2018). The jury acquitted her of distributing suboxone to a federal inmate, making a false statement regarding the alleged suboxone distribution, and possession with intent to distribute and distribution of suboxone. She now appeals her 18-month sentence, an upward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines range established by the district court, arguing that the court violated her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by improperly sentencing her based on acquitted conduct. She also argues that her sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

We review a sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). In so doing, we examine the sentence for “significant procedural error,” including “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [ (2018) ] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. “A sentencing court’s explanation is sufficient if it, although somewhat briefly, outlines the defendant’s particular history and characteristics not merely in passing or after the fact, but as part of its analysis of the statutory factors.” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 518-19 (4th Cir. 2017) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

If we find no procedural error, we also consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence in view of the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. When a district court departs from or imposes a sentence outside of the Guidelines range, we “must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398, 409 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[E]ven though we might reasonably conclude that a different sentence is appropriate, that conclusion, standing alone, is an insufficient basis to vacate the district court’s chosen sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted).

Santiago first argues that the district court violated her Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury by sentencing her based on acquitted conduct. The record does not support Santiago’s contention. Rather, the record shows that the district court varied upward based on its consideration of various § 3553(a) factors related to Santiago’s crimes of conviction, such as her extended relationships with numerous federal and state inmates and the fact that she was involved with introducing drugs into a maximum-security facility, where the risk of harm is greater than a lower-security facility. None of these considerations by the district court leads us to conclude that the district court sentenced her based on acquitted conduct or violated her Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.¹

Next, Santiago’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court opined that the Guidelines range did not adequately reflect the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors in light of the seriousness of providing drugs to federal inmates, the extensive ties between Santiago and federal inmates at a maximum-security facility over a period of time, and the need for just punishment and deterrence. In so doing, the district court provided an individualized assessment of the facts before it and determined that an upward variance was appropriate based on those facts.² We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the variant sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Moreover, a district court may consider conduct of which a defendant has been acquitted if the conduct has nonetheless been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997).

2.   To the extent the district court articulated that Santiago was convicted of distributing drugs to a federal inmate, rather than conspiracy to do so, the inartful phrasing of a single sentence does not negate the entirety of the district court’s explanation.

PER CURIAM:

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.