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Cristina BRILL, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. ULSTER COUNTY; Deputy Damon Alberts, in his individual and official capacity; Detective Emmett Vedder, in his individual and official capacity; Eleni Calomiris, Defendants–Cross-Claimants–Cross-Defendants–Appellees, John Doe Officers 1-5 (their true names and identities presently unknown), acting in their individual and official capacities; Adam Saunders, in his individual and official capacity; Christopher West, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants–Cross-Defendants–Appellees.*
Plaintiff Cristina Brill operated an animal rescue in New York State. In response to reports that Brill tortured and neglected the animals in her care, she was arrested, her home was searched, and she was charged with multiple misdemeanors. After the criminal case against her was closed, she filed this lawsuit against a group of Defendants — including Ulster County, officers from the Ulster County Sheriff's Department, and officers from the Ulster County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals — claiming primarily that the search, arrest, and prosecution violated her constitutional rights. Defendants moved to dismiss only certain of Brill's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), but the district court (Anne M. Nardacci, J.) dismissed Brill's Complaint in full.
Although we express concern about the district court's dismissal of claims that no party moved to dismiss and, in some instances, we find error in the district court's reasoning, we ultimately conclude, on de novo review, that Brill's Complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. In particular, the district court incorrectly concluded that Brill's Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails because the adjournment in contemplation of dismissal that disposed of her criminal case pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 170.55 does not constitute a favorable termination. We previously held in Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980), that an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal under New York law does not qualify as a favorable termination for purposes a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim. However, today we recognize Singleton as overruled in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 142 S.Ct. 1332, 212 L.Ed.2d 382 (2022). Because Thompson holds that a favorable termination is one that “end[s] without a conviction,” id. at 39, 142 S.Ct. 1332, an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal — a disposition that involves no conclusion as to a defendant's guilt — can qualify as a favorable termination and does so here where the prosecution abandoned its case against Brill. We nevertheless conclude that Brill's Complaint does not state a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution because it does not allege any post-arraignment deprivation of her liberty.
Finally, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Brill leave to amend as to most of her claims. Because the district court dismissed her Section 1983 unlawful search and false arrest claims sua sponte without notice to Brill, and Defendants did not raise before the district court the alternative ground upon which we affirm dismissal of her Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, justice requires that Brill be given the opportunity to amend these claims, as well as her Section 1983 conspiracy claim. We affirm the district court's denial of leave to amend as to Brill's First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 1985(3) conspiracy claims on futility grounds.
We therefore AFFIRM AS MODIFIED 1 IN PART and VACATE IN PART the judgment of the district court, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
In reviewing a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss, “we accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [plaintiff's] favor.” Dieujuste v. Sin, 125 F.4th 397, 399 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he court may consider any written instrument attached to the complaint as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.” Yak v. Bank Brussels Lambert, 252 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration incorporated). The facts set forth below are drawn from Brill's complaint.
I. Factual Background
Brill was once an employee of the Ulster County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“SPCA”). After being fired “through no fault of her own,” she challenged her “termination” and “won unemployment benefits.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 1 (“Complaint”) at 5 ¶¶ 29–30. Her success earned her the enmity of the SPCA. She later opened her own animal rescue in Ulster County, obtaining a license to do so from the State of New York.
As Brill operated her rescue, Christopher West and Adam Saunders, both peace officers employed by the Ulster County SPCA, and Eleni Calomiris, a private citizen operating a competing animal rescue, “create[d] and disseminate[d] false information” about Brill. Id. at 4 ¶ 19. On websites like Facebook and PetFinder, as well as verbally, West, Saunders, and Calomiris falsely accused Brill of, among other things, neglecting and torturing the animals in her care and selling sick animals. Calomiris and Saunders subsequently made false statements that Saunders and West relied on to obtain an arrest warrant for Brill and a search warrant for her home.2
On August 23, 2021, West and Saunders along with Deputy Damon Alberts and Detective Emmett Vedder of the Ulster County Sheriff's Office arrested Brill and searched her home. The officers arrived while Brill was out and attempted to enter through various windows and to disable her security camera. Upon Brill's return, the officers presented her with an expired search warrant and interrogated her without providing her Miranda 3 warnings or allowing her to speak with an attorney. On October 6, 2021, Brill was arraigned on a misdemeanor information for violations of Sections 353 and 357 of New York's Agriculture and Market Laws.4 During her prosecution, the government fabricated certain evidence and failed to disclose other evidence. Eventually, the prosecution was dismissed in March 2024 by way of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 170.55. The state court judge initially refused to grant the dismissal and “only acquiesced to do so after the assistant district attorney” explained that the government “could not prove the criminal charges against [Brill] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 11 ¶ 71. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Brill lost her license to operate an animal rescue and was denied various employment opportunities.
II. District Court Proceedings
Represented by counsel, Brill filed suit against Ulster County, Alberts, and Vedder (collectively, the “County Defendants”); Saunders and West (collectively, the “SPCA Defendants”); certain “John Doe” officers; and Calomiris. She asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment; claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights; and state-law claims for false arrest and defamation.
The County Defendants and Calomiris answered the Complaint, denying the allegations and asserting a variety of defenses. The SPCA Defendants moved to dismiss the Section 1983 claims for conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the state-law claims, but did not move to dismiss the remaining counts of the Complaint.
The district court granted the SPCA Defendants’ motion and provided further relief, dismissing all claims against all parties with prejudice. See Brill v. Ulster County, 799 F. Supp. 3d 73, 88 (N.D.N.Y. 2025). First, the district court concluded that Brill failed to allege a conspiracy under Section 1983 or Section 1985 because she provided “nothing more than vague, generalized assertions” as to the existence of a conspiracy without any explanation as to “how Defendants acted in concert with one another to violate [her] rights.” Id. at 82–83. Second, the court held that Brill did not state a claim for false arrest under Section 1983 because she failed to plausibly allege that she was “subjected to confinement” and the arrest was otherwise “privileged because it was made pursuant to a warrant.” Id. at 84. Third, the court rejected Brill's Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim because Brill's state court action was adjourned in contemplation of dismissal, a resolution that does not constitute a favorable termination as required for such a claim. Id. at 85. Finally, the court dismissed Brill's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Brill's First Amendment claim, predicated on the Defendants’ interference with her ability to rescue animals, failed because the First Amendment provides no right to engage in such activities. Id. at 85–86. And the court dismissed her Fourteenth Amendment claim in which Brill contended that Defendants “deprived her of the opportunity to continue operating her animal rescue business,” on the grounds that Brill did not allege a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to her license to operate such a business or that Defendants themselves deprived her of the license. Id. at 86–87 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Brill's state-law defamation claims 5 and denied her leave to amend, concluding that Brill's proposed amendments failed to resolve the deficiencies in her Complaint. Id. at 87–88.
Brill, who now proceeds pro se, timely filed a notice of appeal and seeks reinstatement of all her claims. The County and SPCA Defendants have submitted briefs arguing for the affirmance of the district court's dismissal of all claims.6
DISCUSSION
“We review de novo a District Court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Mazzei v. The Money Store, 62 F.4th 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). Because Brill proceeds pro se in this Court, “we construe [her] appellate briefs and submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Wright v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 381 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2004). For the reasons below, we conclude that Brill's Complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted.
I. Unlawful Search Claim
While the district court acknowledged that Brill had alleged that Defendants violated “her right[ ] to be free from unlawful searches,” it did not analyze Brill's unlawful search claim separately from her conspiracy claims, which we discuss below. See 799 F. Supp. 3d at 80. Notably no Defendant moved to dismiss the unlawful search claim, and it therefore appears that the district court may have overlooked it when it dismissed Brill's case in full. Whether the district court overlooked the claim or intentionally dismissed it sua sponte, it erred in doing so. “We have held that dismissing a case without an opportunity to be heard is, at a minimum, bad practice in numerous contexts and is reversible error in others․ While in certain circumstances a sua sponte dismissal may be appropriate, ․ these circumstances require that it is unmistakably clear that the court lacks jurisdiction, or that the complaint lacks merit or is otherwise defective.” Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, a complaint (or a claim) should not be dismissed sua sponte without notice to the plaintiff unless it is frivolous. See Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000). It is not “unmistakably clear,” Catzin, 899 F.3d at 82, that Brill's unlawful search claim is meritless, and the claim is certainly not frivolous. Brill therefore should have been given an opportunity to respond before the claim was dismissed.
We may, however, address the sufficiency of the claim on appeal in the first instance, because the issue is a purely legal one that the parties have addressed in their briefing. Cf. J.C. v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2002). It would serve little purpose for us to vacate and remand the district court's judgment if we are convinced, with the benefit of the parties’ briefing, that Brill's operative complaint fails to state a claim for relief. Additionally, we are entitled to review this claim as part of our ability to “affirm the judgment of the district court on any ground appearing in the record.” Konikoff v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 234 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the district court's judgment manifested as the dismissal of Brill's Complaint, rather than its dismissal of any particular claim as discussed in its opinion, we may rest our decision to affirm that dismissal based on our own assessment of the Complaint in full. Cf. Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 277, 135 S.Ct. 793, 190 L.Ed.2d 662 (2015) (“[F]ederal appellate courts[ ] do[ ] not review lower courts’ opinions, but their judgments.” (emphasis in original)). In reviewing Brill's unlawful search claim de novo, we conclude that she has failed to plausibly allege that Defendants lacked probable cause, so as to render the search unlawful.
