DORADO OCASIO v. WORMUTH (2025)

The plaintiff, an Army officer, challenges a decision made by the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (“ABCMR”) as arbitrary and capricious because the Board failed to provide a lengthy explanation of its rationale. The ABCMR's decision centered around an adverse performance evaluation that plaintiff received, in part, because of her failure to comply with her superior's orders. The district court upheld the Board's decision. Because we find that the Board provided a discernible path for its determination, we now affirm. In doing so, we acknowledge and respect the special deference Article III courts exercise in reviewing military judgments.

I.

Plaintiff-appellant Gardenia Dorado-Ocasio (“CPT Dorado-Ocasio” or “Captain”) is a captain in the United States Army. In September 2019, she was deployed to Iraq to aid in Operation Inherent Resolve, a mission to “defeat[ ] ISIS in designated areas of Iraq and Syria and set[ ] conditions for follow-on operations to increase regional stability.” Fact Sheet, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve. Plaintiff served as the commanding officer of the 258th Movement Control Team, which consisted of twenty-one soldiers tasked with handling the logistics of moving Army personnel, equipment, and cargo for various military operations. J.A. 225. CPT Dorado-Ocasio was subject to performance reviews, one of which constitutes the central issue before our court.

The regimented procedures by which the Army reviews officers merit a brief description. It is a system characterized by bureaucratic overlay whose multiple levels, however cumbersome, serve to afford fair treatment to individual service members.

A.

Under Army Regulation 623-3, all officers, including both commissioned and warrant officers, are subject to periodical Officer Evaluation Reports (“OERs”). OERs consist of documents known collectively as the DA Form 67-10 series. The primary function of an OER is to analyze how well an officer “performs their assigned tasks as related to the Army Leadership Requirements Model.” Army Reg. 623-3 § 1-8(a)(4)(a). This model emphasizes three core “attributes”—“character, presence, and intellect”—and three core “competencies”—“lead[ing] others”; “develop[ing] the environment, themselves, others, and the profession as a whole”; and “achiev[ing] organizational goals.” Army Leadership, ADRP 6-22, Dep't Army, at 1-5 & fig.1-1 (2012). OERs thus include “judgments about a Soldier's ability to perform at the current and higher grade or rank, whether a Soldier will be given greater responsibility at the present rank” or “retained for further military service,” and are an “extremely important factor[ ]” in comparing different officers' leadership potential. Army Reg. 623-3 § 1-8(a)(4)(a).

Two supervising officers are assigned the duty of completing these forms, a process known as “rating.” In order to promote military discipline and the accuracy of performance evaluations, these two raters reflect the rated officer's chain of command. The initial “rater” is the “immediate supervisor of the rated Soldier responsible for directing and assessing the rated Soldier's performance․ [and] will normally be senior to the rated Soldier in grade or date of rank.” Id. § 2-5(a). The rater must typically serve as the rated officer's supervisor for a minimum of 90 days before submitting an OER. Id. § 2-5(a)(1). The “senior rater,” in turn, is normally the “the immediate supervisor of the rater and a supervisor above all other rating officials in the rated officer's chain of command.” Id. § 2-7(a)(3) (emphasis added). And senior raters cannot typically issue a written OER until they have served as the rated officer's senior rater for a minimum of 60 days. Id.

Every twelve months, a rated soldier receives the standard “annual” OER. Additional OERs may be compiled if interceding events occur, such as a change in rater or a change in a rated officer's duty. See id. §§ 2-10(a)(2), 3-34(c)-(d). Raters must also issue “Relief for Cause” OERs when they seek the “early release” of an officer that they deem “has failed in their performance of duty.” Id. § 3-55.

The procedures required in completing OERs are hardly perfunctory steps taken only at the end of the relevant rating period. Army regulations require the continual participation of both the rated officer and the rater. At the beginning of the rating period, officers must complete DA Form 67-10-1A, listing their goals and objectives. Officers must then meet with their rater to discuss how they will go about achieving these markers of success. Rated soldiers must constantly evaluate their performance and make any necessary alterations to their goals and objectives during the rating period. Id. §§ 2-10(b); 3-6(a).

