UNITED STATES v. ZAMOR (2020)

Patrick Zamor, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his post-judgment motion to dismiss his indictment and vacate his conviction. The government has moved for summary denial and to stay the briefing schedule.

Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, such as “situations where important public policy issues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). An appeal is frivolous if it is “without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002).

A district court’s subject matter jurisdiction “is a question of law, and, therefore, subject to de novo review.” United States v. Perez, 956 F.2d 1098, 1101 (11th Cir. 1992). Generally, a motion alleging a defect in an indictment must be filed pre-trial, but “[a] motion that the court lacks jurisdiction may be made at any time while the case is pending.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). A defendant must raise a motion alleging “a defect in instituting the prosecution, including ․ an error in the grand-jury proceeding or preliminary hearing” before trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)(v).

A district court correctly denies a post-conviction motion to dismiss an indictment where the defendant’s case that led to his conviction and sentence is no longer pending. United States v. Patton, 309 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 2002).

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6, “[t]he foreperson ․ will record the number of jurors concurring in every indictment and will file the record with the clerk, but the record may not be made public unless the court so orders.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c). “A grand jury may indict only if at least 12 jurors concur ․ If a complaint or information is pending against the defendant and 12 jurors do not concur in the indictment, the foreperson must promptly and in writing report the lack of concurrence to the magistrate judge.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(f).

These rules are consistent with longstanding policies favoring grand jury secrecy. See Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218 n.9, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979) (“Since the 17th century, grand jury proceedings have been closed to the public, and records of such proceedings have been kept from the public eye.”). Moreover, there is a “strong presumption of regularity accorded to the deliberations and findings of grand juries.” United States v. Molinares, 700 F.2d 647, 651 n.6 (11th Cir. 1983). “[T]he law presumes, absent a strong showing to the contrary, that a grand jury acts within the legitimate scope of its authority.” United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 300, 111 S.Ct. 722, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991).

Here, there is no substantial question that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Zamor’s post-judgment motion to dismiss his indictment and even if we address the merits, there is no substantial question that the indictment was valid. First, Zamor’s criminal case was no longer pending within the meaning of Rule 12, as the judgment in his case had been entered; therefore, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider his motion. See Patton, 309 F.3d at 1094

Second, even if we considered the merits of his motion, Zamor’s claim that his indictment was invalid because it failed to show the grand juror’s votes is meritless because (1) there is no requirement that the breakdown of the grand jury vote be made public under Rule 6(c), (2) if there had been fewer than 12 jurors voting, the foreperson would have reported the lack of concurrences to the magistrate judge as required under Rule 6(f), which did not happen in this case, and (3) there is a strong presumption of regularity accorded to the deliberation and findings of grand juries. See Molinares,700 F.2d at 651 n.6.

Therefore, because there is no substantial question that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that Zamor’s claim that his indictment was invalid is meritless, we GRANT the government’s motion for summary affirmance. See Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. Accordingly, we DENY the accompanying motion to stay the briefing schedule as moot.

PER CURIAM: