MEYERS v. JONES WRSP (2019)

In these consolidated appeals, David Meyers has filed interlocutory appeals from nonfinal orders. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

Before considering an appeal, we must ensure we have jurisdiction. See Feldman v. Law Enf't Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 346 (4th Cir. 2014) (recognizing Court's obligation to consider questions of jurisdiction sua sponte). We may exercise jurisdiction only over final decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). “Generally, a district court order is not final until it has resolved all claims as to all parties.” Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, 789 F.3d 389, 402 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In No. 19-6184, Meyers appeals the district court's orders denying Meyers’ motions for appointment of counsel, to reconsider the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel, for recusal, and to seal. Because these are nonfinal orders, we lack jurisdiction.

In No. 19-6487, Meyers appeals the district court's order denying Meyers’ motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. We lack jurisdiction over this nonfinal order.

Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals for lack of jurisdiction. In No. 19-6184, we deny Meyers’ to reconsider the order denying leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of fees under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. In No. 19-6487, we deny Meyers’ motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

PER CURIAM:

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.