Raters must conduct in-person counseling with the rated officer at the beginning of and throughout the rating period; simply submitting initial performance objectives and OERs without face-to-face engagement is deemed an “unacceptable shortcut” of army regulations. Id. § 3-7(a)(1)(a). Raters must counsel officers on how well those officers are currently performing and how their development can continue in a positive trajectory. Occasionally, this may involve the rater making alterations to objectives. Id. §§ 2-12(a)-(e); 3-7(a)(1)-(2). When producing written OERs, raters will make final judgments about the rated officer's overall performance during that rating period and leave comments describing their conclusions. Id. § 3-7(a)(3).

Senior raters conduct a more high-level analysis of the rated officer's performance. They initially review and approve the officer's DA Form 67-10-1A. Id. § 3-9(a)(1)(a). At the end of the rating period, the senior rater “will assess the rated officer's potential compared to all officers of the same rank,” including all those officers who the senior rater has previously reviewed while serving as a senior rater. Id. § 3-9(a)(3)(c)(1); see also id. § 2-14(b)(3). The senior rater will also normally review and sign the lower rater's OER before it is provided to the rated officer. Id. § 2-14(c)(1).

Army regulations provide additional safeguards when either rater desires to make derogatory comments about a rated officer. All disparaging information included in an OER must be well-founded or proven. Id. § 3-20. And even if well-founded, not all derogatory comments are permitted. But raters may include substantiated derogatory information about “[a]cts of reprisal” and “[b]ehavior that is inconsistent or detrimental to good order, conduct, and discipline,” among other exceptions. Id. § 3-26(a)(6)-(7). Furthermore, if either rater requests relief for cause, additional review is required and will be performed by the person next most senior in the Army chain of command, who must “[v]erify that any derogatory information has been accurately reflected.” Id. § 2-17(a)-(b).

If rated officers believe an OER contains any inaccuracy, injustice, or illegality, they should first raise this claim with their supervising Commander. Id. §§ 4-3, 4-4. The supervising Commander is typically someone higher up the chain of command than the aforementioned raters. Id. § 1-11. The Commander will initiate an inquiry and produce a report with his independent judgment. Id. § 4-5. If this does not resolve a rated officer's complaint, he may bring claims of bias or inaccuracy in an OER to the Army Special Review Board (“ASRB”). The burden of proof in an appeal to the ASRB always rests with the appellant—the rated officer in most cases—and must be met by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 4-11(a)-(b).

Under Army Regulation 15-185, rated officers may appeal adverse ASRB decisions to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records. 32 C.F.R. § 581.3. This board is statutorily required to consist of civilian personnel. See 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1). Members must be “regularly employed in the executive part of the Department of the Army” and “are appointed by the Secretary of the Army and serve on the ABCMR as an additional duty.” 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(c). Like the ASRB, applicants to the ABCMR bear the “burden of proving an error or injustice.” Id. § 581.3(e)(2). However, the ABCMR instead requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

B.

The present dispute arose from alleged inaccuracies and bias in CPT Dorado-Ocasio's June 29, 2020, “Relief for Cause” OER. On December 20, 2019, appellant was assigned a new commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel (“LTC”) Peter Holloway, who thereupon became her rater. J.A. 170. LTC Holloway started overseeing CPT Dorado-Ocasio during a time of great tension between the Captain and one of her subordinates, Staff Sargeant (“SSG”) Shakeia Dunn. It is the Army's belief that, in October 2019, CPT Dorado-Ocasio retaliated against SSG Dunn for using the Army's “open-door” policy to register complaints about the Captain's leadership failings with the Battalion Commander. Response Br. at 6. CPT Dorado-Ocasio counseled SSG Dunn for “toxic leadership, unprofessionalism, [and] lack of military bearing,” J.A. 79, in a manner which the latter interpreted as being “based on personal feelings ․ rather than from a professional stand point,” J.A. 76. Less than a month later, CPT Dorado-Ocasio reported a civilian contractor's allegation that SSG Dunn and a married sergeant were having an affair. J.A. 56.

