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UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Carlos BAYRON-RAMOS, Defendant, Appellant.
A defendant taken into custody for allegedly violating a condition of supervised release is entitled to a prompt hearing to determine if probable cause supports the allegations. Appellant Carlos Bayron Ramos (“Bayron”) admitted at such a hearing in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico that probable cause existed for several alleged supervised-release violations. Based on statements that the district court made at a subsequent merits hearing, Bayron challenges the resulting revocation of his supervised release. He further challenges the top-of-the-Guidelines sentence of twenty-four months’ imprisonment, plus three additional years of supervised release, that the district court imposed. We affirm the revocation of supervised release but vacate and remand the revocation sentence for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
A. Events Preceding the Final Revocation Hearing
This case stems from Bayron's 2019 conviction, based on a guilty plea, for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine within a protected location. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846, 860. Bayron was sentenced to time served and six years’ supervised release. In 2023, he admitted violating the conditions of his supervised release barring the possession and use of controlled substances. As a result, he received an eighteen-month prison sentence and a new four-year term of supervised release.
In March 2025, eight months after Bayron began his second supervised-release term, his probation officer filed a motion asserting that Bayron had again violated conditions of his supervised release. The motion stated that he had tested positive for cocaine four times since December 2024, provided a diluted urine sample for one drug test, failed to attend seven scheduled appointments for mental health and substance abuse therapy, failed to inform his probation officer of an address change, acted aggressively toward his probation officer on one occasion, and, the same evening, had been arrested for possession of firearms while a rear passenger in a car driven by another convicted felon. In a supplemental motion filed the next day, the probation officer listed the firearms and ammunition found in the vehicle, a Hyundai, and stated that Bayron's firearms-related violation “trigger[ed] a mandatory revocation” of supervised release.
At the preliminary revocation hearing before a magistrate judge, Bayron's counsel stated that they would not be contesting three positive drug tests and the missed therapy sessions,1 and the magistrate judge thus instructed the prosecutor that he did “not need to present evidence [on those violations] for probable cause purposes.” In addition to finding probable cause for the uncontested violations, the magistrate judge found probable cause that Bayron was in constructive possession of two loaded firearms and ammunition found under the front passenger seat of the vehicle in which he had been riding in the backseat. According to a probation officer who testified at the preliminary hearing, one of the two firearms under the front seat was modified with a visible “chip” -- a device that would allow it to be fired automatically.2 The officer also testified at the preliminary hearing that the two guns would not have been visible from Bayron's position in the rear of the car.3 The magistrate judge did not find probable cause for Bayron's possession of a third firearm, located in the trunk of the car, or for nine loaded magazines that were in a bag on the floor near the driver's seat. Nor did the magistrate judge find probable cause for the allegations of a fourth positive drug test, failure to appear for random drug testing on one occasion, provision of a diluted urine sample on another occasion, or failure to provide probation with a change of address.4
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the magistrate judge stated the following: “[A]s to the matters that I have made a finding of probable cause, this matter is respectfully referred to the attention of [the district court] for the scheduling of a final revocation hearing.” A few days later, and a day before the scheduled final revocation hearing, Bayron's counsel submitted an informative motion to the district court stating that Bayron would “contest all allegations of violations of supervised release for which the [magistrate judge] found probable cause at the preliminary revocation hearing.”
B. The Final Revocation Hearing
At the outset of the final revocation hearing, the district court reviewed the background recounted above, noting Bayron's 2019 conviction, his prior supervised-release violations, and the findings of the magistrate judge at the recent preliminary hearing. The court then referred to the motion filed the previous day “inform[ing] that [Bayron] will be contesting all violations for which [the magistrate judge] had found probable cause, which includes the one[s] that he already said that he was not going to contest.” The following exchange between the court and defense counsel then took place:
COURT: So I'm asking the defense if you are contesting all violations or just the ones that you did not consent to and that probable cause was found by a magistrate judge.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: All violations that [the magistrate judge] found probable cause for, even the ones we stipulated to at the preliminary hearing ․
COURT: Very well. If you are going to assume that position, it's going to be then a brand new hearing. You can call it a de novo hearing. And I'm going to allow the government then to offer proof as to all violations, even including the ones that the magistrate judge didn't find probable cause.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, your honor, in that case, we would object to that because ․ this is a different standard. This is preponderance. This is ․ before a different fact finder.
So, while I lodge my objection because I think that's incorrect, if that's the [c]ourt's position, then we would proceed only then with what the defense contested at the preliminary hearing.
COURT: I'm sorry. Say that again.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: So, given the [c]ourt's position, under objection, we will proceed with just the offenses for which we contested at the preliminary revocation hearing.
Defense counsel then asked about a reference the judge made to a Grade A violation -- the most serious level of supervised-release violations, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1) -- in an effort to determine which of the alleged violations the judge believed would qualify as Grade A. The judge stated that, “if there is conduct that amounts to a state or federal offense, then, depending on the conduct, that might be a [G]rade A violation.” In response, defense counsel emphasized that Bayron was entitled to notice of “what exactly is the [G]rade A violation that the government has alleged” and stated that the most serious allegation -- possession of firearms -- “would be a [G]rade B violation.” The court stated that it would “take that into consideration in [its] final ruling,” and the hearing then proceeded with witness testimony.
The scope of the hearing came up three times during the proceeding. First, when it appeared the government was about to elicit testimony about a positive drug test, the following exchange occurred:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Excuse me, your Honor. It was my understanding that we were not -- given the [c]ourt's ruling, we were not going to contest the positives. So I don't know if this line of direct is necessary. If we could just go to what's the issue.
GOVERNMENT: In my response, your Honor, I'm happy to move on and move to something else if the defense is stipulating to that. Given that there is an objection to the way we're proceeding, I just don't want this to come back on appeal somehow and have to re-do it.
So if the defendant wants to waive his right to appeal that particular issue, I'm happy to move on. But I don't want to create an issue on appeal later on as well.
COURT: Yes, counsel.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, your Honor. We're not going to waive that. But in the interests of expediency, given the [c]ourt's ruling, I have no issue with proceeding to what's at issue, obviously with our objection.
COURT: All right. Then you can proceed.
The government then elicited testimony from Bayron's supervising probation officer to confirm documentary evidence that Bayron had tested positive for cocaine on the three dates for which he had conceded probable cause 5 : December 20, 2024, and January 29 and March 14, 2025. The probation officer also reported that, on March 18, 2025, Bayron admitted that he would test positive for marijuana if a sample were taken that day, acknowledged that he had not been going to treatment appointments, and reacted aggressively when she suggested the option of inpatient treatment. On cross-examination, the probation officer acknowledged that Bayron was not tested for drugs on March 18 and that she did not ask why he assumed his test would be positive that day.6
The scope of the hearing came up again during the testimony of the probation officer who supervised Rodriguez-Jamie, the driver of the car in which Bayron had been a passenger and the firearms and ammunition were found. When the government started to elicit testimony about the bag found near the driver's seat, defense counsel objected, observing that “[t]he magistrate judge found no probable cause as to the magazines that were in that bag. So I don't see the relevance of going into this.” The government's attorney then expressed his “understanding ․ that the defense agreed to proceed on all of the allegations, including the ones that no probable cause were found.” In response, defense counsel stated “that was not the defense's position. We objected, but we proceeded on what was found on probable cause.” The court then said it would allow the question, which concerned the visibility of the bag's contents, “just so that I can have some background of what happened.”
