UPPAL v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH NYS (2019)

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Neelam Uppal, pro se, appeals the district court's order denying her proposed order to show cause, in which she sought an injunction against enforcement of the state administrative decision revoking her license to practice medicine and any further action against her by the defendants. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

This Court reviews the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Lynch v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2009). “A district court has abused its discretion if it has (1) ‘based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law,’ (2) made a ‘clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence,’ or (3) ‘rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’ ” Id. (quoting Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) ).

A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy,” and the movant carries the burden of persuasion “by a clear showing.” Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005). Where, as here, the moving party seeks to stay governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Irreparable harm “is the single most important prerequisite” for injunctive relief, and “[i]n the absence of a showing of irreparable harm, a motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.” Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 234 (2d Cir. 1999).

The motion to enjoin enforcement of Uppal's medical license revocation was properly denied because she failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.¹ Uppal informed the court that she did not intend to practice medicine until her state or federal court actions resolved in her favor. Since enforcement of the revocation pending disposition of her claims would thus have no practical effect, the finding that she would suffer no irreparable harm was not clearly erroneous. This finding is sufficient to justify denial of a preliminary injunction. See id.

Uppal's arguments on appeal regarding irreparable injury are unavailing because they allege injuries that have already occurred, rather than prospective injuries that could be avoided by an injunction. See id. (movant must demonstrate an “imminent” injury).

We have considered Uppal's remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The district court found Uppal had abandoned her request to preliminarily enjoin the defendants from “taking any further action” against her. Uppal waived the argument that this was error by failing to raise it in her opening brief. See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 428 (2d Cir. 2005); Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1996).