Aware of the ongoing feud, LTC Holloway prohibited the Captain from any reprisals against SSG Dunn. CPT Dorado-Ocasio confirmed receipt of this order on December 30, 2019, indicating that she “fully respect[ed] the directive you gave me to hold off on counseling and anything that can be seen as retaliation,” but that she would not tolerate any disrespect or aggression from SSG Dunn. J.A. 126. Unassuaged by her response, LTC Holloway repeated his dissatisfaction that the Captain was “considering retaliating against [SSG Dunn] if she was one of the individuals that utilized the open door policy ․ [and that] [t]his concerns me greatly.” Id. He stated that the Battalion Commander would handle disciplinary action taken against SSG Dunn. Despite this clear command, CPT Dorado-Ocasio persisted, and asked LTC Holloway on January 18, 2020, for permission to use the “open door” policy to discuss concerns about SSG Dunn with the Battalion Commander. J.A. 125.

During this time, CPT Dorado-Ocasio also became the subject of an Army Regulation 15-6 (“AR 15-6”) investigation. The scope of the investigation covered appellant's “toxic or ineffective leadership,” her acts of retaliation against subordinates, military housing-policy violations, and an alleged extramarital affair with a major. See J.A. 171. CPT Dorado-Ocasio accused SSG Dunn of manufacturing these allegations behind the scenes “with the intent of having me removed.” J.A. 125. CPT Dorado-Ocasio also later claimed that LTC Holloway initiated the AR 15-6 investigation in retaliation for a sexual harassment claim she brought on December 18, 2019. However, there is no record evidence of this complaint or that the AR 15-6 was in any way linked to the complaint. There is no record evidence to even suggest that the AR 15-6 commenced after the alleged complaint was made. See Response Br. at 8 & n.2.

The results of the AR 15-6 investigation substantiated the allegations and CPT Dorado-Ocasio was served with a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand (“GOMOR”) on March 28, 2020. The GOMOR received multiple levels of review, and Brigadier General Geck finally removed appellant from company command on April 28, 2020. See J.A. 211.

A few days beforehand, during a counseling session with LTC Holloway, the Captain inquired as to what disciplinary action would be taken against SSG Dunn for her alleged affair. LTC Holloway warned her for at least the third time “not to take any action that could be considered as retaliation against SSG Dunn.” J.A. 60. Once again, the Captain ignored his orders, instead immediately reporting SSG Dunn to a Sexual Harassment/Assault Response Prevention (“SHARP”) officer. Id. On April 29, LTC Holloway again counseled CPT Dorado-Ocasio for a “pattern” of retaliation against subordinates despite “verbal and written warnings.” Id.

CPT Dorado-Ocasio subsequently filed a Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 138 request for redress against LTC Holloway on May 18, 2020, making various allegations of wrongdoing, including that he discouraged her from reporting to SHARP. As part of her complaint, CPT Dorado-Ocasio requested that LTC Holloway be removed as her rater and investigated. J.A. 199-200. The request was subsequently denied after an investigation found the Captain's claims were unsubstantiated. See J.A. 62.

While the request for redress was pending, LTC Holloway issued the June 29, 2020, “Relief for Cause” OER. He rated CPT Dorado-Ocasio's performance “UNSATISFACTORY” and recommended that she be removed from command permanently “based upon an AR 15-6 investigation and subsequent GOMOR.” J.A. 170. The senior rater acknowledged the investigation and GOMOR but declined to relieve appellant, rating her instead as “QUALIFIED.” J.A. 171.

C.