The third reference to the scope of the hearing occurred when the government started to introduce evidence about the firearm in the trunk of the car. Defense counsel interjected: “Your Honor, just to the extent to move things along, there was no probable cause as to the trunk as well. So, if we're going to go down what's inside of the trunk, I would object as to relevance.” Government counsel then said he would “move along,” and he turned to questioning the probation officer about the items that were under the front passenger seat -- for which the magistrate judge had found probable cause.
During that questioning, the officer stated that he “pushed the front seat just to see what was underneath, and then I pulled out the guns to have a better picture of how things were under the seat.” Although he had earlier in the hearing answered “[y]es” when asked by the judge if someone “sitting in the back of the car[ ] could ․ see what was underneath” the front passenger seat, his testimony otherwise indicated that only the bag containing ammunition was visible, and only partially so.7
At the conclusion of the testimony, and following brief arguments by counsel, the district court took the case under advisement and scheduled another hearing to announce its decision on the violations and, if warranted, to impose sentence.
C. The District Court's Findings
At the outset of the continued final revocation hearing, the district court recapped the defendant's choice at the beginning of the previous proceeding:
I am just going to say for the record, to have the record clear, that before we began the final revocation hearing last week, [d]efendant had informed that he intended to contest all the ․ probable cause findings made by the magistrate judge ․, including those that he stated to the magistrate judge that he was not going to contest. The [c]ourt ruled at that moment that if that was going to be the case, the [c]ourt was going to allow the government to present evidence as to all violations.
The defendant objected. And then he stated that if that was going to be the case, then he was not going to contest the violations which he had not contested before the magistrate judge.
After obtaining defense counsel's agreement that the court had accurately described the scenario, the court went on to list the violations that Bayron had agreed not to contest and noted that, despite that agreement, “the government, in an abundance of caution, decided to present evidence as to all of those.”
The court then stated its finding that “the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [d]efendant possessed and used illicit substances on December 20, 2024, January 29, 2025, and March 14th, 2025” -- i.e., the three conceded positive-test-result dates. In support of its finding, the court cited the testimony of Bayron's probation officer and “forms that were signed by the defendant showing the accuracy of the positive test results.”8 It then noted that Bayron “did not introduce any evidence that called these facts into question.”
The court went on to say that, by statute, “three failed drug tests within a year span require mandatory revocation”9 and that “case law is clear that when conducting a revocation hearing, a positive test is sufficient to show that the defendant possessed the drugs.” The court also found that, by missing a number of therapy appointments, Bayron violated the mandatory condition that he participate in a mental health treatment program. For that violation, the court cited the testimony of Bayron's probation officer and noted that “[d]efendant introduced no evidence that called that fact into question.”
However, the court found that “the government ha[d] failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [Bayron] possessed firearms or committed a federal, state[,] or local crime.”10 The court concluded that “the weapons and the ammunitions” found under the front passenger seat of the Hyundai were visible from where Bayron was sitting and, hence, the government had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Bayron “knew the weapons were in the car.”11 But, the court stated, the government had not adduced evidence showing that Bayron intended to exercise control over them as needed to establish “constructive possession of the firearms in question, which would have been a [g]rade A violation.” The court then summed up that Bayron violated “two of the three conditions of supervised release that were challenged”12 -- presumably meaning the positive drug tests and missed therapy appointments, but not the gun possession -- and found “a basis in fact to have the term of supervised release revoked.”
The court then invited defense counsel to speak before the sentence was imposed. Counsel pointed out that the statute cited by the court for mandatory revocation requires more than three positive drug tests, and he urged the court to consider the option of an inpatient drug treatment program rather than incarceration. In support of either no prison time or a downward departure from the applicable Guidelines range, counsel emphasized Bayron's longstanding struggle with substance abuse, noting that “[m]ost of Mr. Bayron's relapses ․ have really only harmed himself,” and that his criminal history involves drug-related conduct to support his addiction. Bayron then spoke on his own behalf, acknowledging his addiction and observing that if he were “given the opportunity to get the therapies, either outpatient or internal, ․ [he] would be very much better than ․ in jail” and “would still have an opportunity to continue with [his] work.”
A brief discussion then followed in which the scope of the hearing again came up. The district court realized that it had erroneously stated the dates of Bayron's missed therapy appointments, and, in making a correction, listed the seven dates specified in the probation officer's original motion alleging supervised release violations. Defense counsel then noted that Bayron had told him that, on some of those dates, he was hospitalized, but acknowledged that “we didn't offer anything during the hearing.” Nonetheless, counsel continued that his memory was that there was no testimony at the final revocation hearing “about these particular dates,” and he reiterated his request that, instead of a prison sentence, Bayron be sent to “an intensive inpatient [program], where he can be monitored and treated under the highest conditions.” In response, the court said the following:
Just to have the record clear, ․ there was indeed testimony as to that.13 But not only that, Counsel, these are ․ some of the findings from the magistrate judge that you said that you were not contesting.
Defense counsel responded: “Understood.”
Given a turn to speak, the prosecutor noted Bayron's history of repeated drug use and urged a top-of-the-range sentence of twenty-four months, which he described as “reasonable given the history, given who he was with and what was in the vehicle.” The prosecutor stated his belief that the high-end sentence was justified because “as [the court] found, he knew those firearms and that ammunition were there.”
D. The Sentencing Pronouncement
Concluding that the violations warranted revoking Bayron's supervised release, the district court determined that the guideline for a Grade B violation applied and that, accordingly, the applicable imprisonment range was eighteen-to-twenty-four months. The court said that he had “incurred in a violation of the conditions of supervision involving conduct that amounts to a state or federal offense, which [is] illegal possession of controlled substances.” It stated that “[o]ther violations include the use of illegal substances and failure to commit to mental health and substance abuse treatment.” After noting Bayron's prior revocation, the court explained its chosen sentence as follows:
This time, ․ violations occurred ․ within nine months of Mr. Bayron's commencing his second supervised release term. In this occasion, once again, he faces violations regarding possession and use of illegal substances and failure to commit to treatment. But, in addition, in this instance, he got inside a car in which two Glock pistols with ammunition were visible and accessible to him, which constitute[s] relevant conduct only for purposes of assessing his poor prognosis of rehabilitation and overall attitude with compliance of supervision.
Given the seriousness of the offenses, the defiant and disrespectful attitude towards the probation officer, the fact that this is his second revocation in two years, the second one only nine months after he commenced his second supervised release term, his lack of respect for the law and [c]ourt orders[,] and his poor prognosis of rehabilitation, which are all intangibles not considered by the sentencing guidelines, coupled with the nature of the violations, the [c]ourt deems that a sentence in the upper end of the applicable guidelines is a sentence that is not harsher than necessary.