“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ” Alexander v. City of Syracuse, 132 F.4th 129, 146 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). “While a search pursuant to a warrant issued by a judicial officer upon a finding of probable cause is presumptively reasonable, that presumption can be defeated by showing that a defendant (1) ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard of the truth,’ procured the warrant, (2) based on ‘false statements or material omissions,’ that (3) ‘were necessary to the finding of probable cause.’ ” Ganek v. Leibowitz, 874 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1994)). A false statement is “necessary” if probable cause would not exist without it. Id. at 82. To make such an assessment, “we consider” whether probable cause would exist in “a hypothetical corrected affidavit, produced by deleting any alleged misstatements from the original warrant affidavit.” Id.
Brill alleged that Calomiris, West, and Saunders circulated “false information” about her and that “[a]s a result of th[at] false information,” West and Saunders “improperly obtained a search warrant.” Complaint at 4 ¶ 20. Brill attached the search warrant and its supporting affidavits to her opposition to the SPCA Defendants’ motion to dismiss before the district court. The affidavits include statements from Saunders and Calomiris describing specific instances in which Brill did not provide adequate medical attention to the dogs in her care and sold sick dogs. The Complaint itself does not provide even a cursory description of those materials, much less a basis for believing they are false.
Brill's “ ‘conclusory allegations of falsehood,’ ” without any acknowledgement — let alone refutation — of the facts made in support of the warrant's issuance are wholly insufficient to “challenge ․ [the warrant's] validity.” Calderon v. City of New York, 138 F. Supp. 3d 593, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Velardi, 40 F.3d at 573); see also Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 651 n.7 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[G]eneral allegations that ‘every material fact’ in the affidavits was fabricated do not suffice” to plead falsehood.). Brill argues that the district court should have allowed discovery to proceed so that she could prove that the warrant was based on false assertions. But it is incumbent on Brill to plead “nonconclusory factual allegation[s],” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937, that “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that Defendants falsified the information they offered in support of the search warrant, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Because Brill did not identify any particular statements in support of the search warrant she alleges to be false or facts that would establish their falsity, she failed to state a claim that Defendants’ search of her home was unlawful.7
II. False Arrest Claim
The district court similarly dismissed Brill's Section 1983 false arrest claim despite no party requesting such relief. Unlike the unlawful search claim though, the district court analyzed this claim in its opinion, concluding that Brill had failed to allege that she was in custody and that, even if she had, the arrest was privileged. See 799 F. Supp. 3d at 84. The district court should not have sua sponte dismissed the false arrest claim without notice because it was not “frivolous.” Fitzgerald, 221 F.3d at 364. Furthermore, the district court erred in concluding that Brill did not allege that she was subject to confinement. However, we agree that Brill's unlawful arrest claim, as pled, fails because the arrest was privileged.
“In analyzing § 1983 false arrest claims, we look to the law of the state in which the arrest occurred.” Guan v. City of New York, 37 F.4th 797, 804 (2d Cir. 2022). “To establish a false arrest claim under New York law, a plaintiff must adequately allege (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Carruthers v. Colton, 153 F.4th 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An arrest is privileged if it is based on probable cause,” Guan, 37 F.4th at 804, and “[p]robable cause to arrest exists when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime,” Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court incorrectly concluded that Brill failed to allege that she was subject to confinement. Brill alleged in her Complaint that she was “arrested” by the law enforcement Defendants who appeared at her home, Complaint at 4 ¶ 20, and an inference should have been drawn in her favor to give that word its ordinary meaning as an expression of confinement (as reflected by the very name of the cause of action). In addition, the district court relied on a document that Brill attached to her opposition to the SPCA Defendants’ motion to dismiss that, in its view, demonstrated that Brill “was only issued an appearance ticket.” 799 F. Supp. 3d at 84. But that same document, a report allegedly submitted by Defendant Vedder, also states that Brill was taken “into custody” and “processed” “[a]t the substation” before being released. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 22-3 at 28. The “involuntary transport to a police station for questioning” constitutes confinement for purposes of a Fourth Amendment challenge under Section 1983. See Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003) (per curiam). Thus, even assuming that the district court was permitted to consider this report,8 it did not support the district court's conclusion.
But we agree with the district court on the privileged nature of Brill's arrest. As was the case with her unlawful search claim, Brill provided no specific allegations that the officers who arrested her lacked probable cause. Though she conclusorily alleged that West and Saunders procured the arrest warrant based on false information, that is insufficient to plead that the warrant was obtained without probable cause and, consequently, that her arrest was not privileged. See Fabrikant, 691 F.3d at 214 (“A plaintiff who argues that a warrant was issued on less than probable cause” must show that any false statements were made “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, ․ and that the allegedly false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Brill therefore failed to state a Section 1983 claim for false arrest.
