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UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Kahron ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Defendant-Appellant Kahron Robinson challenges the District Court's imposition of a special condition of supervised release requiring him to submit any “computer, other electronic communication, data storage devices, cloud storage or media” to search by a probation officer upon “reasonable suspicion concerning violation of a condition of supervision or unlawful conduct by the person being supervised” (the “electronic search condition”). App'x at 44.
Sentencing courts have “broad latitude” to fashion special conditions of supervised release. United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2024). But such conditions must be reasonably related to the statutory sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This is not a perfunctory rule; it meaningfully bounds sentencing courts’ discretion by asking them “to carefully balance the goals of supervised release while remaining mindful of the life-altering effects their judgments have on defendants, their families, and their communities.” Id. In this case, Robinson's use of electronic communications in past offenses supplies the requisite reasonable relationship between the “communication” portion of the electronic search condition and the sentencing factors. The “storage” portion, however, is not reasonably related to the sentencing factors. Nor is the condition substantively reasonable insofar as it applies to any employer-provided devices, since that would undermine key goals of Robinson's supervised release. We therefore vacate in part with respect to the electronic search condition and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Background
Robinson was arrested after he tossed a loaded firearm into an alley while fleeing from law enforcement. When asked why he had a firearm, Robinson said that his brother had been shot two days before and that he had been shot five times two months before. Robinson had previously been convicted in 2019 of two New York state felonies: grand larceny in the third degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 155.35, and identity theft in the first degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 190.80.1
Robinson was charged with one count of possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that Section 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. The District Court denied the motion.
Robinson then pled guilty to the single charge in the indictment. The District Court principally sentenced him to time served and three years’ supervised release. The court imposed the conditions of supervised release recommended in the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), including a special condition requiring Robinson to submit his “person, and any property, residence, vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic communication, data storage devices, cloud storage or media, and effects to a search” by a probation officer upon “reasonable suspicion concerning violation of a condition of supervision or unlawful conduct by the person being supervised.” The PSR stated that the reasons for this condition were the involvement of a firearm in the instant offense, the previous convictions for fraudulent financial activity, and the need to detect any new criminality and protect the public. The PSR also indicated that Robinson's conduct underlying his previous felony convictions involved using Facebook to exchange messages with co-conspirators.
Defense counsel objected to the electronic search condition, arguing that it was “overbroad.” App'x at 39–40. In response, the Government argued that the condition was “appropriate ․ in light of the defendant's prior convictions for fraud and financial-related offenses and to make sure that he is fully maintaining his compliance with all laws while on supervised release.” Id. at 40. The District Court stated that it would impose the condition “for the reasons indicated by” the Government. Id.
This appeal timely followed.
II. Discussion
Robinson initially raised two challenges on appeal. First, he argued that his conviction under Section 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022). However, Robinson now correctly concedes that his Second Amendment challenge is foreclosed by this Court's intervening decision in Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025). See Appellant's Reply Br. at 1. Robinson raises that challenge only to preserve it for purposes of potential en banc or Supreme Court review. See id.
Robinson's second (and only remaining) challenge is to the electronic search condition of supervised release. “We generally review challenges to special conditions of supervised release for procedural and substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Jimenez, 175 F.4th 341, 349 (2d Cir. 2026). “ ‘When a challenge to a condition of supervised release presents an issue of law,’ our review is de novo because ‘any error of law necessarily constitutes an abuse of discretion.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95, 111 (2d Cir. 2019)).
A. Procedural Reasonableness of the Electronic Search Condition
Procedural reasonableness requires that a District Court make an individualized assessment on the record of the need for each special condition and “make findings specific to the defendant, connecting those findings to the applicable [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors that would justify including the special condition.” Sims, 92 F.4th at 123. “If the court fails to provide an explanation, we may uphold the special condition only if the court's reasoning is ‘self-evident in the record.’ ” Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018)).
The District Court's assessment of the reasons for the electronic search condition was sufficiently individualized. The District Court explicitly adopted the Government's reasoning that the condition was “appropriate ․ in light of the defendant's prior convictions for fraud and financial-related offenses and to make sure that he is fully maintaining his compliance with all laws while on supervised release.” App'x at 40. To be sure, the generalized reference to maintaining compliance with all laws, alone, would be “plainly inadequate” to constitute an individualized assessment. Jimenez, 175 F.4th at 350. But the District Court here did more by adopting the Government's reference to Robinson's “prior convictions for fraud and financial-related offenses.” App'x at 40. That reasoning constitutes a sufficiently individualized assessment when read in the context of the PSR that the District Court explicitly adopted. See id. at 30–31, 142 S.Ct. 2111; see also United States v. Browning, 185 F.4th 349, 356 (2d Cir. 2026) (“[W]e do not read the sentencing transcript in isolation.”). Robinson's PSR “contains an extended discussion of his offense conduct, criminal history, and personal background.” Browning, 185 F.4th at 356. It specifically explains that Robinson's past convictions for grand larceny, identity theft, and conspiracy involved communication with co-conspirators via Facebook. Thus, even if the reference to Robinson's prior convictions was “phrased in a way that might misleadingly suggest it was applicable to any defendant convicted” of fraud or financial offenses, Jimenez, 175 F.4th at 350, the PSR's individualized explanation of electronics use in these offenses indicates a sufficiently specific basis for imposing the electronic search condition.
B. Substantive Reasonableness of the Electronic Search Condition
We turn to the substantive reasonableness of the electronic search condition. A special condition must be “reasonably related to certain statutory sentencing factors,” including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need to afford adequate deterrence, the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and the need to provide the defendant with training or treatment. Jimenez, 175 F.4th at 349; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Additionally, district courts must “consider how a special condition will impact any cognizable liberty interests,” and a special condition “affecting a cognizable liberty interest must be ‘supported by particularized findings that it does not constitute a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing.’ ” Sims, 92 F.4th at 124–25 (quoting United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2015)). And, of course, a special condition “must be consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. at 125.
At issue here is the “reasonably related” requirement, which “is complex and cannot be satisfied by generalized allusion to the appropriate factors.” Jimenez, 175 F.4th at 350. We have emphasized that a special condition “must be reasonably related to the relevant sentencing factors, not merely related,” and a court must determine that the condition “is likely to protect the public from a specific defendant's crimes, as opposed to criminality more generally.” Id.
As we have explained, our case law confirms that electronic search conditions “will often be reasonably related to the sentencing factors” in at least three contexts: where a defendant's convictions involved sex offenses; where a defendant “instrumentalized an electronic device in the commission of the instant offense conduct and surrounding circumstances”; and where a defendant “presents a high risk of reoffending during the period of supervised release.” Id. at 351. The presence of one of these factors, while not strictly necessary, “will often be sufficient” to make an electronic search condition substantively reasonable. Id.; see also Browning, 185 F.4th at 359–60 (explaining that electronic search condition can be substantively reasonable even if the defendant did not use electronic devices as part of the underlying offense, so long as there is an otherwise sufficient connection to the statutory sentencing factors).
There is no evidence that Robinson's underlying offense—illegal possession of a firearm after a felony conviction—involved any use of electronics. Thus, the electronic search condition is not reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense. To be sure, other portions of the special search condition imposed by the District Court—such as the portions permitting searches of Robinson's “person,” “residence,” and “vehicle”—are clearly connected to the nature and circumstances of the offense, because it would be conceivably possible to find a gun in one of those places. But those portions of the search condition are not at issue on this appeal. As to the electronic search condition specifically, there is no reasonable relationship to the underlying possession offense.
That said, the relevant sentencing factors “include not only the nature and circumstances of the offense, but, inter alia, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence and to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” Browning, 185 F.4th at 359 (citing U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)). Here, the portion of the electronic search condition relating to “electronic communication” was justified because it was reasonably related to Robinson's criminal history.
We have previously relied on the “history and characteristics” factor where a defendant's criminal record is so “severe” as to “self-evidently justify” imposition of an electronic search condition. Jimenez, 175 F.4th at 353; see United States v. Robinson, 134 F.4th 104, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2025) (upholding electronic search condition where the defendant had a “prolific” criminal history including “nine criminal convictions before the age of 30,” he “committed the instant offense while under post-release supervision,” and he “lied to the police in his post-arrest statement”); United States v. Thompson, 143 F.4th 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2025) (same where the defendant had a “serious, long and varied criminal history,” including “convictions for rape, attempted rape, forcible touching, robbery and burglary”); United States v. Arguedas, 134 F.4th 54, 70 (2d Cir. 2025) (same where the defendant's “criminal history spanned over a decade and involved, inter alia, assaults, robberies, and possession of a dangerous weapon”); Browning, 185 F.4th at 358 (same where the defendant “had a history of violent crime, including five convictions for robbery, assault, and child endangerment”).
Robinson's criminal history is comparatively less severe.2 His two prior felony convictions were nonviolent. He did not commit the instant offense while under supervision for a previous offense. See United States v. McCrone, 182 F.4th 254, 261 (2d Cir. 2026) (explaining that this factor is significant to determining risk of reoffense). Nor did he have any history of “dishonesty with law enforcement officers.” See Robinson, 134 F.4th at 111. On the contrary, Robinson admitted to the police that he possessed the firearm and apologized for his conduct.