On December 3, 2020, CPT Dorado-Ocasio appealed her OER to the ASRB. She contended that the OER was (1) factually inaccurate, (2) contained unproven derogatory information, (3) was produced by a rater with a significant conflict of interest and personal bias, (4) did “not reflect an assessment of the performance of assigned duties and responsibilities against an understood set of requirements,” and (5) falsely alleged “defects in her character and leadership.” J.A. 178. And, on April 8, 2021, the Board voted unanimously to deny her appeal. J.A. 221.

Continuing to seek removal of the OER from her Army Military Human Resource Record (“AMHRR”), CPT Dorado-Ocasio filed an application with the ABCMR on July 19, 2021, making substantially the same allegations as she did before the ASRB. See J.A. 26-27. The ABCMR subsequently rejected the application on June 21, 2022. The Board reasoned that

[a]fter reviewing the application, all supporting documents, and the evidence found within the applicant's military records ․ relief was not warranted. The applicant's contentions, her military records, and regulatory guidance were carefully considered. The Board found insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the contested report contains administrative or substantive errors or that it was not prepared in compliance with applicable regulations and policies. Furthermore, the applicant has not shown the evaluations rendered by the rating officials represented anything other than their objective judgment and considered opinions at the time the contested evaluation report was prepared or that they exercised faulty judgment in evaluating her as they did.

J.A. 19-20.

On May 3, 2023, CPT Dorado-Ocasio filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. She claimed that the ABCMR's decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) because the ABCMR ignored evidence about LTC Holloway's bias and did not engage in “serious discussion” about whether the OER “was reprisal for her alleging sexual harassment.” J.A. 7. The parties cross-filed motions for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion in favor of the defendant, finding that the “ABCMR adequately explained its decision to deny Plaintiff[']s application” and otherwise “did all that the law requires [the Board] to do.” Ocasio-Dorado v. Wormuth, No. 23-CV-595, 2024 WL 712533, at *6, *9 (E.D. Va. Feb. 21, 2024).

On April 19, 2024, CPT Dorado-Ocasio filed her notice to appeal the district court's judgment. J.A. 3.

II.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment under a de novo standard of review. Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 348 (4th Cir. 1996). We “employ[ ] the same standards used by the district court,” id., and thus find summary judgment warranted only if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under the APA, our review of ABCMR decisions is limited to instances where the Board's judgment was “arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence.” Downey v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 685 F. App'x 184, 189 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Randall, 95 F.3d at 348).

However, this case involves no ordinary “arbitrary and capricious” review. The ABCMR, and other military boards akin to it, are afforded “an unusually deferential application of the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard.” Kreis v. Sec'y of Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Bolton v. Dep't of the Navy Bd. for Corr. of Naval Recs., 914 F.3d 401, 407 (6th Cir. 2019); Mahoney v. Del Toro, 99 F.4th 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2024). Our deferential standard in military contexts is “calculated to ensure that the courts do not become a forum for appeals by every soldier dissatisfied with his or her ratings, a result that would destabilize military command and take the judiciary far afield of its area of competence.” Cone v. Caldera, 223 F.3d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Indeed, “[p]erhaps only the most egregious decisions [of the boards] may be prevented under such a deferential standard of review.” Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1515. This degree of deference is rooted in (1) the statutory language giving life to the ABCMR, (2) the judiciary's longstanding commitment and obligation to avoid unnecessary intrusion into the military chain of command, and (3) the most basic principles of judicial economy.

A.

In enabling military record correction boards, Congress granted significant discretion to military leaders. The ABCMR's governing statute provides that “[t]he Secretary of a military department may correct any military record of the Secretary's department when the Secretary considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1) (emphasis added). This language is permissive rather than mandatory. Ultimately, so long as she follows the provisions of relevant law, the Secretary of the Army can correct any record in a soldier's AMHRR for those reasons she deems appropriate.