III. Malicious Prosecution Claim
The district court rejected Brill's Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim because it concluded that Brill's adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (“ACOD”) did not qualify as a favorable termination necessary to state such a claim. A malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 requires “(1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding, (4) actual malice, and (5) a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.” Carruthers, 153 F.4th at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations incorporated). We have previously held that an ACOD does not qualify as a favorable termination. See Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 193–95 (2d Cir. 1980). However, we now recognize that decision as overruled in light of subsequent Supreme Court case law holding that a criminal proceeding is favorably terminated if it ends without a conviction. As explained below, an ACOD under New York law can constitute such a favorable termination, including here where the prosecution effectively abandoned its case. Nevertheless, we affirm the district court's decision on an alternative ground, specifically, that Brill failed to allege that she suffered any post-arraignment restraint on her liberty.
A. Favorable Termination
The New York court dismissed the criminal charges against Brill by way of an ACOD pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 170.55. Section 170.55 allows for a court to adjourn a criminal proceeding “with a view to [an] ultimate dismissal” when doing so is “in furtherance of justice.” N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 170.55(2). Under the statutory scheme, a court holds the charges “in a state of suspense for a period of six months, during which the subject's habitual behavior pattern can be tested by time․ [O]nce the six-month period is at an end, absent any untoward event, the case will be dismissed as a matter of course.” Hollender v. Trump Village Co-op., Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 420, 461 N.Y.S.2d 765, 448 N.E.2d 432, 434 (N.Y. 1983).
The New York Court of Appeals has explained that an ACOD “provides a less structured means of disposing of relatively minor charges on a nonmerits adjudicatory basis.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When a case is dismissed by way of an ACOD, it does “not ․ connote either a conviction or, as in the case of a plea, an admission of guilt.” Id.; see also N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 170.55(8) (“The granting of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal shall not be deemed to be an admission of guilt.”). Rather, “[t]he over-all effect of a consummated ACOD dismissal is ․ to treat the charge as though it had never been brought.” Hollender, 461 N.Y.S.2d 765, 448 N.E.2d at 434–35. Accordingly, and as relevant here, “in a subsequent civil litigation to which a finding of guilt or innocence of the charge is germane, adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, by reason of its sui generis character, will leave the question unanswered.” Id., 461 N.Y.S.2d 765, 448 N.E.2d at 435.
A motion for an ACOD can be made by the defendant, the government, or the court but requires the consent of all three to take effect. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 170.55(1). The motion must be made early in the proceedings, because an ACOD “is unavailable once fact finding has occurred”; that is, it is available “only before the entry of a guilty plea or the commencement of trial.” Matter of Edwin L., 88 N.Y.2d 593, 648 N.Y.S.2d 850, 671 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (N.Y. 1996). In granting the motion, the court is not required “to give any reasons for dismissal.” Hennessy v. Gorman, 87 A.D.2d 29, 450 N.Y.S.2d 638, 639 (4th Dep't 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 58 N.Y.2d 806, 459 N.Y.S.2d 261, 445 N.E.2d 644 (N.Y. 1983); see also Hollender, 461 N.Y.S.2d 765, 448 N.E.2d at 434 (explaining that the ACOD scheme “[d]ispens[es] with the need to consider the formally specified factors integral to” a motion to dismiss under N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 170.40 and instead employs “a less structured means of disposing of relatively minor charges”); Peter Preiser, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Crim. Proc. L. § 170.55 (2026) (“There are no statutory standards or criteria for an [ACOD],” and “no reasons need [to] be stated for an [ACOD].”). And upon the eventual dismissal, a defendant is entitled to have her record sealed and evidence destroyed. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 160.50. The result of the ACOD therefore is to render “the arrest and prosecution ․ a nullity” and to “restore[ ]” the defendant “to the status [she] occupied before [her] arrest and prosecution” without “any disability or forfeiture.” Id. § 170.55(8).
Decades ago, this Court held that an ACOD does not qualify as a favorable termination for purposes of a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim. In Singleton, we looked to “the common law” to hold that a termination is favorable “only when the[ ] final disposition is such as to indicate the accused is not guilty.” 632 F.2d at 193 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660, comments a & b (1977)). And because an ACOD “leaves open the question of the accused's guilt,” we reasoned, it cannot be said to “constitute a termination in [the accused's] favor.” Id. Singleton described an ACOD as “a procedure not unlike probation, designed as a ‘special break, given usually to first offenders,’ ” and expressed a fear that the treatment of an ACOD as a favorable termination would open the floodgates to malicious prosecution claims and result in “fewer prosecutors ․ be[ing] willing to consent to such adjournments.” Id. at 194 (quoting Kenul v. Hollander, 86 Misc.2d 466, 382 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1976)).
We have applied Singleton’s reasoning on numerous occasions, including in our 2018 decision in Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2018). There we held that the plaintiff had failed to “plead that the termination of the prosecutions against him affirmatively indicated his innocence” and that he therefore did not receive a favorable termination where he simply alleged “that the charges against him ‘were dismissed’ at some point after a jury trial, without specifying how or on what grounds.” Id. at 28. We explained that such a “vague allegation” was “consistent with dismissal on any number of procedural or jurisdictional grounds, all of which fail to affirmatively indicate innocence.” Id.