The court then imposed the twenty-four-month term of imprisonment, to be followed by a new three-year term of supervised release.
II. The Coercion Challenge
We begin with Bayron's challenge to the district court's decision to revoke his supervised release. Bayron argues that the district court erred by forcing him to choose between waiving his right to contest the drug and missed-treatment allegations or defending against all allegations, including the firearm charges for which the magistrate judge found no probable cause.
As we recounted above, the colloquy at issue went as follows: The district court asked the defense “if [it was] contesting all violations or just the ones that [it] did not consent to and that probable cause was found by a magistrate judge.” Defense counsel answered: “All violations that [the magistrate judge] found probable cause for, even the ones we stipulated to at the preliminary hearing.” The district court responded: “Very well. If you are going to assume that position, it's going to be then a brand new hearing. You can call it a de novo hearing. And I'm going to allow the government then to offer proof as to all violations, even including the ones that the magistrate judge didn't find probable cause.” This comment prompted the following objection: “Well, your Honor, in that case, we would object to that because ․ this is a different standard. This is preponderance. This is ․ before a different fact finder.”
Bayron contends on appeal that “[b]ecause the district court here did not permit [him] to contest all the alleged violations at issue without facing exposure for an allegation that had already been dismissed for lack of probable cause, he was denied adequate process in violation of the Constitution and Rule 32.1.” He further argues that the District Court's presentation of the choice “between waiving his right to contest the allegations at issue under Rule 32.1(b)(2) or fac[ing] potential culpability for a previously dismissed firearm possession allegation ․ rendered his waiver involuntary.”
We review a district court's decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of discretion when the challenge to that decision is preserved. United States v. Navarro-Santisteban, 83 F.4th 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2023). Our review is de novo when a defendant alleges a denial of due process or an error of law in a decision to revoke supervised release and the challenge is preserved. United States v. Ortiz-Rodríguez, 177 F.4th 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2026).
The government urges us to find that Bayron “did not preserve his claim on appeal that the court violated his Fifth Amendment and Rule 32.1 rights to contest evidence or that his decision to waive those rights was involuntary.” Therefore, the government argues, we “should review that claim, if at all, for plain error only.” We need not resolve this question because we conclude that Bayron's coercion claim fails under a lower standard of review given the limited arguments he has made to us for concluding otherwise.
Importantly, Bayron notes that “the government is correct that a district court retains authority to review a magistrate judge's findings” and that he has “never contended otherwise.” This concession makes it difficult to understand the basis for his coercion-based challenge on appeal, at least when we consider the fact that the district court stated that it was “going to allow the government then to offer proof as to all violations, even including the ones that the magistrate judge didn't find probable cause” (emphasis added), and did not state that it was going to require or encourage the government to do so.
To be sure, Bayron claims that “[t]he issue here is not, as the government contends, whether the district could theoretically review the magistrate judge's findings; it is whether the court could use the threat of that review to coerce the abandonment of a separate, independent right.” But Bayron does not offer any developed reasoning to explain why we must conclude that the district court's statements about future proceedings that it was concededly authorized to conduct constituted a “threat” of review that “coerce[d] the abandonment of a separate, independent right.” Nor does Bayron identify any authority that speaks to whether that conclusion about the nature of those statements is required.
For example, Bayron cites to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), in seeming support of this challenge. But that precedent establishes only that he had the right to contest the supervised release violation allegations. It does not shed any light on whether it was appropriate for the district court to say what it said in the colloquy at issue.
Similarly, Bayron cites United States v. Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2003), for the conclusion that the waiver of rights in this context must be voluntary, which no one disputes. And, while Bayron also attempts to use Correa-Torres to support the dispositive nub of his claim -- that the choice he faced made his waiver involuntary -- we fail to see how that precedent provides support for Bayron's contention.
The analysis in Correa-Torres focused largely on the “knowing” part of the “knowing and voluntary” requirement. Because Bayron's challenge is to voluntariness, not knowledge, we fail to see much in the opinion to support his argument. To the extent Correa-Torres did analyze voluntariness, we concluded that the waiver was involuntary because it “yielded [the defendant] no discernible benefit.” Id. at 24-25. As to that particular conclusion, Bayron has failed to explain how the facts of that case map on here.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Bayron has shown that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his supervised release because he has not established legal or constitutional error in the district court's actions. Thus, his coercion claim fails even assuming that it is preserved.14
III. The Sentencing Challenge
Bayron asserts that the district court also erred when it imposed a twenty-four-month sentence based, in part, on certain factors that are off-limits when a court sentences a defendant to a term of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release. In Esteras v. United States, the Supreme Court examined the statutory provisions that govern sentencing for a defendant's original crime and for violating conditions of supervised release. See 606 U.S. at 191-93, 145 S.Ct. 2031 (comparing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)). The Court stated that, in the revocation context, “a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sentencing ․ but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution.” Id. at 196, 145 S.Ct. 2031. The Court pointed out that, in keeping with that forward-looking focus, several factors that courts are instructed to consider when imposing the original sentence are excluded as considerations when the court chooses a post-revocation sentence. Among the excluded factors is “the need for the sentence imposed to ‘reflect the seriousness of the offense, [and] to promote respect for the law.’ ” Id. at 192, 145 S.Ct. 2031 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing the factors to be considered in revoking supervised release).15
As recounted above, see supra Section I.D, the district court's explanation for its chosen sentence referenced both of those excluded considerations. We repeat, for the reader's convenience, the pertinent portion of that explanation:
Given the seriousness of the offenses, the defiant and disrespectful attitude towards the probation officer, the fact that this is his second revocation in two years, the second one only nine months after he commenced his second supervised release term, his lack of respect for the law and [c]ourt orders[,] and his poor prognosis of rehabilitation, which are all intangibles not considered by the sentencing guidelines, coupled with the nature of the violations, the [c]ourt deems that a sentence in the upper end of the applicable guidelines is a sentence that is not harsher than necessary.
The government gives particular attention to the court's stated reliance on “the seriousness of the offenses.” In Esteras, the Supreme Court emphasized that, “[i]n the context of a revocation hearing, the ‘offense’ is the underlying crime of conviction, not the violation of the supervised-release conditions.” Id. at 193-94, 145 S.Ct. 2031. The government, however, asserts in its brief that, when the district court cited “the seriousness of the offenses,” the “context makes clear that the court referred to Bayron's repeated violations of his supervised release conditions.” And, according to the government, a court may properly consider “the seriousness of a defendant's supervised release violation.”
The record, however, belies the government's interpretation of the district court's reasoning. We recognize that, because Esteras was issued after Bayron's revocation hearing, the district court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's definitive statement that the word “offense” as used in the sentencing provisions “refer[s] to a criminal conviction” rather than to “conduct that constitutes a violation of supervised release.” Id. at 194, 145 S.Ct. 2031 (noting that, in addition to “[t]he opening provision of Title 18's sentencing chapter,” “neighboring provisions in § 3583 consistently use the word ‘offense’ to refer to the defendant's original crime of conviction, while using the word ‘violation’ to refer to the conduct that triggers revocation”). Without knowledge of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the word “offense,” it is plausible that the district court would have used that term, as the government contends, to refer to the supervised release violations.