Crucially, however, Robinson's past felony offenses involved the use of electronic devices to communicate with co-conspirators. Although the use of electronic devices carries less weight when electronics use occurred in past crimes, as opposed to the instant offense, we conclude that past use of electronics to coordinate a conspiracy supplies a reasonable relationship between the “communication” portion of the electronic search condition and the history and circumstances of the defendant.3
Moreover, the underlying offense involved possession of a loaded gun, which connects the condition to an additional sentencing factor: the need to protect the public from further crimes of this defendant. See Browning, 185 F.4th at 358–60.
As to the “storage” portion of the electronic search condition, however, Robinson's past offenses cannot supply the requisite reasonable relationship. The PSR indicates that the extent of Robinson's past electronic use was using Facebook to communicate with co-conspirators. Other components of Robinson's past crimes were notably analog—for example, using nail polish remover to modify checks. His conduct did not involve any general use of electronic “storage.” Thus, the portion of the condition pertaining to “storage,” namely “data storage devices, cloud storage or media,” is not reasonably related to the sentencing factors. On remand, the District Court should excise that portion of the condition. We recognize that the interconnected nature of modern electronic devices may preclude easy classification of “communication” versus “storage” devices. But we are confident that the capable District Court can tailor the condition to Robinson's electronic communications in a way that is workable for those directly supervising and monitoring him.
Furthermore, we hold that even the “communication” portion of the condition is substantively unreasonable insofar as it covers electronic communications on any employer-provided devices. Applying the condition to such devices could significantly affect Robinson's ability to maintain employment, which is a requirement of his supervised release. Consistent with the goals of supervised release to “fulfill[ ] rehabilitative ends and provide[ ] individuals with postconfinement assistance,” Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 196, 145 S.Ct. 2031 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted), any electronic communications on employer-provided devices should be exempted from the condition. Again, on remand the District Court should distinguish any employer-provided devices from devices that are Robinson's personal property.
Finally, we note that the Government has correctly conceded that the electronic search condition applies only where there is “reasonable suspicion that evidence of the violation of a condition of supervision or unlawful conduct will be found in the place to be searched.” Appellee's Suppl. Br. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the condition does not permit a search of Robinson's electronic communications merely because there is reasonable suspicion that he has committed a violation of supervised release; rather, there must be a “nexus between the reasonable suspicion and the area to be searched.” Id.
III. Conclusion
In sum, we hold that the imposition of the electronic search condition was procedurally reasonable, and that the portion of the condition pertaining to electronic “communication” is substantively reasonable except insofar as it could be read to apply to devices that are the property of a lawful employer. We also hold that the portion of the condition pertaining to electronic “storage” devices, namely “data storage devices, cloud storage or media,” is not substantively reasonable. On remand, the District Court should amend the condition accordingly.
In so holding, we reiterate that electronic search conditions “potentially pose enormous consequences to criminal defendants’ lives.” Jimenez, 175 F.4th at 351. Electronic devices, such as cell phones, are “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that they have become “indispensable to participation in modern society.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 315, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 201 L.Ed.2d 507 (2018) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014)). And electronic search conditions may not be “substantively reasonable in all, or perhaps even most, cases.” Jimenez, 175 F.4th at 352. They are, of course, not included as part of the “mandatory” or “standard” conditions of supervised release. Id. at 351 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(2)). Thus, even where—as here—some particular aspect of the defendant's circumstances makes it reasonable to impose a special electronic search condition, a sentencing court has substantial discretion to tailor that condition appropriately. See United States v. Carlineo, 998 F.3d 533, 536 (2021).
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's judgment is VACATED in part with respect to the electronic search condition, and REMANDED to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FOOTNOTES
1. The Presentence Investigation Report also indicates that Robinson was convicted in 2019 of conspiracy in the fifth degree, which is a misdemeanor under New York Penal Law § 105.05.
2. Robinson's history of parole and disciplinary violations does not factor meaningfully into our analysis. Many of those violations—such as failing to maintain compliance with drug testing, programming, and employment requirements—were administrative, rather than criminal. See Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 194, 145 S.Ct. 2031, 222 L.Ed.2d 438 (2025) (“[C]onduct that constitutes a violation of supervised release need not be criminal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And supervised release “is not a punishment in lieu of incarceration․ Rather, it fulfills rehabilitative ends and provides individuals with postconfinement assistance.” Id. at 196, 145 S.Ct. 2031 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, past violations of supervised release would have to be extremely numerous or severe to supply the requisite connection between an electronic search condition and the sentencing factors.
3. The “communication” portion of the condition includes any communication via “computer,” or “other electronic communication.” The “storage” portion includes, namely, any other “data storage devices, cloud storage or media.”
Myrna Pérez, Circuit Judge:
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Docket No: No. 24-2993
Decided: November 10, 2026
Court: United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
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