Singleton and Lanning, however, were decided in the absence of any guidance from the Supreme Court, and when it came time for the Supreme Court to address the favorable termination standard, it reached a different result. In 2022, the Court explained that the favorable termination standard turned not on the application of the evolving common law but rather on the state of “American malicious prosecution tort law as of 1871,” the year in which Section 1983 “was enacted.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43, 45, 142 S.Ct. 1332, 212 L.Ed.2d 382 (2022). At that time, “American courts ․ were largely in agreement” that “the favorable termination element ․ was satisfied so long as the prosecution ended without a conviction.” Id. at 45, 142 S.Ct. 1332. Thus, a malicious prosecution claim could lie where “the prosecutor abandoned the criminal case or the court dismissed the case without providing a reason.” Id. In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court called attention to the “flawed” reliance by several circuit decisions on the 1976 Restatement's standard, citing Lanning among other cases as an example. Id. at 47–48, 142 S.Ct. 1332. Rather than “describe the consensus of American law as of 1871,” the Restatement addressed the status of the law over a century later and thus did not bear directly on the pertinent time period. Id. Two years later, in Chiaverini, the Supreme Court again applied “the common-law principles governing malicious-prosecution suits when § 1983 was enacted” to hold that, when a government official brings multiple charges against a defendant, the existence of a valid charge does not bar a malicious prosecution claim based on an invalid charge. Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 563, 144 S.Ct. 1745, 219 L.Ed.2d 262 (2024).
Since Thompson, this Court has had two occasions to further refine the favorable termination standard. In Carruthers, we explained that Thompson and Chiaverini did “nothing” to “undermine[ ]” our prior precedent holding that “a dismissal of a charge as part of a plea disposition does not satisfy” the favorable termination standard. 153 F.4th at 185–87. That is because “a negotiated guilty plea” enables “a bargaining process in which the parties exchange the dismissal of certain charges for a conviction on others to resolve a criminal proceeding” and thus “provides an explanation for why charges were dismissed” that is related to a defendant's guilt. Id. at 186. A contrary conclusion, we again warned, “would threaten to disturb the incentive structures underlying plea agreements” and “disincentivize” prosecutors from pursuing them. Id. at 187.
And the following year in Chapdelaine, we applied Thompson and Carruthers to decide that a defendant's agreement to “participat[e] in a one-day supervised diversionary program” available under Connecticut law did not “amount[ ] to a favorable termination” and thus barred her malicious prosecution claim. Chapdelaine v. Desjardin, 180 F.4th 454, 466 (2d Cir. 2026). We reasoned, based “on the specific facts of th[e] case,” that the diversionary program constituted “a court-ordered compromise” that the defendant had “bargained[ ]for.” Id. at 466–67. In particular, we observed that the prosecution “did not abandon the case” and “noted its objection to Chapdelaine being [ ]considered for the [diversionary] program.” Id. at 460, 466.
We are now confronted with the same ACOD statute that was at the heart of our previous decision in Singleton. Thompson requires that we revisit that decision and recognize it as overruled. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 405 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]here there has been an intervening Supreme Court decision that casts doubt on our controlling precedent, one panel of this Court may overrule a prior decision of another panel.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because Thompson holds that a favorable termination is one where the “prosecution ended without a conviction,” 596 U.S. at 39, 142 S.Ct. 1332, it is incompatible with Singleton’s conclusion that a favorable termination must be one where the defendant is found to be “not guilty,” 632 F.2d at 193. Thus, it is no longer the case that an ACOD under New York law fails to qualify as a favorable termination solely because it is not a determination of innocence.9
This conclusion readily comports with Carruthers and Chapdelaine, neither of which had occasion to opine specifically on New York's ACOD regime. The ACOD Brill received is distinguishable from the dismissal of certain, but not all, claims via plea bargaining, which was at issue in Carruthers. Plea bargaining constitutes a “calculated decision [by the government] to dismiss certain charges in order to secure a conviction on another.” Carruthers, 153 F.4th at 187. The government's justification for the resulting dismissal is therefore self-evident. Moreover, plea bargaining results in an actual conviction. Cf. N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 170.55(8) (explaining that following an ACOD, the “arrest and prosecution” are to be “deemed a nullity”). Likewise, Chapdelaine is distinguishable. In contrast to the Connecticut program in which the judge permitted the plaintiff to participate over the prosecution's objection, Chapdelaine, 180 F.4th at 460, New York's scheme requires the consent of the prosecution, see N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 170.55(1). In other words, the prosecution must effectively “abandon [its] case” for an ACOD to be granted. Chapdelaine, 180 F.4th at 466. Additionally, the plaintiff in Chapdelaine was required to complete a brief diversionary program in order to secure the dismissal. See id. at 460. The ACOD Brill received was not the result of any comparable bargaining, as Brill was not required to give up any liberty in exchange for the dismissal of the charges against her.