But that contention must withstand scrutiny of the district court's full explanation, in which the district court verbally treated Bayron's “offenses” and his “violations” as two different categories. After listing “the seriousness of the offenses” and Bayron's “lack of respect for the law and [c]ourt orders” among the factors it deemed relevant, the court stated that the considerations it had just cited were “coupled with the nature of the violations.” (Emphasis added.) Although the government omits that latter portion of the explanation in reproducing the district court's reasoning in its brief, we cannot ignore it -- or the fact that the court chose two different words to describe Bayron's misconduct when listing the multiple justifications for the maximum sentence it imposed. In addition, the court referred to Bayron's “offenses” side-by-side with another factor also excluded from sentencing for violations of supervised release, namely, the “lack of respect for the law.” On its face, then, the court's explanation for the chosen sentence was improper under Esteras.
The government properly notes, however, that Bayron did not object to the court's sentencing pronouncement based on the court's reliance on improper factors,16 leading the government to argue that plain-error review applies and leading Bayron to offer reasons why it should not. We do not need to resolve that debate because we find Bayron prevails even under plain-error review.
As we have previously observed, “plain error review requires us to evaluate whether the law is clear now, at the time we are conducting appellate review, regardless of whether the law was unclear at the time of sentencing.” United States v. Acevedo-Osorio, 118 F.4th 117, 132 n.7 (1st Cir. 2024) (citation modified) (quoting United States v. Delgado-Sánchez, 849 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2017)). Hence, taking the district court's words at face value, we must conclude that, by giving separate attention to “the seriousness of the offenses” and “the nature of the violations” in its sentencing pronouncement, the district court plainly contravened the holding of Esteras. In other words, this is the case contemplated by the Supreme Court in which it is “ ‘clear’ ․ that the district court actually relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A)17 -- because it did so ․ by unmistakable implication.” Esteras, 606 U.S. at 203, 145 S.Ct. 2031 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)).
Having found error that is plain, we must address the other prongs of the plain-error standard: whether the error “affected both [Bayron's] substantial rights and the fairness of the sentencing process.” United States v. Ponzo, 171 F.4th 507, 512 (1st Cir. 2026). On the third prong -- the question of prejudice to Bayron -- we see “a reasonable probability that but for the error, the district court would have imposed a different, more favorable sentence.” United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 78 (1st Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., United States v. Baxter, 179 F.4th 73, 88 (1st Cir. 2026) (“An error affects substantial rights when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (citation modified)). Indeed, the court began its explanation with reference to “the seriousness of the offenses.” Given the emphasis reflected by that placement and the court's invocation of Bayron's “lack of respect for the law and [c]ourt orders,” we cannot say the forward-looking factors -- most significantly, his “poor prognosis of rehabilitation” -- would have independently justified a sentence the court acknowledged was at the “upper end of the applicable guidelines.” If the court had looked only forward, it is reasonably probable that it would have viewed more favorably Bayron's request for placement in a drug treatment program rather than a prison.
As for the fourth prong, we can readily conclude that the error “seriously implicate[d] the fairness of the sentencing process.” United States v. García-Toro, 177 F.4th 336, 340 (1st Cir. 2026). As the Supreme Court has rhetorically asked, “what reasonable citizen wouldn't bear a rightly diminished view of the judicial process and its integrity if courts refused to correct obvious errors of their own devise that threaten to require individuals to linger longer in federal prison than the law demands?” Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 141, 138 S.Ct. 1897, 201 L.Ed.2d 376 (2018) (quoting United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 2014)). Because there is a reasonable probability in this case that Bayron would have received a less severe sentence if the district court had considered only permissible factors, it follows that the Esteras error “seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] proceedings.” United States v. Cheveres-Morales, 83 F.4th 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2023)(quoting United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)).
Accordingly, the sentence imposed on Bayron for violating the conditions of his supervised release is vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing without delay.
So ordered.
I agree with my colleagues that Bayron must be resentenced because of the district court's reliance on factors deemed improper by the Supreme Court in Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 197, 145 S.Ct. 2031, 222 L.Ed.2d 438 (2025). I disagree, however, that Bayron has failed to show that the district court violated his rights when it gave him the ultimatum to forgo challenging the violations he had conceded -- solely for probable-cause purposes -- or face defending against all of the alleged supervised-release violations, including those for which the magistrate judge found no probable cause. Because I conclude -- contrary to the government's argument -- that the district court's handling of the final revocation hearing is properly before us, and because the court improperly pressured Bayron, I would remand for a new revocation proceeding.
I. The Scope of the Final Revocation Hearing
Bayron asserts that the district court violated his rights when it forced him to choose between again admitting the positive drug tests and missed therapy appointments or defending against allegations of supervised-release violations for which the magistrate judge found no probable cause. Most significantly, the magistrate judge found probable cause lacking for the allegations that Bayron possessed the ammunition found under the driver's seat of the car and the firearm found in the trunk. For its part, the government claims that the district court was properly managing the hearing by offering Bayron the option to limit the scope of the proceeding if he agreed to forgo challenging the alleged violations for which he had acknowledged that probable cause existed.
Assessing these competing perspectives is not a straightforward task. Before addressing that complexity, I explain why I conclude that Bayron is entitled to consideration of his coercion claim on appeal. I then consider the extent of authority conferred on district courts by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 -- which sets forth the procedures for revoking supervised release -- and review our circuit's precedent on the scope of final revocation proceedings. With that backdrop in place, I turn to the circumstances of Bayron's proceeding.
A. Preservation
In its brief, the government states that “Bayron's objection [was] that it would be incorrect to allow evidence [at the final revocation hearing] as to the violations for which the magistrate judge found no probable cause.”18 That objection, the government asserts, did not preserve his claim that the choice imposed on him by the district court violated his rights under Rule 32.1 and denied him due process. I disagree. To be sure, Bayron did not expressly cite either the Fifth Amendment or the federal rule in making his objection and did not use the word “coercion.” However, the meaning of defense counsel's objection is readily apparent: he was protesting the court's ultimatum that Bayron either forgo his right to have the government satisfy the higher preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for the violations for which he had conceded probable cause or risk exposure to revocation of supervised released based on more violations -- i.e., as the government put it, “the violations for which the magistrate judge found no probable cause.” In these circumstances, I think it is clear enough that counsel was objecting to the court's unfairly demanding that Bayron relinquish his procedural rights. And that challenge to the district court's ultimatum is likewise apparent in Bayron's briefing on appeal.