Failure to defer to the ABCMR's decisions would render the Secretary of the Army's discretion effectively meaningless. Therefore, to avoid undermining the Board's congressional design, courts read the statute as “substantially restrict[ing] the authority of the reviewing court to upset the Secretary's determination.” Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1514.

Our conclusion that the statutory language requires considerable deference to the ABCMR's decision-making is hardly exceptional. We merely add to the chorus of our sister circuits, who have long held that “[i]n light of this [statutory] language, the review of military board judgments is ‘exceptionally deferential.’ ” Williams v. Wynne, 533 F.3d 360, 368 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Viles v. Ball, 872 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1989)); see also Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1513; Bolton, 914 F.3d at 406-07; Mahoney, 99 F.4th at 34.

B.

The reasons for significant judicial deference to military decisions are multiple. The Framers of the Constitution left no doubt as to the Judiciary's limited authority in military affairs. To Congress, the drafters gave the power to “declare War,” to “raise and support Armies,” to “provide and maintain a Navy,” to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” U.S. Const. art I, § 8. To the Executive, the drafters gave the title of “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” Id. art II, § 2; see also Saikrishna Prakash, Deciphering the Commander-in-Chief Clause, 133 YALE L.J. 1, 58-59 (2023). But to the Judiciary, the drafters left no such explicit power.

This omission does not enable federal courts to look away from gross abuses of military authority that violate constitutionally protected rights. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 18 L.Ed. 281 (1866) (holding that civilians cannot be tried by military tribunals when civilian courts remain open). However, when—as here—no such rights are implicated, Article III courts best uphold their place in our constitutional system by deferring to their legislative and executive partners who possess “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment[s]” of military authority. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). “[C]ourts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.” Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988). The “responsibility” for handling the intricacies of military life “rests upon the Congress and upon the President of the United States.” Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953). “It is this power of oversight and control of military force by elected representatives and officials which underlies our entire constitutional system.” Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973).

Since the earliest days of our republic, the federal judiciary has avoided improvident interference with military affairs. Just three years after the Constitution's ratification, federal circuit courts in New York and Pennsylvania refused to make determinations regarding individual veterans' pensions under the Invalid Pensions Act of 1792—that administrative task was suitable for the Secretary of War, not Article III tribunals. See Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, 410 n.*, 2 U.S. 408, 1 L.Ed. 436 1792. And the Supreme Court has not deviated from the broader non-interference principle in the two centuries that have followed. For example, the Court has rejected the expansion of judicially implied causes of action to the military on the grounds that this would intrude upon Congress's regulatory authority. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300-02, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983); accord Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 549-50 (4th Cir. 2012). Our circuit has taken the additional step of limiting Section 1983 actions for injuries incident to service in order to “respect[ ] the delicate separation of powers necessary for [a] smooth and effective military.” Aikens v. Ingram, 811 F.3d 643, 649 (4th Cir. 2016) (framing this holding as an extension of the Feres doctrine).

Even when the Constitution does not expressly prohibit judicial review, prudential concerns have counseled hesitancy about intrusions into military affairs. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that “the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.” Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974). This “specialized community” is governed by its own unique codes and regulations—a “separate discipline from that of the civilian.” Orloff, 345 U.S. at 94, 73 S.Ct. 534. Officers are regularly tasked with making countless “complex[,] subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of [the] military.” Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10, 93 S.Ct. 2440. Flexibility in such decision-making is critical to the maintenance of an effective, adaptable, and readily deployable fighting force.

Judicial involvement in this whole process raises the risk of hindrance to military discipline. See Blevins v. Orr, 721 F.2d 1419, 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted in a decision whose age has not dimmed its pertinence:

An army is not a deliberative body. It is the executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier. Vigor and efficiency on the part of the officer, and confidence among the soldiers in one another, are impaired if any question be left open as to their attitude to each other.

United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153, 11 S.Ct. 54, 34 L.Ed. 636 (1890); see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986) (“The military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life in order to prepare for and perform its vital role.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975))). Military chains of command simply have no obvious civilian analog. Life and death do not often inhere in corporate decision-making.