We therefore conclude that an ACOD can constitute a favorable dismissal as defined by Thompson — one that “end[s] without a conviction.” 596 U.S. at 39, 142 S.Ct. 1332. To be sure, there may be some instances where an ACOD may resemble a bargained-for resolution of the type at issue in Chapdelaine. For example, one section of the New York statute allows a court to “condition ․ an [ACOD] order” on the defendant performing community service or participating in a dispute resolution program. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law. § 170.55(5), (6); see also Hollender, 461 N.Y.S.2d 765, 448 N.E.2d at 434 (“The trial court, in its discretion, also is empowered to condition ACOD status on a willingness to participate in a dispute resolution program and, subject to the accused's consent, on performance of community service.” (internal citations omitted)). But, as explained below, we have no occasion today to address such scenarios.
Before turning back to the facts of this case, we make two further points. First, our conclusion that an ACOD can constitute a favorable termination serves the purposes underlying the requirement as identified in Thompson. Once a dismissal has been granted by way of an ACOD, the case cannot be reopened, which prevents any “parallel ․ civil and criminal proceedings over the issues of probable cause and guilt.” Thompson, 596 U.S. at 44, 142 S.Ct. 1332. And because an ACOD does not make any determination of guilt, it avoids “inconsistent civil and criminal judgments” and “precludes ․ a claimant ․ succeed[ing] in [a] tort action after having been convicted in [a] criminal case.” Id. For that reason, a malicious prosecution claim brought following an ACOD does not amount to an “improper[ ] ․ collateral attack[ ] on criminal proceedings.” Id.
Second, although we recognize the fears expressed in Singleton and Carruthers that a loosening of the favorable termination standard “could disincentivize the dismissal of charges, which, in turn, could lead to fewer plea agreements, [and thus] render[ ] an ‘essential component’ of our criminal system less effective,” we are confident that our ruling today does no such thing. Carruthers, 153 F.4th at 187 (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)). As the Supreme Court recognized in Thompson, even with a relaxed favorable termination standard, a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 still remains challenging to maintain because “officers are still protected by the requirement that the plaintiff show the absence of probable cause and by qualified immunity.” See 596 U.S. at 48–49, 142 S.Ct. 1332. Probable cause — “a complete defense to a malicious prosecution claim,” Cornelio v. Connecticut, 32 F.4th 160, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2022) — “is not a high bar” and can be satisfied even where a criminal defendant achieves a verdict of not guilty or the prosecution unconditionally dismisses the case prior to trial, District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57, 138 S.Ct. 577, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). And even where probable cause does not exist and a plaintiff can satisfy the remaining elements of a malicious prosecution claim, qualified immunity remains a potent backstop. This Court is no stranger to resolving Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims on qualified-immunity grounds. See, e.g., Rohman v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 2000); Bonide Prods., Inc. v. Cahill, 223 F.3d 141, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2000); Droz v. McCadden, 580 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 2009); Dettelis v. Sharbaugh, 919 F.3d 161, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2019). Thus, while our holding today corrects our case law to align with recent Supreme Court precedent, it may have significance only in those cases where a plaintiff can demonstrate an absence of probable cause and where the defendant violated clearly established law.
Returning to Brill's Complaint, there is nothing to suggest that her unconditional ACOD was anything but a favorable termination under Thompson. In fact, she alleged that the court initially refused to grant the ACOD and did so only after the prosecution conceded that it “could not prove the criminal charges against [her] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Complaint at 11 ¶ 71. Effectively, “the prosecutor abandoned the criminal case” against Brill. Thompson, 596 U.S. at 45, 142 S.Ct. 1332. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Brill's malicious prosecution claim on this basis.
B. Post-Arraignment Deprivation of Liberty
The County Defendants ask us to affirm the district court's dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim on an alternative ground — that Brill failed to allege any post-arraignment deprivation of liberty implicating her Fourth Amendment rights. We agree that dismissal is appropriate on this basis.10
Because a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim emerges from the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must “show some deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of ‘seizure.’ ” Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1995). Without such an injury, a malicious prosecution claim amounts to an impermissible “review of the decision to prosecute.” Id. (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)). Physical detainment is the paradigmatic type of actionable seizure, see Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1997), but we have also recognized that “a post-arraignment defendant who is obligated to appear in court in connection with criminal charges whenever his attendance is required suffers a Fourth Amendment deprivation of liberty,” Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations incorporated); see also, e.g., Rohman, 215 F.3d at 216 (concluding that defendant suffered a post-arraignment deprivation of liberty where he was required “to return to court on at least five occasions before the charges against him were ultimately dropped”).
Brill's Complaint identifies two deprivations of liberty: (1) her arrest on August 23, 2021, and (2) the arraignment itself on October 6, 2021. See Complaint at 3 ¶ 16, 7 ¶ 43. Neither of those events is alleged to have occurred after her arraignment. Accordingly, Brill has not alleged that she suffered any Fourth Amendment injury following her arraignment and therefore has not stated a claim for malicious prosecution.