B. Revocation of Supervised Release
Under Rule 32.1, if a person is taken into custody for allegedly violating a condition of supervised release, “a magistrate judge must promptly conduct a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a violation occurred.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(1)(A). The Rule provides that, “[i]f the judge finds probable cause, the judge must conduct a revocation hearing. If the judge does not find probable cause, the judge must dismiss the proceeding,” id. § (b)(1)(C), thereby releasing the person from custody.19
The Rule also specifies various protections afforded to a defendant facing possible revocation of supervised release, including written notice of the alleged violations, the opportunity to present evidence and question witnesses at the final revocation hearing, and the right to counsel. See id. § (b)(2)(A), (C), (D). By statute, the standard of proof at that final hearing is preponderance of the evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Our court has noted that “adherence to the processes prescribed by Rule 32.1 is instrumental to the fair and efficient operation of revocation proceedings” and, therefore, “a waiver of the rights conferred thereunder cannot be effective unless that waiver is made both knowingly and voluntarily.” United States v. Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2003); cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (“[S]ociety has a[n] ․ interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness; fair treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness.”).
Of primary importance here is the section of Rule 32.1 stating that the judge “must dismiss the proceeding” if no probable cause is found for any alleged violation. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(1)(C). This provision on its face appears to foreclose reconsideration of the allegations if there is no finding of probable cause made at the preliminary hearing. Consistent with that mandate, our court has presumed at least twice that, where findings of no-probable-cause were made at the preliminary hearing for some, but not all, of the alleged violations, only the violations found to be supported by probable cause were reviewable at the final revocation proceeding. In United States v. Serrano-Berríos, 38 F.4th 246 (1st Cir. 2022), we stated the following: “The magistrate judge concluded that there was no probable cause to support a conclusion that [the defendant] committed a state crime, so that alleged violation was dismissed and was not properly before the district court.” Id. at 250. We cited Rule 32.1(b)(1)(C) in support of that statement.
The next year, in United States v. Navarro-Santisteban, 83 F.4th 44 (1st Cir. 2023), we similarly noted that the magistrate judge had “found no probable cause to support the alleged drug-related violations and dismissed them,” leaving only “the government's allegation that [the defendant] had violated the supervised-release condition barring the commission of a new crime.” Id. at 48. Thus, our court in both Serrano-Berríos and Navarro-Santisteban presumed that the district court lacks authority to revive alleged violations for which a magistrate judge finds no probable cause.
The government disagrees, citing a third case, United States v. García-Oquendo, 144 F.4th 66 (1st Cir. 2025), and claiming that we “implicitly acknowledged” there that district courts may revisit “alleged violations for which the magistrate judge found no probable cause.” As Bayron points out, the government overreads García-Oquendo, where the alleged violation at issue was the commission of new crimes, including the fraudulent use of two individuals’ identities to obtain credit cards. See id. at 69. The magistrate judge found probable cause with respect to one of the individuals, but not the other. Although the district court examined evidence related to both alleged victims, we made a point of noting that the only challenge pressed on appeal was the allegedly improper admission of out of court statements by several witnesses. See id. at 73-74. Accordingly, García-Oquendo does not displace the view we adopted in Serrano-Berríos and Navarro-Santisteban concerning violations found at the preliminary hearing to lack probable cause.
Significantly, at oral argument before this court, both parties confirmed that ordinarily in the District of Puerto Rico the government would not pursue alleged violations for which the magistrate judge had found no probable cause, absent an intervening event such as a new criminal indictment. Thus, when Bayron's revocation proceedings took place, the standard practice in Puerto Rico aligned with our court's assumption that only alleged violations that survived the probable-cause assessment would be at issue at the final revocation hearing.
I recognize that, despite the defensible assumptions made in Serrano-Berríos and Navarro-Santisteban, the answer to whether district courts have the authority to revisit no-probable-cause determinations made by magistrate judges in the context of alleged supervised-release violations may be more complicated than the express language of Rule 32.1 suggests, especially given that many revocation hearings -- like the one now before us -- involve multiple allegations that may have differing levels of evidentiary support. The inquiry involves examination of the Magistrate Judges Act, which sets forth the authority of magistrate judges, see 28 U.S.C. § 636, as well as provisions governing supervised release, including Rule 32.1.20 Some courts have analyzed the issue in depth and reached different conclusions. Compare United States v. Brigham, 569 F.3d 220, 229 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that district court “review of a magistrate judge's dismissal order under Rule 32.1 is available” because otherwise the “[c]ongressional grant of authority to magistrate judges relative to probable cause determinations presents constitutional problems”), with United States v. Lopez, 710 F. Supp. 3d 849, 853-54 (D. Nev. 2024) (finding that “no provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636 authorizes [the district court] to review the magistrate judge's probable cause finding for [the defendant]’s supervised-release violation,” but concluding that review is proper under the court's “plenary responsibility over pending cases”), and with United States v. Gutierrez-De La Rosa, 426 F. Supp. 3d 722, 727 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (rejecting the Brigham analysis and expressing “serious doubts” about whether jurisdiction exists for district court review of magistrate judge findings of no probable cause, but avoiding that “complex issue” and upholding the magistrate judge's decision on the merits).21
In this case, however, Bayron's coercion claim does not depend on the actual authority held by the district court but on the authority the district court purported to wield in the specific context of this case. Hence, although it would be appropriate to examine the issue closely -- revisiting the view accepted without deliberation in Serrano-Berríos and Navarro-Santisteban -- I have no need to do so to resolve Bayron's coercion claim.22 Rather, at issue here is Bayron's assertion that a district court's assumed ability to “consider evidence of dismissed violations at a revocation hearing does not mean it may use the threat of such consideration to induce a supervisee to abandon rights he would otherwise exercise.”
Bayron thus contends, in effect, that we must consider the specific context in assessing whether the district court committed reversible error at the revocation hearing. I agree. Whether Bayron was improperly pressured to give up his right to challenge the violations for which he had stipulated probable cause depends on the circumstances that existed at the time he was confronted with that choice, not on what we might now conclude about a district court's authority. I therefore consider his coercion claim in that light. Cf. Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d at 23 (stating that, when a “person on supervised release mounts a retrospective challenge to the validity of a waiver of Rule 32.1 rights, a reviewing court should look not only to the punctilio of the sentencing court's colloquy with the ․ person on supervised release, but also to the totality of the attendant circumstances”).
A district court's decision to revoke supervised release is reviewed for abuse of discretion and its underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Millette, 121 F.4th 946, 951 (1st Cir. 2024). Our review is de novo when a defendant alleges a denial of due process. United States v. Ortiz-Rodríguez, 177 F.4th 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2026).