Judicial deference serves to preserve respect for the chain of command when judicial review over a claim is permitted. See Farmer v. Mabus, 940 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[S]uits for injunctive relief, like those for monetary damages, must be carefully regulated in order to prevent intrusion of the courts into the military structure.”). Federal judges have neither the tactical skills of a Major General planning an operation, nor the logistical talents of a Sargeant Major assisting its execution. See Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175, 181 (4th Cir. 2015) (“As judges, we are just not equipped to second-guess such small-bore tactical decisions. We are also ill-suited to evaluate more strategic considerations. We do not know the waters.”). On this, our sister circuits have long agreed. See, e.g., Blevins, 721 F.2d at 1423; Tirado-Acosta v. P.R. Nat'l Guard, 118 F.3d 852, 855 (1st Cir. 1997); Jones v. N.Y. State Div. of Military & Naval Affs., 166 F.3d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1999); Farmer, 940 F.2d at 923; Alhassan v. Hagee, 424 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 2005); Horn v. Schlesinger, 514 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 1975).

Respect instilled for military decision-making in non-threatening environments can carry over to the realm of battle. One need only look to the circumstances of the present case to understand that day-to-day military operations are “a field foreign to our normal competence.” Horn, 514 F.2d at 553. Operation Inherent Resolve, in which CPT Dorado-Ocasio and her supervisors were engaged, is an extension of the “War on Terror”—a relatively new form of conflict, in a region halfway across the globe. How ordinary human tensions and shortcomings may affect this mission may not be immediately apparent. Technological capabilities, geopolitics, and intelligence gathering evolve daily. The judiciary was not designed to keep abreast of such changes. We were not trained to understand the objectives and processes of a Movement Control Team, the logistical unit which CPT Dorado-Ocasio commanded, nor the shifting performance goals that drove raters' and senior raters' OERs. It would thus be a mistake to “sit astride the top of the command pyramid,” and, without hesitation, substitute our judgments for those closer to the ground. Wu Tien Li-Shou, 777 F.3d at 181; see Austin v. U.S. Navy Seals 1-26, ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 1301, 1302, 212 L.Ed.2d 348 (2022) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[T]he District Court, while no doubt well-intentioned, in effect inserted itself into the Navy's chain of command, overriding military commanders' professional military judgments.”).

The ABCMR, whose decision we review, is comprised of individuals with “far greater experience than this court in deciphering the content and effect of military regulations.” Navas v. Gonzalez Vales, 752 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1985). ABCMR members are required to be “regularly employed in the executive part of the Department of the Army.” 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(c). They are repeat players with intimate knowledge of Army protocols, including OERs. Our deference simply reflects a comparative deficit. It is not wrong to recognize that the range of judicial comprehension is not limitless. See Orloff, 345 U.S. at 94, 73 S.Ct. 534.

C.

Deference to military review boards also reflects our obligation to conserve limited judicial resources. In 2023, a total of 92,791 officers served in the Army. 2023 Demographics – Profile of the Military Community, U.S. Dep't Def. 15 (2023). Thus, at a minimum, nearly one hundred thousand “annual” OERs are issued each year. And each branch of the Armed Forces has analogous evaluation procedures to the Army. The ABCMR and its cousins were designed not only to avoid intrusion of Article III courts into military affairs, but also to avoid “opening the floodgates” of litigation in federal courts. Grzyb v. New River Co., 793 F.2d 590, 592 (1986).

While deference does not eliminate our obligation to ensure that the ABCMR has acted appropriately, it does streamline our review process and ensure that time and energy are not spent unnecessarily on cases that the military has competently resolved. Indeed, it is a well-known principle that “there is an important judicial economy in deference.” Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1985) (McKay, J., concurring). The logic behind deference thus parallels that of administrative exhaustion requirements. See Hodges v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 417, 423 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[W]e can guard ․ against inefficient use of judicial resources by requiring ‘finality’ within the military system and thus avoiding needless review.”).