IV. First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The district court dismissed Brill's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims because she failed to allege a violation of a right protected by either Amendment. We agree.
Brill alleged that her First Amendment rights were violated because Defendants’ conduct denied her of the ability to engage in “protected activities of rescuing animals, caring for them and then seeking persons to adopt those animals through various sources.” Complaint at 12 ¶ 78. She also alleged that Defendants’ conduct deprived her of the “rights to freely associate with others.” Id. at 11 ¶ 76. Those largely conclusory allegations fail to add up to a plausible First Amendment claim. The
“freedom of association” protected by the First Amendment has been generally understood to encompass two quite different types of associational activity: “choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships” and “association for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”
Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Dep'ts, 852 F.3d 178, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2017) (alterations incorporated) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617, 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984)). Brill's claim does not implicate any “intimate human relationships” nor has she identified any legal authority (and we know of none) suggesting that the conduct of rescuing of animals constitutes an activity protected by the First Amendment.
As to her Fourteenth Amendment claim, we construe Brill's Complaint as claiming that her procedural due process rights were violated when she lost her license from the State of New York to operate an animal rescue. To state a procedural due process claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both “(1) the existence of a property or liberty interest that was deprived and (2) deprivation of that interest without due process.” Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 692 F.3d 202, 218 (2d Cir. 2018). A plaintiff possesses a property interest in a state-issued “license” where the license “can be ‘suspended only upon a satisfactory showing’ of misconduct.” Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979)); cf. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) (“A benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.”). Here, the Complaint contains no allegations regarding the nature of the license Brill possessed and does not plead that the license could be revoked only for cause. And even assuming that the license could be revoked only for cause, the Complaint does not allege that any Defendant had any role in the licensing process or in the revocation of Brill's license in particular. See Wiggins v. Griffin, 86 F.4th 987, 996 (2d Cir. 2023) (“To establish a Section 1983 violation, a plaintiff must plead (and later prove) that each defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.”). Because the harm associated with a Fourteenth Amendment violation is the deprivation of process owed, it is immaterial that Brill alleged that Defendants were involved in events that may have triggered, but were nevertheless distinct from, any revocation proceedings.11
V. Conspiracy Claims
Brill brought conspiracy claims under Section 1983 and Section 1985(3), seemingly in an effort to impose liability on Defendant Calomiris, a private citizen. Though conspiracy claims under the two statutes differ somewhat,12 we conclude that each fails to state a claim.
First, a claim for conspiracy under Section 1983 requires that the conspiracy actually violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Singer, 63 F.3d at 119–20. For the reasons above, Brill has failed to allege any violation of her constitutional rights, and thus her conspiracy claim under Section 1983 necessarily fails. Second, because Section 1985(3) protects individuals from conspiracies that are “motivated by ․ racial or [some] otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus,” a plaintiff must allege some membership in a “class protected under” the statute. Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Brill has not alleged membership in any class (nor is her membership in any evident on the face of her Complaint). She has therefore failed to state a Section 1985(3) claim. Because we affirm the district court's decision on these grounds, we need not consider its conclusion as to the sufficiency of Brill's allegations regarding the existence of a conspiratorial agreement among Defendants.
VI. State-Law Defamation Claims
We also affirm the district court's refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Brill's state-law defamation claims. Because we conclude that all of Brill's federal claims were properly dismissed, that refusal was not an abuse of discretion. “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, th[e] balance of factors to be considered ․ will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Keeling, 996 F.2d 1485, 1490 (2d Cir. 1993) (ellipses in original) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988)). However, the district court should have dismissed these claims without prejudice to refiling in a court of appropriate jurisdiction, and we amend the district court's judgment accordingly.13 See Jusino v. Fed'n of Cath. Tchrs., Inc., 54 F.4th 95, 106–7 (2d Cir. 2022).
VII. Leave to Amend
Finally, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave for Brill to file an amended complaint as to all her claims. “Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court should freely give leave to amend the complaint when justice so requires.” Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations incorporated). Because the district court dismissed Brill's unlawful search and false arrest claims sua sponte without notice, justice requires that Brill be given the opportunity to replead those claims at least once. Prior to the district court's dismissal of those claims, Brill had not received any notice of the claims’ deficiencies and had no opportunity to respond with potentially curative amendments. She is entitled to an opportunity to do so. See Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[S]ua sponte dismissals may prejudice plaintiffs by depriving them of an opportunity to amend their complaints ․” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And because the district court was incorrect in holding that Brill's ACOD did not constitute a favorable termination for purposes of her Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim — the only argument the SPCA Defendants advanced before the district court as to that claim and the only basis for the district court's dismissal of that claim — justice requires allowing Brill the opportunity to replead this claim as well to correct the deficiency we have identified for the first time on appeal. Finally, because any amendments Brill may make to those claims may allow her to state a claim for a constitutional violation and may further demonstrate the existence of an agreement among Defendants, we allow Brill the opportunity to amend her Section 1983 conspiracy claim.14
But “a motion for leave to amend a complaint may be denied when amendment would be futile,” Tocker v. Philip Morris Cos., 470 F.3d 481, 491 (2d Cir. 2006), and we find that any opportunity for Brill to amend her First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 1985(3) claims would be just that. The SPCA Defendants’ motion to dismiss alerted Brill to the deficiencies in her First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims, and she offered no substantive amendments to those claims in the amended complaint she proposed in response. Nor is there any indication in Brill's Complaint or in her briefing on appeal that she can amend her Section 1985(3) claim to demonstrate that Defendants acted against her based on her membership in a protected class.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we AFFIRM IN PART AS MODIFIED and VACATE IN PART the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FOOTNOTES
1. As explained below, because the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Brill's state-law defamation claims, we modify the judgment to dismiss those claims without prejudice to refiling in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.