C. Whether Bayron Suffered a Violation of Procedural Due Process
Notably, remarks by both the magistrate judge and the district court at Bayron's hearings were consistent with an understanding that, at least ordinarily, the only allegations that survive the preliminary hearing are those for which the magistrate judge finds probable cause. The magistrate judge stated at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing that the case would be “referred” to the district court for scheduling of a final revocation hearing “as to the matters” for which the magistrate judge “made a finding of probable cause.”23
In turn, the district court's exchange with Bayron at the outset of the final hearing appears to presume that what the magistrate judge “referred” was the starting point for the proceeding -- i.e., that the hearing would address only the allegations that the magistrate judge found were supported by probable cause. That expectation is implicit in the way the court handled Bayron's announced intention to challenge all of those alleged violations -- including the positive drug tests and missed therapy appointments that he had conceded met the probable-cause standard. When Bayron persisted, the court said, “If you are going to assume that position, it's going to be then a brand new hearing” during which the court would “allow the government then to offer proof as to all violations, even including the ones that the magistrate judge didn't find probable cause.” (Emphasis added.) Put differently, the court told Bayron that, if he insisted on challenging the positive drug tests and missed therapy appointments for which he conceded probable cause, the court would “then” enlarge the hearing beyond review of only the “matters” referred by the magistrate judge to include the alleged violations that the magistrate judge did not refer because probable cause was lacking. The implication of that ultimatum is that unless Bayron gave up his rights, the proceeding would take a different course than everyone present had anticipated with respect to the violations for which the magistrate judge had not found probable cause.24
As noted above, the government insists that the district court's approach was simply a “judgment call” about how to manage the proceeding that was properly within the court's discretion. But that depiction of the situation is untenable. The district court told Bayron he must give up a right he indisputably possessed or -- contrary to everyone's expectations -- the court would conduct a de novo hearing and consider all alleged violations. That ultimatum, seemingly triggered by the court's displeasure over Bayron's intention to litigate the drug and therapy violations, cannot fairly be described as simply management of the proceedings.
As I have explained, the pressure on Bayron and his counsel in those circumstances does not depend on whether the court in fact had authority to limit or expand the proceeding as it announced it would do. Nor does it depend on whether the government would in fact accept the court's “invitation” to pursue all of the violations. The court was representing that it could control the proceeding in that way, and the government, through its silence, acquiesced to that questionable assertion of authority. Without time to deliberate, defense counsel faced a choice that, either way, would benefit the government. If Bayron opted to challenge the previously stipulated violations, the court would give the government the opportunity to relitigate the allegations rejected by the magistrate judge. Among those allegations, in addition to the firearms possession noted above, was a fourth positive drug test that, if found supported by a preponderance of the evidence, would have mandated revocation of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(4).25 Moreover, the court had raised the specter of finding a Grade A violation of supervised release, the most serious level.26
On the other hand, if Bayron gave up his right to contest the allegations for which he had conceded probable cause, the government would be relieved of the need to prove those stipulated-to violations under the higher preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. In either scenario, Bayron could face a harsher punishment than might otherwise be imposed. In other words, both options were potentially detrimental to Bayron.
Of course, even if Bayron had chosen to challenge the stipulated violations, the government may not have sought to revisit the allegations deemed unsupported by the magistrate judge.27 But at the time Bayron had to make his decision, the government had offered him no insight into how it would proceed if he refused to give up his right to challenge the positive drug tests and missed therapy appointments. Bayron was thus faced on the spot with responding to the judicial officer in charge of the proceeding with the knowledge that, if he insisted on his rights, he unexpectedly could need to defend against allegations he thought had been put to rest. The coercion in that scenario is undeniable. Cf. United States v. Fulcar, 181 F.4th 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2026) (reiterating the observation that “due process requires that [a guilty] plea amount to a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right” (quoting United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995) (as modified))).28
Bayron did have another option: he could have resisted the court's ultimatum and persisted in defending against the violations he conceded, later challenging the court's approach as erroneous on appeal. But that strategy could have resulted in findings on his constructive possession of another firearm, additional ammunition, and other violations,29 and Bayron would understandably be averse to the risk that those findings would be upheld on appeal. Not unreasonably, Bayron describes the district court's ultimatum in his reply brief as “a winding road of potential pitfalls.” Given the unexpected situation, neither Bayron nor his counsel can be faulted for accepting the offered deal while preserving his objection to the process and, as he is now doing, claiming on appeal that he was improperly coerced to give up his right to defend against all violations for which the magistrate judge found probable cause.
I thus conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Bayron's supervised release after demanding that he either give up his right to challenge the positive drug tests and missed therapy appointments or face exposure to findings that he committed additional violations.
D. Was the Error Harmless?
The government maintains that, even if the district court's approach violated Bayron's rights, any such error was harmless. In taking that position, the government points out that, “out of an abundance of caution,” it elicited testimony that supported the violations for which Bayron had conceded probable cause. The government notes that “Bayron took advantage of the opportunity to cross examine the government's witness and asked questions challenging his positive test results.” The government also cites the district court's observations that Bayron did not introduce evidence calling into question the government's facts on either the three positive drug tests or the missed therapy appointments.
But the deal Bayron accepted over objection required him not to challenge those violations. The government cannot fairly suggest that Bayron bears responsibility for an incomplete record on the violations that the district court, in effect, prevented him from contesting.30 The record reveals that, at a minimum, Bayron had evidence to explain some of the missed therapy appointments.31 See Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d at 24 (noting that “[p]resentation of mitigation evidence is ․ [an] important step necessary to determine whether ․ a violation warrants revocation and, if so, what sentence shall be imposed” (citation modified)). It is impossible to know how much leeway, if any, the district court would have allowed Bayron to rebut the stipulated violations. In the circumstances, however, it certainly was reasonable for counsel to steer clear of a full defense given the risk that the court would view counsel's attempt to do so as backtracking on the deal and a basis for expanding the scope of the hearing to all alleged violations.
To be sure, if the outcome of the revocation proceeding were the marker, Bayron made out better at the final hearing than he had at the probable cause stage. Most significantly, despite the magistrate judge's finding that probable cause existed for Bayron's constructive possession of the firearms concealed on the passenger side of the car, the district court rejected that violation because “the government did not introduce evidence sufficient to prove that Mr. Bayron intended to exercise control over the firearms in question.”32 Nor did the district court address, or make explicit findings on, other violations for which the magistrate judge had found probable cause, including that Bayron had been in the company of a convicted felon.
Rather, in summing up its findings, the court said that it found that Bayron had violated only the conditions requiring him to “refrain from the unlawful use of controlled substances” and to “not unlawfully possess controlled substances,” and it found that he “failed to appear for treatment” as required seven times between September 2024 and March 2025. Yet, that outcome does not mean that the court's erroneous ultimatum was harmless. The district court revoked Bayron's supervised release in reliance solely on the violations that he reasonably claims he was unfairly pressured to admit. The finding concerning the missed therapy appointments is particularly troublesome. No evidence at the final hearing established that Bayron had in fact missed the seven appointments the district court identified, and, as noted above, the record raises a question as to whether some of his absences were justified. Moreover, the number of missed appointments may well have been consequential in the district court's rejection at sentencing of either a downward variance or Bayron's plea that, rather than incarceration, he be sent to a drug-treatment program.
Accordingly, on this record, I cannot conclude that the court's error was harmless. Bayron should be given a new revocation hearing so that he can contest the violations he agreed not to challenge when confronted by the district court's improper ultimatum. See United States v. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (“On direct appeal, the courts of appeal have statutory power under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to ‘vacate’ a sentence and to ‘remand the cause and ․ require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.’ ” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2106)).