In the case of OERs, the layers of review are onion-like. A rater's evaluation is often reviewed by a senior rater, a Commander, the ASRB, and the ABCMR before Article III courts even become involved. And where, like here, a “contested issue may first be litigated through established agency procedures,” deference is “particularly appropriate.” Casey v. FTC, 578 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1978). Failing to afford these reviewers proper deference risks encouraging an inevitable cohort of dissatisfied soldiers to continue their challenges in federal court. And if even a small fraction of OERs do elicit such challenges, the effect on judicial caseloads would be measurable. See McCoy v. Gilbert, 270 F.3d 503, 510 (7th Cir. 2001).

III.

Given the deference due to the military's decisions with regard to military personnel, we are constrained to affirm the judgment here. There must be some explanation providing a discernible path to the Board's determination. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). The explanation, however, does not have to be a “model of analytic precision.” Inova Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Dickson v. Sec'y of Def., 68 F.3d 1396, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Rather, we will “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may be reasonably discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974).

The ABCMR clearly met this low bar. That the ABCMR analyzed the “relevant data” is beyond question. The Board's discussion of the factual context of CPT Dorado-Ocasio's OER spans nine pages. It demonstrated an understanding of the incidents with SSG Dunn and LTC Holloway, including the plaintiff's repeated failure to heed orders not to retaliate against those who raised lawful concerns about her leadership. See J.A. 11-19. And while appellant claims that the ABCMR ignored “evidence” regarding LTC Holloway's conflict of interest, she did not submit key evidence that could have validated those hollow claims. The ABCMR is “not an investigative body”; it only reviews record evidence. 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(c)(2)(iii). And neither the AR 15-6 investigation report, nor direct evidence of CPT Dorado-Ocasio's sexual-harassment claim were part of the administrative record. See J.A. 11 (detailing all documents submitted to and reviewed by the ABCMR).

The ABCMR's decision explained that the available evidence did not credibly support claims of LTC Holloway's lack of objectivity, any substantive or procedural errors in the evaluation process, or any factual inaccuracies. See J.A. 19-20. Applicants cannot decline to submit relevant documentation and then cry foul when the Board finds that there is insufficient information to justify correcting their AMHRR. Furthermore, appellant could not point the ABCMR to any Army regulation which would have required LTC Holloway to recuse himself from the OER process. See Oral Arg. at 13:38-14:19.

We are therefore satisfied that the ABCMR's discussion provided sufficient clarity as to its rationale for rejecting CPT Dorado-Ocasio's application. The Board's explanation, as we have noted, need not represent a “model of analytic precision.” Shalala, 244 F.3d at 350 (quoting Dickson, 68 F.3d at 1404). And the speculation that appellant would have benefited from slightly more elaboration does not inspire us to ignore the settled tradition of deference to professional military judgments.

IV.

None of the above is to imply that military decision-making is invariably correct. It is not. The Supreme Court simply counsels that the risk of military error is presumptively outweighed by the risks run by deviation from the constitutional design. In upholding the ABCMR's decision, we acknowledge that the effectiveness of an army unit depends upon the obedience that individual military personnel, whether enlisted or officer, have to the orders of their superiors. See Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 368, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976). CPT Dorado-Ocasio's OER reflected her failure to respect the chain of command. She was ordered not to retaliate, warned of the consequences, and retaliated, nonetheless. Discipline of officers is a matter generally entrusted to the Army. We are not willing to import civilian values and rules into this context when multiple layers of review have found rational justifications for CPT Dorado-Ocasio's negative evaluation. Failure to give the ABCMR a wide berth would force us to inappropriately “tamper with the established relationship between [ ] military personnel and their superior officers.” Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. 2362. We are unwilling to do so. The judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion in which Judge King and Judge Heytens joined.