2. Under New York Agriculture and Markets Law, officers of the SPCA have authority to enforce the state's animal welfare statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 371 (allowing “any agent or officer of any duly incorporated society for the prevention of cruelty to ․ summon or arrest ․ any person offending against any of the provisions of article twenty-six [entitled ‘Animals’] of the agriculture and market law”); see also Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 208 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that New York law “grants municipalities the authority to delegate broad animal-control powers to private organizations such as the SPCA”).
3. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (holding that the government “may not use statements ․ stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination” and that such procedural safeguards include warning the defendant prior to questioning “that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney”).
4. Section 353 criminalizes the torture and abuse of animals, and Section 357 criminalizes the selling of diseased animals.
5. Brill consented to the dismissal of her state-law false arrest claim, “conced[ing] that [the claim was] barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.” 799 F. Supp. 3d at 87.
6. Defendant-Appellee Calomiris did not file a brief on appeal.
7. Though Brill also alleges that the search warrant had expired under New York law, any failure to comply with state procedural law in this regard does not necessarily implicate the Fourth Amendment. The latest search warrant Brill attached to her opposition to the SPCA Defendants’ motion to dismiss was issued on August 12, 2021 and was required to “be executed within ten days of issuance.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 22-3 at 30. The mere fact that the search warrant was executed one day after its expiration on August 23, 2023 on its own — without any other non-conclusory allegations of the search's unreasonableness — does not “implicate[ ] constitutional concerns.” United States v. Singletary, 798 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that “constitutional reasonableness does not demand that a seizure comport with state procedural law” (emphasis in original)); see also United States v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1993) (summarizing case law concluding that “completing a search shortly after the expiration of a search warrant does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation ․ so long as probable cause continues to exist”); United States v. Nyah, 928 F.3d 694, 701 (8th Cir. 2019) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require that search and seizure warrants include expiration dates.”).
8. A represented plaintiff “is not entitled to amend [her] complaint through statements made in motion papers,” Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998), and it is not clear that the report the district court relied on is integral to Brill's Complaint such that it can be considered at the pleading stage.
9. In reaching this conclusion, we note that several district courts in the Circuit have already recognized Thompson’s overruling of Singleton. See, e.g., Perez v. City of New York, No. 20-cv-1359, 2022 WL 4236338, at *13–*14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2022); Douglas v. Walmart, No. 24-cv-3030, 2026 WL 2922281, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2026).
10. The requirement of a post-arraignment deprivation of liberty distinguishes the malicious prosecution claim from the false arrest claim.
11. For that reason, even if we construed Brill's Complaint as bringing a “stigma plus” claim based on her allegations regarding the difficulty of finding subsequent employment, the claim would fail against Defendants. A “stigma plus” claim provides, “in limited circumstances, ․ a remedy for government defamation under federal constitutional law.” Salladah v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2004) (Sotomayor, J.). In order to succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must still allege that the defendant was responsible for “a material state-imposed burden or state-imposed alteration of [her] status or rights.” Id. As explained above, Brill has not alleged that Defendants were responsible for revoking her license.
12. Because a Section 1983 claim may be brought only against governmental actors, allegations that a private citizen conspired with the government provides a basis for a plaintiff to demonstrate that the private citizen “acted under color of state law.” Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323–24 (2d Cir. 2002). Section 1985(3), meanwhile, provides, among other things, “a cause of action for private conspiracies” where the conspirators are motivated based on some “class-based animus.” N.Y. State Nat. Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1358 (2d Cir. 1989).
13. Because, as explained below, we vacate the district court's denial of leave to amend, the federal district court may be a court of appropriate jurisdiction for Brill's state-law claims if she is able to cure the deficiencies with any of her federal-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
14. As explained above, we do not take a position on the Complaint's current sufficiency in alleging the existence of an agreement among Defendants to violate Brill's constitutional rights.
Liman, District Judge:
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Docket No: No. 25-2432
Decided: November 10, 2026
Court: United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
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