FOOTNOTES
1. Defense counsel first informed the court that Bayron would not contest the drug tests. Then, after receiving and reviewing Bayron's treatment records before the hearing formally began, counsel stated that Bayron also “would not be contesting the no-shows to treatment.”
2. Near the end of the hearing, Bayron's attorney accurately pointed out that, contrary to testimony presented at the hearing, the probation motion listing Bayron's supervised release violations stated that the modified gun was found under the driver's seat rather than under the front passenger seat. Counsel argued that, because of that inconsistency, the magistrate judge should not find probable cause with respect to that firearm. The magistrate judge responded that the “point [was] well taken,” but that the issue was one of credibility “that the [c]ourt takes into account but that does not necessarily mean that the [c]ourt has to discredit or completely disbelieve the testimony.” The magistrate judge then reiterated its finding of probable cause for the two firearms that, according to the probation officer's testimony, were located under the front passenger seat.At the final revocation hearing, the same probation officer again testified that the modified firearm was found under the front passenger seat. That probation officer was called to the scene and participated in the search of the vehicle because he supervised the driver of the car, Jose Javier Rodriguez-Jamie. The probation officer also testified that Rodriguez-Jamie admitted “possessing or owning” that firearm.
3. The following exchange occurred during cross-examination of the officer at the preliminary hearing:DEFENSE COUNSEL: The firearms that you said were found under the passenger seat of the car, those were only revealed after you moved the seat.WITNESS: Yes.DEFENSE COUNSEL: The front passenger seat.WITNESS: Yes.DEFENSE COUNSEL: They would not have been visible to Mr. Bayron the way the seat was originally.WITNESS: I'm sorry, what's the question?DEFENSE COUNSEL: They were not visible the way the front passenger seat was positioned originally[?]WITNESS: Visible to who?DEFENSE COUNSEL: Visible to anyone.WITNESS: No.Earlier in the proceeding, during direct examination by the government, the probation officer responded as follows to a question about a photograph in evidence that was taken after he pushed the front passenger seat forward: “[Y]ou can see the rear and then you can see the plastic clear bag that was full with ammunitions and then you can see the bottom of a Coyote pistol.”
4. The probation officer's original motion also listed a bag of cash found in the vehicle containing $1,613 in “different denominations of dollars.” The magistrate judge noted that “having cash is not a crime” and then stated that “there's no evidence that those are drug proceeds or anything like that but to the extent that the parties need a ruling from the [c]ourt, I do not make a finding of probable cause as there was no testimony about that.”However, the magistrate judge did find probable cause for several alleged violations in addition to the firearms under the passenger seat and the violations for which Bayron conceded probable cause: that Bayron had reacted aggressively when his probation officer suggested inpatient treatment for his substance-abuse problem, that he admitted verbally to using marijuana on March 18, 2025, and that he had been “in the company of a convicted felon” that evening.
5. The documents included the forms that Bayron signed admitting drug use.
6. The probation officer also acknowledged that the drug tests with positive results were performed locally and were not sent for confirmation to a national laboratory, which was the usual practice “if the patient does not admit the use.”
7. The probation officer testified that, before the car door was opened on the passenger side of the vehicle, he could see “a plastic bag under the passenger seat with ammunitions, yellow color.” It is unclear from the testimony, however, whether the ammunition inside the bag was visible, or identifiable as such, before the bag was opened. When the court sought to clarify “what [he] saw from outside the vehicle when the vehicle was closed,” the officer referred to photographs that were in evidence: “We saw this plastic bag that is in the picture. I believe the parties have another picture where you can see just the bottom of the plastic bag. That is what I saw from outside of the car before opening the door.”At one point during cross-examination, the officer agreed that, in one photograph taken when the car door was open, the plastic bag was visible, but it was not possible to determine if the contents were ammunition. The officer's testimony at the preliminary hearing was similarly imprecise. He had described the bag as “a plastic clear bag with ammunition, gold colored,” but he did not say when he first recognized the bag's contents as ammunition. On cross-examination, the officer responded “[n]o” when asked by defense counsel if he could “see any bullets” in a photo showing the plastic bag “the way it looked when [the police] stopped the car.”By contrast, as described above, see supra note 3, the probation officer testified unequivocally at the preliminary hearing that the firearms were visible only after he moved the front passenger seat forward. And he confirmed that account at the final hearing. He first confirmed in response to questioning from defense counsel that “the butt of a firearm” was visible when the front seat was moved forward, and he subsequently agreed that he had pushed the front seat forward “to reveal these firearms.” He explained that he “pushed the front seat just to see what was underneath, and then [he] pulled out the guns to have a better picture of how things were under the seat.” Earlier in that hearing, the officer said the items under the seat were “reachable” without difficulty.
8. The probation officer's original motion stated that Bayron had admitted using cocaine and had signed “drug admission forms.”
9. In fact, the statute the court cited -- 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(4) -- calls for mandatory revocation if the defendant tests positive “more than 3 times over the course of 1 year.” (Emphasis added.)
10. Despite Bayron's drug use, the court evidently found no violation of the condition barring Bayron from committing another offense -- at least initially, see infra Section I.D -- because the government had failed to prove the specific crime cited in the probation officer's motion as a basis for finding a violation of that condition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession of firearms by a felon.
11. In drawing that conclusion, the court stated that the probation officer had “testified that the plastic bag with the ammunition was in plain view, but, most importantly, that the weapons and the ammunitions were clearly seen from the backseat, behind the passenger seat, where the defendant was sitting.” Given the testimony recounted above, see supra notes 3 & 7, we think the court's finding on the visibility of the weapons was clearly erroneous. That error, however, plays no role in our analysis of the issues before us in this appeal.
12. Although the court referred to “the three conditions of supervised release that were challenged,” two of the violations the court had just addressed were those Bayron had agreed -- over objection -- not to challenge. In addition, as described above, see supra note 4, the magistrate judge had found other violations supported by probable cause, and Bayron had said he was challenging all such violations. But we think it clear enough that the court was referring here to the three alleged violations for which it had just announced findings.
13. Bayron argues in his reply brief that, contrary to the district court's assertion, defense counsel accurately recalled that there was no testimony at the final revocation hearing on the specific dates that Bayron missed treatment appointments. Specifically, he asserts that “[t]hose dates ․ appear only in the probation officer's unsworn petition to revoke supervised release.”
14. Although Bayron has failed to develop an argument that persuades us on the merits of his coercion-based challenge, we do caution against the “if/then” formulation used in this case by the district court -- that “[i]f you are going to assume that position, it's going to be then a brand new hearing” -- precisely because of the possibility that it might be construed as something other than merely offering the defendant a choice.
15. Section 3583(e) authorizes the court to revoke a term of supervised release after considering the factors set forth in specified subsections of § 3553(a), which lists the factors to be considered for the original sentencing. As the Supreme Court noted, § 3553(a)(2)(A) and (a)(3) are conspicuously absent from the provisions governing decisions to impose or revoke supervised release. See Esteras, 606 U.S. at 192, 145 S.Ct. 2031. Subsection (a)(2)(A) “requires the court to consider the need for the sentence imposed to ‘reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.’ ” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)). Subsection (a)(3) “requires the court to consider ‘the kinds of sentences available.’ ” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3)).
16. Following the district court's sentencing pronouncement, defense counsel did object generally “to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the 24-month sentence.”
17. Section 3553(a)(2)(A) is the provision requiring courts to consider “the seriousness of the offense” in sentencing for the original crime. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
18. As recounted in the majority opinion, Bayron's objection was not stated in exactly these terms, but the government's articulation is consistent with Bayron's argument.
19. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 32.1 state that “the terms ‘magistrate judge’ and ‘court’ ․ are used to reflect that in revocation cases, initial proceedings in both felony and misdemeanor cases will normally be conducted before a magistrate judge, although a district judge may also conduct them.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b) advisory committee's note to 2002 amendment. The Note also states that “a district judge must make the revocation decision if the offense of conviction was a felony,” but cites 18 U.S.C. § 3401(i) for the proposition that the district court “may designate a magistrate judge to conduct a hearing and submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations.” Id.
20. A subsection of 28 U.S.C. § 636 gives magistrate judges, within the district of their appointment, “all powers and duties conferred or imposed ․ by the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1). In the context of supervised release, as described above, the authority of magistrate judges to conduct probable-cause hearings can derive from Criminal Rule of Procedure 32.1, as it did in this case. Another subsection of § 636 states that a district court may designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings “and to submit ․ proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition” on various motions. Id. § 636(b)(1)(B). One court has noted that § 636(a)(1) is “unique within the statute in its lack of a mechanism for review or expressed standard of review.” United States v. Info. Associated with Email Acct. (Warrant), 449 F. Supp. 3d 469, 474 (E.D. Penn. 2020); see also, e.g., In re Anthony Marano Co., 647 F. Supp. 3d 643, 654-56 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (discussing the distinctions between §§ 636(a)(1) and (b)(1) with respect to district court authority to review decisions of a magistrate judge).A different statute, which describes the roles magistrate judges may perform in misdemeanor cases, includes a provision allowing a district court to designate a magistrate judge to conduct a revocation hearing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3401(i). In such a case, as with actions taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the magistrate judge would “submit to the [district] judge proposed findings of fact and recommendations,” which may include, “in the case of revocation, a recommended disposition under section 3583(e).” 18 U.S.C. § 3401(i). Section 3583(e), inter alia, authorizes the court to revoke a term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
21. In an unpublished decision, a Tenth Circuit panel concluded that Rule 32.1 does not foreclose the district court from considering “any of the alleged violations the government decides to pursue” “[s]o long as the magistrate judge finds probable cause for at least one alleged violation.” United States v. Pearson, 787 Fed. App'x 511, 514 (10th Cir. 2019). However, the panel gave two other reasons for upholding the district court's authority. First, in the case before it, the government submitted an amended petition with additional evidence on the violation for which the magistrate judge found no probable cause. See id. at 514-15. Second, the panel noted that the defendant “does not dispute that the government could have refiled the firearm possession violation even if the magistrate judge had dismissed it at the preliminary hearing.” Id. at 515.
22. Indeed, in his reply brief, Bayron states that he has never disputed “that a district court retains authority to review a magistrate judge's findings.”
23. The magistrate judge's language tracked the language of Rule 32.1, which labels as “Referral” the section of the Rule providing for a final hearing “[i]f the judge finds probable cause” and stating that “the judge must dismiss the proceeding” “[i]f the judge does not find probable cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 32.1(b)(1)(C).
24. The government implausibly asserts in its brief that Bayron's “last-minute motion” advising the district court that he would challenge the violations for which he had stipulated probable cause “could have materially changed the scope of issues before the court” from the government's perspective. At the preliminary revocation hearing, the magistrate judge stated multiple times that those matters were “not contested for probable cause purposes.” (Emphasis added.) The prosecutor himself also noted, before the magistrate judge announced findings, that “this is just a preliminary hearing” and “[w]e're talking about probable cause.” Then, after the magistrate judge stated his findings, the judge acknowledged a point made by defense counsel by saying “I understand but I think that we have enough on the record for me to make a probable cause finding. Remember, there's a different threshold at a final revocation hearing.”In any event, as the government also points out, it came prepared with the evidence to support the positive drug tests and missed therapy appointments.
25. Other alleged violations also exposed Bayron to the possibility of mandatory revocation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1), (2) (requiring revocation, inter alia, if the defendant unlawfully possesses a controlled substance or possesses a firearm in violation of federal law).
26. When summarizing the probation officer's motion to revoke supervised release at the start of the hearing, the district court -- before giving Bayron the ultimatum -- listed most of the alleged violations and stated that “[t]hese violations are grouped for purposes of the ․ violation that they are, and they are type A violations.” When defense counsel asked for clarification of the reference to “type A,” the court responded that there “might be a [G]rade A violation” “[i]f the defendant committed another federal or state crime or if there was conduct ․ that amounts to a state or federal offense.” Given that response -- and regardless of whether the district court was correct in raising the specter of a Grade A violation -- Bayron and his counsel could have reasonably concluded that there was less risk in avoiding reconsideration of the violations for which the magistrate judge had found no probable cause.
27. Indeed, as I have described, our precedent at least raises a question about whether it would have been permissible for the government to do so.
28. The choice Bayron confronted at the outset of the revocation hearing cannot be equated with the choice routinely faced by a criminal defendant when deciding, after deliberation and attorney-client consultation, whether to accept a plea bargain. Given the higher standard of proof and standard practice in Puerto Rico, Bayron likely entered the proceeding expecting that he could challenge all violations for which probable cause had been found and would not need to relitigate allegations for which no probable cause was found. He was then forced to immediately choose between two unfavorable options and took the one for which he had prepared.
29. As noted above, the magistrate judge found no probable cause for Bayron's possession of a gun found in the trunk of the car, nine loaded magazines found near the driver's seat, and an additional positive drug test. In addition, the magistrate judge found no probable cause for a failure to appear for random drug testing, provision of a diluted urine sample, and failure to provide the supervising probation officer with a change-of-address.
30. The government does, however, place such blame on Bayron: “Bayron thus failed to seize his chance to introduce evidence challenging his failure to participate in the treatment program or positive drug tests.”
31. Defense counsel stated at the hearing that “during at least some of this time, [Bayron reported] that he was under medical care in the hospital.”
32. The district court's ruling on those firearms makes clear that it also would not have found constructive possession of the firearm and ammunition found under the driver's seat and in the trunk of the car, which was the most serious conduct for which the magistrate judge found a lack of probable cause. However, because Bayron could not predict how the proceeding would develop, our focus is necessarily on the risk he perceived -- and the pressure he felt -- when presented with the court's ultimatum at the outset of the hearing.
PER CURIAM.
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Docket No: No. 25-1366
Decided: November 10, 2026
Court: United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
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